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
H. L. JONES

VOLUME XXVI

THE ROMAN IMPERIAL NAVY

31 B. C. — A. D. 324

BY CHESTER G. STARR, JR.



The Roman Imperial Navy 31 B. C. – A. D. 324

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To
MY PARENTS

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Preface

THE following pages present an attempt to explore the organization and history of Roman imperial sea power as fully as our sources permit. In accordance with this aim, I have not confined the discussion to the two great Italian fleets of Misenum and Ravenna, although these must necessarily take a central place, but have gone beyond them to a consideration of the provincial fleets and to a study of the manner in which the various flotillas were assigned their proper functions in the maintenance of the Empire. This point of view has dictated my use of the term "navy" for a group of independent squadrons which were never integrated into one formal unit.

Since previous studies on the subject have been few, it has seemed sufficient to indicate them in the List of Abbreviations or to cite the monographs on the provincial fleets at the appropriate points in the text. The imperial navy, indeed, has been sadly neglected; there is no treatment of any length in English, and the works by Continental scholars on various phases of the matter are by now somewhat out of date. One of these, however, I should like to single out both because it is the best and because it has been almost entirely ignored; the outstanding merit of the brief study which Camille de la Berge wrote about 1870 is the more remarkable when one reflects that the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* had not yet at that time assembled the basic evidence in compact form. In any investigation of the imperial navy the eight hundred inscribed stones set up by the members of the several fleets, terse epitaphs for the most part, must form the main building materials. Apart from them we have only a few perfunctory chapters in a thoroughly untrustworthy treatise by the fourth-century Vegetius, scattering references in the literature of the Early Empire, and along with a few coins and papyri some

scant aid from archaeology. Such evidence may at times appear to justify Mark Twain's quip: "There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact." Yet these materials grow the richer the more one studies them, and it has seemed possible to form an essentially correct and fairly detailed picture of the navy and of its place in the history of the Roman Empire.

My deep thanks are due first to the American Academy in Rome for the opportunity to travel in the Mediterranean and to complete this study in the United States after August 1939, and secondly to the editors of the Cornell Studies in Classical Philology for publishing it in its present form. To those friends who have encouraged and aided me I have already expressed my appreciation; here I would name in token of respect and gratitude Professor M. L. W. Laistner of Cornell University, who first suggested the present theme to me and has given me most generous help and wise counsel at all times.

CHESTER G. STARR, JR.

Champaign, Illinois,
May 4, 1941

Contents

	PAGE
Preface	ix
List of Abbreviations	xiii
I Sea Power in the Later Republic	I
II The Italian Fleets: Their Ports	II
III The Italian Fleets: Officers of Command	30
IV The Italian Fleets: Ships and Crews	51
V The Italian Fleets: The Sailors	66
VI The Provincial Squadrons of the Mediterranean	124
VII Naval Power on the Northern Frontier	106
VIII The Navy and the Empire	167
Appendix: <i>Prosopographia praefectorum classium</i>	209
Index of Inscriptions and Papyri	215
General Index	223

MAP

The Roman Imperial Navy, A. D. 150

Frontispiece

List of Abbreviations

<i>AE</i>	<i>L' Année épigraphique, revue des publications épigraphiques relatives à l' antiquité romaine.</i> 1888—.
<i>Archiv</i>	<i>Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete.</i> 1900—.
<i>BGU</i>	<i>Aegyptische Urkunden aus den Koeniglichen Museum zu Berlin: Griechische Urkunden.</i> 1895—.
<i>BMC</i>	<i>British Museum Catalogue of Greek Coins.</i>
<i>C. Th.</i>	<i>Codex Theodosianus</i> , ed. Theodor Mommsen and P. M. Meyer (Berlin, 1905).
<i>CAH</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History.</i>
Chapot	Victor Chapot, <i>La Flotte de Misène, son histoire, son recrutement, son régime administratif</i> (Paris, 1896).
<i>CIGr</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , ed. August Boeckh (Berlin, 1828–1859).
De la Berge	Camille de la Berge, <i>Étude sur l' organisation des flottes romaines</i> ; in <i>Bulletin épigraphique</i> 6 (1886), pp. 1–17, 53–68, 101–116, 153–167, 205–231.
Dess.	Hermann Dessau, <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> (Berlin, 1892–1916).
<i>Dig.</i>	<i>Corpus Iuris Civilis: Digest</i> , ed. Theodor Mommsen (Berlin, 1905).
Dio	Dio Cassius, <i>Roman History</i> , ed. U. P. Boissevain (Berlin, 1895–1901; citations are to the figures on the right-hand pages of this edition).
Dip.	Diploma, cited after the number in <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> XVI, ed. Heinrich Nesselhauf (1936).
Domaszewski, <i>Rangordnung</i>	Alfred von Domaszewski, <i>Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres</i> (Bonn, 1908).
<i>Eph. ep.</i>	<i>Ephemeris epigraphica.</i> 1873–1913.
Ferrero 1878	Ermanno Ferrero, <i>L' ordinamento delle armate romane</i> (Turin, 1878).

- Ferrero 1884 *idem*, *Iscrizioni e ricerche nuove intorno all' ordinamento delle armate dell' Impero romano* (Turin, 1884).
- Ferrero 1899 *idem*, *Nuove iscrizioni ed osservazioni intorno all' ordinamento delle armate dell' Impero romano*; in *Memorie della Reale accademia delle scienze di Torino* 2. ser. 49 (1899), classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, pp. 165-333.
- Fiebiger Otto Fiebiger, *De Classiarum Italicarum Historia et Institutis*; in *Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie* 15 (1894), pp. 277-459.
- Gnomon BGU 5. 1: *Der Gnomon des Idios Logos*, ed. Emil Seckel and Wilhelm Schubart (Berlin, 1919).
- IG *Inscriptiones Graecae*. 1877—.
- IGR *Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes*, ed. René Cagnat and others (Paris, 1901-1927).
- Jahreshefte *Jahreshefte des österreichischen archäologischen Institutes in Wien*. 1898—.
- JHS *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 1880—.
- JRS *Journal of Roman Studies*. 1911—.
- Lesquier, L' Armée romaine d' Égypte Jean Lesquier, *L' Armée romaine d' Égypte d' Auguste à Dioclétien* (Cairo, 1918).
- Mommsen, Die Provinzen Theodor Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*: Vol. 5, *Die Provinzen von Caesar bis Diocletian* (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1885).
- NdS *Notizie degli Scavi di antichità*. 1876—.
- Not. Dig. *Notitia Dignitatum*, ed. Otto Seeck (Berlin, 1876).
- P. Ox. *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt (London, 1898-1927).
- Pan. Lat. *Panegyrici Latini*, ed. Aemilius Baehrens (Leipzig, 1895).
- Prosop. *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, ed. Elinar Klebs and others (1st ed.; Berlin, 1897-1898).
- Prosop. the same, ed. Edmund Groag and Arthur Stein (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1933—).
- PSI *Papiri greci e latini of the Società italiana per la ricerca dei papiri greci e latini in Egitto*. 1912—.
- PW Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1894—.
- Rostovtzeff, Michael Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica e sociale dell' Impero romano* (Florence, 1933).
- SHA *Historia Augusta*, ed. Ernest Hohl (Leipzig, 1927).

SB Wien	<i>Sitzungsberichte der (kaiserlichen) Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, philosophisch-historische Klasse.</i> 1848—.
Wilcken	Ulrich Wilcken and Ludwig Mitteis, <i>Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde</i> (Leipzig, 1912), 1, part 2.
ZSS:RA	<i>Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung. Romanistische Abteilung.</i> 1880—.

I have cited inscriptions from the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (1863—) by volume and number, e.g. III 6980. Unless otherwise stated, inscriptions of Vol. VI are from Rome; of Vol. X, from Misenum and its vicinity; of Vol. XI, from Ravenna and Classis; of Vol. XIV, from Ostia.

The Roman Imperial Navy

31 B. C. — A. D. 324

CHAPTER I

SEA POWER IN THE LATER REPUBLIC

IF ONE were required to designate an event which marks the beginnings of the Roman imperial navy, that event would assuredly be the first Mithridatic war (88–84 B. C.). The earlier Republic had maintained large fleets in the Punic wars and in the great eastern campaigns at the beginning of the second century B. C., but between these squadrons and the makeshift fleet of Sulla in 84 B. C. there lies a gap of eighty years in Roman naval history. From the time of Sulla events led steadily toward the standing navy of the Empire. The false peace of the sea, which had rested on the general naval disarmament dictated by Rome in the early second century B. C., was first broken by the invasions of Mithridates and the aggressive menace of the pirates; then came the civil wars for the mastery of Rome, which covered both land and sea. The course of the conflicts clearly pointed out the value of sea power; their quickening succession made standing fleets ever more permanent.

These fleets of the later Republic differed sharply from the navy of the Punic wars. Since its first small beginnings in the late fourth century B. C., Roman naval activity had been greatly indebted to the nautical skill of Greeks and Etruscans, yet it must be remembered that throughout the struggle against Carthage the Roman state had manned its fleets at least partly with its own citizens, had constructed the warships in those fleets at its own expense,¹ and had entrusted their command as a *provincia* to a Roman consul or praetor, or promagistrate.² After 200 B. C., however, Rome relied ever more heavily on her Greek allies and subjects for naval aid. The cities of the eastern provinces furnished most of the ships which were stationed off Italy in the Social war (90–88 B. C.); Sulla found it impossible to pursue Mith-

ridates from Greece to Asia Minor until his gifted subordinate Lucullus had gathered a fleet from the maritime cities of Syria, Phoenicia, Pamphylia, and Ionia.³ Throughout the civil wars levies on the maritime cities remained the standard means of raising a squadron hastily; in default of that, the generals holding the western Mediterranean had to resort to large-scale construction of ships and to conscription. Since the eastern ships and sailors were in each of the civil wars eventually absorbed into the fleets of the western victors, Greek naval technique became steadily and more deeply rooted in Roman naval practice. It is to be noted also that the commanders of fleets in the later Republic were usually not independent magistrates but rather assistants of some army commander, and that the actual admiral, on some occasions at least, was a Greek.⁴

After the conclusion of peace with Mithridates in 84, Roman naval power in the Aegean was not again permitted to sink into abeyance. Lucullus' fleet was dismissed; the subjugation of Mitylene required the assistance of Bithynian ships; but the legate A. Terentius Varro commanded a fleet in the Aegean in 84/83 B. C., and in the same years his superior Murena ordered various coastal cities to construct and lay up in reserve a number of ships for future use.⁵ This plan for the naval defense of Asia Minor was probably devised by Sulla himself: if it were impossible for the Roman state, with its yearly changing officials, to take direct responsibility for the creation of a fleet, the next best step was to fix the contributions to be expected from each maritime ally. Although these naval preparations ensured Roman control of the sea in the third Mithridatic war, the contingents which could ordinarily be demanded from the allies in the Aegean were limited, for the Roman fleet at this time never exceeded one hundred vessels.⁶

This strength might cope with Mithridates, but it was by no means sufficient to deal with the pirates. Since the middle of the second century, when Rome destroyed the fleets of the Seleucid state and of Rhodes without putting a maritime police force in their place, the evil of Cilician piracy had been growing; in the opening years of the first century B. C., under the encouragement

of Mithridates and the disturbed conditions in the East, piracy attained its greatest power in the ancient Mediterranean. The East was terrorized, and in the years 70-68 the pirates ravaged the Italian coasts, capturing two praetors with their lictors, carrying off travelers on the Appian Way, and sinking a consular fleet in the port of Ostia.⁷ But their presumption had this time overreached itself, inasmuch as they had endangered the food supply of Rome and had impaired its prestige in a way that every Roman might behold. The populace clamored; the senate could not resist; and in a systematic, whirlwind campaign of three months (67 B. C.) Pompey "had restored the rule of the sea to the Roman people," as the terms of his subsequent triumph related.⁸

The tale of his actions need not be told, for it is the purpose of these pages to stress only those factors in Republican history which influenced the character of imperial sea power and determined the imperial attitude toward the navy. But for that purpose certain minor aspects of the campaign require attention. One may note, for instance, that the employment of legates to act as admirals here received an amplification which foreshadowed the setting of *legati Augusti* over legions and provinces, as well as the imperial commission of *praefectus classis*.⁹ The naval commanders of the late Republic, however, were still senators.

Of more significance is the sudden appearance of large Roman fleets in the Mediterranean; fairly trustworthy estimates assign two hundred beaked ships and seventy lighter vessels to Pompey, and the speed of his campaign forbids the conjecture that he built new ships. A great part of his fleet undoubtedly was furnished by the Greek cities of the East, which were probably more eager to put their whole resources at his disposal than they had been to lend them to Rome in the Mithridatic wars; yet Rhodes, the greatest of these cities, could launch only thirty-three triremes when attacked by Cassius in 43 B. C.,¹⁰ and the contingents of the other cities were certainly much smaller. Cities of the West such as Massilia also provided ships and crews, but no small part of Pompey's navy must have consisted of vessels stored in Roman docks. Sulla had brought west the seventy warships ceded by Mithridates in 84, which could still have been put in service in 67; it must

also be considered that the feeble efforts of magistrates from year to year to curb piracy had perhaps entailed some construction.¹¹ Commercial shipping probably furnished the sailors for these ships, while drafts on the allies and subjects provided the rowers; only the marines would have been Roman citizens.

Although Pompey had removed the pirate scourge and soon afterwards expelled Mithridates from Asia Minor for the last time, he strongly urged that the state support a standing navy, thus proceeding a step beyond Sulla's plan. In accordance with his proposal, fleets patrolled the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Seas in 62 B. C. at a cost of 4,300,000 sesterces; in the same year Flaccus, governor of Asia, was exacting funds from the maritime cities for the maintenance of an Aegean squadron, which cruised in two flotillas above and below Ephesus. Again in 61 the Roman Republic spent money on a fleet in time of peace, but Cicero's silence about the subject for the years 60 and 59 suggests that the ships were laid up. Quintus Cicero, who had succeeded Flaccus in Asia, abolished the ship money, thinking that when the occasion arose "*quam vellet subito classem se comparaturum*." Incidental references to piracy recur; to all appearances, the Roman attitude toward the sea stood as it had in 88 B. C.¹²

None the less, the Mithridatic wars and the attendant piracy had shown, at least to the observant, the importance of sea power, forgotten since the Punic wars; it remained for the civil wars to point the lesson with repeated proofs. In the first of these struggles Caesar defeated Pompey in spite of the latter's superior fleet, for the Pompeian attempt in 48 B. C. to prevent reinforcements from crossing the Adriatic and joining Caesar at Dyrrachium eventually failed. As a modern writer has felicitously put it, "in the most critical campaign Pompey trusted to sea power, Caesar to the sea; and despite exciting moments, the sea won."¹³ Still this naval patrol—in winter, let it be marked—came near to success, and its delay of Caesar's operations revealed the value as well as the limitations of a fleet. In the skillful use of sea power, indeed, Pompey had few rivals in Roman history.

Although Caesar's campaigns occasionally suffered from naval mishaps, Caesar himself did not condemn the navy nor underesti-

mate its value. On the outbreak of hostilities with Pompey, he took quick steps to secure Sicily and Sardinia and thus nip any plans Pompey might have of using his fleet "ad intercludendos commercatus Italiae et ad occupandas frumentarias provincias";¹⁴ during his brief stay at Rome in 49 he ordered the construction of warships on both the Adriatic and the Tyrrhenian.¹⁵ Pompey, on the other hand, might draw on the naval resources of the East and by the beginning of 48 had fitted out a fleet of about three hundred ships, divided into five squadrons, Egyptian, Asian, Syrian, Liburnian and Achaean, and Rhodian.¹⁶ Since the strength of the East in the Mithridatic wars had been less than one hundred warships and Egypt sent only sixty vessels, his fleet represented in large part new construction, manned both by raw levies and by experienced sailors drafted from eastern commerce. For the next twenty years these drafts grew steadily greater as the war fleets increased to the final total of approximately a thousand vessels.

The attempt to starve Rome on the sea was reserved for the war between the son of Pompey and the adopted son of Caesar.¹⁷ After Pharsalus and Caesar's conquest of Africa and Spain the Pompeian cause was upheld only by Sextus Pompey, who led a piratic life with a few vessels in the western Mediterranean. With the death of Caesar his star began to rise, and in 43 the "fleets of the Republic," composed of Caesar's fleet and the Pompeian ships which Caesar had brought to the West or had captured there, were entrusted by the Roman senate to Sextus, to strengthen him as a counterweight to Antony and Octavian.¹⁸ Upon the defeat and death of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi their fleet, comprising about two hundred warships of the East, went in part to Antony and in part to Sextus.¹⁹ These accretions made Sextus Pompey lord of the western Mediterranean. Its two chief islands, Sicily and Sardinia, were in his hands from 43; fugitives from the proscriptions of the triumvirs, runaway slaves, and adventurers swelled his ranks; one by one the petty squadrons created in the wrack of the past ten years joined him until his fleet rose to a total of three hundred vessels.

Every reason from filial devotion to his own proscription in-

duced Sextus, now the only opponent of the Caesarean triumvirate formed by Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus, to use his powers against the triumvirs. From 42 to 40 he applied steadily more irritating pressure on Italy through his control of the sea, raiding the coast and cutting off the grain supply of Rome almost entirely. Antony, who had taken the East as his share of the world, at first stood aloof and left the difficult affair to Octavian, but in 39 the enraged outcries of the Roman populace forced the two to come to a joint agreement with Sextus off Puteoli.²⁰ The ensuing Treaty of Misenum granted Sextus possession of Sicily, Sardinia, and Achaia on his promise to send Rome stipulated amounts of grain and to quell the pirates whom the disturbed conditions had reinvigorated. The peace was no more than a truce, but it furnished Octavian a vital period of quiet.

The remaining stages of the long-protracted struggle against Sextus belong entirely to Octavian and form the most difficult military operations of his whole life. In the present connection they are the most important campaigns in the civil wars, for the lessons which Octavian might derive from Caesar's *Commentaries* or from a study of earlier Roman history were here crystallized with unmistakable clarity. He himself felt the unruliness of the Roman people when its food supply was endangered; he saw the devastation which Sextus wreaked on the Italian coast; and he experienced fully the difficulties of creating a fleet to eliminate the menace to his control of Italy.

In his task Octavian was greatly assisted by an adroit campaign of publicity which exploited the mistakes of Sextus and made him appear a glorified brigand. The proscribed, in the main, returned to Italy after the amnesty in the Treaty of Misenum, and the wealthy of Italy, irked by Sextus' reception of runaway slaves and angered by his plundering, supported Octavian by furnishing money and rowers.²¹ The problem of manning a fleet in the western Mediterranean was, moreover, easier now than it had been ten years previously, for the civil wars had scattered seafarers over all the coasts.

When Octavian renewed the war in 38, however, the fleets which he had constructed in 39 B. C. at Rome and Ravenna were

destroyed by storms and defeat.²² Octavian then summoned the knight Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, his lifelong friend and military adviser, from Gaul, and the two set about the construction of another fleet. The entire year of 37 was devoted to the herculean task of building and manning some four hundred warships. A naval station was established at Forum Iulii in Gaul, where some part of the fleet was probably built; the famed harbor Portus Iulius in the crater lake of Avernus by Puteoli, joined by Agrippa to the sea, furnished a safe port for the training of sailors and rowers.²³ In the spring of 36 the last campaign began. Lepidus invaded western Sicily from Africa, Agrippa defeated Sextus off Mylae, and Octavian with a squadron from the Adriatic, strengthened by one hundred and thirty ships from Antony, landed troops in Sicily. Despite a few mishaps the war ended with the crushing defeat of Sextus at Naulochus on September 3.²⁴ Sextus fled to the East, where he was soon executed; the triumvir Lepidus was removed; the stage lay clear for the contest between Octavian and Antony.

That this was settled by a naval encounter on September 2, 31 B. C., reflects the importance which sea power had attained, but for the history of the Roman imperial navy the battle of Actium itself is an insignificant event.²⁵ As between Octavian and Antony it chose the former to be the master of the Roman world, yet that choice was clearly foreshadowed by the physical and psychological skirmishing before the battle proper; in influencing Octavian's attitude toward sea power, it was much less important than the campaign against Sextus; viewed from the standpoint of naval tactics, the battle does not seem notable. This final sea fight in the civil wars, the last great conflict in the Mediterranean until that between Licinius and Constantine which closes our period, is more a prelude than an opening note in the consideration of the Roman imperial navy. The historic task of that navy was not to fight battles but to render them impossible.

In only one point must one consider the battle carefully. Since antiquity it has been dramatized as a battle between the ponderous great ships of Antony and the new, swift, small liburnians of Octavian, wherein the latter proved once for all their superiority.

This reconstruction of Actium as an earlier Defeat of the Spanish Armada cannot be substantiated. In part it arises from a statement of the untrustworthy Vegetius (4. 33), in part from misinterpretation of writers in the Later Empire, who used *liburna* as a synonym of *navis*.²⁶ The lines of Horace also play a part:

ibis Liburnis inter alta navium,
amice, propugnacula,
paratus omne Caesaris periculum
subire, Maecenas, tuo.

but these may well be taken as a reference to the fact that Octavian customarily cruised about in a liburnian while Agrippa commanded the fleet,²⁷ or as a poetic statement of the higher average size of Antony's ships, which ranged upward to a *dekeres*. Since the crews with which Octavian filled his fleet against Sextus were not experienced, he and Agrippa had built their ships in especially solid fashion—the parallel with the reasoning of the Roman senate in the Punic wars is strengthened by Agrippa's use of a *corvus* to assist grappling—and the ships which defeated Sextus were those which defeated Antony.²⁸

NOTES

1 Polyb. 6. 19. 2-3; W. W. Tarn, "The Fleets of the First Punic War," *JHS* 27 (1907), pp. 48-60. See also De la Berge, pp. 9-17, 53-66; F. W. Clark, *The Influence of Sea-power on the History of the Roman Republic* (Menasha, 1915); L. A. Stella, *Italia antica sul mare* (Milan, 1930), especially pp. 267-306.

2 VI 1300; Livy 42. 48. 5.

3 Social war: Memnon, *History of Heraclea* 29, in K. W. L. Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* 3 (Paris, 1849); *IG* XIV 951. Lucullus: Plut., *Lucullus* 3; Appian, *Mithr.* 56; *IGR* 4. 1111, 1113-1115, 1117 (Rhodian aid). For the naval operations in the Mithridatic wars, see Théodore Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator* (Paris, 1890).

4 E. g., *IGR* 1. 843.

5 Livy, *Epit.* 89; Suet., *Caesar* 2. 1; *IGR* 1. 843; Cic., *Verr.* 1. 86-90, with the scholia of Ps.-Asconius *ad loc.*

6 Johann Kromayer, "Die Entwicklung der römischen Flotte vom Seeräuber-kriege des Pompeius bis zur Schlacht von Actium," *Philologus* 56 (1897), pp. 426-491, has analyzed the strength of the various Republican squadrons from the first Mithridatic war, and emphasizes their gradual increase in size.

7 Cic., *De imp. C. P.* 31-33, 53-55, 67, *Verr.* 5. 42-51, 59-112; Appian, *Mithr.* 92-93; Plut., *Pompey* 24; Dio 36. 20-23. Cf. H. A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the An-*

cient World (Liverpool, 1924); Erich Ziebarth, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten Griechenland* (Hamburg, 1929).

8 Pliny, *H. N.* 7. 98; the campaign is discussed by P. Groebe, "Zum Seeräuber-kriege des Pompeius Magnus (67 v. Chr.)," *Klio* 10 (1910), pp. 374-389. Pompey's fleet: Appian, *Mithr.* 94; Kromayer, *Philologus* 56 (1897), pp. 429-431.

9 Livy's usage of *praefectus classis* for the years 191 B. C. and following (36. 20. 7, 36. 42. 1) is anachronistic, for the first dated use of the term occurs in *IGR* 3. 1018 of 49/48 B. C. The term gained currency in the civil wars, when the contestants equipped private fleets and appointed praefects; cf. De la Berge, pp. 59-63.

10 Appian, *B. C.* 4. 66.

11 The peace of 84: Appian, *Mithr.* 55, 58; Plut., *Sulla* 22. Granius Licinianus, p. 27 (Teubner ed.), erroneously assigns these ships to the allies. New construction: Cic., *De imp. C. P.* 33, 67; Dio 36. 23. 2.

12 Preparedness: Cic., *Pro Flacco* 27-33. Piracy: *ibid.* 31; Dio 39. 59. 2.

13 F. E. Adcock, *CAH* 9, p. 647.

14 Cic., *Ad Att.* 9. 9. 2 (also 10. 4. 9, 10. 7. 3); Caesar, *B. C.* 1. 30, 3. 101; Appian, *B. C.* 2. 40, 54. Cicero, *Ad Att.* 10. 8. 4, ascribed to Pompey Themistocles' judgment, "qui mare teneat eum necesse esse rerum potiri."

15 Caesar, *B. C.* 1. 30; Appian, *B. C.* 2. 41. Ships were built in thirty days to blockade Massilia, the siege of which (and with it much more) turned on the sea battles: Caesar, *B. C.* 1. 34, 36, 56-58.

16 Caesar, *B. C.* 3. 5; Cic., *Ad Att.* 9. 9. 2; Kromayer, *Philologus* 56 (1897), pp. 432-438.

17 Marius' interception of the grain supply in 87 B. C. (Plut., *Marius* 41-42) should be noted as a precedent.

18 Cic., *Phil.* 13. 50; Appian, *B. C.* 4. 84-85; Dio 46. 40. 3. His coins thenceforth bore "praef clas et orae marit ex s. c.": H. A. Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum* 2 (London, 1910), pp. 554-557, 560-565.

19 Appian, *B. C.* 5. 50, 55, 25; Kromayer, *Philologus* 56 (1897), pp. 439-449.

20 Appian, *B. C.* 5. 71-72; Dio 48. 36; Plut., *Antony* 32; Suet., *Aug.* 16. On the futile operations of Octavian, and Sextus' command of the sea, cf. Appian, *B. C.* 4. 82, 85, 5. 18; Dio 47. 36. 4, 48. 7. 4, 48. 31. 1; and in general on Sextus, Moses Hadas, *Sextus Pompey* (New York, 1930).

21 Appian, *B. C.* 5. 92; Dio 48. 49. 1. This aid was not entirely voluntary.

22 Appian, *B. C.* 5. 77-92; Suet., *Aug.* 16, 74; Dio 48. 45. 4-48. 6.

23 The fleet: Dio 48. 49-51; Kromayer, *Philologus* 56 (1897), pp. 454-457. Forum Iulii: A. Donnadieu, *Fréjus, le port militaire du Forum Iulii* (Paris, 1935), p. 8. Portus Iulius: Strabo 5. 4. 5-6; Dio 48. 50; Virgil, *Georgics* 2. 161-164; Karl Lehmann-Hartleben, *Die antiken Hafenanlagen des Mittelmeeres* (Leipzig, 1923; *Klio*, Beih. 14), pp. 174-176, who points out that this was the first port in the Graeco-Roman world designed to be used solely as a war harbor.

24 Appian, *B. C.* 5. 95-122; Dio 49. 1-11; Harold Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum* 1 (London, 1923), pp. cxv, 80, 83-84.

25 The account of Johann Kromayer, "Der Feldzug von Actium und der sogenannte Verrath der Cleopatra," *Hermes* 34 (1899), pp. 1-54, in which Cleopatra and Antony planned to break through to Egypt from the outset has been challenged by Aldo Ferrabino, "La battaglia d' Azio," *Rivista di filologia classica* n. s. 2 (1924), pp. 433-472, and by W. W. Tarn, "The Battle of Actium," *JRS* 21 (1931), pp. 173-199. These rely on Horace, *Epod.* 9. 17-20, as indicating a genuine battle. See, however, Kromayer, "Actium: Ein Epilog," *Hermes* 68 (1933), pp. 361-383; G. W. Richardson, "Actium," *JRS* 27 (1937), pp. 153-

164 (with Tarn's reply, "Actium: a Note," *JRS* 28 [1938], pp. 165-168); M. A. Levi, "La battaglia d' Azio," *Athenaeum* n. s. 10 (1932), pp. 3-21.

26 The echo of Horace's lines, quoted in the text, in Prudentius, *contra Symm.* 2. 530-531, is a notable example of this use:

institerant tenues cumbae fragilesque faseli
inter turritas Memfítica rostra Liburnas.

27 Horace, *Epod.* 1. 1-4; Plut., *Antony* 65; Appian, *B. C.* 5. 111; Tarn, *JRS* 21 (1931), p. 181 n. 1. Liburnians had been a common adjunct of fleets since Philip V had introduced them at Chios in 201 B. C.: Polyb. 16. 2-7; Tarn, *op. cit.* p. 193 n. 8.

28 Solid construction: Dio 49. 1. 2, 3. 2; Appian, *B. C.* 5. 106. Actium: Dio 50. 19. 3; Florus 2. 21. As Tarn, *op. cit.* p. 193 n. 8, well says, why should Octavian have constructed an entirely new fleet for Actium, and in so doing adopt the methods of Sextus, whom he had defeated with a heavy navy?

CHAPTER II

THE ITALIAN FLEETS: THEIR PORTS

WHEN Antony broke from Actium and fled with Cleopatra toward the southern horizon, Octavian became master of the Mediterranean. Naulochus had given him the Tyrrhenian; the rest was his after Actium. To the four hundred vessels which Octavian had brought from Italy were now added roughly three hundred of Antony's ships, taken at Actium or during the Actian campaign.¹

Octavian may not be expected fully to have appreciated his position, as September 2 came to its victorious and weary close. Antony and Cleopatra were yet alive, and the East was in turmoil; there was no certainty that malcontents might not again kindle rebellion in some of the western provinces. Permanent decisions awaited an assured peace, yet at that moment some disposition had to be made of the captured vessels which lay in the Gulf of Actium, partly manned by disheartened and defeated sailors. To Actian Apollo Octavian offered a spectacular dedication of ten vessels from Antony's fleet, representing each type of warship from the liburnian to the *dekeres*. Other ships were burned or scrapped. The remainder were formed into a squadron, and their crews were reinforced by transfers from Octavian's own fleet. When Octavian left with his main fleet to finish the conquest of the East, this squadron sailed to Forum Iulii, presumably in the fall of 31.²

With this act the history of the Roman imperial navy formally begins. Octavian might well have destroyed Antony's entire fleet, inasmuch as he himself already possessed a navy capable of meeting any future opposition; the fact that he did not suggests that thoughts of a permanent navy were in his mind. At all events, the Empire thenceforth had standing naval forces as long as it was an effective state; as Vegetius (4. 31) says:

Romanus autem populus pro decore et utilitate magnitudinis suae non propter necessitatem tumultus alicuius classem parabat ex tempore, sed, ne quando necessitatem sustineret, semper habuit praeparatam.

The exact nature of the navy was not yet settled, and a fleet based on Forum Iulii was not to be the solution; but we may briefly consider the history of that fleet before proceeding to a discussion of the material framework on which later naval activity was based.

Forum Iulii was at this time a new municipality, a colony of veterans from Caesar's Eighth legion which he had settled as a check on nearby Massilia.³ Octavian and Agrippa had first used the city as a naval base in the campaign against Sextus; through extensive construction of moles and quays they had converted a lagoon of the Argenteus River into a good harbor for both naval and commercial purposes, and the work of fortification went on after Actium. Recent excavations have uncovered the wall encircling the harbor, the two *castra* at strategic points thereon, the baths, the hospital, and on the north of the harbor a complex *praetorium* area, the earliest known from the Empire and one of the most complete. Within its walls were the mansion of the praefect, his baths, an *auguratorium*, a *quaestorium*, and magazines. Forum Iulii was at the moment the most suitable harbor in the West for a fleet; Strabo, who compiled the bulk of his information in the third and second decades before Christ, terms the port "the naval base of Augustus."⁴

The fleet at Forum Iulii guarded the coastal regions of Gaul and could land forces far up the Rhone if the newly conquered Three Gauls were restless. The Alps and Hispania Citerior, both disturbed areas, also lay near, and the squadron of Forum Iulii may have had some function in the wars against the Alpine tribes (roughly 25 to 14 B. C.) and perhaps in the Cantabrian wars from 26 to 19.⁵ As Gaul became more obviously pacified and these campaigns were brought to a close, the limited usefulness of the harbor disappeared, and its secluded remoteness for the empire as a whole became more apparent.

Yet the transfer of Gallia Narbonensis to senatorial control in

22 B. C. did not see the end of the naval detachment at Forum Iulii, for Augustus did not thus quickly abandon a base which had required so much work. Tacitus' accurate list of the armed forces in A. D. 23 mentions the fleet at Forum Iulii, and an inscription from the town itself commemorates a trierarch who served during Tiberius' reign.⁶ Most of the ships and crews presumably were transferred to the newer harbor at Misenum before 22 B. C., for naval inscriptions from Forum Iulii are of early date and number but three. The existence of a large *praetorium* demonstrates that the fleet was originally under a separate praefect; later it was probably merged with the Misene fleet, and in 69 the small squadron at the port was commanded temporarily for Vespasian by the procurator of Gallia Narbonensis, at which time Forum Iulii was still entitled "claustra maris."⁷ Probably the flotilla was allowed to deteriorate as the Actian ships rotted, and the *Argenteus* silted up the harbor within a century after its construction.⁸ After 69 harbor and fleet alike disappear.

§ 1. CLASSIS MISENENSIS⁹

Long before the fleet at Forum Iulii vanished, two other squadrons had become the chief agents of imperial control of the Mediterranean. At the death of Augustus, Misenum and Ravenna were the great imperial war harbors, and the fleets based on these two Italian ports must be the central theme of any study on Roman imperial sea power.

Their history, however, begins in the mist which envelops the Augustan principate. Later historians were not interested in the prosaic construction which proceeded apace after 27 B. C., and the indifference of readers soon condemned the writings of those who did deal with the subject. Thus, it is impossible to fix with precision the dates in the reorganization of the army or of the parallel establishment of the great Italian fleets, nor can one name the officials charged with the task. The general supervision may well have fallen to Agrippa; the broad plans must have been determined by Octavian.

Certain ancient references, which will be cited later in this chapter, indicate that the fleet at Ravenna was an early creation

of Augustus' principate, and it may reasonably be assumed that the Misene fleet was another result of the same energetic systematization from 27 to 15 B. C.¹⁰ Octavian and Agrippa certainly did not send all the fleet returning with them from the East to swell the squadron at Forum Iulii. Ravenna was a natural base for part of it; equally valid considerations dictated the retention of the remainder on the west Italian coast.

These considerations made Misenum, a harbor at the end of the northern cape of the Bay of Naples, the logical base for that fleet; indeed, the excellence of the choice is demonstrated by the fact that the Misene fleet quickly became the strongest and most important in the empire. A Gallic port could not serve as headquarters for a fleet directed from Rome, and of the other Italian ports each had some peculiarity rendering it unsatisfactory. Portus Iulius had served well the purpose which led to its construction by Agrippa in 37, but the Lucrine Lake soon sanded, and only continual dredging could have maintained it in use. Octavian had already abandoned it when he sent Antony's ships to Forum Iulii. Naples and Puteoli were crowded with commercial shipping; the Tiber had ruined Ostia as a harbor, and the time of Claudius' works at Portus was not yet at hand. The southern ports, such as Brundisium, were unsatisfactory by reason of their distance from Rome, and although Ravenna became the base of an imperial fleet its distant position at the head of the Adriatic debarred it from ever being the station for the first fleet of the Mediterranean. Set off by itself, Misenum was not a commercial town, yet it was near the great ports of western Italy and guarded the Italian end of the vital grain routes to Egypt, Africa, and Sicily. Misenum was as close to Rome as any other good port in Italy at the time and could quickly receive the orders of the emperor; from it a squadron could dominate the Tyrrhenian Sea, and might easily sail farther.

Despite the action of various geological forces on the Campanian coast since antiquity, the present port preserves in general the features which caused its selection by Augustus. The inner haven, which was apparently the main harbor, is now the landlocked, shallow lagoon called Mare Morto; in the first centuries

after Christ it was connected by a narrow channel, over which a wooden bridge passed, to the outer harbor, which looks toward the southeast.¹¹ On the north of the harbors is a high ridge, the Colle di Bacoli, which ends in the Punta di Pennata; on the south a sandy peninsula termed Miniscola runs from the steep-sided volcanic hill Monte di Procida east to the famed tumulus promontory of Misenum, sea-washed on three sides. The outer harbor, which was once part of a crater, was improved by the erection of two parallel arched moles northeast from the promontory. These typically Campanian "Bogenmolen" resembled the single arched mole which had recently been built at Puteoli; but here, since the aperture of one arch corresponded to the pier in the other mole, waves and winds were prevented from rushing through the arches into the harbor. A single arched mole ran southwest from the Punta di Pennata, which was pierced at two points, presumably to retard sanding. By means of these moles, some pillars of which still remain, the harbor was safe from all winds; as a whole the area fits with remarkable exactness the prescriptions of a good port set forth by the architect Vitruvius, a contemporary of Augustus.¹²

Several of the large Republican villas of the region persisted into the Empire. The Punta di Pennata was entirely given over to a great mansion, and the promontory of Misenum itself was crowned by an imperial villa, once owned by Marius and later by Lucullus. At this the Emperor Tiberius tarried and finally died. The site of the town and the camp of Misenum proper must be sought just to the northeast and below this villa, stretching down to the peninsula Miniscola, for in this area may be seen the insignificant ruins of the baths and of the theatre, which looks out to Ischia.¹³ The *praetorium* too lay hereabouts, and one must picture Pliny the Younger's graphic story of the flight from Misenum during the eruption of Vesuvius, August 24, A. D. 79, as taking place on the sandy beach of Miniscola.¹⁴ This name, it has been pointed out, is apparently a corruption of *militum schola*, the drill ground; some ruins, presumably those of *navalia*, still fringed the Mare Morto in the seventeenth century.¹⁵ Although the site of the town and the camp present only the barest of ruins

now, the water reservoir, an edifice especially necessary in this region, has survived and suffices to give a notion of the care and magnitude of Augustus' work. Excavated in the hillside of the Colle di Bacoli, it is faced with meticulous Augustan reticulate masonry of the best quality and still bears the roof, two hundred and thirty by eighty-five feet, on its forty-eight pillars.¹⁶ Augustus must have spent no less attention on Misenum than on Forum Iulii, but apart from the reservoir and the harbor piles his work here is gone.

Although Misenum was a *colonia Iulia*, quite possibly as a result of Augustus' colonizing activity after Actium,¹⁷ it cannot have had much room for growth, and many of the sailors settled their families elsewhere on the northern shore of the Bay of Naples, at Baiae or Puteoli. From the town one road ran across Miniscola to Cumae and the Via Domitiana while another crossed the wooden bridge and ran east to Baiae, three miles distant;¹⁸ along each road lay the single graves and the larger columbaria of the dead. One of these latter, which has recently been excavated, is typical: built about A. D. 100 in reticulate masonry with brick courses, it is decorated with simple frescoes of a peacock and dolphins on the end wall and an eagle of after-life with more dolphins on the ceiling.¹⁹

For four centuries Misenum served as the headquarters of the fleet which took its name from the town. The strength of this fleet—or, indeed, of the other praetorian fleet at Ravenna—is nowhere stated in the sources, and the only figures which one may proffer are based on uncertain speculation. Each squadron, that is, furnished the men for one legion during the civil wars of 68–69, the Misene the legion I Adiutrix under Nero, the Ravennate the legion II Adiutrix under Vespasian. Apart from the men taken by Nero in 68, Otho drew off well over a thousand Misene sailors for service against Vitellius, and the fleet then still had enough strength to undertake an expedition. Shortly thereafter Vitellius himself raised, or planned to raise another legion at Misenum.²⁰ Since replacement of the losses under Nero during the early part of the year 69 is improbable, the Misene fleet had as a minimum well over ten thousand sailors at this period, if the legions formed

in the civil wars had each five thousand men. If one estimates the crew of a trireme as two hundred men, this minimum would mean over fifty triremes, which would roughly agree with the fact that epigraphical evidence has preserved the names of some eighty Misene ships of all classes. This coincidence may not be pressed, for the evidence is haphazard information covering three centuries. On the same method of calculation, the Ravennate fleet would have been considerably over five thousand men strong; it certainly was weaker than the Misene fleet, for inscriptions referring to it are far fewer than for the Tyrrhenian flotilla. These minima would at best be valid only for A. D. 68-69, for we cannot determine whether and to what extent the strength of the fleets fluctuated.

Students of the Roman imperial navy have agreed that the ships and sailors of the Misene fleet were not all stationed at Misenum. The fact may be admitted, and the reasons are clear: squadrons operating from the one harbor could not cope with sporadic piracy in Sardinia or Corsica; local exigencies in other ports of the west Italian coast and the general responsibility of guarding the Italian littoral necessitated the stationing of a few ships at select points. As Vegetius (4. 31) remarks, "in rebus bellicis celeritas amplius solet prodesse quam virtus." These detachments or *vexillationes* did not necessarily have ships permanently attached; those at Rome did not, and even some of the stations on the seacoast must have been merely bases for the refitting of ships operating in the vicinity. Along a quay would lie arsenals and the small camp, controlled by a trierarch.²¹ The sailors detached for special service apparently remained on their tour of duty for some length of time, for their wives and children settled near them.

One important station of the Misene fleet was situated at Ostia, or to speak more correctly, it probably lay at the Portus just north of the Tiber mouth. This detachment presumably dates from the reign of Claudius, who constructed the Portus, and lasted into the third century.²² From Ostia many of the senators and *equites* went forth to their provincial posts on Misene ships, and emperors at times sailed thence for Campania or more distant regions.²³ The port was especially important in the grain supply

of Rome, for a great part of the *annona* was there transshipped to the river boats or stored; and the navy probably exercised general supervision over navigation in the coastal and river channels. In the year 186 the detachment, under the trierarch Iustus, dedicated a stone to Commodus;²⁴ other naval inscriptions are relatively numerous.

Ostia, and with it Puteoli, were probably ports of call for Misene ships which bore despatches from the provinces, for in the reign of Vespasian and later, sailors were couriers from both harbors to Rome.²⁵ Presumably messages from the western provinces came to Ostia and those from the East to Puteoli; in the latter port, long the most important of Italy,²⁶ there may have been a small detachment of sailors in an unimportant section of the busy harbor. At this place ships would land their despatches and then go on to Misenum, but for important outgoing orders and for the conveyance of officials, some galleys may have been kept on hand at Puteoli.

The other port in Italy which received a station of the Misene fleet was Centumcellae, the harbor constructed by Trajan on the south Etrurian coast;²⁷ the strong detachment at this point guarded the city, the grain supply, and the commerce, and transported the emperor and his officers. During the period of Centumcellae's importance sailors probably acted as couriers between it and Rome along the Via Aurelia. The Emperor Antoninus Pius had a favorite villa at Lorium, midway along this route between the two cities, and here also sailors from both the Italian fleets were stationed for purposes of communication.²⁸ Apart from the four harbor stations—Misenum, Ostia, Puteoli, and Centumcellae—the Misene fleet or detachments thereof might put in temporarily at any one of a dozen other Tyrrhenian ports, as at Tarra-cina in 69 or at Formiae in 64.²⁹

The chief standing duty of the Misene fleet as a police force was the maintenance of peace in the Tyrrhenian Sea. The uncivilized inhabitants of Sardinia and Corsica presented the chief danger; on these islands, accordingly, stations were early established. Only two naval inscriptions have been found at Aleria, the capital of Corsica, but an incidental reference to the commander

of the liburnians at the island in 69 suggests that a small squadron had its headquarters there or, at least, that the Misene ships put in there from time to time. Such a detachment would serve as a military force for Corsica and perhaps might also oversee the shipping of timber from the island to the Misene dockyards.³⁰ From Corsica, furthermore, the coasts of Gaul and Spain could be more easily guarded. Mariana to the north, at which one early inscription (X 8329) has been discovered, was certainly no more than a port of call.

Of restlessness in Sardinia, we get a revealing notice in A. D. 6, when brigands so terrorized the island that no senatorial official could be sent there for three years.³¹ Imperial military forces were needed to put down the trouble; the naval station at Carales, the best harbor in the island, was probably established at this time to co-operate in the pacification of Sardinia and to ensure its quiet thereafter. The epigraphical evidence attests the presence of the detachment from the Julio-Claudian period until the early third century.³²

In Sicily naval inscriptions have been found only at Panormus, and their scarcity attests that Misene galleys rarely called at the port.³³ The other coasts of the western Mediterranean reveal few traces of protection by the Misene fleet. The African shores had their special flotilla. In Spain thus far only one naval inscription has been uncovered—a Ravennate sailor's tombstone at Dertosa (II 4063). The status of the fleet at Forum Iulii is uncertain, but after Tiberius the praefect of the Misene fleet probably controlled it.

In Aegean waters the chief port of call for ships of both Italian fleets was the Piraeus. Galleys bearing governors or other dignitaries bound for the East, as Germanicus in 18,³⁴ put in that their passengers might visit venerable Athens, and the occasional squadrons or entire fleets engaged in carrying troops and generals to the eastern provinces in the Parthian wars perhaps stopped here to rest their soldiers and to pick up detachments which came by land from Dyrrachium. The majority of the five Misene inscriptions found at the Piraeus or in the Ceramicus seem to reflect these naval movements of the late second and early third centuries.³⁵

Since the Syrian fleet cruised in the Aegean, it is doubtful whether any permanent detachment of either Italian fleet was stationed at the Piraeus; in time of war an arsenal and repair station may have been manned for a brief period.

Such a temporary detachment is attested at Seleuceia in Syria, for a papyrus bill of sale for a slave mentions a camp of the Misene fleet at Seleuceia in February 166 and names sailors from five ships. The presence of this vexillation, to which the three Misene inscriptions found in the vicinity of the town may well refer,³⁶ is easily coupled with the Parthian war which the Emperor Lucius Verus was waging at the time; undoubtedly the Misene fleet had duties of supply and communication between Rome and Antioch, which required a temporary establishment of some Misene ships at the eastern end of the route. Inasmuch as Seleuceia was the base of the Syrian fleet, a permanent station of the Misene fleet here is very improbable.

The largest detachment of the Misene fleet, to judge from the inscriptions, lay not on the sea but at Rome. It was probably already in existence under Augustus;³⁷ at the accession of Claudius in 41 sailors were present in the praetorian camp, where they were quartered;³⁸ and the station received permanent form at the latest under the Flavians, for when these emperors tore down Nero's Golden House and erected the Flavian Amphitheatre the Misene station received a permanent camp just to the southeast of the Colosseum, on the slope of the Esquiline. An inscription records its enlargement in 240 by Gordian III; at some time thereafter the station disappeared, but its *castra* is recorded in the fourth-century regionary catalogues.³⁹ The sailors of this detachment were drawn from the whole fleet, for the inscriptions in their columbarium on the Appian Way mention twenty-eight ships; since sailors of only three years' service are found at Rome, this assignment does not seem to have been a means of rewarding good service.⁴⁰ The same sailors took part both in 212 and a few years previously in the *ludi scenici* which the *vigiles* and Misene sailors gave to honor the birthday of Septimius Severus.⁴¹

Apart from furnishing runners for despatches to the west Italian ports and tending, at least under Commodus, the awnings

which warded off the sun at the amphitheatre games, the group had unknown duties. It was possible for ships to sail up the Tiber to Rome, but the location of the camp makes the regular attachment of ships to the station highly improbable; ⁴² nothing is heard during the Empire of the Republican *navalia* along the Tiber. The conjunction with the *vigiles* in the games suggests that the detachment may have been directly under the *praefectus vigilum*, a step quite desirable to maintain discipline in the metropolis.

§ 2. CLASSIS RAVENNAS

Literary references to the construction of a harbor at Ravenna enable us to date the establishment of the Ravennate fleet more precisely than is possible for the Misene squadron. That is to say, the *fossa Augusta*, which was excavated by Augustus to link the southern branch of the Po with the new war harbor at Ravenna, is mentioned by Valgius Rufus in an extant fragment of his elegiac poetry, and was also known to Vitruvius. Since the former composed his poetry in the first decade of Augustus' principate, and Vitruvius probably wrote between 25 and 23 B. C., the canal was at least well begun by the twenties, and it may with fair certainty be assumed that the Ravennate fleet had been established by that date. ⁴³

The new harbor at Ravenna, like that at Misenum, was designed only for naval use. A lagoon on the Adriatic, two miles distant from Ravenna proper, was fortified with moles, a pharos, and *castra*; ⁴⁴ the canal already mentioned was dug to connect this harbor, Classis as it was eventually entitled, with Ravenna and the Po, the mouths of which were at this time almost impassable. ⁴⁵ The ensuing deposit of sediment brought down by the canal was successfully checked during the height of the Empire, but in the Middle Ages the Po so completely obliterated Classis that today we are forced to rely on ancient references for reconstruction of the port. The church of San Apollinare in Classe still marks the site of the town, and one of the magnificent mosaics in San Apollinare Nuovo shows the Byzantine harbor, a walled city with amphitheatre, basilica, and two light towers flanking the entrance. ⁴⁶

The canal may have been begun before Actium, inasmuch as Octavian had already in 39 B. C. made Ravenna the base of a temporary fleet.⁴⁷ On the eastern coast of the Italian peninsula, indeed, the choice was much simpler than on the Tyrrhenian, for no other port possessed in equal degree the strategic importance of Ravenna, quite apart from the fact that the previous naval activity at Ravenna made it a suitable choice. From this point the Dalmatian coast could be watched, and an alert fleet might crush pirates such as the Liburni. Ravenna was the first good port which the great road from Rome to the upper Adriatic, the Via Flaminia-Aemilia, touched after crossing the Apennines; accordingly it provided an excellent supply base for war in the eastern hinterland of the Adriatic, which Augustus was already invading in 35 and 34 B. C.⁴⁸ Although the general needs of the empire prevented further action until Agrippa and then Tiberius pushed into Illyricum from 15 B. C. on, the establishment of the fleet at Ravenna in the twenties may well have been a preliminary step in Augustus' plan of expansion to the Danube.

Nor were the defensive advantages to be ignored: the port lay just behind the reserve line of defense for Italy, and a fleet operating up the *fossa Augusta* and then along the Po as far as Placentia or beyond could protect northern Italy against invasion.⁴⁹ In this respect the part taken by the Ravennate fleet during the military operations of the civil wars A. D. 68-69 in northern Italy, which will be discussed in a later chapter, illustrates the strategic position of Ravenna. From land invasion, moreover, Ravenna itself and the new harbor were well protected by the swamps which lay deep about them, as the later history of the city down through the Byzantine exarchate of Ravenna demonstrates. One last point, the fact that timber, particularly the larch, came from the headwaters of the Po, should not be overlooked, for the rarity of forests in Italy made this an important consideration.⁵⁰

From the period of Caesar on, the town of Ravenna was a flourishing *municipium*, although the authority of the local government seems to have been so limited by the presence of an imperial praefect of the fleet that only *magistri*, magistrates more appropriate for a village or *vicus*, have thus far been found.⁵¹

Since there were no other large towns in the vicinity, most of the sailors and their families lived and died at Ravenna or Classis.

Subsidiary detachments of the Ravennate fleet were few. The only possible station at the head of the Adriatic was Aquileia, center of the road net for this region and the most thriving commercial port on the Upper Sea, but there is no good evidence that a detachment was placed there.⁵² Salona was more certainly a station. Operations on the jagged Dalmatian coast needed a base closer than Ravenna, and the naval inscriptions found at Salona, one of which is before A. D. 71, add weight to the supposition that the capital of Dalmatia afforded that base.⁵³ In the early years of the first century some fleet, probably the Ravennate, had ships at Brundisium "ad usus commeantium illo mari," that is, to transport dignitaries to and from Dyrrachium. The four inscriptions of active sailors from the city are all early;⁵⁴ as the Illyrian roads were built, and direct maritime communication between the west Italian coast and the eastern provinces became more common, this detachment was withdrawn. There is no evidence for the existence of a permanent station at Ancona.

In other seas the Ravennate fleet acted chiefly in the role of assistant to the Misene fleet. The one inscription of a Ravennate sailor found at the Piraeus indicates that its ships called there occasionally,⁵⁵ and epigraphical evidence also shows that Ravennate galleys appeared from time to time in the western part of the Mediterranean. One sailor of the fleet was buried in Spain; the tombstones of others are dotted along the western coast of Italy, at Luna, Ostia, Misenum, and especially Centumcellae. This latter port may have served as the main base after A. D. 100 for Ravennate ships which happened to be in Tyrrhenian waters.⁵⁶

The contingent at Rome, smaller than the parallel Misene detachment, was yet the largest vexillation of the Ravennate fleet. Its *castra* lay in the fourteenth region, west of the Tiber, with a columbarium on the Via Aurelia in the modern Villa Doria-Pamfili.⁵⁷ This camp would have been not far from the basin excavated by Augustus for his sham naval battle in 2 B. C.; inasmuch as further naval spectacles were presented, at rare intervals, by other emperors thereafter, the Ravennate sailors may have had

special duties in the preparations for these battles.⁵⁸ Such duties surely did not include participation in the actual fighting, for this was reserved to criminals in all cases known.

Apart from the detachment at Lorium noted above, another land station is attested for the Ravennate fleet, at the Fucine Lake. Two inscriptions found here indicate the presence of a detachment both before and after A. D. 71. Since condemned criminals participated in the naval battle which Claudius gave to celebrate the draining of the lake, these marines may have labored on the drainage work or perhaps maintained it on completion.⁵⁹

§ 3. SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY

The foregoing analysis of our epigraphical sources may be considered in part a verification of an ancient summation of Augustus' naval policy: "*classem Miseni et alteram Ravennae ad tutelam Superi et Inferi maris conlocavit.*"⁶⁰ As we shall see later, however, the remark is not an inclusive statement of the naval measures taken by Augustus himself, and it certainly cannot be considered a description of the role of the Italian fleets throughout the whole period of their existence. Granted that they had their main harbors and subsidiary stations chiefly at strategic ports on the Tyrrhenian or Adriatic Seas, the naval history of the Empire will demonstrate that the Italian fleets were yet active throughout the Mediterranean. At least from the period of Vespasian onwards, they were the imperial fleets *par excellence*.

The question of spheres of influence then arises, and is pointed by a statement on the subject by Vegetius:

Apud Misenum igitur et Ravennam singulae legiones cum classibus stabant, ne longius a tutela urbis abscederent et, cum ratio postulasset, sine mora, sine circuitu ad omnes mundi partes navigio pervenirent. Nam Misenatum classis Galliam Hispanias Mauretaniam Africam Aegyptum Sardiniam atque Siciliam habebat in proximo. Classis autem Ravennatum Epiros Macedoniam Achaiam Propontidem Pontum Orientem Cretam Cyprum petere directa navigatione consueverat, quia in rebus bellicis celeritas amplius solet prodesse quam virtus.⁶¹

In some particulars this division does not depart too widely from the truth. While Ravennate ships might on a very rare occasion cruise to Spain, they only infrequently visited even the great Italian ports of Centumcellae, Ostia, and Puteoli. Egypt also would naturally be attached to the sphere of a fleet, the ships of which guarded the Italian end of the vital trade routes. To this fleet the majority of the Egyptian naval recruits were assigned, and all naval evidence found in Egypt which relates to an Italian fleet is Misene.

On his assignment of the eastern waters to the Ravennate fleet, however, Vegetius' scheme breaks down and reveals its unreality. In the first place, the remote location of Ravenna at the head of the Adriatic would have impeded any such control, and in the second, the actual evidence does not support him. Though the Ravennate fleet apparently accompanied Caracallus east in 214-217, the Misene fleet maintained a detachment at Seleuceia during the Parthian war of Lucius Verus, and both fleets, as we shall see later, co-operated in the eastern wars of the third century. The two fleets called at the Piraeus, but Misene inscriptions predominate. With regard to the rest of the Aegean, a Misene sailor was buried at Thessalonica, seat of the Macedonian procurator (III 7327); a Ravennate sailor died at Chalcedon (III 322), the wife of a Misene trierarch at Cyzicus (*IGR* 4. 151), another Ravennate sailor at Samos (III 6092a). From such fragments one can deduce little. One stone, however, shows definitively that the Misene fleet was directly concerned with the Aegean, for it commemorates a scribe of the Misene fleet sent on naval business to Ephesus, capital of the Roman province of Asia.⁶²

The scheme of Vegetius, that is to say, may be discarded, and one may generalize by noting that while the Misene squadron, as the strongest fleet in the Mediterranean, generally controlled the western shores by itself, the Ravennate fleet oversaw the Adriatic and acted jointly in eastern waters with its sister squadron. It must be remembered also that the statement of Vegetius is vitiated by his failure to mention the provincial fleets of the Mediterranean, which took the burden of minor, ordinary policing. These will be discussed in a later chapter, after the organization of the

imperial squadrons has been sketched from the more abundant evidence for the Italian fleets; here I would but recall their existence in Egypt, Syria, Africa, and the Propontis.

NOTES

1 Octavian's fleet: Orosius 6. 19. 6, Florus 2. 21 (both from Livy). His captures: Plut., *Antony* 68. 1, quoting Augustus himself. Orosius 6. 19. 9 and Florus 2. 21. 5 indicate that only one hundred and seventy of Antony's ships took part in the battle itself; the others, then, would not have been manned, but there is little certainty in the subject. Cf. Tarn, *JRS* 21 (1931), pp. 178-179; Richardson, *JRS* 27 (1937), pp. 154-157.

2 Tac., *Ann.* 4. 5: "proximumque Galliae litus rostratae naves praesidebant, quas Actiaca victoria captas Augustus in oppidum ForoIulense miserat valido cum remigio."

3 Pliny, *H. N.* 3. 35; Cic., *Ad fam.* 10. 15. 3, 10. 17. 1; A. Héron de Villefosse and H. Thédénat, *Inscriptions romaines de Fréjus* (Tours-Paris, 1884), pp. 11-13. From Pliny it appears that Octavian settled some veterans of the fleet there.

4 Strabo 4. 1. 9; A. Donnadiou, *La Pompeii de la Provence, Fréjus* (2nd ed.; Paris, 1928); *idem*, *Fréjus, le port militaire du Forum Iulii* (Paris, 1935); *idem*, *Le Canal de dérivation de l'Argens dans le port de Fréjus à l'époque romaine. Le phare du port romain* (Paris, 1938); J. Formigé, "Le Comblement du port romain de Fréjus," *Bull. de la Soc. nat. des antiq.* 80 (1937), pp. 67-104. See also Lehmann-Hartleben, *Hafenanlagen*, pp. 171-174, with plan xxvi.

5 Fiebigler, p. 293 (followed by V. E. Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit* [Leipzig, 1891] 1, p. 648), emphasizes the service of the Forum Iulii fleet in the Cantabrian wars. This must have been limited; the troops which took the Cantabri in the rear on the present Basque coast were transported by Gallic ships on the Atlantic: Florus 2. 33; Orosius 6. 21. 4; Ronald Syme, "The Spanish War of Augustus (26-25 B. C.)," *American Journal of Philology* 55 (1934), pp. 293-317.

6 Tac., *Ann.* 4. 5; XII 257. Sextus Aulienus, praefect of a fleet under Tiberius (X 4868) and duumvir of Forum Iulii, was probably a native of the town, but may possibly have been honored because he had been praefect of the fleet stationed in its harbor.

7 Tac., *Hist.* 3. 43.

8 Lehmann-Hartleben, *Hafenanlagen*, p. 171. Some of the sailors may have been transferred to the auxiliaries by Augustus; see below, p. 188.

9 Entitled simply *classis* or *classis quae est Miseni* (Dip. 1) through the reign of Claudius, the Misene fleet was known as *classis Misenensis* under Nero and after A. D. 71 as *classis praetoria Misenensis*. The name of the Ravennate fleet underwent exactly the same development. These changes in nomenclature are discussed in Chapter VIII; for unofficial variants, see the list of Ferrero 1899, pp. 260-261.

10 Despite the paucity of epigraphical evidence for the Julio-Claudian period, one inscription (X 3357, a trierarch freed before 27 B. C.) does attest the existence of the Misene fleet in the lifetime of Augustus.

11 Strabo 5. 4. 5 is still applicable to the general nature of the coastline. The best description of the port is that of Julius Beloch, *Campanien* (2nd ed.; Breslau, 1890), pp. 194-202, with the excellent map at the end; see also Heinrich

Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde* 2 (Berlin, 1902), pp. 727-728; Lehmann-Hartleben, *Hafenanlagen*, pp. 176-177; Philipp s.v. "Misenum" (PW). The bridge, X 3344.

12 *De arch.* 5. 12, in which he also describes the processes used in the necessary underwater constructions. The similarity between Misenum and Vitruvius' ideal port seems more than fortuitous.

13 Beloch, *Campanien*², pp. 197-200. On the villa of Misenum, cf. Tac., *Ann.* 6. 50; Phaedrus 2. 5. 7-10. The trumpets which impelled Nero to leave Baiae after the murder of Agrippina (Tac., *Ann.* 14. 10) were more likely echoes of the actual trumpet calls of the camp at Misenum than a reminiscence of the Misenum legend (cf. Jean Hubaux in *L'Antiquité classique* 2 [1933], pp. 135-166).

14 Pliny, *Epp.* 6. 20.

15 Fiebiger, p. 291. X 3344, which mentions the "schola armaturarum," was discovered on Miniscola. If situated here, the *navalia* would have faced north, as prescribed by Vitruvius, *De arch.* 5. 12.

16 Karl Baedeker, *Southern Italy and Sicily* (17th ed.; Leipzig, 1930), pp. 119-121.

17 Duumvirs, X 3674, 3678. The suggestion of Nissen, *Landeskunde* 2, p. 728 n. 4, that the Augustan colony at Cumae (*Gromatici veteres*, ed. Karl Lachmann and Adolf Rudorff [Berlin, 1848], p. 232) was actually at Misenum seems most dubious. Mommsen, *CIL* X, p. 317, followed by Kornemann s.v. "coloniae" (PW), col. 537, inclines to the opinion that Claudius was the founder, inasmuch as Misenum belonged to the tribe Claudia, but it was not yet an immutable rule that the emperor ascribed *coloniae* to his own tribe; see J. R. McElderry, *JRS* 8 (1918), pp. 68-69.

18 Beloch, *Campanien*², p. 200; Tac., *Ann.* 14. 9; the excerpts from the itineraries in *CIL* X, p. 58.

19 *NdS* 1928, pp. 187-201. Dolphins were especially frequent on sailors' monuments at Ravenna; cf. XI 32. These columbaria were sometimes used in antiquity as foundations for later buildings (X 3334), as at present.

20 For the two legions Adiutrix, see Chapter VIII; Otho, Tac., *Hist.* 2. 12, 17, 22; Vitellius, *ibid.* 3. 55 (I Adiutrix being at the time in Spain, *ibid.* 3. 44). Cf. Ritterling s.v. "legio" (PW), col. 1267, on the Vitellian legion.

21 A trierarch commanded at Ostia in 186, XIV 110; at Aleria in 69, Tac., *Hist.* 2. 16. In some cases, as at Athens, it is possible that a centurion was commandant. In the determination of these detachments literary and epigraphical evidence must be examined reasonably. Incidental literary mention of ships at a port cannot always be used to demonstrate the existence of a station; thus, the ships at Tarracina in A.D. 69 (Tac., *Hist.* 3. 76-77) were there only to defend the city against Vitellius. Nor does a mere mass of inscriptions prove anything; large numbers of naval tombstones come from Baiae, six miles from Misenum, not because it was a station but because sailors established their families at this ancient watering place and were buried there. Fiebiger, Chapot, and Ferrero go badly astray in this matter and draw up preposterous lists of stations.

22 Lehmann-Hartleben, *Hafenanlagen*, pp. 182-190, 195-198, with plan xxx; Giuseppe Lugli and Goffredo Filibeck, *Il porto di Roma imperiale e l'Agro portuense* (Rome, 1935), Lugli's part only. Fiebiger, pp. 322-324, shows that the two fire cohorts at Ostia and Puteoli (Suet., *Claud.* 25) were not composed of sailors.

23 Tac., *Hist.* 2. 9; Juvenal 8. 167-176; Dio 60. 21. 3, 63. 27. 2; Suet., *Nero* 47.

24 XIV 110. The subject of *AE* 1929. 139 (Ostia) is more likely one of the urban soldiers than a sailor.

25 Suet., *Vesp.* 8. 3; "classarios vero, qui ab Ostia et Puteolis Romam pedibus per vices commeant . . ."

26 Lehmann-Hartleben, *Hafenanlagen*, pp. 163-171; Mommsen, *CIL* X, p. 183; Fiebiger, pp. 324-325. A very great proportion of the naval inscriptions are of veterans or of sailors whose families resided in the town. The trierarch of X 3360 may have commanded the station (Fiebiger, pp. 324-325).

27 Lehmann-Hartleben, *Hafenanlagen*, pp. 192-195, with plan xxxiii.

28 XI 3736, 3737 (Misene), 3735 (Ravennate); Fronto, *Epp. ad M. Caes.* 2. 15, 3. 20, and *passim*.

29 Tac., *Hist.* 3. 76-77, *Ann.* 15. 46. A trierarch died or was buried at Alsium (XI 3719), a port from which Marcus Aurelius embarked for a cruise: Fronto, *De fer. Als.* 3 (ed. Haines [Loeb Library] 2, p. 4).

30 Naval evidence: Tac., *Hist.* 2. 16; *Eph. ep.* 8. 800, 801; possibly Ferrero 1899. 820. Timber: Theophrastus, *H. P.* 5. 8. 1-2; Pliny, *H. N.* 16. 197 (Fiebiger, pp. 329-330).

31 Dio 55. 28. 1; trouble in 19, Tac., *Ann.* 2. 85. Sardinia was still a source of grain: Rostovtzeff *s.v.* "frumentum" (PW), cols. 128-129.

32 X 7592, 7593, 7595, 7823 (?); *Eph. ep.* 8. 709-712. Ermanno Ferrero, "Iscrizioni classiarie di Cagliari," *Atti della Reale accademia delle scienze di Torino* 21 (1886), pp. 959-965, with a plan of the ancient harbor; Ettore Pais, *Storia della Sardegna e della Corsica* 1 (Rome, 1923), pp. 284-293.

33 X 7288, 7291. X 7456 (Cephaloedium) is not naval.

34 Tac., *Ann.* 2. 53.

35 III 556a, 558 = 7291, 6109, 7290, probably 14203¹⁸.

36 III 14394, 14395; *AE* 1905. 126. The papyrus, *AE* 1896. 21.

37 V 938 (Aquilaia): L. Trebius T. f. . . : "natus sum summa in pauperie, merui post classicum miles ad latus Augusti annos septemque decemque nullo odio sine offensa, missus quoque honeste." In view of the early date of the inscription, "Augustus" may best be taken as referring to Octavian himself. Since his civil wars did not last seventeen years, Trebius must have been with him at Rome for at least part of the period.

38 Jos., *Ant.* 19. 4. 3.

39 VI 1091; Heinrich Jordan, *Topographie der Stadt Rom im Alterthum* 2 (Berlin, 1871), pp. 545, 574; *idem*, *Forma Urbis Romae* (Berlin, 1874), p. 57 frag. 5; S. B. Platner, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, rev. by Thomas Ashby (Oxford, 1929), p. 105; cf. *IG* XIV 956 B 15.

40 For the columbarium near the third milestone on the Appian Way, see Henzen *ad CIL* VI 3093; on the length of service, note VI 3099, 3101, 3139 = 7466, 3910.

41 VI 1063, 1064.

42 Awnings: *SHA vita Commod.* 15. 6. The supports for the awning poles seem to be a later addition to the Colosseum, but still within the Flavian period. Ships to Rome: Suet., *Otho* 8 and *Tib.* 72. 1.

43 Valgius Rufus: Otto Ribbeck, *Geschichte der römischen Dichtung* (2nd ed.; Stuttgart, 1900) 2, pp. 359-360. Vitruvius: *De arch.* 2. 9. 16 (by implication). Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* 2 (4th ed.; Munich, 1935), pp. 387-388, offers strong evidence for the dates of Vitruvius suggested in the text, but it is possible that he wrote later.

44 Pliny, *H. N.* 36. 83; Jordanes, *Getica* 29. 150, quotes Dio (Chrysostom ?), "classem ducentarum quinquaginta navium . . . tutissima dudum credebatur recipere statione." *AE* 1922. 135 and XI 2606 (Ilva) name the *castra*.

45 Strabo 5. 1. 5.

46 Charles Diehl, *Ravenna* (Paris, 1903), pp. 14-15; Lehmann-Hartleben,

Hafenanlagen, pp. 177-178, Fiebiger, pp. 282-290; Rosenberg *s.v.* "Ravenna" (PW). See also the fine description by H. St. L. B. Moss, *The Birth of the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1935), p. 55.

47 Appian, *B. C.* 5. 78, 80.

48 At this time a fleet was used against the Illyrian pirates: Appian, *Ill.* 16.

49 The Po was navigable at least to Placentia (Strabo 5. 1. 11) or to Turin (Pliny, *H. N.* 3. 123).

50 Veg. 4. 34; Vitruvius 2. 9. 16; Fiebiger, p. 284, who is corrected on the Pineta by Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit* 2, p. 349 n. 40.

51 XI 863; Bormann, *CIL* XI, p. 6 (after Mommsen).

52 Veterans, V 774, 910; a fragment, V 960; and a very dubious stone, V 1048 (with *CIL* V, p. 1025). In the fourth century Aquileia did have a station, *Not. Dig. Occ.* 42. 4; Fiebiger, pp. 334-335, assumes an earlier detachment.

53 III 2034, 14691, perhaps 3165; a veteran, III 2020. Two veterans of the Misene fleet (III 2051 = 8380, 14695) settled at Salona; III 2036 may be a token that a Misene ship occasionally visited the region.

54 Tac., *Ann.* 4. 27 (A.D. 24); IX 41-43, *Eph. ep.* 8. 33; veterans, Dess. 9218, *NdS* 1896, p. 239.

55 III 557. In III 7289 the reading should perhaps be "p Rav."

56 Luna, *NdS* 1890, p. 380; Ostia, XIV 4496, 4497; Centumcellae, XI 3528-3531a, 3536; Misenum, X 3486, 3524, 3527, 3645. The sailors of the two fleets at Centumcellae carefully distinguished their fleet on tombstones, which come chiefly from a naval columbarium. Misene epigraphical custom is generally followed.

57 Ferrero 1878, p. 132; Henzen *ad CIL* VI 3149. The popular identification of the site of this camp with the present church of Santa Maria in Trastevere rests on no serious grounds.

58 Bernert *s.v.* "naumachie" (PW); Eduard Norden, *Ennius und Vergilius* (Leipzig, 1915), pp. 163-167.

59 IX 3891, 3892, with Mommsen's remarks; Tac., *Ann.* 12. 56; Suet., *Claud.* 21. 6.

60 Suet., *Aug.* 49; cf. Tac., *Ann.* 4. 5.

61 Veg. 4. 31. I shall return to the more general problem of naval policy in the last chapter.

62 Dess. 2888 (Misenum): "d. m. L. Calpurnio Rufo scribae cl pr Mis. Hic Epheso in munere missus defunctus est et ibi sarcophago marmoreo situs est. M. Sittius Africanus municeps et heres ad castra memoria fecit."

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

I regret that I have been unable to make use of Henri Seyrig's valuable article, "Le Cimetière des marins à Séleucie de Piérie," *Mélanges Syriens offerts à M. René Dussaud* 1 (Paris, 1939), pp. 451-459, which reached me only after the present work was in page proof. The large number of new inscriptions commemorating sailors of the two Italian fleets—twelve Misene and three Ravennate—assembled by M. Seyrig indicates that detachments of both squadrons stood off Seleuceia at various times in the second century apart from the Parthian war of Lucius Verus. M. Seyrig has also found three new inscriptions of the Syrian fleet, which certainly prove that its station lay at Seleuceia; one of these mentions a praefect of the fleet, one . . . ellius.

CHAPTER III

THE ITALIAN FLEETS: OFFICERS OF COMMAND

§ I. PRAEPECTI

BEFORE the introduction of the *magistri militum* under Constantine the administrative machinery of the Roman Empire had no official even faintly resembling the modern Minister of War. The *praefectus praetorio* enjoyed special control over the army under certain emperors, notably in the third century,¹ but this influence was limited and ephemeral; since Augustus and his successors were acutely aware of the true justification for their power, they were their own ministers for the army and the navy. For this reason a great department *a classibus* at Rome has not been and hardly will be discovered. The letter home of a second-century Egyptian recruit contains the only hint that any part of the imperial machinery at the capital dealt directly with the navy: he had gone to Rome and had there been instructed to report to the Misene fleet.² He does not inform his family by whom he was so assigned; possibly some official in the bureau for conscription, the *dilectus*, was in charge of the allotment of recruits to the various fleets. Other branches of the government had recurring business with the navy—the imperial treasury or *fiscus*, the state departments of correspondence and communication, the chancery which oversaw the manufacture and shipment of *diplomata*—but in the main each of the Italian fleets was a self-contained entity controlled by its praefect.

As early as 39 B. C., when Octavian first divided his fleet into two squadrons, each detachment had a separate praefect;³ on the establishment of the Misene and Ravennate fleets, this precedent was followed. The two fleets were so distinct that, as we have seen, each maintained an independent station at Rome. The per-

manent union of two squadrons operating in different waters offered no rewards in efficiency, and the expedient of Vitellius, who appointed Sextus Lucilius Bassus as praefect for both fleets in the troubled year A. D. 69, remained unique. A joint command is not known even in the third century, when the Italian fleets occasionally co-operated in eastern waters.

This imperial system of command, it will be noted, stemmed directly from the practice of the late Republic and owed nothing to the earlier Republican methods. Senatorial control of army and navy through obedient magistrates and promagistrates had vanished in the conflicts of individuals seeking mastery, and Augustus was of no mind to restore it even seemingly. He had appointed Agrippa and others to command his fleet and to serve his interests during the civil wars; even after January 13, 27 B. C., when the Republic was officially restored, the navy, as the army, continued to be his, although one must hasten to add that both are also to be regarded as the armed forces of the state. Every praefect of a fleet during the Empire, as every legate of a legion, was the vicerent of the emperor, appointed directly by him of his own advice,⁴ and serving at his pleasure. The jurist can justify the praefect's authority only as a delegation of the emperor's *imperium proconsulare*;⁵ the occasional responsibility granted a praefect by a senatorial decree was vested in him solely because of that delegated power. The praefect therefore was naturally responsible only to the emperor for his command and took orders only from him or his representative.

A change in the class which furnished the admirals of the navy accompanied the altered nature of the post, for the Republican policy of designating senators to command fleets virtually ends with M. Titius, a praefect of Antony's fleet in the Aegean about 35-32 B. C.⁶ Only one senatorial admiral appears in the Empire in the person of Marcius Agrippa, appointed by Caracallus to command an Italian fleet during the eastern campaign of 214-217.⁷ Otherwise the precedent set when M. Vipsanius Agrippa, a member of the equestrian class, took over command of the fleet to chastise Sextus Pompey remained unbroken. Apart from the fact that Augustus encouraged the service of the *equites* in the im-

perial government, a certain fear of placing senators, with their ancestral pride and independence, in military posts within Italy impelled him to set over the fleets men whose rank and honor came only from him, just as he placed *equites* over the *vigiles*, the urban cohorts, and the praetorian cohorts. For their part, the senators were presumably pleased not to serve in the fleets; the landed aristocracy of Italy never loved the sea, and the rank of the new-founded navy was at least for a time to be low.

Under Augustus and Tiberius these equestrian praefects of the navy were drawn directly from the army, for the elaborate scheme of promotion which later linked equestrian military and civil posts into one hierarchy was not yet conceived. Usually the praefect had served as tribune of a legion (*angusticlavus*) and then as praefect of an auxiliary squadron of horse; but a *praefectura castrorum* is twice substituted for the cavalry post, and at times a legionary tribune became praefect of a fleet at once.⁸ At least three of the early naval praefects had risen from the legionary ranks to the primipilate of the legion, which was a chief source for military equestrian officers in the Julio-Claudian period. Thus, for example, Sextus Aulienus was *primus pilus bis*, military tribune, praefect of scouts, *praefectus castrorum* for Augustus and Tiberius, and then praefect of a fleet under Tiberius.⁹

The first steps toward integrating the military and civil staffs of the imperial administration came under Claudius. The naval praefect, along with the governors of various minor territories, was put on a par with the financial officials known as procurators, and the title of the praefect now ran *procurator Augusti et praefectus classis*.¹⁰ The visible result of this change is the appearance of imperial freedmen, who had had no military background, as naval praefects, for the use of freedmen as procurators had been common since Augustus. Their service, however, as admirals was far from attaining the proportions which some modern writers suggest. Before A. D. 41 the praefects were in every case equestrian, and in the period 41–69 only three of the praefects thus far known were freedmen.¹¹ Such evidence, embracing as it does the instructive example of the freedman Anicetus, who secured his praefecture through base services for Nero, fully warrants an

assertion that the freedman praefect was an exception even under Claudius and Nero.

Influenced by the fifty years of peace which the Mediterranean had enjoyed, Claudius had altered the fleet praefecture from a completely military to a semi-administrative post; his error was made manifest by the civil wars of 68–69, which amply demonstrated the essential functions of the navy. Vespasian dropped the addition *procurator Augusti* from the praefect's title and, by virtue of that act, barred freedmen from ever again holding the post. His appreciation of the importance of sea power extended even further, for the naval praefecture became at this time one of the greatest military positions in the rapidly developing equestrian hierarchy. Henceforth the *praefectus classis praetoriae Misenen-sis* stood above all the equestrian procurators in the imperial administration and directly below the great praefectures of the watch, the *annona*, and Egypt; the *praefectus classis praetoriae Ravennatis* was of slightly lower rank, inasmuch as he might be promoted to the highest of the procuratorships, that of Lugdunensis and Aquitania, or to the command of the Misene fleet.¹² In terms of salary classification, an important one in the imperial bureaucracy, the praefects of the Italian fleets had thus been advanced from the level of the *sexagenarii*, those receiving sixty thousand sesterces yearly, to at least the ranks of the *ducenarii*, whose stipend was two hundred thousand sesterces; it even appears likely that the praefect of the Misene fleet, praefect of the navy we might say, ranked with the other great praefects as a *trecentarius*, albeit the lowest.¹³ At least three of the fleet commanders of the period after Vespasian eventually became praetorian praefects; ¹⁴ others advanced to the praefecture of the *vigiles*, a *rationibus*, and similar high posts. With the inception of honorific titles in the late second century, the praefect of the Misene fleet (and presumably of the Ravennate fleet), along with the praefects of the watch, the *annona*, and Egypt, was a *vir perfectissimus*, one grade below the praetorian praefect, who bore the title of *vir eminentissimus*.¹⁵

From the reign of Vespasian, then, the praefectures of the Italian fleets were high rungs in the ladder of equestrian promotion.

Men like Pliny the Elder, who died in 79 as praefect of the Misene fleet, came to these posts after a long and varied career.¹⁶ Their training had begun in the *militia equestris*, i. e., in service as praefect of an auxiliary cohort, tribune of a legion, and praefect of an auxiliary squadron of horse, and was continued in various provincial procuratorships of ascending importance, with perhaps extraordinary military commands in time of war. Previous naval experience was unnecessary, although some praefects had served as praefects of a provincial squadron.¹⁷ At each step in the equestrian career marked efficiency was noted, and eventually, after some thirty years of state service, a particularly able *eques* would be chosen to fill a vacancy in the command of an Italian fleet.¹⁸ The praefect's tenure of office was possibly indefinite; at least it varied greatly from praefect to praefect. Iulius Fronto may have commanded the Misene fleet for ten years, while L. Iulius Vehilius Gratus Iulianus, who rose rapidly to the praetorian praefecture, spent one year as praefect of the Ravennate fleet and another as praefect of the Misene fleet.¹⁹ An examination of the inscriptions leads one to believe that the praefects of the second century usually served four or five years, a normal term for high offices in the Roman Empire. In the first century praefects were invariably Italian by birth; a native of Baetica was praefect of the Ravennate fleet and then of the Misene fleet in 134,²⁰ but the Italian equestrian aristocracy seems to have furnished most of the praefects even in the later second century.

The extended civil training of the praefects indicates that the praefecture was essentially an administrative position. The praefect was admiral of his squadron vice the emperor, but occasions for such active command on the seas as the Misene praefect Moschus exercised in 69 were rare. When the entire fleet, or the greater part of it, was called away from its base, the praefect presumably accompanied his ships; for ordinary detachments subordinates more skilled on the sea must have been placed in charge. Confronted by the eruption of Vesuvius in 79, the elder Pliny, who was then praefect at Misenum, thought first as a scientist in ordering a liburnian prepared that he might observe the spectacle more closely, and the phrases of his nephew do not mask the fact

that the praefect made no more than a sporadic attempt to embark refugees after a request for aid. The triumphal insignia are not recorded for any praefect, for naval triumphs vanished along with sea battles.

The praefect was assuredly responsible for the efficiency of his force. Extraordinary missions—the transport of emperors and governors or more serious service in war—followed direct imperial order,²¹ but the routine tasks were presumably left to the praefect's initiative. As we have seen, a clerk of the praefect's staff was sent directly to the governor of Asia for consultation on naval business, an instance which suggests that requests for assistance may have been directed to the praefect without passing through Rome. Efficiency requires maintenance in good condition; upkeep of the elaborate depot at the base harbor, with its *castra*, *praetorium*, barracks, and storerooms, and the replacement or repair of ships and supplies lay directly under the praefect's eye.

Much of the praefect's daily business concerned the men who staffed the supply depots and manned the ships. Officials of the *dilectus* presumably enlisted and assigned the sailors to their fleet, but after their arrival at Misenum or Ravenna orders emanating from the praefect's staff governed their life until discharge. Officers of the praefect enrolled the recruits in their ships; drillmasters trained them in their duties on land and sea; orders from the *praetorium* regulated the daily activity; and problems too important to be settled by the ship's officers rose through a gradual chain of authority to the praefect himself. The penalty of death to deter the mutinous lay within his power, for naval praefects were expressly released from the provisions of the *lex Iulia de vi publica*, "ut sine aliquo impedimento legis Iuliae per eos militare delictum coerceri possit."²² The praefect's control of the various stations was less direct, and in some cases, as in the *castra* at Rome, the commander of the *vexillatio* may have been almost totally freed from his power. Yet over all sailors in the Misene and Ravennate fleets the appropriate praefect had at least nominal authority; if they served their twenty-six year term, the official who discharged them and recommended them for diplomas was their praefect. In the formal state religion the fleet was embodied in the praefect

as the legion in its legate, and the praefect undoubtedly offered to the Genius of the emperor or to the patron divinities the solemn sacrifices which were demanded by feast days or impending naval activity.²³

Only in one respect did another agency of the imperial bureaucracy infringe on the praefect's control of the fleet. The separation of military and financial authority was a standard rule in the Augustan system, and this obtained also in the fleets. The imperial *fiscus* bore the expense of their maintenance as a general charge, and oversaw directly the disbursement of funds for upkeep and pay, the paymasters being slaves of the *familia Augusti* and not sailors. The bookkeepers also belonged at least in part to the *familia* but may have been aided by the praefect's staff.²⁴

At times the praefects of the two Italian fleets acted as civil agents of the imperial government. In the *senatus consultum* of 177/178, designed to lessen the burden of gladiatorial games, the provision recurs that

trans Padum autem perque omnes Italiae regiones arbitrium iniungendum praefectis alimentorum dandis, si aderunt, vel viae curatori, aut si nec is praesens erit, iuridico vel classis praetoriae praefecto.²⁵

In the lack of comparable laws we cannot state whether this clause is exceptional or a standard means of enforcing regulations in Italy, which lacked a regular series of imperial officials. Certainly the praefects tended to acquire powers over the adjoining countryside. Ravenna seems never to have had complete municipal autonomy, and the praefect Clodius Quirinalis escaped punishment for coercing its townsfolk only by committing suicide.²⁶ At Misenum, also, the praefect and his agents had jurisdiction outside the camp; thus in the late second century Alfenius Senecio, subpraefect of the Misene fleet, acted as judge "cum consilio" in a controversy over the proper preservation of graves sold with a piece of property to a Misene sailor at Misenum.²⁷ This dependence of a *civitas* on the imperial administration was, indeed, but an example of the tendency in other sections of the empire during

the late second and third centuries, which in turn reacted on the status of Ravenna and Misenum. In the fourth century the *Notitia Dignitatum* entitled the Ravennate praefect "praefectus classis Ravennatum cum curis eiusdem civitatis," while at Misenum Flavius Marianus, praefect of the fleet and "curator reip. Misena-tium," restored a wooden bridge in the same period.²⁸

For assistance in these manifold duties, military and civil, the praefect could turn to his subpraefect or to extraordinary officials or especially for the daily paper work of administration to the extensive staff of sailors, the *officium*, which duplicated that of the legate of the legion.²⁹ Under the sergeant-major or *cornicularius*, the highest-ranking *principalis* of the fleet, we may place as further *principales* or "sergeants" the *beneficiarii*, promoted by benefice of the commanding officer and used for general work, and from the end of the second century possibly an *actuarius*, whose underclerk, the *exactus*, is known only for the Alexandrian fleet.³⁰ The remainder of the staff usually held the rank of *immunis*. *Librarii*, sufficiently numerous to be differentiated into *dupliciarii*—those who received double pay—and the occasional *principalis*, presumably kept the records of enlistment, promotion, and so forth, while a number of *scribae* dealt with other written material and could be used for various purposes.³¹

Other posts on the praefect's staff were less closely connected with administration. The praefect may have used the *praeco praefecti*, who has thus far come to light in one third-century inscription, as a herald in his religious or judicial duties, or as a means of communication from one ship to another.³² Certain military officers, who occur frequently in the land establishments, are so rare in the fleet that they probably served on the praefect's staff alone, for example, the standard-bearer or *signifer*.³³

Epigraphical evidence does not attest the *subpraefectus* for the Italian fleets until the reign of Nero, but from at least that time on the officer appears to have been a regular subordinate of the praefect.³⁴ Almost invariably the subpraefecture followed directly the *militia equestris*; upon the satisfactory fulfillment of his duties as subpraefect, the *eques* proceeded in all cases known

to the procuratorship of the Alpes Atrectianae.³⁵ The post accordingly ranked among the *sexagenarii* and in the third century carried the third-class honorific title of *vir egregius*.³⁶

The subpraefecture was an insignificant post. It is rarely mentioned by officials who enjoyed an extended career; to judge from the monuments, no praefect of an Italian fleet had been a subpraefect. The duties of the position are obscure; one may perhaps compare the subpraefect to the tribune in the legion, who served as an administrative aide of the legate. The only evidence of his specific duties is embodied in the record of an investigation by Alfenius Senecio which has already been mentioned.

The *praepositus reliquationis* is named thrice in third-century inscriptions. The title indicates that his duties were temporary, and the inscriptions suggest that in the absence of the praefect from the base with the greater part of the fleet this officer was appointed by the emperor to exercise power at the home port.³⁷ When both fleets were summoned for service, the detachments remaining in Italy might be combined under one man; C. Iulius Alexander was *praepositus* of both Italian fleets during the Oriental expedition of Gordian and then praefect of the Misene fleet on its return. The historical accidents which demanded the appointment of such officers will be considered later.

Even more unusual is the office of *praepositus vexill(ationi* or *-ibus)* mentioned in Gordian's reign—exceptional necessity called for special measures, and for a special officer appointed by the emperor to control the necessary detachment of the fleet. Another interim or emergency appointment was that of L. Artorius Castus, *primus pilus*, who became *praepositus* of the whole Misene fleet in the late third century and then praefect of the legion VI Victrix.³⁸

§ 2. NAVARCHI

A year or two before the battle of Actium the "navarchi et trierarchi quei militant Caesari" set up a bilingual inscription to M. Mindius Marcellus, erstwhile praefect of the fleet. In a tablet of 196 the navarchs and trierarchs are similarly associated in honoring M. Aurelius Antoninus (Caracallus), then heir-apparent.³⁹

Clearly the two were important ranks in the navy, closely connected and yet distinct. For an understanding of the organization of the navy, determination of the difference is essential.

Though *ναύαρχος* had originally stood for the "chief of a ship" and *τρίηραρχος* the "chief of a trireme," long before the Romans transliterated these terms they had changed their meaning. In the closing years of the Peloponnesian war Melanchridas was Spartan navarch or admiral; during the Hellenistic age the word became the standard expression for admiral or commander of a squadron. Thus Polybius calls Theophiliscus navarch of the Rhodians at Chios in 201 B. C. The term "trierarch" on the other hand had been carried over to the commander of the quadrireme when Athens began to use that vessel about 330 B. C., and is used in Hellenistic sources to mean "ship's captain" without reference to the ship's class.⁴⁰

In view of these undisputed facts and the deep debt of the later Republican fleets to the Greek cities of the Hellenistic East, it is extraordinary that Mommsen, faced with the term *navarchi et trierarchi*, should have reverted to the original meaning of the words. Such, however, is the case, and the explanation he evolved—that in the Roman fleets the trierarchs commanded triremes and smaller vessels and the navarchs the quadriremes and quinqueremes—has been so deeply embedded in subsequent literature that it will probably never die.⁴¹ Mommsen nevertheless was completely wrong.

On an examination of the epigraphical evidence, any concept of the navarch as a captain quickly vanishes. Navarchs never made reference to a ship on their monuments; trierarchs occasionally did. Navarchs never acted as heirs or executors for men of the ship's company; trierarchs often did. Trierarchs commanded small detachments; navarchs are never recorded in such posts.⁴² As conclusive disproof of the notion that the navarchs commanded vessels larger than triremes, one may adduce the fact that at least five of the provincial fleets, which certainly did not possess quadriremes or quinqueremes, had navarchs.⁴³ And finally, to turn to literature, there is Galen's positive statement: "Of old they called those commanding triremes trierarchs, but now they name all

such, whatever ship they command, even if the ship is not a trireme." ⁴⁴

If the navarch was not captain of a ship, he can have filled only the post of squadron commander. We have no direct proof that imperial fleets were divided into squadrons, but both before and after our period fleets commonly were so divided. Hellenistic and late Republican fleets were often organized on a squadron basis, each unit having sixty ships; in the Byzantine navy, dromons were grouped by threes or fives under a *comes* or *navarchos*.⁴⁵ Vegetius had a notion that the imperial fleets had been divided into ten cohorts under ten tribunes, and although this itself is worse than dubious it is worth noting that the commander of a squadron of the late fourth century who is called *ναύαρχος* by the Greek Zosimus is termed *tribunus* in Ammianus Marcellinus;⁴⁶ in other words, behind the muddled ideas of Vegetius may lie some reference to the navarch's command of a squadron. Fiebigger supposes that the *δεκανοί* of an Italian fleet who set up a Greek inscription to Lucius Verus at the Augusteum in Alexandria were the navarchs, and that their squadrons were accordingly ten ships strong. This bold equation cannot be termed proved, but it has much to commend it; it will be remembered that Augustus picked ten ships for dedication to Actian Apollo, and the unit of ten vessels appears elsewhere.⁴⁷

Under Augustus the navarchy and trierarchy alike were largely filled with skilled Greek sailors, who used their native tongue along with Latin in the dedication set up to M. Mindius Marcellus. One of these navarchs, C. Numisius Primus, settled at Sinope, where he became a priest in the cult of Augustus and held the highest municipal offices. Another, a certain Seleucus from Rhosos in northern Syria, has recently turned up in a lengthy Greek inscription from his home town, which contains several letters of Augustus strongly praising this loyal officer.⁴⁸ Selcucus, who secured a pardon for Rhosos immediately after Actium, served against Sextus Pompey in 36 B. C., possibly as one of the sailors lent by Antony to Octavian in accordance with the Treaty of Tarentum (37 B. C.); after Naulochus he was rewarded by a grant

of Roman citizenship with wide privileges, and continued to act as a navarch for Octavian through the battle of Actium.

Although the grant of citizenship to Seleucus, and also to Numisius, may have been the result of extraordinary conditions, it is quite possible that from an early date the navarchs, unlike the ordinary sailors, received Roman citizenship while they were still in service. The point is clear for the freedmen who served in the early navarchy, for *liberti* normally became citizens on manumission.⁴⁹ As for the others, their names are in every case the Roman *tria nomina*, and the children of navarchs born during service were legitimate, but as we shall see later these are not definite tests of citizenship.⁵⁰ Yet the case of Seleucus attests that free navarchs could be enfranchised before discharge; later, at all events, the navarchs generally were Roman citizens, for they were made eligible by Antoninus Pius for the higher legionary centurionates.

As this equation shows, the navarchy was in many respects comparable to the centurionate. Within the respective establishments each formed the highest grade of officers on permanent tenure, yet neither quite crossed the rigidly preserved line of demarcation between the *miles* and the equestrian or senatorial officer, and one navarch recorded his years of service, *stipendia*, in the fashion of the ordinary sailors.⁵¹ The hopeful dreams of the aspiring recruit in either army or navy could scarcely reach beyond or even so far as these posts; indeed, while the centurion might in rare cases shift to the praetorian centurionate and so eventually rise into the equestrian class, the sailors could not until the reign of Antoninus Pius (137-161) expect promotion beyond the navarchy by transfer to any other branch of the armed services.⁵² Navarchs and centurions usually retired as such, content to become members of the municipal aristocracy in the smaller towns.⁵³

In the first two centuries of the Empire the navarchy was filled by orderly promotion from below. Thus, in the only strictly naval *cursus* preserved, P. Petronius Afrodissius of the Ravennate fleet was advanced from the trierarchy to the navarchy, and then

below the navarchs and trierarchs.⁵⁸ Henzen suggested that the Emperors bestowed the municipal decurionate or "third order," as contrasted with the senatorial and equestrian orders, upon navarchs and trierarchs, who had received the rank of legionary centurion from Pius. Nowhere, however, is the decurionate so entitled and no other branch of the armed service ever received such an honor; furthermore, one navarch gained the municipal decurionate in A. D. 198 only through a regular decree of the local decurions.⁵⁹ Thus far Domaszewski offers the best explanation: the legionary centurionate was opened to the *navarchus princeps* and navarchs by Pius, who first admitted officers of the *vigiles* to the legions; Aurelius and Verus gave the same right to the trierarchs.⁶⁰ The military use of *ordo* in *primi ordines* supports this interpretation.

At all events several inscriptions of the late second and the third centuries do indicate that the navarchs had been admitted to the complicated scale of promotion which embraced every office in the army and led upward through the centurionate to the primipilate and thus into the equestrian order. Examples are not numerous; though the legionary centurionate had lost some of its ancient dignity, tradition was still against such a change, and in most instances the officers' naval training must have precluded satisfactory service on land. No promotion of trierarchs to the centurionate is known; one *navarchus princeps* became *primus pilus*, and in the third century, when old customs were breaking rapidly, another person was promoted from *optio peregrinorum* in the army to the navarchy and thence to the centurionate.⁶¹

§ 3. TRIERARCHI

The determination of the navarch's position has already indicated the nature of the trierarch's post: the trierarch was the ship's captain, whether the ship were the *hexeres Ops* of the Misene fleet or a small craft in a provincial flotilla. Trierarchs also appear occasionally as the commanders of small detachments,⁶² but their main function was the control of the individual ships. In the words of Vegetius (4. 32), the trierarchs "*exceptis ceteris nautarum*

officiis gubernatoribus atque remigibus et militibus exercendis cotidianam curam et iugem exhibebant industriam." Thus we find the trierarchs of two ships which put in at Cythera in 69 acting as the leaders in putting down a pseudo-Nero who had seized the island.⁶³

Although a large number of the sailors as a whole were recruited from inland areas, the trierarchs came, in so far as they disclose their origin, from seacoast peoples. Two of those known were from Dalmatia; many others were furnished by the Greek-speaking shores of the East.⁶⁴ In the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius trierarchs occur who designated themselves, for example, as "Malchio Caesaris trierarchus." Inasmuch as a slave of Octavian would have called himself "so-and-so Caesaris," Mommсен assumed that this Malchio and his fellows were slaves, but the fortuitous discovery of another inscription has shown that our particular Malchio had certainly been freed by Octavian.⁶⁵ In all such cases the genitive "Caesaris" depends on the title "trierarchus" and may be considered an equivalent of the "quei militant Caesari" which appears in the dedication to Mindius Marcellus. These freedmen trierarchs probably were sailors enslaved in the civil wars whom Octavian manumitted to meet the ever pressing need for officers to manage his huge fleet. The wife of Malchio came from the notorious Daphne by Antioch, and his name suggests a Syrian origin; another, Helios, is clearly an easterner.⁶⁶ Under Tiberius, Anthus, a former slave of Livia, was trierarch in the fleet at Forum Iulii, and one of Claudius' captains on the British expedition was his freedman Ti. Claudius Seleucus, who probably came from Syria. The last freedman trierarch thus far known was a Ti. Claudius Zena of the Perinthian fleet under Domitian.⁶⁷ These later cases are most easily explained as promotions of favored freedmen.

The *liberti* trierarchs, as the freedmen navarchs, were surely citizens as a result of their manumission, but by the reign of Claudius many captains were peregrines who received citizenship only as a reward on discharge.⁶⁸ At no time, apparently, did the trierarchs in the Italian fleets share the privileges of the navarchs with regard to enfranchisement before discharge, unless Domas-

zewski is right in thinking that trierarchs were admitted to the legionary centurionate by the grant of Aurelius and Verus.⁶⁹

Generally the trierarchy must have been filled by promotion from below, although only one inscription (VIII 21025) records such advancement. In this instance the trierarch rose from the post of *exactus*. Sometimes the promotion of a skilled sailor came early, for one trierarch (VI 3911) died at the age of thirty; advancement to the navarchy, on the other hand, must have been possible only to the most gifted. Ship captains were normally entitled to honorable discharge after twenty-six years of service, but at least in the first century, when the state did not always retire its veterans on the due date, many served longer. M. Plotius Paulus remained twenty-nine years in the navy; a certain Celsus of the Misene fleet entered the service at the age of seventeen and apparently died under the colors in his sixtieth year.⁷⁰

One can say of the trierarch's pay only that it was lower than that of the navarchs, but the inscriptions of trierarchs reflect a status much better than that of the ordinary sailor. Sums of six and eighteen thousand sesterces were spent on columbaria; stone dedications by trierarchs are more common than for the sailors generally; one trierarch had a lengthy poem carved mourning the loss of his son, and another nameless captain was according to tradition the father of the jurist Pegasus, who became consul and *praefectus urbi* under Vespasian.⁷¹ Or, to turn to less exalted but more certain testimony, one may note Torquatus, son of the Celsus just named, who was admitted into the order of decurions at Misenum and was made duumvir of the colony before his twenty-fifth year—a striking indication of the reputable standing of his trierarch father in the late first century after Christ.

NOTES

¹ Dio 52. 24. 3-4 (the speech of Maecenas) suggests that the praefects of all soldiers in Italy be placed under the praetorian praefect, but Marcel Durry, *Les Cohortes prétorienne* (Paris, 1938), pp. 169-171, justly doubts whether this was the actual practice. *Contra*, Theodor Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* 2. 2 (3rd ed.; Leipzig, 1887), pp. 1118-1120.

² See below, p. 80.

3 Appian, *B. C.* 5. 78, 80; so too Caesar in 49, *ibid.* 2. 41. I may say here the article of Félix Robiou, "Le Recrutement de l'état-major et des équipages dans les flottes romaines au temps de l'Empire," *Revue archéologique* 2. ser. 24 (1872), pp. 142-156, rests so largely on false inscriptions as to be useless.

V 8659, IX 1582, and X 1127 prove that the phrase *praefectus classium praetoriarum Misensis et Ravennatis* is only an economical means of listing two distinct offices.

4 Cf. Tac., *Hist.* 2. 100. As far as the legions are concerned, my statement is completely true only after Caligula withdrew the legion III Augusta from the control of the African proconsul; see J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius* (Oxford, 1934), p. 155.

5 Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*³ 2. 2, pp. 840-869, especially pp. 862-863.

6 III 455 = 7160.

7 *SHA vita Carac.* 6. 7; Dio 78. 13. 2-4. Otto Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian* (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1905), p. 227 n. 1, surely errs in considering Marcius a knight, for he had been made a senator by Caracallus and was praefect at the time of the Emperor's death.

8 *Tribunate and praefectura equitum*: Dess. 2674 (Luna); XIV 2105 (Lanuvium); Tac., *Hist.* 2. 100; on the stones the titles are often combined in *praef eq et class. Praefectura castrorum*: X 4868 (Venafrum), XI 711 (Bononia). *Tribunate only*, V 533 (Tergeste).

9 X 4868; also XI 6344 (Pisaurum), V 533. Inasmuch as the inscriptions down to Nero bear the simple title *praefectus classis*, we cannot always determine the fleet commanded, nor is it possible to establish the precise dates of service for all of the Julio-Claudian praefects.

10 V 533, X 6318 (Tarracina). See also A. N. Sherwin-White, "Procurator Augusti," *Papers of the British School at Rome* 15 (1939), pp. 11-26, who places the changes of Claudius in their true light. He fails to note the attendant bifurcation in the military *cursus* which Durry, *Les Cohortes prétoriennes*, pp. 140-141, points out, but this latter was not rigid for a time (cf. V 533).

11 See the Appendix.

12 XIV 5341; II 1178, V 8659, VI 31856, X 1127, Dess. 9002. From these inscriptions it would seem that promotion from the Ravennate to the Misene fleet was almost a rule after Hadrian.

13 Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, pp. 145, 150, 168 n. 16, classifies both praefects as *ducenarii*, but the fact that the Misene praefect was promoted only to the other great praefectures suggests a higher rank.

14 Cornelius Fuscus, Tac., *Hist.* 3. 12, 42 (cf. *Prosop.*² 2, p. 324 no. 1365); T. Furius Victorinus, Dess. 9002; L. Iulius Vehilius Gratus Iulianus, VI 31856. Note also Dess. 2159, "vice agens praef praet," a term discussed by Durry, *Les Cohortes prétoriennes*, p. 173, and Arthur Stein, *Hermes* 60 (1925), pp. 94-103.

15 VIII 12296; X 3336, 3343, 3344. See Otto Hirschfeld, "Die Rangtitel der römischen Kaiserzeit," *Sitzber. Berlin Akad.* 1901, pp. 579-610.

16 Pliny: Pliny, *Epp.* 6. 16. 4; *IGR* 3. 1015; Theodor Mommsen, "Eine Inschrift des älteren Plinius," *Hermes* 19 (1884), pp. 644-648. The administrative career proper: Hirschfeld, *Verwaltungsbeamten*, pp. 410-465; Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*³ 3. 1, pp. 539-565; Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, pp. 122-171; Wilhelm Liebenam, *Die Laufbahn der Procuratoren bis auf die Zeit Diocletians* (Jena, 1886). To my knowledge no one has noted the great difference between the praefects before and after Vespasian, that is, between a P. Pallius Clodius Quirinalis in 56 and a C. Plinius Secundus in 79.

17 XIV 5341, VI 31856.

18 According to Pliny, *Epp.* 3. 5. 7, his uncle died as praefect at the age of fifty-six. The only certain instance of irregular promotion of an imperial favorite after 71 is that of M. Aquilius Felix, assistant to Septimius Severus in his senatorial condemnations and thereafter praefect of the Ravennate fleet, but even Felix held several procuratorships before the praefecture: *SHA vita lul.* 5. 8, *Pesc. Nig.* 2. 6; X 6657 (cf. *BGU* 156, VI 1585b ll. 26ff.).

19 Fronto was praefect in 129 (Dip. 74), and his name has been restored in Dip. 66 of 118/119. The . . .]one of the latter cannot be Q. Marcius Turbo, praefect in 114; cf. Arthur Stein *s.v.* "Marcius Turbo" (PW). Vehilius: VI 31856; F. Barnabei, "Di un' epigrafe onoraria a L. Iulio Iuliano," *NdS* 1887, pp. 536-553. Tac., *Ann.* 14. 3, 62, shows that Anicetus served at least three years.

20 M. Calpurnius Seneca, II 1178, 1267, 1083. Vehilius may have been a Palmyrene.

21 Cf. Tac., *Ann.* 15. 46.

22 Iulius Paulus, *Sent. ad filium* 5. 26. 2 (G. P. E. Huschke, *Iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae reliquias* 2. 1 [6th ed. by E. Seckel and B. Kuebler; Leipzig, 1911], p. 155; quoted by De la Berge, p. 106). Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, pp. 31, 39, 55, 59, who does not appear to know this passage, does not admit capital jurisdiction even for the legate of a legion and cites Dio 52. 22. 3 as proof. The subject of Roman military law needs a thorough discussion; cf. Theodor Mommsen, *Romisches Strafrecht* (Leipzig, 1899), pp. 28-33; J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law* (Oxford, 1912) 1, pp. 115-126; E. von Nischer in Johann Kromayer and Georg Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegsführung der Griechen und Römer* (Munich, 1928), pp. 533-534.

23 The praefect's religious *cura* of the shrine, which was presumably exercised by C. Sulpicius Caecilianus as *praepositus reliquationis* (X 3342), is discussed by Domaszewski, *Rheinisches Museum* 58 (1903), pp. 387-388.

24 Paymaster: X 3346 (Trajanic in date); Liebenam *s.v.* "dispensator" (PW). Bookkeepers: X 3347, a slave *a rationibus*; XI 17, a freedman *tabularius*, who was perhaps attached to the praefect's staff.

25 II 6278 ll. 42-44, 50-51; see also the copy found at Sardis, *AE* 1909. 184, and Mommsen, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin, 1913) 8, pp. 510-511.

26 Tac., *Ann.* 13. 30.

27 X 3334. With regard to the formulation of the sentence Mommsen remarks of the subpraefect "rei militaris fortasse magis peritus quam iuris civilis," but the actual decision agrees with the praetorian rules of bonitary ownership; cf. H. F. Jolowicz, *Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law* (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 273-276.

28 Ravenna, *Not. Dig. Occ.* 42. 7; Misenum, X 3344. Mommsen's date of the fifth century for this stone seems too late.

29 Apart from the posts of *stator*, *strator*, and *equites*; see Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, pp. 38-39.

30 *Cornicularii*: X 3415 (Misene); A. Betz in *Jahreshefte* 29 (1934), Beibl. col. 325 (Ravennate). *Beneficiarii*: VI 32770; X 3413, *beneficiarius stolarchi* (Fiebiger, pp. 347-348). *Exactus*: VIII 21025. According to Denis van Berchem, *Bull. de la Soc. nat. des antiq.* 80 (1937), pp. 133-137, the *actuarius* was in charge of the military *annona*.

31 X 3438, 3440; cf. Bilabel *s.v.* "librarius" (PW). Since each ship had its clerk and also at times a *librarius*, we cannot certainly identify the clerical members of the praefect's staff.

32 *Eph. ep.* 8. 800 (Aleria); see Étienne Michon, *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* 11 (1891), pp. 113-116, and Ermanno Ferrero, *Atti . . . di Torino* 27 (1892), pp. 1078-1079.

33 X 1080 (Nuceria Alfaterna) is the only one known.

34 V 328 (Parentia). See De la Berge, p. 107.

35 E. g., VIII 17900 (Thamagudes); see the Appendix. Only in IX 5357 is a *praefectura vehiculorum* interposed between the subpraefecture and the procuratorship; in VI 1643 the editors restore "[Cottiarum?]," but some abbreviation of "Atrectianarum" is surely right. The only complete exception is Dess. 9488, on which see below, pp. 190-191.

36 IX 5439 (Falerium); VIII 14729 (Ghardimau; Fiebiger, p. 359).

37 VIII 1322 = 14854 with X 3342 (Tuccabor); Dess. 9221 (Misenum); X 3345 (probably third century); K. H. W. Henzen, *Bull. dell' Inst. di corr. arch.* 1850, p. 128; 1851, p. 117 n. 1 (cited by De la Berge, p. 116). Since C. Sulgius Caecilianus held the position between the legionary centurionate and the primipilate, he was evidently appointed by the emperor.

38 VI 1638, III 1919 = 12791 (near Salona).

39 AE 1925. 93 (Velletri), also in *NdS* 1924, pp. 511-513. On Mindius and his part in the war against Sextus Pompey, cf. Münzer s.v. "M. Mindius Marcellus" (PW). X 3341; note also X 3340 and *Dig.* 37. 13. 1.

40 Melanchridas: Thucydides 8. 6. 5. Theophiliscus: Polyb. 16. 5. 1, also 1. 53. 7, 54. 2; 5. 43. 1, 59. 1. He occasionally uses "navarch" in its original sense (e. g., 1. 21. 4), but throughout Hellenistic literature and papyri this is a secondary meaning; cf. Friedrich Preisigke, *Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten* (Strassburg, 1915-1922), nos. 429, 4225; and also Strack s.v. "nauarchos" (PW).

Trierarch: *IG*² II 1632 ll. 19-22 and *passim* (323/322 B. C.); Philippe Le Bas, *Voyage archéologique* 3 (ed. W. H. Waddington; Paris, 1847), no. 504. Cf. Joachim Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung* 2 (2nd ed.; Leipzig, 1884), p. 509 n. 2.

41 Mommsen *ad CIL* X 3340; A. Martin s.v. "navarchus" in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités*, and Strack s.v. (PW), to cite only the encyclopaedists. This explanation quickly ran into difficulty on the "adiutor trierarchi IIII [i. e., quadriremel Venere]" of X 3391, which was valiantly hurdled by the argument that *trierarchus* could be used as a general term for "captain." The correct explanation had already been suggested by De la Berge, pp. 110-113, and additional proof was advanced by Fiebiger, pp. 363-367 (who does not give due acknowledgment to his predecessor).

42 Ships: III 434, VIII 21025, IX 41, X 3361. Executors: III 3223, X 3360 and 3479, AE 1929. 143. Detachments: see p. 43.

43 *IGR* 1. 1129 (Alexandrian); *IGR* 3. 1006 (Syrian); XII 2412 (German); *Dig.* 36. 1. 48 (British); *Dip.* 3 (Moesian, but see below, p. 158 n. 17).

44 Ed. Kühn 5, p. 897 (quoted by Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung* 2, p. 509 n. 2). Vegetius (4. 32) does place navarchs in command of liburnians but by his era the old titles were so obsolete that he glossed the term by "id est quasi navicularios."

45 Republic: W. W. Tarn, *JRS* 21 (1931), pp. 198-199; *idem*, *JHS* 28 (1908), p. 230 n. 108. Byzantine navy: Leo VI, *Tactica* 19. 22. Is the use of the term *nauarchos* by the latter more than fortuitous?

46 Veg. 4. 32; Ammian. 23. 3. 9; Zos. 3. 13 (compared by Fiebiger, p. 363).

47 *Dekanoi*: *IGR* 1. 1046; Fiebiger, pp. 377-381. Unit of ten: Polyb. 22. 7. 4, 24. 6. 1; Diod. 14. 103. 3. It may be recalled that the *duoviri navales* of the early Republic commanded squadrons of ten ships: Livy 40. 18. 8, 41. 1. 2.

48 Numisius: III 6980; the "Sp. f." in this inscription suggests that he was a Greek by birth and lacked a true Roman filiation. Seleucus: Pierre Roussel, "Un Syrien au service du Rome et d'Octave," *Syria* 15 (1934), pp. 33-74, an

excellent article; M. A. Levi, "La grande iscrizione di Ottaviano trovata a Roso," *Rivista di filologia* 16 (1938), pp. 113-128.

49 Freedman navarch under Tiberius, VI 8927. His wife calls him "vir," a term which implies the right of Roman marriage or *conubium*.

50 Children: X 3351; *Dig.* 36. 1. 48 (46) of about A.D. 83. The navarch C. Iulius Magnus, who gives his tribe (X 8215 of A.D. 198), seems to be a veteran; another (III 14394, Seleuceia) describes himself as "natione Italicus," but this does not prove citizenship. In Dip. 1 of A.D. 52 Claudius gave Roman rights only to trierarchs and sailors, but navarchs may not have been discharged in this year.

51 III 14394. In *Dig.* 37. 13 navarchs and trierarchs are reckoned legally as being sailors, although the passage indicates a sharp distinction in fact.

52 Even the navarch Volusius Proculus, an assistant in the murder of Agrippina, did not receive such promotion, although he expected it: Tac., *Ann.* 15. 51.

53 Navarchs as decurions and duumvirs: III 6980; X 8215.

54 XI 86.

55 Diod. 20. 50. 4; Plut., *Alex.* 66. 2; Strabo 15. 1. 28, 2. 4. In Lucan, *Phars.* 3. 558-566, the *magister* of the flagship, who transmitted the order of Decimus Brutus to the entire fleet, might have been this officer. Imperial *archigubernai* and *principes*: X 3348, 3349, 8215; XI 86; *Dig.* 36. 1. 48 (46).

56 G. C. Pickard and H. Le Bonniec, "Du nombre et des titres des centurions légionnaires sous le Haut Empire," *Revue de philologie* 63 (1937), pp. 112-124.

57 Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, p. 111; X 3348. The navarch was promoted to the simple primipilate, not the primipilate *bis*.

58 Mommsen *ad CIL* X 3340.

59 X 8215. Henzen, *Bull. dell' Inst. di corr. arch.* 1851, pp. 174-176; accepted by Ferrero 1878, pp. 37-38; Fiebigler, pp. 371-377; Chapot, pp. 139-142.

60 *Rheinisches Museum* 58 (1903), pp. 385-386; in *Rangordnung*, pp. 105-106, Domaszewski changed his explanation slightly by considering the grant one of the rank of centurion.

61 X 3348; VIII 1322 = 14854. Domaszewski's restoration (*Rangordnung*, p. 242) of X 3342a to show promotion of a *decurio equitum* in an auxiliary unit via the trierarchy to the centurionate is very dubious; his suggestion that III 10979 (Brigerio) also relates to promotion from the navy is the barest of conjectures. *AE* 1912. 120 cannot be construed to indicate the promotion of a navarch, for it is probably Flavian in date.

The peculiar title *bis navarchus* which appears in VI 32772 and X 3350 has nothing to do with the navarchy proper; see below, pp. 87-88.

62 XIV 110; XIII 7719, 8036; Tac., *Hist.* 2. 16. W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments* (Cambridge, 1930), p. 164, suggests that a liburnian in the Augustan period had only a *gubernator* and *proreus*, but at least later it was usually commanded by a trierarch (III 434, VIII 21025, X 3361). In the German fleet of A.D. 69, *gubernatores* possibly did command some ships; cf. Tac., *Hist.* 4. 16.

63 Tac., *Hist.* 2. 9; cf. *ibid.* 3. 12.

64 X 3361, XI 71; VI 3621, 8929, 32778, VIII 21025, *IGR* 4. 151.

65 IX 41; *AE* 1913. 216; Conrad Cichorius, *Römische Studien* (Leipzig, 1922), pp. 257-261. In IX 41, it is now clear, Malchio's *nomen* was omitted because his wife's name came first. For Mommsen's full argument, see the first section of Chapter V.

The *veterani Augusti nostri* of X 3544, 3548, 8212, 8213; XIV 235, 4497; *AE* 1892. 22 are from the late second century; cf. X 3354, "[tr] Augg."

66 VI 8929, X 3357. "M. Plotius Paulus qui et Zosimus tr Aug" of VI 3621 may be a free trierarch of Octavian, like the navarch Seleucus, but the character

of the inscription does not quite fit so early a period. In X 3356 the "c" following "tr Aug" may perhaps be read as "c(astae)" with the following "coniugi."

67 Anthus, XII 257; Seleucus, XIII 3542 (Gesoriacum); also X 3358, a freedman of Tiberius and Livia, and VI 8928, a trierarch of Tiberius. Zena, *IGR* 1. 781 of A. D. 88/90. V 1048 (with *CIL* V, p. 1025) probably does not refer to the trierarchy.

68 Dip. 1; Dip. 24 of the Egyptian fleet (A. D. 79), granted to a sailor "ex remigibus," suggests that the constitution had also a list of trierarchs. Note also VIII 21025, X 3356.

69 X 3361 may refer to a veteran; cf. Mommsen, *Herthes* 16 (1881), pp. 467-468, and Dess. 5516. In the provincial fleets, the decreased distinction between legionaries and auxiliaries toward the end of the second century occasionally brought a Roman citizen to the trierarchy: III 4319 (Brigetio), 14214³⁴ (Chersonesus, A. D. 185).

70 VI 3621, *AE* 1930. 3. Cf. J. E. Dunlap, "A New Inscription from Pozzuoli," *American Journal of Archaeology* 2. ser. 33 (1929), pp. 393-397.

71 X 3359, 3361. An ordinary sailor spent only two thousand sesterces in X 3360. Dedications: X 3337 to Jupiter Striganus; XI 555 (Cesena) to Silvanus; see also X 3342a. Trierarch's son, X 8131. Pegasus: Scholiast on Juvenal 4. 77; *Dig.* 1. 2. 2. 53. Pegasus was not necessarily a freedman's son, as some modern writers assume.

CHAPTER IV

THE ITALIAN FLEETS: SHIPS AND CREWS

§ 1. THE SHIPS

THE squadrons of the Empire inherited and used throughout their existence a type of warship no longer found in modern fleets. This was the long, low war galley, a vessel which had one decisive advantage in the fact that its motion was based on the only certain, controllable source of power available in the ancient world.¹ When under oars the galley was independent of the winds, which blow more fitfully in the Mediterranean than in the Atlantic, and could thereby more satisfactorily fulfill its duties in communication and transport; in the battle itself, for which the warship was primarily designed, its superiority over the sailing ship was even greater. Here the galley became a guided projectile tipped by a ram, the movements of which were necessarily quick and abrupt.

The ancient warship, however, had also certain grave defects. The power of the rowers being limited and easily expended, the hull and equipment of the galley were lightened as far as possible, and spare room was narrowly restricted. Since ancient shipwrights had at their disposal only wood and cables, warships could not surpass a certain size lest their backs be broken in rough weather. The very largest were less than two hundred feet in length, and the *dekeres* of Antony at Actium stood but ten feet above the water.² As a result ancient galleys were not very seaworthy nor even stable; the Greek variety is not inaptly likened to a racing shell by a modern scholar, and Roman warships, which were built on a heavier pattern, were none too sturdy. Lucan mentions a galley at the battle off Massilia in 49 B. C. which capsized when all its crew ran to one gunwale.³ So far as the scanty evidence permits one to judge, the *fabri navales* and the *architecti* in the dockyards

at Ravenna and Misenum continued to launch heavier vessels suitable to the Roman boarding tactics, yet in the reign of Nero a great part of the Misene fleet was lost in a storm off Cumae.⁴

Accordingly Roman and Greek warships alike were unable to keep the sea for long periods. Even moderate seas were dangerous, and in any event the crew quickly became cramped in its narrow quarters. The rowers also wearied, and on long voyages they probably served in shifts which drove the galley forward at a relatively slow pace; when the wind was favoring, a mast and big square sail were hoisted, in addition to the small sail at the prow. In winter the fragile warships, lacking log, compass, or sextant, were normally laid up, although the more solidly built commercial craft occasionally ventured winter navigation in the Empire.⁵ Blockade and siege by sea were thus rarely successful in antiquity; in our period, the nature of the galley dictated the establishment of subsidiary stations and provincial fleets in those sectors of the Mediterranean which needed special attention. All in all, the advantages of galleys seem to modern eyes almost outweighed by their weaknesses, but they were in the Mediterranean sufficiently decisive to ensure the retention of the galley until the introduction of steam.

Within their general classification as galleys, the ships of the imperial fleets were specialized on the basis of function and power into various types which were in the main taken over from Greek naval experience. In the inscriptions, indeed, one finds only the Greek titles *trieres*, *quadrieres*, *penteres*.⁶ The exact meaning of these terms has long been debated; but since the problem is of minor significance in the present connection, a brief description of the several types, as I understand them, will be sufficient.⁷

The standard warship of the Hellenistic and Roman Republican fleets, the *penteres* or quinquereme, lost its pre-eminence after Actium, but continued to be used in small numbers in the Misene and Ravennate fleets. The *quadrieres* or quadrireme also appears, and in rather greater numbers.⁸ In the quinquereme five men seem to have pulled each great oar; for the quadrireme there is no sound evidence, but it is possible that four men sat in a group, as the three in a trireme, each rower pulling an individual oar.

The Misene fleet had also one larger vessel, the *hexeres Ops*. The evidence for this, which comes from Rome, Ostia, and Misenum, suggests that it was an imperial flagship.⁹ The crews of these greater ships were substantially larger than those of triremes, for a quinquereme under Gaius had a complement of four hundred rowers.¹⁰

The prevalent interpretation of Actium as the Victory of the Liburnians, which has already been examined, carries with it the equally unacceptable corollary that Augustus and his successors used a "light cutter" exclusively in the imperial fleets. In point of fact, the inscriptions show that the great bulk of ships in the Italian fleets were triremes, which thus regained the place they had held in Greek fleets of the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ. At Athens this type of ship had been roughly one hundred and twenty by twenty feet, and drew about three feet. On each side it had usually twenty-five groups of three rowers each, a total of one hundred and fifty oarsmen which with supernumeraries and officers of various sorts made a crew of about two hundred men.¹¹ The rowers in each group seem to have been staggered inward, upward, and to the stern; that is, the oarsman nearest the side of the boat sat slightly below and forward of the oarsman nearest the center of the ship, a complicated arrangement which saved space. The return to the trireme, in which each man pulled one oar as against the quinquereme with its five men to an oar, denoted an increased emphasis on rowing skill in the imperial navy, for while only one or two men of each five in a quinquereme needed to be trained, all three in each group in a trireme required experience. To judge from the Italian galleys of the early modern period, a trireme was also more efficient than a larger vessel of the other system.¹²

In essentials a Misene trireme showed remarkably slight change from the trireme of Periclean Athens. At the base of the prow jutted forth a ram of bronze and wood, almost useless now in an era without sea battles. Above the ram the prow pushed forth in a *proembolium*, usually carved to represent some animal, and then swelled out and back in a lofty volute adopted from the Etruscans. On the sides of the prow were the mystic eyes, a token of the

warship in antiquity, and other carved figures; these latter usually indicated the name of the ship, which might be that of a great river, *Rhenus*, *Danuvius*, *Euphrates*, *Padus*, a deity or abstract virtue, *Cupido*, *Concordia*, *Pax*, *Libertas*, *Iustitia*, *Pietas*, a hero, or even in far memory of Athens' glory *Salamina* and *Athenonice*.¹³ The deck aft of the prow was low and disappeared in the middle about the mast, which could thus be raised and lowered; at the prow was a second smaller mast, inclined forward. The poop rose somewhat above the waist and was the focus of ship and crew, with the steersman, the *tutela* or image of the ship's patron divinity, and sometimes a cabin for the trierarch.¹⁴ Over this curved the lofty sternpost or *aplustre*, radiating in four or five fingers, where standards and lanterns might be placed. On each side of the poop hung a steering oar; ¹⁵ beside one oar an anchor was suspended.

The one other class of warship used in the imperial fleets, the liburnian, differs from these triremes, quadriremes, and quinqueremes in that the term *liburna* designates, not a system of oarage, but rather a style of construction. As used originally by the Dalmatian pirate tribe, the Liburni, the ship probably resembled an early Greek *pentekontor*, but by the late Republic it had become a bireme, that is, a vessel with two men in each group in the style of a trireme. The liburnian occurs in limited numbers in the Italian fleets; in the provincial squadrons it was apparently the standard type, and the river vessels on Trajan's Column with their two vertically distinct rows of oars are probably to be considered liburnians.¹⁶ The distinguishing marks of liburnian construction are unfortunately not clear, apart from the fact that it produced a fast ship; by some obscure process it seems to have been taken over in the larger vessels, for Tacitus and Suetonius tended to use the term as a loose synonym for warship. This equation became complete only in the writers of the Later Empire.¹⁷

An Italian fleet was thus made up of war galleys with varying speeds and sizes, which might be used in conjunction or separately as the occasion demanded. Unfortunately we have little evidence as to the impression which the Misene or Ravennate fleet as a whole would give to the spectator. The reliefs of Trajan's Column

are inadequate, and the literature of the Empire affords but one detailed sketch of a great fleet:

Cornua Romanae classis validaeque triremes
 quasque quater surgens extracti remigis ordo
 commovet et plures quae mergunt aequore pinus,
 multiplices cinxere rates. Hoc robur aperto
 oppositum pelago. Lunata classe recedunt
 ordine contentae gemino crevisse liburnae.
 Celsior at cunctis Bruti praetoria puppis
 verberibus senis agitur molemque profundo
 invehit et summis longe petit aequora remis.

Although Lucan is describing Decimus Brutus' fleet at Massilia in 49 B. C., his lines will fit both the fleet of Augustus at Actium and the Misene squadron, for the ships of each ranged from the liburnian up through the *hexeres*.¹⁸ The coincidence is scarcely accidental; a fleet thus composed included all the types of galleys which the Romans found useful.

§ 2. THE CREWS

The complement of one of these warships formed one of the most complex units to be found in any branch of the Roman service, for the crew had both military and naval functions. Its military and administrative framework was borrowed from the army; in the special organization for its naval duties Greek influence was paramount. Recruitment of Hellenized sailors had become so great in the first century before Christ that when Augustus gave the Roman imperial fleet its definitive form Greek experience was incorporated inextricably into the naval fabric, more so even than in the fleets of the earlier Republic. The Romans adopted the Greek titles for ship's officers, and along with the titles, presumably, the relative rank of the posts, which had long been fixed in Greek waters. The order in which they appear in a dedication by a Coan ship at Samothrace 84/82 B. C.—*τρίηραρχος, κυβερνήτης, πρωρεύς, κελυστής, πεντηκόνταρχος, ἱατρός*—recurs, for instance, in a Rhodian ship of the second century B. C. and in

the complements of five Athenian ships at the beginning of the fourth century B. C. The Latin poet Claudian, in A. D. 399, echoes Aristophanes in asserting that a sailor first rose to be an overseer of the rowers, then *proreus*, and finally *gubernator*.¹⁹

Naval activities of the crew may be divided into three phases: direction, motion, and maintenance, each with its special officers. On the poop the *gubernator*, κυβερνήτης, managed or supervised the movement of the two steering oars and controlled the sailors in the aft part of the ship. Since the steersman had also general responsibility for navigation, veteran sailors usually directed the helm, and by reason of their higher pay could afford more elaborate monuments, one of which shows their steering oars.²⁰ Some bore Greek *cognomina*, but Africans are met, and one steersman was even a Pannonian. On the prow was the *proreta*, προρεύς, who was the chief assistant of the *gubernator*. He controlled the forward part of the ship and relayed to the steersman information on shoals and rocks.²¹

To obtain controlled motion, a rhythmical beat and supervision of the oarsmen must be established. These duties fell chiefly to the *celeusta*, κελευστής, also termed *pausarius*, who might give the stroke vocally with the rowers joining in a sort of refrain after the fashion of a sea-chantey, or might use a *symphoniacus*, the Greek *πρηραύλης* or flutist. No special titles distinguished the overseers of the rowers, the Greek *τοίχαρχοι*, but the numerous sailors who styled themselves simply *duplicarii* may have been such officers. To manage the sails each vessel also had a few *velarii* whose special skill gave them double pay.²²

The duties of various petty officers centered in the maintenance of men and matériel. Of cooks we know nothing, but every crew had its *medicus duplicarius*, whose skill was extremely limited.²³ The *nauphylax* was presumably responsible for the care and physical upkeep of the ship and is perhaps the official who replaced the Greek *πεντηκόνταρχος*.²⁴ In these capacities he would have supervised the *fabri*, whose important duties aboard ship brought a much higher position than in the land forces. Usually they received double pay, and their skill as trained workmen and carpenters at times kept them in service beyond the usual term.²⁵

The simple administrative machinery of the Roman warship owed nothing to Greek precedent. A *beneficiarius* headed the trierarch's staff, which corresponded almost exactly to that of the equestrian tribune in the legion; beneath him were a *secutor*, i. e., an aide who preserved discipline and perhaps passed down the trierarch's commands, and one or two clerks of various kinds. The *scriba*, the regular ship's clerk, would normally forward the routine reports to the central administrative offices at Misenum and Ravenna, and may have composed letters home for the crew; other types which appear each in one or two inscriptions are the *adiutor* or higher clerk, the *librarius*, chiefly concerned with the financial records, and the *exceptor* or stenographer.²⁶ These latter were perhaps carried only on the larger ships; or again, they may have been enrolled on the ship's strength simply for administrative reasons, and actually served in the praefect's staff.

Even the religious facet of the crew's life finds brief reflection in the titles of its officers. The *coronarius* of the trireme *Dana* in the Ravennate fleet probably bedecked the *tutela* and the ship with crowns of flowers "festis ac sacris diebus,"²⁷ and a permanent *victimarius* perhaps slew in solemn sacrifice the offerings presented by the trierarch on behalf of the entire crew. Here again, the only *victimarius* known, who was entered in the roster of the bireme *Fides*, may have been attached to the praefect's staff for fleet sacrifices.²⁸

Superimposed on the Greek naval organization of the crew into rowers, sailors, and officers, lay a Roman military framework which cut athwart these distinctions. The crew of each warship, regardless of its size, formed one *centuria* under its *centurio* (*classicus*) in the manner of a legionary century. In this *centuria* every member of the crew had his place: clerks, doctors, and even steersmen identify themselves as *milites* and ascribe themselves to the ship's century; one *gubernator* set up a statue of himself with a sword on flank.²⁹ Ulpian did no more than follow the admiralty tables of organization when he stated that "in classibus omnes remiges et nautae milites sunt."³⁰ The sailors themselves named their ship in inscriptions or followed the military custom of giving their centurion; placing the symbol *q* for *centuria* be-

fore the name of the ship, e. g. *q quadrieri Fide*, was a frequent compromise to indicate their dual activity.³¹ In any case they jealously claimed their lawful title of soldiers, and only in one inscription, of early date, does a sailor call himself *nauta* rather than *miles* or *manipularis*.³² Although the uniform aboard ship seems to have been an armless, short tunic, on the third-century naval tombstones at Athens the sailors carry the light auxiliary spear or *hasta* with round shield and generally a sword, and wear *sagum* or *paenula*.³³

This constitution of the crew as a military unit surely accompanied Augustus' establishment of the permanent fleets. In the civil wars he had continued Caesar's custom of detailing a legionary centurion and legionary soldiers to serve aboard each ship,³⁴ but these marines were withdrawn when the necessity which had brought their detachment ended. Yet the navy continued to be a part of the military establishment of the empire, and military exigencies might require the joint action of a whole crew;³⁵ since there were no legions in Italy to provide marines, the naval century was an inevitable step in organization. The imperial navy, that is, returned to the spirit of the Athenian navy under Pericles, when every sailor was also a soldier. Though full evidence from the fleets in the Augustan period is lacking, the *vigiles*, to which the navy was closely akin, were organized in centuries from their inception in A. D. 6—the Roman mind knew no other system for a military group which was not semi-barbarian. Tacitus mentions both a centurion and a trierarch in recounting Agrippina's death in 59, while an inscription of several decades before 71 shows the equation of ship and century.³⁶

Since the steersmen and the other naval officers cannot have had time or ability to learn two professions well, this organization of naval centuries must in actual practice have had the result not only of the general exercise of all the sailors in the use of arms but also of the special training of a few members of the crew for running fights with pirates or for boarding operations. An Athenian trireme at the beginning of the fourth century had some ten marines and a Coan quadrireme in 84/82 B. C. twenty; but evidence for such persons in the Roman imperial navy is limited to

a distinction by Tacitus between sailors and marines in the German fleet.³⁷ One is tempted to see in those who called themselves *manipulares* the more definitely military part of the ship's complement, but the word is simply a synonym for *miles* rather frequently employed in the Misene area; the only Ravennate sailor so to style himself was buried at or near Naples.³⁸ In any case the formal, sharp distinction between rowers and marines which was current in the Republic must have vanished in the Empire, for it was incompatible with the centuriate organization.

The success with which the Romans adapted their standard military unit to fit the peculiar conditions of the navy illustrates their military genius. Since each ship was a self-contained unit and the occasions on which crews of several vessels acted in conjunction were rare, it was unnecessary to organize the centuries into cohorts. In truth such a step would have been made especially difficult by the fact that the century on a quinquereme was much stronger than that on a liburnian.³⁹ The elaborate hierarchy of the legionary century was pared down to meet the needs of the simpler ship unit; of the three chief *principales* in a century, the *signifer*, *optio*, and *tesserarius*, the naval century required regularly only the *optio* or second-in-command. Since the individual ship with its *tutela* and outwardly distinguishing characteristics had no great need for a *signum* or standard, the lone *signifer* thus far known was probably flagbearer for the fleet; both Trajan's Column and literary sources show that the *praetoria navis* of the admiral was marked by lanterns at night and by a flag in the daytime.⁴⁰ The *tesserarius*, or sergeant of the watch, was useful only on shore, and the one naval *tesserarius* known occurs in a detachment of the Ravennate fleet operating on land against an Umbrian robber.⁴¹ The military musicians were of lessened importance aboard ship and named their posts rarely; one *cornicen* and two *bucinatores* are attested, but the *tubicen* has not yet turned up, although Lucan indicates that the *tuba* was used to order sailing.⁴²

Military matters were left almost entirely to the centurion, for the trierarch normally did not even carry a sword. The centurion supervised the training of the sailors by the *armaturae*, directed their military actions, and punished them with his vinestock, the

centurion's badge of rank. The post was the reward of long, capable service and was often given to natives of inland areas, in contrast with the trierarchy; thus C. Aemilius Severus, a Pannonian, died as centurion of the Ravennate trireme *Hercules* after twenty-two years of service.⁴³ The pride in discipline which placed a *vitis* on his tombstone may explain the fact that sailors turned rather to the trierarchs and *optiones* than to their centurions when they desired some officer to mark their graves.⁴⁴ Yet the cleavage between centurion and soldier, though great, appears less deep than in the legions, and the discussion in the following chapter on the conditions of service for the sailor will be applicable throughout to the centurion and to all subaltern officers. The complicated scheme of promotion for legionary centurions did not exist in the navy; specially qualified centurions probably advanced to the trierarchy, although one suspects that the *gubernator* more often possessed the necessary qualifications for the higher post.

A small group of military officers assisted the centurion. The chief aide, the *optio*, might normally expect promotion to the centurionate. Of his auxiliary capacities, which covered a wide range in the land establishment, the only one known in the navy is his supervision of the sick.⁴⁵ A further aide was the *suboptio*, who does not occur in the other armed forces;⁴⁶ possibly the *optio* and *suboptio* between them controlled the marines on prow and stern, while the centurion commanded the whole.

The only purely military administrative officer aboard ship was the *armorum custos*, who kept and repaired the arms of the crew while they acted as rowers. The importance of the post is suggested by the mature age at which it was obtained and the frequency with which it is noted on monuments; one inscription suggests that quadriremes and quinqueremes, with their large crews, had two such officers.⁴⁷ Of further offices there is no trace. Military functions were not deeply specialized in the rudimentary ship century, and the petty naval officers already described took over many of the duties carried on in the orderly and supply rooms of a legion.

The niceties of the interrelation between naval and military

organization aboard ship, or on shore, remain dark to us. We know only that the naval framework, marked by a more particular specialization of duties and by the supremacy of the trierarch aboard ship, was essentially the more important. The *gubernatores* and other naval officers were technically members of the century, a point which presumably means that the centurion ranked directly after the trierarch and above the steersman; yet one cannot say whether the two sets of officers were fully merged into one hierarchy. It would seem more logical that the centurion, while at sea, should command only the small group of marines and have no other authority, and that during service of the entire crew on land the naval ranks would be generally disregarded and the centurion become chief. The further question of promotion is as obscure; sailors may have been shifted from naval to military posts and back again, or may have moved up in one branch. If the Q. Arruntius Valens of two separate sources is the same person, the *suboptio* could become an *optio*, but in the particular case he changed his ship in the promotion.⁴⁸ The distinction between *principales*, the lower officers whose rank released them from the daily *munera*, and the *immunes*, those exempted from some duties by reason of the compensating tasks they performed, is much less important in the navy than in the army.⁴⁹ The naval officers never referred to the distinction, because it was a military, not a naval matter; apart from the *optio* and such *medici*, *fabri*, *scribae*, and so on as gained the rank of *principalis*, the lesser military officers were usually *immunes*.

NOTES

1 Armchair experts occasionally dealt with this problem of propulsive power; the fourth-century *De rebus bellicis liber*, published by Salomon Reinach, "Un Homme à projets du Bas-Empire," *Revue archéologique* 5. ser. 16 (1922), especially pp. 242-250, 263, suggested oxen-operated paddlewheels.

2 Orosius 6. 19. 9. Cf. Tarn, *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments*, pp. 139-141; *idem*, "The Oarage of Greek Warships," *The Mariner's Mirror* 19 (1933), especially p. 74.

3 Lucan, *Phars.* 3. 647-652; Tac., *Ann.* 14. 5. Roman warships: Tarn, *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments*, p. 124; Lucan, *Phars.* 3. 556-557; Polyb. 1. 22. 3; Appian, *B. C.* 5. 106. The tendency to stress boarding over maneuver,

and so to build heavier vessels, occurs also in the Hellenistic fleets but in lesser degree; cf. Franz Miltner *s.v.* "Seekrieg" (PW), cols. 903-905.

4 *Fabri*: X 3418, 3419, 3424, 3425; XI 56. *Architecti*: X 3392, possibly 3393. *Artifices* appear in a *factio* or society under an *optio* in X 3479 (cf. L. Lammert *s.v.* "optio" [PW]); the *caementarius* (X 3414) and the *ergodota* (*AE* 1899. 35) were perhaps employed in the yards. The vast commercial yards at Ostia and Ravenna may also have been used; see J. P. Waltzing, *Les Corporations professionnelles chez les Romains* (Louvain, 1896) 2, p. 77; 4, pp. 19-20. There is, however, no good evidence that these were state-owned in the first two centuries of the Empire. Catastrophe off Cumae: Tac., *Ann.* 15. 46.

5 Shifts: Xen., *Hell.* 6. 2. 29; Tarn, *JHS* 25 (1905), p. 145 n. 24. In battle the speed of the trireme could rise to six or more knots per hour: Josef Kopecky, *Die attischen Trieren* (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 59-60. On the general question of seaworthiness, see especially A. W. Gomme, "A Forgotten Factor of Greek Naval Strategy," *JHS* 53 (1933), pp. 18-24. To Suetonius (*Aug.* 17) it was remarkable that Augustus "in nave victor pernoctaverit" after Actium; the same passage illustrates the danger of winter navigation for warships.

6 The Latin equivalents, *triremis* and so on, never appear. Cf. VI 1063, 1064, 3095, 32771; IX 43; XI 3522; Dess. 2838, 9218.

7 I have dealt with the matter at greater length in "The Ancient Warship," *Classical Philology* 35 (1940), pp. 353-374.

8 Consult the list of ship names in Ferrero 1899, pp. 263-265, or the fuller list of Miltner *s.v.* "Seewesen" (PW).

9 VI 3119, 3163, 3170 (?); X 3611; XIV 232. From VI 3168 it even appears that Ravennate sailors served on the ship.

10 Pliny, *H. N.* 32. 4. A Roman quinquereme in the first Punic war had three hundred rowers and a temporary detachment of one hundred and twenty soldiers (Polyb. 1. 26. 7).

11 Size: Kopecky, *Die attischen Trieren*, pp. 56-59; Tarn, *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments*, pp. 139-140. Crew: Thucyd. 8. 29. 2; Diod. 14. 60. 6; Xen., *Hell.* 1. 5. 4-7.

12 Luigi Fincati, *Le Triremi* (2nd ed.; Rome, 1881), translated in Admiral Serre, *Les Marines de guerre de l'antiquité et du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1885), pp. 162, 197.

13 Miltner gives a full list of ship's names *s.v.* "Seewesen" (PW). My description draws chiefly from the ships of Trajan's Column and the Praenestine relief, on which see below. The survival of the ram is attested by Dio 74. 13. 2; cf. also Francesco Gneocchi, *I medaglioni romani* 2 (Milan, 1912), plate 105 no. 8.

14 The Greek custom that the *tutela* divinity named the ship was perhaps rare in the imperial navy, but in *AE* 1927. 180 a sailor called his ship "tutela Tauro" (cf. Ovid, *Trist.* 1. 10. 1). A thus far unique *scenicus principalis* (X 3487) is connected with the cabin or *scaena* by Ferrero 1878, p. 60, who quotes Pollux 1. 89.

15 On ancient methods of steering, see especially Eugène de Saint-Denis, "Le Gouvernail antique," *Revue des études latines* 12 (1934), pp. 390-397.

16 Conrad Cichorius, *Die Reliefs der Traianssäule* (Berlin, 1896-1900), plates 25, 26, 34, 35, 58, 59, 61, 63. The term *biremis* occurs in inscriptions only in the abbreviation "II" in VI 3127 (Chapot, p. 101 n. 1); the *bicrōta* (*δίκρωτος*), found in V 1956, was a bireme differing from the liburnian type. Cf. Lucan, *Phars.* 3. 533-534 (quoted in the text); Appian, *Ill.* 3; Tarn, *JHS* 25 (1905), p. 148 n. 41.

17 Suet., *Aug.* 17; Tac., *Hist.* 2. 16, 35, 3. 12, 77; Firmicus Maternus, *Mathesis* 8. 30. 4, 8. 31. 10 (on which see Franz Cumont, *L'Égypte des astrologues* [Brussels, 1937], pp. 209-213); above, p. 8. Tacitus and Suetonius still employ *tri-*

remis when exactness is required, e.g., "triremium plerasque et minora navigia passim" (Tac., *Ann.* 15. 46). For the reading "deceris Liburnicas" in Suet., *Calig.* 37. 2, Cecil Torr, *Ancient Ships* (Cambridge, 1894), p. 16, suggests "de cedris Liburnicas." Liburnian fast: Orosius 6. 19. 8; Appian, *B. C.* 5. 106; Tarn, *JRS* 21 (1931), p. 193.

18 Lucan, *Phars.* 3. 529-537. Actium: Florus 2. 21. 6. On the *Aeneid*, see below, p. 171. The Praenestine relief gives an admirably clear example of an isolated great ship in the period of Octavian's civil wars: Franz Miltner, "Das praenestinische Biremenrelief," *Jahreshefte* 24 (1929), pp. 88-111; Robert Heidenreich, "Zum Biremenrelief aus Praeneste," *Mitt. des deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Römische Abteilung* 51 (1936), pp. 337-346. Whatever it is, it is not a bireme.

19 IGR 1. 843; Hermann Collitz, *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften* (Göttingen, 1899) 3. 1, no. 4335; IG² II and III 1951; Claudian, *De cons. Manl. Theod.* 42-46; Aristophanes, *Knights* 541-544. Pollux 1. 96, 98 mentions some of these officials; on their duties, see Augustin Cartault, *La Trière athénienne* (Paris, 1881), pp. 162-167, 226-234. The Greek influence on Latin naval terminology is thoroughly discussed by Eugène de Saint-Denis, *Le Vocabulaire des manœuvres nautiques en Latin* (Macon, 1935).

20 X 3437a; their responsibility, Tac. *Ann.* 15. 46. L. Licinius Capito died at the age of sixty-three after forty-five years' service (XIV 238), and the lowest service recorded for a steersman is fourteen years (X 3433). Greek *cognomina*, X 3430, 3432; Africans, X 3433, 3435; Pannonian, XIV 238.

21 X 3482-3485; Ferrero 1878, p. 57 n. 15.

22 *Celeusta*: XII 5736 (Forum Iulii). *Pausarius*: Dess. 2867 (Bacoli), who quotes Sen., *Epp.* 56. 5, "pausarium . . . voce acerbissima remigibus modos dantem." *Symphoniacus*: IX 43 (Brundisium); see De la Berge, pp. 115-116, and Ps.-Asconius, *Div. in M. Caecil.* p. 52 (ed. Stangl). *Dupliciarii*: VI 3169, 32771; X 3503-3508, 3882; XI 343. *Velarii*: X 3499, 3500.

23 Two *medici* died in their twenties after five years' service (VI 3910, XI 29); the post had a low rank in the land establishments, Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, pp. 15, 45. O. Jacob has not yet published a sequel to his study of doctors in the Republican army (*L'Antiquité classique* 2 [1933], pp. 313-329). The *diaetarii* of Dig. 4. 9. 1. 3 were commercial supercargoes.

24 Inscriptions use *naofylax* or *naufylax* (except X 3450 and XI 43); see below, p. 85. The duties of the *subunctor* (X 3498), *nonagenarius* (X 3456), *strig.* (X 3495) are not clear.

25 Forty-eight years of service, X 3420; twenty-eight years, X 3419 (possibly third-century, however). *Dupliciarii*, X 3422-3426, XI 56; *principalis*, X 3427. Only X 3418-3421 and XI 6737 were simple *fabri*. Cf. Camille Jullian s.v. "fabri" in Daremberg-Saglio 2. 2, p. 958.

26 X 3412, 3494, 3391, 3439 (*librarius* on a quadrireme); XI 77; *Eph. ep.* 8. 430 (Misenum); Veg. 2. 7; Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, pp. 14-15, 40-41.

27 XI 30; Firm. Mat., *Math.* 4. 21. 6. Cf. Virgil, *Aeneid* 4. 418 and *Georgics* 1. 303-304; Suet., *Vitel.* 10. 2.

28 X 3501. This inscription is known only through one transcript and is either spurious or incorrectly copied. The abbreviation "II" for a bireme is very rare, the sailor surely did not enlist at the age of eight, and a *victimarius* who was a *principalis* is an extraordinary officer for a bireme.

29 III 7290; VI 3910; X 3380, 3385, 3434. The expression "Valeri Rufi III Neptuno" in VI 3165 (also IX 42) does not indicate that one ship had two centuries but probably results from a pedantic desire for fullness (see also Fiebigler, p. 389). In the unique "trq Zenonis" of X 7288, the mason apparently

omitted the name of the ship (Fiebiger, p. 332 n. 1). *Centuria* in full is found only in XI 3533; *centurio classicus* (*classiarius*), in Tac., *Ann.* 14. 8, VIII 9386, XI 4654.

30 *Dig.* 37. 13.

31 VI 1063, where the *vigiles* use *q Serotini*, etc. The use of *q* and also less commonly γ to designate both centurion and century makes uncertain the correct reading of several naval inscriptions. Legal documents give the ship only, e. g., *AE* 1896. 21, *AE* 1922. 135.

32 Dess. 9218 (Brundisium). The term *classici* is chiefly literary and occurs but five times in inscriptions; diplomas use *classici* (Dip. 32, etc.) or less frequently *remiges* (Dips. 1, 24).

33 III 557, 6109, 7290, 7327 (Thessalonica); Fiebiger, plates 4-7; Cichorius, *Die Reliefs*, plates 24, 25. Cf. De la Berge, p. 164; Paul Coussin, *Les Armes romaines* (Paris, 1926); below, p. 162 n. 75.

34 On Actium, see Orosius 6. 19. 8, Plut., *Antony* 64. XI 4654 (Tuder), a centurion of the Forty-first legion of Augustus and also *centurio classicus*; X 18 (Locri), a centurion of the legion XXX Classica, possibly used on ships; V 2501 (Ateste), a soldier who took his *cognomen* from Actium, "Actiacus."

35 E. g., Tac., *Hist.* 2. 9.

36 Tac., *Ann.* 14. 8; IX 42 (Brundisium). X 7592 is also before 71, and V 938 names a *classicus miles* of Augustus' reign. Caesar had armed for land service part of his rowers in the African campaign (*Bell. Afric.* 20. 1). On the *vigiles*, see Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, p. 6.

37 *IG*² II and III 1951; *IGR* 1. 843; Tac., *Hist.* 4. 15-16. See also Kromayer, *Philologus* 56 (1897), pp. 481-491.

38 X 3524; in X 3636 the term is used in addition to *miles* to avoid repetition. See also De la Berge, pp. 206, 211.

39 Since the reading "chiliarchus" in Tac., *Ann.* 15. 51, is universally abandoned, there is no evidence at all to support Vegetius' assertion (4. 32) that each Italian fleet formed a legion of ten cohorts.

40 Cichorius, *Die Reliefs*, plates 58, 59; Dio 49. 17. 2; Lucan, *Phars.* 3. 558; Caesar, *B. C.* 2. 6. 4; Tac., *Hist.* 5. 22; Front., *Strat.* 1. 1. 2; Virgil, *Aeneid* 3. 561-563, 5. 833-834, 10. 156-157. The flag was used at least in the Byzantine navy for signaling: Leo VI, *Tactica* 19. 36, 39-41. *Signifer*: X 1080; the "bix" of X 3502 is probably not a "vex(illarius)." On the *signa*, see Domaszewski, *Die Fahnen im römischen Heere* (Vienna, 1885), who points out on pp. 21-23 that the military century did not have an ensign in the Early Empire.

41 XI 6107.

42 X 3416; XI 6735; *AE* 1896. 21; Lucan, *Phars.* 2. 689-691; Veg. 2. 22; Friedrich Behn, "Die Musik im römischen Heere," *Mainzer Zeitschrift* 7 (1912), pp. 36-47. Behn, incidentally, makes the *symphoniacus* a drum-beater.

43 XI 340. Another Pannonian, X 3375; Bessi, X 3374, 3376; Asian, X 6800; Cilicians, III 225, X 3372; Egyptians, X 3381, 3383 (probably); Corsican, X 3572 (probably); a native of Formiae in the third century, X 3365. The contrast in ethnic origin between the trierarch Herculeius and the centurion Obaritus, who together slew Agrippina, is instructive (Tac., *Ann.* 14. 8). The centurion had a sword, the trierarch a club. *Armaturae*, X 3344.

44 Trierarchs as heirs, above, p. 39; *optiones*, X 3381, 3400a, 3459, 3469 and 3464a, XI 109, *Eph. ep.* 8. 431; centurions, *Eph. ep.* 8. 711 (Carales), and even here it is possible that the centurion set up the gravestone without being heir. In X 3370 a "veteranus ex centurionibus" is heir.

45 "Optio conv(alescentium)," if it is to be so understood, in X 3478; see Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, pp. 12-13. Pannonians, X 3465, 3468 (or Dal-

matian), III 14691; Dalmatians, X 3475, XI 76; Sardinian, X 3466; Egyptians, X 3460, 3464a (3469), 3467, 3470; native of Pontus, X 3461; Corsican, XI 6741 (?). In the third century, a native of Nola, X 3474; and a *verna* (of Ravenna), XI 65.

46 X 3496, 3497; XI 349, 3531 (Centumcellae); *AE* 1896. 21. The relative frequency with which the officers occur in the inscriptions is interesting: *optio*, forty-one times; *armorum custos*, twenty-four; *gubernator*, sixteen; *nauphylax*, fifteen; *faber*, twelve; *scriba*, ten; *medicus*, seven; *suboptio*, six; *proreta*, four. The older and more advanced a sailor was, the more likely he was to have an estate or friends to perpetuate his memory; also the heirs would more often be willing to incur the expense of a longer inscription which included the testator's title.

47 X 3406. The shortest service mentioned by a *custos* is twelve years (X 3403). Note Servius, *Ad Aen.* 1. 183 (quoted by De la Berge, p. 157), "navigantium militum mos est in puppibus arma religare."

48 X 3464a and 3469; *AE* 1896. 21; Maximilian Ihm in *Rheinisches Museum* 57 (1902), p. 317. C. Valerius Dasius was promoted from *gregalis* to *armorum custos* immediately before his discharge (Dip. 100, A. D. 152).

49 Paul Cauer, "De muneribus militaribus centurionatu inferioribus," *Eph. ep.* 4 (1881), pp. 355-481; Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, *passim*.

CHAPTER V

THE ITALIAN FLEETS: THE SAILORS

§ I. STATUS

THE statements commonly repeated about the sailors of the Roman imperial navy are few and, in the main, erroneous. Essentially they rest upon a faulty conception of the legal status of the navy and its sailors; with this, then, a consideration of the sailor's life must begin. More particularly, one must commence with the ultimate source of the misconception, Theodor Mommsen's *Schweizer Nachstudien* of 1881.¹ Under Augustus and Tiberius, Mommsen wrote, the fleet was a personal possession of the emperor, and the sailors were slaves or freedmen of the imperial *familia*. The trierarch called himself "slave of Caesar"; the ordinary sailor, a citizen of no political unit, described his homeland as would any other slave, by giving his ethnic derivation, e. g. *natione Graecus*. Later Claudius organized the fleet as a state service, barred slaves and freedmen, and enrolled as sailors only *peregrini*—free inhabitants of the Roman empire without Roman or Latin rights.

The sailors continued to be peregrine until Hadrian began the custom of conferring Latin rights on recruits in the Italian fleets. This grant Mommsen detected in their adoption of "Latin" names on enrollment—an Apion from Egypt, as we shall see later, became a sailor and accepted the name of Antonius Maximus. Such a person was to Mommsen no longer a peregrine, but Roman citizenship was not given him until discharge; he must therefore have possessed the intermediate status of those enjoying Latin rights. After Caracallus' grant of citizenship to the majority of the inhabitants of the Roman world, many of the sailors possessed Roman citizenship even before entering the service.

Ferrero and Chapot accepted Mommsen's statements. Otto Fie-

biger at first disagreed with him as regards slaves in the Julian navy, for the military use of slaves by the Romans was very rare, and there was, he considered, little evidence for the service of slaves in the navy; later he seems to have been swayed by some intervening remarks of Gardthausen and accepted Mommsen's theory completely.² Since Fiebiger's endorsement all writers who have touched on the Roman navy have adhered to Mommsen's thesis without cavil or have at least not disagreed with it openly; indeed, careless quotation of Mommsen has resulted in the general impression that the navy was staffed by imperial slaves and freedmen throughout its history. This is most demonstrably false, but as a matter of fact a careful investigation of the pertinent evidence requires a substantial revision even of Mommsen's original conclusions.

It cannot be denied that the Roman imperial navy in the reigns especially of Augustus and Tiberius was closely attached to the emperor's person. The trierarchs and navarchs of the fleet called themselves "Caesaris trierarchi (navarchi)" or "navarchi et trierarchi quei militant Caesari"; Gardthausen cites the boast of Augustus that "classis mea" sailed farther east in the North Sea than any Roman squadron before his time. These facts may be admitted, but their acceptance does not make the navy a peculiarly personal possession of the emperor. Against "classis mea" in the *Res Gestae* may be matched "exercitus meus" in another section of this intensely autobiographical document;³ the trierarchs of Caesar the Younger served the emperor in the same fashion as did the equestrian *praefecti castrorum Augusti*, some examples of whom were noted in the discussion of the early fleet praefects. In Augustus' advice to his successor, where he stated "quantum civium sociorumque in armis, quot classes, regna, provinciae, tributa aut vectigalia,"⁴ the navy seems as much a public institution as the army. It is to be noted that throughout the Julio-Claudian period, as later, *equites* shifted from military posts to naval commands and back again without difficulty.

The navy, to be certain, was never the peer of the legions, and as late as Commodus a legionary soldier was punished for base conduct by transfer to the fleet.⁵ On this point a French scholar

has recently advanced a fruitful distinction between the legions, the traditional army of Rome, and on the other hand the aggregate body of the new branches—praetorians, auxiliaries, sailors, etc.—which were constituted in final form by Augustus. Veterans of the legions received no rights by imperial constitutions on discharge, while all the troops in the latter group did; their privileges were not set by long tradition, and since they were especially imperial in character, they required special imperial rewards.⁶ The auxiliaries and sailors were accordingly always particularly dependent on the emperor, and were yet forces of the Roman state.

Accordingly we must examine with care Mommsen's supposition that the Augustan navy was manned by slaves and freedmen of the imperial *familia*. It is to his credit that he carefully brought forward epigraphical testimony to substantiate the point, for the modern conception of galley-service as a task for slaves, captives, and prisoners of justice has made succeeding scholars accept the matter as self-evident. The use of slaves or prisoners, however, as galley-rowers is in actual fact exclusively a phenomenon of the modern world, and *Les Misérables* and the tales of Barbary rovers have buried what lies before. In the Italian maritime cities before the middle of the sixteenth century, as at Athens in the period of Pericles, service in the galleys was one of the first duties owed by the citizens to the state. Throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages the post of rower, albeit accupied usually by the poorer free men, did not degrade, and nowhere were slaves regularly admitted to the rowers' benches.⁷

At Rome itself an inbred dislike of the sea tended to shift the burden of galley service from the citizens to the allies and in lesser degree to freedmen as the Republic grew greater and its citizens prouder; slaves, however, were never admitted to any armed forces of the Roman Republic, except under the compulsion of Cannae. In their unscrupulous attempts to gain victory in the civil wars the contestants relaxed this bar, but Augustus himself, "custos rerum," checked these departures from precedent. The runaway slaves who had served as sailors for Sextus Pompey and had received their freedom in the Treaty of Misenum were re-

stored to their masters by Octavian in 36 B. C.; those whom no master claimed were executed.⁸ In 37 Octavian did enroll twenty thousand slaves in his own fleet, in preparation for the war against Sextus—but he freed them before formally enlisting them.⁹

On the basis of Augustus' general policy alone, regular admission of slaves to the navy, whatever its official status, would have been very remarkable. Furthermore, the rule of the Republic that "*ab omnia militia servi prohibentur*" held as firmly in the Empire, and the sailors were *militēs* from the period of Augustus.¹⁰ The freedmen are another matter, for they had served in the Republican navy and were regularly admitted by Augustus to the *vigiles* of Rome; at certain critical times they were even conscripted for the army.¹¹ The epigraphical evidence of the Julio-Claudian period attests their employment in the navy only in restricted numbers.

This testimony of inscriptions, though it is scanty for the fleet as for most other phases of life in the early first century after Christ, fails to support Mommsen's theory. The praefects were equestrian until the reign of Claudius. An isolated freedman navarch is found, and freedmen trierarchs appeared from the civil wars until the reign of Domitian, but throughout these years free men served side by side with these freedmen in the same grades. In particular such persons as Malchio, "*Caesaris trierarchus*," were not slaves.

The sailors in the lower ranks who may be assigned to the Julio-Claudian period were all definitely free.¹² The *diplomata*, that is, the individual exemplars of the imperial discharge constitutions, give the names of twelve sailors enlisted in the reign of Claudius or earlier, but not one was a freedman. Of the inscriptions earlier than 71, ten refer to *peregrini*, and seven to free veterans who had assumed Latin names if they did not already possess them.¹³ The one common sailor who can definitely be dated to the period of Augustus is L. Trebius; possibly a native of Aquileia, he may well have been a Roman citizen, and was at least a Latin.¹⁴ The four sailors who called themselves *vernae* are the only ones who could have been slaves, for *verna* originally designated a person born as a slave to household slaves. The nomenclature of these

sailors, however, shows that they were neither slaves nor freedmen, and since they date from the latter part of the second century, when the term *verna* no longer necessarily meant slave, they are of no relevance to the present discussion.¹⁵

For the period of Augustus and Tiberius, then, our evidence suggests that the navy was a state service in which both freedmen and free men might serve. Such a mixture might be expected at a time when imperial institutions were yet fluid. Originally Octavian had turned wherever he could for sailors. Skilled easterners who had been captured during the wars of the past seven years were manumitted in 37 B. C. and placed in command of ships beside free men; the rowers' benches were filled by drafts from the poor, the freedmen, and the slaves of Italy, but the slaves were freed on entering the service. Octavian created a navy, just as he had enrolled legions and *auxilia* on his own initiative. When he became an integral part of the state, his military forces and especially the divisions thereof which he had formed became public agencies under his more immediate supervision. The sailors were as much servants of Rome as were the soldiers on the frontiers; in neither case did Roman military practice tolerate slaves as defenders of the *Urbs*.

Claudius, the special patron of *liberti*, did not eliminate freedmen from the navy, for they appear in the trierarchy as late as the reign of Domitian. These scattering examples after A. D. 41 seem to be the product of imperial favor; thus a masseur of Tiberius and Claudius was freed by the former and promoted by the latter to the subpraefecture of the Alexandrian fleet.¹⁶ The class of freedmen as a whole must have furnished a very minor part of the crews even in the later years of Augustus' reign. *Liberti* normally would be too old to enter the navy, and industrial and commercial opportunities suited the majority. Furthermore, the freedmen had no need to serve twenty-six years in the navy in order to obtain Roman citizenship as a reward on discharge; those who were not enfranchised at their manumission had easier means of access to citizenship than naval service.¹⁷ The presence of freedmen as trierarchs but not as common sailors is not accidental—honor and rank were inducements in the former post, but not in the latter.

Nor did Claudius introduce the recruitment of peregrines, for these doubtless comprised the bulk of the sailors from the principate of Augustus. According to Mommsen the peregrine sailors had received Latin rights by A. D. 129. As proof he adduced the diplomas: in those issued up to 71 the sailors bear their native names; the next extant diploma, of 129, and those following give the sailors "Latin" names. That is, one now finds sailors with such names as C. Valerius Dasius; the only difference from Roman nomenclature lies in the omission of a filiation and of the tribe, which was the sign of citizenship. Young men who possessed Latin rights from birth were thenceforth admitted to the Italian fleets.¹⁸

It is as well that Mommsen offered no reason for such a grant by Hadrian, for more recent evidence demonstrates that this use of Latin names was established long before Hadrian's reign. At two columbaria built at Misenum about A. D. 100, older grave markers have been found which bear the *tria nomina*, although one of those named was a Bessus, another an Alexandrian, and a third so Hellenized that his monument was inscribed in Greek.¹⁹ These stones must have been twenty or thirty years old by the first decade of the second century. A more exact date for the extensive use of Latin names among the sailors is determined by the fact that all save one of the naval inscriptions after A. D. 71 have Latin nomenclature, and all except two of those before that date have peregrine names.²⁰ It would seem that any grant of Latin rights to the sailors of the Italian fleets must be connected with Vespasian, who added, as will appear later, the honorific *praetoria* to the titles of the Misene and Ravennate fleets and settled their veterans in colonies. To those remaining in the praetorian fleets and to all recruits thereafter, Vespasian, who gave *latinitas* to all Spain, would have granted Latin rights, presumably by an edict shortly after April 5, 71, when he finished his mass discharges of naval veterans. The failure of the diplomas in 71 to show this change would be explained by the tardiness which characterized Vespasian's rewards.²¹

The whole question, however, is probably one of those rare instances where Mommsen's legalistic genius led him somewhat

astray. To him, persons with so-called "Latin" names were necessarily Latin in status, but when one comes to examine these Latin-named sailors no real indication of Latin status is visible. The case is clearer for the army, where we have more varied evidence. In a papyrus of A. D. 179, for instance, fifty-two of the seventy-six ordinary soldiers, *gregales*, listed for the *ala veterana Gallicana* and eight of the seventeen officers have peregrine names, the rest Latin names. It is most unlikely that the twenty-four Latin-named *gregales*, who were probably recruited in Egypt, had Latin status by birth, for Latin rights were extremely rare in Egypt; nor is there any reason to assume that these particular individuals alone had been favored by the grant of Latin rights during service. None the less, in some other Egyptian instances the adoption of a Latin name on enlistment is certain. An Isidorus thus became Iulius Martialis on entering an auxiliary unit, and Neon became L. Iulius Apollinaris. A certain Octavius Valens was definitely an Alexandrian citizen and not a Latin at all.²² Of two soldiers recruited from the peregrine *civitas* of the Eravisci in Pannonia, one has a Latin name in his discharge diploma and the other a peregrine name. Two diplomas for Spanish veterans, who were recruited after Vespasian had given all Spain Latin rights, attest that their recipients still *officially* bore peregrine names.²³ The auxiliary soldiers seem to have adopted Latin names at their pleasure, without any attendant change in status; the Spanish evidence even suggests that persons possessing Latin status might still have peregrine nomenclature. Clearly the name of a soldier or sailor does not always reflect his legal standing.

The tendency, indeed, of non-Roman inhabitants of the empire to use names based on Roman forms was checked by Claudius, who forbade peregrines to usurp "Romana nomina dumtaxat gentilicia."²⁴ The exact scope and force of the edict are not clear; but in any event its enforcement was difficult and with respect to the Romanization of the empire distinctly not desirable. Emphasis on the old regulations steadily decreased thereafter, especially in the second century, as citizenship in the "orbis terrarum" became less a matter of forms. On the frontiers, peregrine soldiers but slowly accepted the custom of changing their names on enlist-

ment, and change is a measure of Romanizing influence; ²⁵ in the heart of the empire conformity to the standard Italian nomenclature seemed more urgent, if the sailor were not to appear a barbarian. The easterners in the navy, also, had become accustomed to changing from local to Greek names in an effort to assimilate themselves. ²⁶

Apart from these natural influences the change about the year 71 may indicate that Vespasian removed Claudius' ban as far as the navy was concerned, and fostered the adoption of Latin names by the sailors, who would in any case receive such names on discharge. ²⁷ By itself this use of the *tria nomina* cannot be considered proof for the bestowal of Latin rights, and there is no stronger testimony elsewhere. On the contrary, Ulpian and Gaius, in listing the methods by which a Latin could receive citizenship, mention the *vigiles* under the heading *militia* and pass over the navy in complete silence; apparently Latins did not normally serve in the navy. ²⁸ Until decisive evidence proves that this omission is merely accidental and that Vespasian actually did reward his sailors in a fashion unparalleled in any of the other armed forces, ²⁹ one must consider the sailors of the Italian fleets as generally peregrine in status from the reign of Augustus to the end of the second century.

By the period of the Severi the distinctions in status which had furnished the basis for the Augustan system of recruitment were disappearing. Roman citizens enlisted in auxiliary units and provincial fleets as well as in legions, although the Italian fleets seem to have remained peregrine; after Caracallus' famous edict of 212 granted citizenship to those of his free subjects who did not already possess it, almost all sailors must have been Roman citizens. ³⁰ The difficulty of recruiting increased in the third century; sailors were enlisted from the age of fifteen on, the term of service was extended two years, and Italians now served in the navy in numbers. An *optio* in the Misene fleet came from Nola, and the two complete naval diplomas of the century were issued to sailors born respectively at Misenum and Ateste. ³¹

Legal status and actual reputation naturally do not always correspond. The sailors of the Italian fleets were never slaves but

were peregrines for a longer period than the auxiliaries; they ranked far below the legionaries and somewhat below the auxiliaries, at least in the system of Augustus himself. The inscriptions reveal a folk who only occasionally indulged in lengthy epitaphs and never in more than the tersest of dedications, and the papyri show that while some could write others could not. They were a group taken from the middle and lower strata in the provinces who might often say with L. Trebius, "I was born in the depths of poverty"; yet their obscurity was lightened by the fact that they served Caesar and Rome.³²

§ 2. SERVICE

In its broad significance a discussion of the daily life and service of these sailors may be considered a study in cultural change: for generation upon generation groups of provincial youths entered the Italian fleets each year, to emerge decades later as Roman citizens who had accepted the Mediterranean urban civilization. This process of Romanization, common in its outlines to all branches of the armed forces, assumes in the navy an especially interesting character.³³ Conscription and volunteer enlistment brought together on each vessel, a microcosm of the whole, a crew far more varied in its ethnic origins than any ordinary unit of the army, yet all the recruits accepted at least in externals Roman culture. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that even natives of the Hellenized East tended to drop their Greek ways at Misenum and Ravenna. A naturally delimited sphere capable of independent study which reveals so concretely the proselyting power of Roman culture, when aided by official pressure and by a favorable environment, can rarely be found elsewhere, and although the material to illustrate the nuances of the process, the precise limit of its success in the intangible aspects, is necessarily lacking we can yet regain an instructive picture from the great mass of terse funeral inscriptions.

Table I suggests the wide variation in the origins of the sailors. Their sole bond of unity appears to have been a common lack of Roman citizenship, a prerequisite for service which had been

TABLE I
THE ORIGIN OF THE SAILORS

	<i>Misene Fleet</i>			<i>Ravennate Fleet</i>			<i>Totals</i>
	30 B. C.— A. D. 71	71— 211	211 on	30 B. C.— A. D. 71	71— 211	211 on	
BALKANS:							
Dalmatia	1	12	1	1	24		39
Pannonia		9			8	1	18
Bessi	3	38			7		48
Daci		1			1		2
ASIA MINOR:							
Bithynia		4			3		7
Pontus		7					7
Phrygia	1	2					3
Asia		1					1
Cappadocia		1					1
Lycaonia		1					1
Pamphylia		2					2
Cilicia		17			1		18
"Greek"	3	14	1		5		23
ORIENT:							
Syria	2	11			5	1	19
Egypt		33			5		38
"Alexandria" ...		21			3		24
Crete and Cyrenaica		1			1		2
WEST:							
Africa		10					10
Libya		1			2	1	4
Sardinia	1	17			4	1	23
Corsica		4			6		10
Italy	2	4	3		2	2	13
Germany		1			2		3
Raetia		1					1
Totals	11	213	5	1	79	6	317

In drawing conclusions from a table based on epigraphical sources, the narrowness of the sample and the importance of accident must be considered; however, it may be noted that the evidence which would have been obtained by counting the inscriptions given in Ferrero's three epigraphical *corpora* is almost identical with that to be derived from examining the not inconsiderable number of inscriptions found between 1899 and 1940. Sailors and under officers up to, but not including the trierarchs, have been combined in these figures. In naval inscriptions it is difficult both to determine the ethnic origin of a sailor simply from his name, and also to establish the date of the stone; I have accordingly been conservative in the table on both points. Particularly, I have placed before 71 or after 211 only those stones which directly indicate such dating.

firmly set in the last centuries of the Republic. By Actium the tradition was too strong to be changed, and Augustus in any event reserved his citizens for the legions. In most cases the absence of Roman citizenship further implied a lack of Roman culture, and the inscriptions show that the vast majority of the recruits came from rural or lesser urban regions. The Italians listed in the table for the period from 71 to 211 were either sons of sailors who had been born and had enlisted while their fathers were still serving, or came from areas which had not yet received Roman citizenship, as a sailor from the Camunni of northern Italy; ³⁴ the Greeks were more precisely Greek-speaking and may have hailed from any shore of the Levant; the African sailors were probably from Mauretania and the less Romanized interior. Achaia, Gallia Narbonensis, Sicily, Macedonia, and Hispania Baetica to our knowledge did not furnish one sailor to the Italian fleets, for these regions, which stood among the areas most fully possessing Roman citizenship in the Early Empire, were either largely exempt from military service or filled the legions in the Augustan system. They happened also to be senatorial provinces, but this seems a less essential basis of differentiation. One may note also that those provinces or districts which furnished auxiliary soldiers or recruits to the legions in large numbers, as Galatia, Raetia, the Three Gauls, and the Outer Spains, sent few men to the fleets.

Although the two Italian fleets overlapped in their areas of recruitment, their major sources were clearly distinct. The observation of Tacitus that the Ravennate fleet in A. D. 69 was largely composed of Dalmatians and Pannonians is borne out by the table, for forty-three per cent of the Ravennate sailors therein came from the Balkans as against twenty-eight per cent for the Misene fleet. ³⁵ Dalmatia, across the Adriatic from Ravenna, was a particularly important source of sailors; its inhabitants had invented one type of ship adopted by the Roman navy, the liburnian, and had used it in piracy on the Adriatic down to the Empire.

In the matter of recruitment the relatively greater importance of the Misene fleet appears again, for while it drew sailors in substantial numbers from all the sources open to the Ravennate fleet, the largest Misene contingents came from yet other regions. Since

the Misene squadron might not recruit in Italy or in the Romanized continental shores facing the Tyrrhenian, it turned in the first instance to Sardinia, Corsica, and Africa, but the great bulk of its sailors was derived from the Hellenized East, which contributed fifty-two per cent of the Misene sailors in the table, as against twenty-eight per cent for the Ravennate fleet. Every province of Asia Minor, coastal and inland alike, is represented except Galatia; the Cilicians and Bithynians, along with the Syrians or Phoenicians and those who called themselves *Graeci*, may have been skilled sailors, but seamanship was evidently not a prerequisite for enlistment. This fact becomes the clearer as one notes the Bessi, a horse-loving, barbarian tribe dominating the Thracian Hebrus,³⁶ or the Egyptians. These two groups furnished the largest contingents in the Misene fleet.

The presence of native Egyptians or *laoi*, as distinguished from the Greek and Roman residents of Egypt, in the Italian fleets is an extraordinary exception to the Roman rule that the fellahin could not serve in the military forces.³⁷ The *Gnomon of the Idiologos*, an administrative law-code from the middle of the second century, explicitly states that "Egyptians" were not permitted in the legions or the navy generally but might enter the Misene fleet, along with which the Ravennate fleet, of lesser importance in Egyptian recruitment, is probably to be understood.³⁸ The frequent occurrence of the term *Alexandrinus* in inscriptions of Egyptian sailors from the two fleets of Misenum and Ravenna probably reflects the enlistment of these others from whom those of the superior Alexandrian status wished to distinguish themselves.³⁹ *Laoi* had regularly served in the Ptolemaic navy, and large numbers possibly entered the Augustan navy when this absorbed Antony's partly Egyptian fleet; ⁴⁰ the precise reasons, however, why the emperors continued thereafter to admit representatives of this element, so valuable for Egypt's fiscal prosperity, to the Italian fleets alone are obscure. It may perhaps have been thought wise to allow the more adventurous-spirited among the Egyptians at least one military outlet, at a distance from Egypt, and of the armed forces the Italian fleets were the lowest-ranking units capable of absorbing large numbers of such recruits.⁴¹

The precise steps by which an Egyptian lad from Philadelphia in the Fayum and a young man of the Bessi in central Thrace found their way to the same trireme in an Italian fleet lie hidden from us. The emperors had, and used when necessary, far-reaching powers of conscription, but the papyri and inscriptions present only volunteers for the first two centuries of the Empire, a fact which partially explains the wide area over which the sailors' homes were scattered. In any case, the emphasis on long-term service indicates a volunteer basis. The service assured maintenance and exciting change in scene; often a sailor who had already enlisted enticed his brother; ⁴² on discharge the veteran became one of the privileged class of the empire as a Roman citizen. A certain Egyptian by the name of Sempronius wrote his son Gaius, who had gone to Alexandria to enlist but had been dissuaded:

I have learned from Tilis (?) that, yielding to his persuasion, you have not enlisted in the fleet, and I have spent two days grieving. Henceforth see to it that you are not persuaded, else you will no longer be my son. You know that you differ from and surpass your brothers in everything easily. You will do well to enter a fine service.⁴³

A similar sentiment, coupled with a truly patriotic touch, is echoed in the plaintive funerary inscription (III 8385) set up to a certain Principius,

quem gloria nisi
 avus adque pater puerum dedere praeclara[e]
 militia[e] patruoque suo iunxere fovendum.
 Cum primum pulchra lanugine sumeret annos,
 spectantes magnum patriae columenque futurum,
 heu miseri! gloriari sibi laetamque senectam
 crudele[m] luctum domui Ravenna remisit.
 Hoc miseros titulo proprium signasse dolorem.

Whether by compulsion or by free will, each year the due number of provincial youths, usually between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three in the second century, entered the navy.⁴⁴ Odd chance has preserved the letters written home by two Egyptian

recruits arriving in Italy; one wishes for more such informative and pleasant documents as this:

Apion to Epimachus his father and lord, many greetings.

Before all I pray that you are in good health and, prospering continually, fare well along with my sister and her daughter and my brother. I give thanks to the Lord Serapis that he saved me at once when I was in danger on the sea. As soon as I came to Misenum, I received my *viaticum* of three gold pieces from Caesar. And it is well with me.

I beg you then, my lord father, that you write me a little letter, first of all about your safety, secondly concerning that of my brother and sister, and thirdly that I may kiss your hand (writing), because you have brought me up well and I therefore hope for speedy promotion if the gods are willing. Give many greetings to Capito and to my brother and sister and to Serenilla and my friends. I send you a little picture of myself by Euktemon. My name is now Antonius Maximus.

I pray that your health be good.

Centuria *Athenonike*.

To still the importunities of other recruits from the same town, Apion has scribbled on the left side of the papyrus: "Serenus the son of Agathus Daemon and . . . and Turbo the son of Galonius and . . . greet you." ⁴⁵

The other letter, also of the second century, comes from Karanis:

Apolinaris to Taësis his mother, many greetings.

Before all I bid you hail and good health, making supplication for you before all the gods. And having found a man at Cyrene who was coming to you, I deemed it necessary to give you news of my safety [then]; and do you inform me at once about your well-being and that of my brothers. I am now writing you from Portus, for I have not yet gone up to Rome and received my assignment. When I have been assigned and know to what unit I am going, I shall let you know at once.

Do not be slow in writing about your health and that of my brothers. And if you do not find anybody coming to me, write to Socrates and he will forward to me. I salute my dear brothers

often, and Apolinaris and his children, and Kalalas and his children, and all who love you.

Asklepiades salutes you.

Farewell and good health to you.

I arrived in Portus Pachon 25 [May 20].

And as postscript: "Know that I have been assigned to Misenum; I learned it later." In another letter from Rome itself, Apolinaris repeats the news about himself and adds, "I do not yet know my century, for I have not gone to Misenum." He tells his mother not to worry, for he is in a "good spot" (καλὸν τόπον), redoubles his salutations, and gives as postal directions, "Deliver to Taësis at Karanis, from her son Apolinaris of Misenum."⁴⁶

To each who reads them, these letters will possess their own particular charm; in the present connection they must fulfill the prosaic end of portraying the arrival of the new recruit in Italy and his eventual assignment to a ship, for Apion the trireme *Athenonike*. Apion and his friends seem to have known their destination before they left Egypt and presumably traveled directly to Puteoli; Apolinaris for some reason had to go by way of Rome and received his assignment at the hands of an unnamed branch of the central administration. For these young recruits sorrow at parting from home mixed with a naïve pride in a new life. Apion had now a sailor's uniform and hastened to have a miniature painted for his family. He had also taken the first step toward Romanization in adopting a Latin name, undoubtedly by official order, and he would henceforth be called Antonius Maximus in every legal and official document relating to the erstwhile Apion. As we shall see below, his old name does not appear even in later letters to his family in Egypt.

When Apion and Apolinaris entered the navy, they swore an oath to obey the emperor and his officers, and indicated their formal willingness to serve twenty-six years unless sooner discharged. The imperial fleets, like the army, were based on the long-term, professional soldier; no other solution was practically possible, given the conditions of the Empire, and it is probable that Augustus settled this twenty-six year period for the sailor at the time when he established legionary service at twenty years and auxiliary

at twenty-five. At some time between 166 and 214/215 the term was lengthened two years, possibly by Marcus Aurelius in his later years, or by Septimius Severus to offset difficulty in recruiting.⁴⁷

Release from the contract before its completion might come from death, *missio ignominiosa* for grossly unsatisfactory service, *missio causaria* for incapacitating accident, or in two more honorable ways. If the sailor did remarkably well in time of stress, he might be presented with an honorable discharge and its privileges before the due date. Such a reward was bestowed by Vespasian on some sailors after the civil wars and by Trajan to the crew of a ship which possibly saved the Emperor himself in a storm. Or again, a pressing imperial need for soldiers might require the promotion of sailors *en bloc* to the Roman legions, a step which entailed the grant of Roman citizenship to the fortunate sailor at once. In the civil wars of 68-69 two legions were formed from the Italian fleets, and the Jewish war forced Hadrian to transfer certain Egyptians from the Misene fleet to the legion X Fretensis in Syria. The phrase used on this occasion "ex indulgentia divi Hadriani," sufficiently implies the rarity of such a transfer.⁴⁸

Though Apion might well hope for "speedy promotion" at least into the beginning steps of the military or naval hierarchy aboard his trireme, advancement even to the trierarchy was improbable, and he was more likely to spend a decade or more in a subordinate post. A separate increase in pay was also possible, for there are some references to *sesquipliciarum*, who received one and one-half times the base pay, and numerous mentions of *dupliciarum* or "double-pay" men. Unfortunately there is no good evidence as to the base pay itself. The sailors may have gotten the same pay as the auxiliaries, i. e., one hundred denarii yearly from the reign of Domitian to that of Commodus;⁴⁹ the enlistment bounty of three *aurei* or seventy-five denarii which Apion received might, however, have represented an initial gift of one year's pay.

The life of the sailor in his day-to-day duties is not very well illuminated. In the sailing season, the Italian fleets were probably often at sea, practising oarsmanship, carrying notables to their provincial posts, or aiding in the supply and transport of armies,

and from time to time pursuing the occasional pirate. As a sailor, apparently on a commercial ship, describes his life:

navibus velivolis magnum mare saepe cucurri,
 accessi terras conplures, terminus hic est
 quem mihi nascenti quondam Parcae cecinere.
 hic meas deposui curas omnesque labores,
 sidera non timeo hic nec nimbos nec mare saevom,
 nec metuo sumptus ni quaestum vincere possit.⁵⁰

At Rome and elsewhere along the coasts detachments were permanently stationed as guards and couriers; other sailors protected the Flaminian Way against a robber in the troubled days of Philip.⁵¹ Possibly the sailors of the Italian fleets were assigned to labor on aqueducts, canals, and other civil works, but evidence is lacking.

Such tasks, along with routine arsenal and shipyards work, must have left much free time to the sailors, however true the gloomy statement of the astrologer, "torquebuntur et habebunt vitam semper in navibus," may have seemed at times to the weary rowers.⁵² In the winter, when the warships were largely laid up, the sailors perhaps supplemented their pay by various private activities; at all events a remarkable number of sailors had sufficient means to purchase a slave or—very rarely—two.⁵³ At times they benefited by the sale of prisoners of war; the seven-year-old Mesopotamian slave whom Q. Iulius Priscus, sailor on the trireme *Tigris*, sold to C. Fabullius Macer, *optio* of the same ship, at Seleuceia in 166, was probably a captive picked up in the Parthian war. More generally, however, their purchases were made through commercial channels, as in the case of T. Memmius Montanus of the Ravennate fleet, who acquired a full-grown African female slave for six hundred and twenty-five denarii from a Milesian slave-dealer. The female slave, who was more common, often served as concubine and was sometimes freed to become the wife of the sailor; the male slave represented an investment by the sailor from which he expected dividends, either in an increased sales value on maturity or in an immediate return from the slave's technical skill.⁵⁴

The testamentary activity of sailors represents chiefly that anxious desire for the care of their last remains and for remembrance by posterity which has preserved to us most of our epigraphical evidence. Often the tombstone states that the deceased ordered a monument set up by his will, "testamento fieri iussit," and sometimes the sailor not only directed that he be buried suitably but also prescribed the sum to be spent on his funeral.⁵⁵ Beyond this, however, the sailor's will occasionally dealt with other matters which prove that he possessed at least moderate means. The testament of C. Longinius Castor, a veteran of the Misene fleet domiciled at Karanis in Egypt, freed three slaves, left four thousand sesterces to a relative, and disposed of five and one-fourth aruras of grainland in addition to his home and orchard; some years previously, he had been the heir of another sailor who left a legacy of two thousand drachmas to a third party. At times a fiduciary heir carried out the testator's last wishes and kept the remainder of the estate in trust for a child.⁵⁶

Juristic sources show that a soldier, at least from the end of the first century after Christ, had wide privileges in the testamentary power; for his will did not need to be written, only a clear statement of his intent was required, and anyone, apart from a few exceptions, could be instituted as heir.⁵⁷ A fellow sailor, either from the same ship or from another, was the usual heir; even when the sailor left his estate to his wife or children, a sailor not infrequently acted as co-heir with them and might at times actually be the sole heir.⁵⁸ The recurrence of such terms as "substitutus heres" and "secundus heres" is a noteworthy reminder of the sailor's dangerous life; since the first heir might die before his benefactor, a contingent legatee was named.⁵⁹ If the heir were away at the time of his friend's death, a trierarch or other ship's officer might act in his stead at the funeral. One monument thus bears the notation "curante Sulpicio Prisco optione III Jove," the heirs being on the trireme *Mercurius* and the quadrireme *Minerva*.⁶⁰

Even if the sailor left no estate, he was not necessarily forgotten. Parents and brothers might dutifully mark his grave for posterity; once a pious sister is found; grateful freedmen and freedwomen,

the latter usually concubines, often dedicated stones to their patrons, and one proudly registers "de pecunia sua." The variety of those setting up monuments—a wife and a freedman, a freedman and a brother, two children and a freedwoman—bears mute witness to the deep personal ties which a sailor might form during his service.⁶¹

A bond of mutual interests within each of the classes of naval officers can be detected in the sailors' testamentary activity. A *nauphylax* was guardian for the son of another *nauphylax*, the *armorum custos* of one ship made two *armorum custodes* of another ship heirs, and so on.⁶² This feeling obtained even more concrete expression in the *collegia* of the officers. The professional aspect of such clubs cannot be entirely dismissed, but certainly mutual benefit burial privileges and union for social enjoyment constituted the main reason for the formation of the *collegia*. The *ordo proretarum*, as heir, set up a stone to one of its deceased members, the *armaturae* possessed a *schola* or meeting place by A. D. 159, and the *artifices* of Misenum were organized into a *factio* under an *optio*. Even common sailors were presumably eligible for the "sodales ex classe praetoria Ravennati," and at Misenum a group of "ingenui et veterani corporati" took a special place in the life of the colony.⁶³ Barrack-life changes but slightly with the centuries; the sailors formed their specialized and general groups, and though the garrisons of the camps at Misenum or Ravenna, along with the veterans, dominated the life of these towns, they often remained slightly apart even in burial.⁶⁴

The mingling, nevertheless, of Hellenized Orientals and semi-Romanized natives from the Balkans in the cosmopolitan heart of the empire gave rise to that Romanization which has already been briefly mentioned. The volunteers denoted by the very act of enlistment an openness to change which aided the acceptance of a new culture; as for the unwilling conscripts, their local peculiarities must have been quickly rubbed off in the service in the camp and aboard ship, a rough process which produced at least external conformity to the standard of the surrounding regions of Italy. We have an illustrative letter of Apion to his sister in Egypt a few years after his enlistment. He calls himself only

Antonius Maximus, has a wife named Aufidia and three children, whose names, Maximus, Elpis, Fortunata, are a significant mixture of Greek and Latin, and whereas earlier he had mentioned Egyptian Serapis he now prays for his sister's welfare before "the gods here." ⁶⁵

The other sailors who enlisted after 71 likewise discarded their former name or at most employed it as an adjunct to their official name in inscriptions, as "T. Suillius Albanus qui et Timotheus Menisci f." ⁶⁶ Against those few who kept their old name and were perhaps commonly called by it may be set the overwhelming majority of those who were willing to drop even the betraying peregrine name of their father. The legal acts of these sailors—their wills, their bills of sale, their institution of tutors—follow closely standard Roman practice; in their military and naval duties Latin was the only language permitted, and naval inscriptions were almost invariably carved in Latin. ⁶⁷ The Ravennate sailors followed Po Valley sepulchral customs, the Misene sailors the west coast habits, and both groups reflect the changes which the Latin language underwent in the popular speech of the Empire, especially in the occasional use of intervocalic *b* for *v* in *bixit*, *militabit*, and the like. ⁶⁸

Generally the sailor's epitaph construes and is spelled correctly, for error was largely obviated by its brief, stereotyped character; yet careful inspection uncovers here and there lurking remnants of Greek speech, while a few sailors set up stones in Greek or in Latin using Greek characters. One thus finds an inscription in Greek at Misenum, headed *des μανιβους* (*dis Manibus*), which reveals an interesting mixture of new religious thought and adherence to the sailor's native tongue. This stone is to be dated to the late first century after Christ, and traces of such mixture or retention of Hellenistic culture grow fewer thereafter. ⁶⁹ Cohesion of compatriots yet continued throughout to play a certain part, and can be detected in the sailors' wills; the heirs of a Libyan are Libyan in one inscription, and in others Egyptians and Bithynians name as legatees respectively Egyptians and Bithynians. ⁷⁰

Often the sailors' wives were local women, daughters possibly of other sailors; in one instance a sailor married a fellow sailor's

sister. Not infrequently, however, the wives were freedwomen, previously the sailors' concubines, who might come from any shore of the Mediterranean.⁷¹ In rare cases the sailor found a wife of his own tongue and homeland; one Lycaonian sailor, an inscription testifies, married the girl he had left behind in his native village.⁷² These compatriot wives, in so far as they were Greek-speaking, probably remained a retarding influence on their husbands' Romanization.

A glance at the religious beliefs of the sailors best reveals their mosaic diversity and their acceptance of the Graeco-Roman culture. In common with the rest of the Roman world the sailors united in a reverence for the ruling emperor and such of his predecessors as had received official deification. Their statues were placed in the camp, and vows were occasionally set up for the emperor's health or safety; on his birthday the Misene sailors at Rome, and probably elsewhere, gave games in the third century.⁷³ For many of the sailors this reverence was reinforced, or possibly decreased, by the close proximity of the imperial court, for the emperor often spent part of his time on the Campanian coast. At Misenum certainly the institution of the *Augustales*, the body dedicated to the state cult, was fully organized.⁷⁴

Like the other military forces of the Empire, the sailors also united in a formal worship of the standards of their local unit. Each fleet had its *signifer* and its *signum*, which was presumably kept in a shrine. The religious *cura* for the fleet was a part of the praefect's duties, and he cared for the shrine besides offering sacrifice for his fleet, especially on embarking for an extended voyage.⁷⁵ The trierarch performed the same duties aboard each ship, assisted by officials such as the *coronarius* and possibly the *victimarius*. In the bow of the ship was placed the *tutela* of the divinity which served as patron, and the ship often bore the name of this or another Roman deity or deified abstraction; a carved slab from Boulogne is apparently to be taken as an *ex-voto* to the guardian deity of the trireme *Radians* of the British fleet.⁷⁶

Beyond this enforced joint worship lay bewildering variety, which bears witness to the religious toleration of the Early Empire; only the Christian sect seems lacking in the navy of the period.

Often the recruit brought a belief in some local god of his fatherland which remained unshaken by the religious cosmopolitanism that lay about him. A trierarch set up a votive offering to an otherwise unknown Jupiter Striganus, and a veteran of the Ravennate fleet, in fulfilling a vow, preserved for us evidence that he had clung to his native Dalmatian *matronae*. Frequently, however, the gods of the new locality received the sailor's allegiance in part or in full, as the "gods here" of Apion's second letter.⁷⁷

The Roman pantheon suffered in the competition. Most of the Roman world still paid lip service to Jupiter or Zeus; yet often by Jupiter the dedicator meant some local deity. Almost all the sepulchral monuments from the fleets are prefaced *d(is) m(anibus)*, "to the deified shades," but this is no more than a vague acknowledgment of an afterlife, an afterlife which is in one case a matter of clearly expressed doubt.⁷⁸ The failure of the old Graeco-Roman gods is shown most sharply in the neglect of the classic gods of the sea. Neptune, a god of flowing water whom the Latin world had never equated fully with the Greek Poseidon, is rarely mentioned; since his worship as god of the sea is usually attributable to Greek influence, it is the more remarkable that the Hellenized sailors had no weight in this regard. More surprising yet is the lack of attention to Castor and Pollux, "fratres Helenae, lucida sidera," regarded as the saviors of those in danger on the sea—the sailors of the Roman imperial navy addressed their vows in time of peril to deities of more palpable power.⁷⁹

Of the Oriental gods and goddesses who were revered in the navy, the Egyptian deities were by far the most popular. It is not alone that Isis and Serapis appealed strongly to the Hellenized sections of the empire, from which many of the sailors came; more especially, as Aelius Aristides states, "Serapis is great on the sea, and both merchantmen and warcraft are guided by him."⁸⁰ As we have seen, Apion thanked Serapis for his salvation in a tempest; Serapion and Serapias are theophoric names frequent in sailors' families, although they may not always have been proof of religious affiliation.⁸¹ There is, moreover, good evidence that the Misene sailors had a special celebration of the *navigium Isidis* to open the sailing season, for the *bis navarchi* who appear in

two third-century inscriptions from Rome and Misenum respectively were certainly officials in this sacred procession.⁸²

Despite Cumont's assertion that the sailors from Ravenna who were enrolled in the legion II Adiutrix introduced the worship of Mithras at Aquincum in Pannonia,⁸³ it cannot be said that Mithras ever obtained the favor of the sailors in the degree that he won over the soldiers. There are no Mithraic monuments from Ravenna or its close vicinity, nor is there any direct epigraphical evidence that any sailor worshiped the semi-Hellenized Persian god of light. Most of the sailors came from regions which never accepted him, Syria, Egypt, Hellenized Asia Minor; and if Cilician and Balkan recruits in the Misene fleet worshiped Mithras at the nearby Mithraea in Puteoli, Naples, and Rome, information is thus far wanting.

In and near Rome the new divinities of the second and third centuries were probably favored as the imperial house favored them. This is at least true for Jupiter Optimus Maximus Dolichenus, the old Hittite deity who was Hellenized in Commagene and spread through the Roman world, especially in the reign of Commodus and thereafter. A detachment of the Misene fleet at Ostia in 186 made a dedication to Jupiter Dolichenus, and a sailor of the Misene fleet on duty at Rome dedicated a sculptured marble base at his Esquiline shrine.⁸⁴

§ 3. DISCHARGE

An examination of the epitaphs reveals that the majority of sailors did not see the end of their full term of enlistment; mortality was perhaps higher in antiquity, and sea life has ever a tinge of the dangerous. Others were discharged at one time or another by reason of disability or unsatisfactory service, and the extraordinarily large number of sailors who record twenty-five years' service may possibly have been given a *missio causaria* at that point in order that they might not qualify for diplomas.⁸⁵ A certain number of sailors, however, did satisfactorily round out their twenty-six years and arrived at the time for honorable dismissal. On one day each year the praefect of the fleet, whose office kept

full records, would give these veterans *honesta missio* and then send a list of those who had been so discharged to Rome.⁸⁶ Here, from Claudius' reign through the middle of the third century of our era, the imperial chancery issued for each group of such veterans a separate imperial constitution granting certain privileges in set terms and naming the recipients of the grant. This constitution was cut in bronze and set up on the Capitoline, or after Domitian at the temple of Augustus on the Palatine; exemplars of the grant, giving the name of the individual veteran—today called diplomas—were then made in bronze and sent back to the praefect, who distributed them to the veterans. This was the essential step for the sailors, who remained actually in service until the rewards which had in part tempted them to enlist were visibly confirmed.⁸⁷

First among the privileges conferred by the diploma was the grant of Roman citizenship to the sailors themselves, their children, and their posterity:

iis qui militaverunt in classe praetoria . . . , quae est sub . . . , sex et viginti stipendiis emeritis dimissis honesta missione, quorum nomina subscripta sunt, ipsis liberis posterisque eorum civitatem dedit.⁸⁸

This grant of citizenship stemmed from the right of Republican magistrates to reward *peregrini* individually for meritorious service. An enabling vote of the *populus* was required to validate this action, and Augustus in granting citizenship to the navarch Seleucus proceeded under a *lex Munatia et Aemilia*. In justification of this particular grant, he noted that Seleucus had served faithfully not only the state but more especially himself and thus deserved citizenship, "as is due to those serving us well and doing well in war."⁸⁹ Although Augustus seems to have proceeded on this precept in various grants of citizenship to his soldiers, formal establishment of the rule that auxiliaries and sailors received citizenship on discharge is more probably the work of Claudius, for the first diplomas date from his reign, and the step seems connected with his general policy of promoting the spread of Roman citizenship wherever possession of Roman culture could serve as justification.

It has been suggested that Claudius planned by this innovation to form a sprinkling of Roman citizens throughout the empire which could serve as a basis for later territorial grants of citizenship.⁹⁰ By this period the need for a validating law had vanished along with the other powers of the people, and the Emperor cited no authority in bestowing citizenship.

The second privilege, as stated in all naval diplomas now known, was the grant of *conubium* with the wives whom the sailors had at the time when citizenship was given to them or, if they were then bachelors, with those whom they afterwards took as wives, except that *conubium* existed only with the first wife so taken:

et conubium [dedit] cum uxoribus quas tunc habuissent cum est civitas iis data aut si qui caelibes essent cum iis quas postea duxissent dumtaxat singuli singulas.

By this clause the benefits of the full Roman marriage or *conubium*, normally allowed only between two Roman citizens, were assured the veteran. Even though the mother were a peregrine, the children born to the sailor after discharge would be full Roman citizens, taking their father's *nomen*, but would not be subject to the Roman family institution of *patria potestas*.⁹¹

In point of fact this grant also legitimated the earlier children and made legal any marriage the sailor had contracted. The problem of marriage in the armed forces of the Empire has long been debated, but certain papyri have fixed the point, already suggested by the literary, epigraphical, and juristic evidence, that down to the reign of Septimius Severus marriage was completely forbidden to soldiers in all branches of the army as being an institution incompatible with the duties of the service. For the Roman citizens in the legions a marriage with *conubium* was suspended by service, and entrance into the service constituted sufficient ground for divorce.⁹² *Matrimonium ex iure gentium*, the type of marriage which could be contracted by any two free inhabitants of the Roman empire, with a few minor exceptions, was also forbidden auxiliaries and legionaries alike.⁹³

Like the soldiers, the sailors could not legally marry, at least

until A. D. 160, but certainly they did do so in actuality even from the period of Claudius. Sailor and wife refer to each other constantly as "*coniunx*" and "*maritus*." Endearing epithets are used, "*dulcissima*," "*carissima*," even "*inaptabilis femina et incomparabilis coniunx*"; and Arrius Isidorus proudly records that he spent three hundred denarii for the burial of his wife.⁹⁴ At times the sailor seems to have signaled his enlistment by taking a wife immediately,⁹⁵ for the practice was not actively discouraged by the emperors. These wives were apparently considered in legal phraseology as concubines, a relation not sharply distinguished from *matrimonium* in the Roman world. The children of a concubine were not legitimate and accordingly took their mother's name; several epitaphs give the name of the sailor, his *coniunx*, and their children, in which the children have the *nomen* of the mother. The only one of these which can be approximately dated is of the last years of the first century after Christ.⁹⁶ In cases at law, however, this marriage in active service created no rights until Hadrian permitted issue of such a union in Egypt to inherit an intestate father's property.⁹⁷ It is uncertain whether the privilege was extended throughout the whole empire.

By the year 166 a certain change had been effected as regards the sailors, and the diplomas thenceforth gave, in addition to *conubium*, citizenship to sailors and those children the mothers of whom were officially recognized to have lived with the sailors in accordance with the "permitted custom": "*ipsis filiisque eorum quos susceperint ex mulieribus quas secum concessa consuetudine vixisse probaverint.*"⁹⁸

The "*consuetudo*" has generally been regarded as concubinage, which would thus be publicly acknowledged, and such an interpretation seems reasonable on a first reading of the phraseology employed in the diplomas.⁹⁹ It is, however, peculiar that concubinage, so widely prevalent in army and navy alike, should have been actually illegal, and that the government should have officially accepted the *custom* of concubinage, when, in point of fact, almost every sailor customarily considered his spouse not a concubine but a genuine wife, an "*incomparabilis coniunx*." The requirement that the sailor "prove" that the mother of his children

had lived with him is also hardly consonant with concubinage, which usually needed no formalities; on the other hand *matrimonium*, with its attendant giving of *dos* and other ceremonies, would fit excellently.

If the "consuetudo" actually be *matrimonium*—and against this view there is no evidence—one must consider the changed reading of the diplomas an additional reward, which only incidentally entailed a certain restriction of citizenship in that the children of *matrimonia* alone received citizenship thenceforth. If this be true, the first signs of a more liberal imperial policy on the question of military marriage showed themselves in the navy, and the grant of *matrimonium* to the sailors by Marcus Aurelius presaged the certain bestowal of full marriage rights on soldiers under Septimius Severus.¹⁰⁰ With the navy, indeed, concessions might be made more easily; while engaged on active service the sailor could not hope to have his wife present or near by, and during the stops in port he had little to do of a military nature. There are many examples of a son taking his father's *nomen* while the latter was still in service. Thus, Iulius Ponticus, a son, and Antonia Callicyche, a *coniunx*, erected a tombstone to C. Iulius Ponticus, who lived forty-four years and served twenty-two; he obviously died before discharge, yet his son was apparently the offspring of a legal *matrimonium*.¹⁰¹ These examples are unfortunately not conclusive proof, for they cannot be precisely referred to the period after 166, and in any case soldiers and sailors alike tended to consider their children legitimate even when legally they were not.

The problem of the sailors' marriage rights is connected with the further difficulty that, while the issuance of auxiliary diplomas ceased apparently in the reign of Commodus, the soldiers in the praetorian and urban cohorts, the *equites singulares*, and the sailors in the Italian fleets continued to receive diplomas throughout most of the third century. It has generally been assumed that these persons still needed the grant of citizenship or *conubium*, but the precise manner in which they lacked either the one or the other has been difficult to discover. The interpretation of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* formerly accepted, that Caracallus granted

citizenship in 212 only to the inhabitants of the urban units of the empire, seemed to settle the question for the navy, for the native Egyptians would not have received citizenship and in so far as they served in the navy would still have required the diplomarary grant. Although the matter is not definitely resolved, it is at least certain that these native Egyptians were included in the *Constitutio*, and in general the statements of Dio and Ulpian that Caracallus' grant extended to everyone in the empire, that is, to every free person residing within its boundaries in A. D. 212, are probably correct.¹⁰² Since barbarians, who might come into the empire after this date, and the categories of freedmen who received only Junian Latinity on manumission are not recorded in the navy, it is therefore unlikely that sailors needed the diplomas to give them citizenship. In any case the extant naval diplomas were given to persons from Misenum and Ateste, yet both of these must already have been citizens.¹⁰³

Since the wives of the sailors were normally also Roman citizens after 212, their marriage, if legalized by Marcus Aurelius or even later by Septimius Severus, would surely have been *conubium* even during service.¹⁰⁴ This point has forced the latest student of the problem to argue that the soldiers in the praetorian cohorts were still legally unable to contract marriages after Septimius Severus had granted marriage rights to the soldiers generally.¹⁰⁵ While these praetorian units of Italy did not settle down into militia life as fully as the frontier armies of the third century, it yet appears surprising that the very troops which were closest to the emperors should have been most limited in their privileges.

The true solution of the difficulty seems to be that the diplomas were still issued to the members of the Italian units, and only to these, not because they might still be peregrines or could not legally marry, but solely *honoris causa* and as the traditional evidence of their service.¹⁰⁶ With the increased exactions of the third century and the tendency of various agencies to infringe on the official rights of Roman citizens this testimonial had an increased value, although its formal privileges were long antiquated; and the praetorians, *equites singulares*, and sailors, coming as they did

from the empire at large and likely to settle in areas far from the region of their service, were precisely the persons who needed such documents.

Apart from the grant of citizenship, which embraced the privileges of the Roman law, and the bestowal of *conubium* by the diploma, the veterans of the navy presumably enjoyed the further rights extended to veterans of all forces by general edict. While still triumvir Octavian had exempted veterans as citizens "*optimo iure optimaque lege*," their parents, children, and wives from the *tributa* and the public *munera*, or expensive offices; at the same time they might, without losing their immunity, hold priesthoods and other posts if they desired. Winter quartering of troops in their houses was forbidden.¹⁰⁷ In 88/89 Domitian reinforced this grant by another edict in general terms.¹⁰⁸ By the time of Ulpian, in the early third century, the veterans were obligated for *vectigalia* and inherited *onera solennia* but were still exempt from municipal posts. Veterans certainly could enter burial clubs, but the emperors kept a careful check on any other organizations of the potentially dangerous veterans.¹⁰⁹

The auxiliaries and sailors apparently did not on discharge receive a cash bounty or any other form of pecuniary reward. Augustus settled some of his naval veterans at Forum Iulii, and others possibly at Nemausus; thereafter Vespasian alone thus rewarded the veterans of the Italian fleets, who had materially aided his advance to the throne. A great number of the Misene fleet, retired on February 9 and April 5, 71, he settled at Paestum in southern Italy; those discharged from the Ravennate fleet on April 5 were located in Pannonia. The colony at Paestum at least was not entirely satisfactory; only one inscription of the area reflects the settlement, and to judge from the diplomas the sailors so discharged preferred generally to sell their land and to return to their homeland.¹¹⁰

Throughout the first century, down to the end of the reign of Trajan, soldiers and sailors alike were retained under the colors after their discharge date, and even when dismissal came to be given on the correct date some of the sailors, particularly those who had occupied technical posts, were allowed to continue in

service.¹¹¹ In the third century the officers immediately below the trierarch were at times admitted to the special military branch of the *evocati*, or special agents on military duties.¹¹²

Nor is it surprising that sailors should at times have preferred to continue in service. Those who were settled in colonies by an emperor were few; the remainder were discharged in later middle age to shift for themselves. Some returned to their native land and settled down to an honorable old age as Roman citizens. A few may have been able to retire; the evidence of Egypt suggests that most turned from labor on the sea to labor on the land as renters or proprietors of small farms.¹¹³

A very large number were unwilling to leave scenes become familiar through years of service. All their ties bound them to Italy, and so large groups of veterans settled at the mouth of the Po or in the Gulf of Naples from Cumae around to Stabiae. The region about Naples in particular was pleasant to the veteran sailor who came from the East, for Naples long remained Greek and could furnish natives of every Oriental land and cults of every Hellenistic divinity. Some veterans entered civil life as small merchants and the like; ¹¹⁴ others may have continued on the sea as fishermen or sailors on private ships.

It would be too much to say that these Italian sailors had been fully Romanized in every sense during their twenty-six years of service, for the purely Latin culture had deserted Italy, or at least the central western coast, for the provinces; but certainly they had imbibed much of the urban, cosmopolitan culture, partly Latin, partly Hellenistic, and if they remained in Italy after discharge this culture persisted with them. To this extent the grant of Roman citizenship was not only a legal reward but also a reflection of actual change in status and culture. The sons born and grown to maturity before the father's discharge sometimes entered the fleet; more generally the second generation, improved in status, served, if at all, in the legions or the praetorian guard.¹¹⁵ Raw recruits from Egypt, the Hellenistic East, and the Balkans were always pouring in to the center of the Roman empire to take the place of outwardly Romanized veterans; the Roman navy played its part in the cosmopolitan culture of imperial Rome and Campania, and

to the provinces whence the sailors had come they might return as a Romanizing leaven.

NOTES

1 *Hermes* 16 (1881), pp. 445-494; see also *Hermes* 19 (1884), pp. 32-39, and his *Römisches Staatsrecht*³ 2. 2, pp. 862-863.

2 Fiebiger s.v. "classis" (PW, 1899), col. 2636; for his earlier view, see Fiebiger, pp. 384-386 (1894). The remarks of Gardthausen are discussed immediately below in the text.

3 *Res Gestae* 26, 30; Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit* 1, p. 469; above, p. 44. The possessive adjectives in the *Res Gestae* are fully justified in each case by the fact that Augustus, through his *imperium proconsulare*, was the legal commander of the forces.

4 Tac., *Ann.* 1. 11. Suet., *Aug.* 49, lists the Italian fleets "ex militaribus copiis" with the legions and auxiliaries.

5 Dio 79. 3. 5, on which see *Prosop.*¹ 3, p. 355 no. 42. Naval service was inflicted as a punishment at least once by Augustus (*Jos., Ant.* 17. 12. 2 [B. I. 2. 110]), but regular penal service in the galleys was unknown.

6 Durry, *Les Cohortes prétoriennes*, pp. 298-300. The absence of the praetorians and sailors alike from the *Res Gestae* stems from this distinction. It is possible that the groups were separated also in financial accounts; cf. Domaszewski, "Zur Gemma Augustea," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 25 (1927), pp. 1-4.

7 The evidence for Athens, and the Greek states generally, has been assembled by Rachel L. Sargent, "The Use of Slaves by the Athenians in Warfare II," *Classical Philology* 22 (1927), pp. 264-279. On the Middle Ages, see *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, ed. Sir Henry Yule (3d ed. by Henri Cordier; London, 1903), p. 39; Fincati in Serre, *Les Marines de guerre*, pp. 174-184 (Fincati cites Venetian testimony which proves that the use of slaves was an innovation in 1539).

8 Slaves in the army after Cannae: Livy 22. 57. 11-12 and *passim*; according to Servius, *Ad Aen.* 9. 544, this was the only time at which slaves served in the army. Armed slaves in the civil wars: Plut., *Marius* 41-43, *Sulla* 9. 7; Caesar, B. C. 1. 24, 34, 3. 4; *Bell. Afric.* 19; Appian, B. C. 2. 103. Octavian's harshness: Appian, B. C. 5. 131; *Res Gestae* 25.

9 Suet., *Aug.* 16, is here to be preferred to Dio 48. 49. 1, 49. 1. 5 (cf. 47. 17. 4), according to whom Augustus freed these slaves in 36 B. C. Suet., *Aug.* 74, states that Menas, the only freedman admiral of Augustus, was made a free man.

10 Marcian, *Dig.* 49. 16. 11; also Servius, *Ad Aen.* 9. 544, and a concrete case in Dio 67. 13. 1. The sailors: V 938; above, pp. 57-58.

11 After the Pannonian revolt of A. D. 6 and the defeat of Varus in A. D. 9: Suet., *Aug.* 25; Dio 55. 31. 1; Vell. Pater. 2. 111. See G. L. Cheesman, *Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army* (Oxford, 1914), p. 66; P. K. Baillie Reynolds, *The Vigiles of Imperial Rome* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 64-68. Freedmen in the Republican navy: Livy 22. 11. 8 (217 B. C.), 36. 2. 15, 40. 18. 7, 42. 27. 3, 42. 31. 6-7, 43. 12. 9; cf. Appian, B. C. 1. 49.

12 If slaves served in any great numbers, one may, I think, justly expect some epigraphical evidence, and in any case the service of free and unfree in the same unit is an impossible idea. Mommsen's argument from the sailors' use of ethnic origins in inscriptions, it may be noted, is inconclusive, for, as he admits,

sailors might give their political units and auxiliaries their ethnic origins. The Italian sailors, isolated from the auxiliaries, formed their own epigraphical style, which differs on other points from that of the army.

13 Dips. 1, 7-17. Peregrines: III 2034 (Salona); V 1956 (Portus Liguentiae); IX 42, 43 (Brundisium), 3892 (Fucine Lake); XI 45, 88; XII 5736 (Forum Iulii); *Eph. ep.* 8. 33 (Brundisium). The veterans: III 14695 (Salona, in Greek); X 719 (Latin in Greek letters), 3416 (birthplace Nicaea); V 938; VI 2491; X 3530; Dess. 9218.

14 V 938. A certain . . . nius C. f. An. Silvanus (VI 2491), who served in the Misene fleet before 71, likewise seems to have been at least a Latin during service.

15 X 3646, 3654; XI 59, 65; possibly also XI 3736 (Lorium; Ferrero 1878, p. 81); cf. Forcellini s.v. "verna." The term came to mean "native" (especially of Rome) and may in the navy be an equivalent of the army phrase *ex castris*, on which see Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte*, pp. 209-211.

X 3531, bearing "M. Arius M. l. Princeps," is a poorly-cut stone which has other errors.

16 VI 32775.

17 As by serving six years (later three) in the *vigiles*: Gaius, *Inst.* 1. 28-35, and Ulpian, *Reg.* 3. 3, 3. 5. See also A. M. Duff, *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 141-142.

18 Dips. 12-16 of 71; Dip. 74 of 129. A Liburnian Varvarine, who had Latin rights, as a sailor: XI 104; Pliny, *H. N.* 3. 139. To anticipate the following discussion, I may state here that there is no clear proof of Mommsen's notion that such a name as C. Valerius Dasius is really a Latin name, i.e., that persons of Latin rights, and these persons only, bore the *tria nomina* without the tribe. The term is employed in the text only as a convenient description of such names.

19 *NdS* 1928, pp. 193-194; *AE* 1929. 142-145, 147-149.

20 V 938 and VI 2491 before 71; *AE* 1929. 146 (Misenum) after 71, "Serapion Serapionis [f.]" Serapion may not have taken a Latin name, or he may have preferred to be buried under his original name. In X 7592 and 8329 "pr(aetoria)" may be omitted in the title of the fleet.

21 The grant to Spain, attested by Pliny, *H. N.* 3. 30, is thoroughly discussed by R. K. McElderry, "Vespasian's Reconstruction of Spain," *JRS* 8 (1918), pp. 53-102, and *ibid.* 9 (1919), pp. 86-94. This was *latinitas colonaria*, on which see Ulpian, *Reg.* 19. 4-5; Edward Poste, *Gaii Institutiones* (4th ed. by E. A. Whit-tuck; Oxford, 1904), pp. 27-28. Tardiness in rewards: Suet., *Vesp.* 8. 2, although this refers strictly to the regular payments on discharge.

22 *Ala veterana Gallicana*: P. Hamb. 39; Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte*, pp. 222-223, who cites also a roster of the cohort I praetoria Lusitanorum of 156 (*BGU* 696) and another army list of 172/192 in which Latin and peregrine names are mixed. Isidorus, Neon, and Octavius Valens: P. Catt. cols. 4-5 (Mitteis 372); M. Lambert, *Glotta* 5 (1914), p. 153. Lesquier, *op. cit.* pp. 219-224, is the only scholar to my knowledge who has directly attacked Mommsen's equation of "Latin" nomenclature and Latin status.

23 Dips. 112 (151/160) and 123 (167); Dips. 48 (103) and 56 (107). The observation of Mommsen, *Die Provinzen*, p. 66 n. 1, that if any persons with peregrine names occurred in Spain after Vespasian the matter would be one of "faktische Vernachlässigung" will not explain the diplomas. In Dip. 76 (133) a Helvetian and in Dip. 84 (138) a member of the Treveri have Latin names, although they came from regions which were not Latin.

24 Suet., *Claud.* 25. This rule may have stemmed from Claudius' respect for

the rules of the past or from the flagrant case of the Anauni (V 5050); the tendency to take a name at least partly Latin goes back to the Republic: Cic., *Verr.* 5. 112. Non-Romans also tended to assume the toga: Tac., *Agric.* 21; Strabo 3. 4. 20; Mommsen, *Die Provinzen*, p. 64 n. 1.

25 The military diplomas, all after Domitian, have but a small proportion of Latin names. Some veterans used parts of Roman nomenclature, e. g., Secundus Sasiri f. (Dip. 101) or Victor Liccai f. (Dip. 99). It is significant that the officers more often took Latin names than the peregrines in P. Hamb. 39; this distinction seems to occur in the early navy also, for the common sailor Scaeva served under the centurion M. Vettius (IX 42, Brundisium). The manner in which the natives of the Rhineland adopted Romanized names is of interest in this connection; see Joachim Scharf, *Studien zur Bevölkerungsgeschichte der Rheinlande* (Berlin, 1938), pp. 44-48.

26 M. Lambertz, "Zur Ausbreitung des Supernomens oder Signum im römischen Reiche," *Glotta* 4 (1913), pp. 78-143; *ibid.* 5 (1914), pp. 99-170.

27 The letter of Apion, quoted in § 2 of this chapter, and Dip. 79 (134) suggest that in the second century the sailor had to take a Latin name; in the latter a Sardinian veteran seems to have disliked Romanization, for he kept an exotic *cognomen*, D. Numitorius Agasini f. Tarammo, and named his son Tarpalaris.

28 Ulpian, *Reg.* 3. 5; Gaius, *Inst.* 1. 32. It has been suggested that the admission of native Egyptians to the Italian fleets (see above, p. 77) entailed the receipt of peregrine or Latin status by these Egyptians on entry, but this is not at present capable of proof; see A. H. M. Jones, *JRS* 26 (1936), p. 232 n. 37; W. Seston in "Les Vétérans sans diplômes des légions romaines," *Revue de philologie* 59 (1933), pp. 383-384.

29 The very rare grants of Roman citizenship and in one case Latin rights to auxiliary units were always made only to those actually in the specific unit at the time of the reward and did not carry on to the new recruits. Cf. Dip. 26 (A. D. 80); Cichorius *s.v.* "cohors" (PW), col. 234.

30 See above, p. 93. On citizens in the *auxilia*, cf. Lesquier, *L' Armée romaine d' Égypte*, pp. 218-219; and Dip. 90 (144) and following, which gave citizenship to the veterans of the *auxilia* who did not already possess it. This change did not occur in naval diplomas.

31 X 3474; Dips. 152 (247) and 154 (249).

32 A thought concretely expressed in III 8385, quoted above, p. 78. Trebius, p. 28. If Domaszewski (*Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 25 [1927], p. 2) were correct in assuming that the unarmored men leading prisoners on the lower zone of the Gemma Augustea were sailors, they would take their place beside the army in the apotheosis of the *Pax Augusta*. The suggestion, unfortunately, is fanciful.

33 Parallel studies in the life of the enlisted personnel of the other forces may be found in Lesquier, *L' Armée romaine d' Égypte*, pp. 203-375; Durry, *Les Cohortes prétorienne*, pp. 239-358; René Cagnat, *L' Armée romaine d' Afrique et l' occupation militaire de l' Afrique sous les empereurs* (2nd ed.; Paris, 1912-1913), pp. 287-423.

34 XI 42; Pliny, *H. N.* 3. 134; Ihm *s.v.* "Camunni" (PW); Mommsen, *Hermes* 16 (1881), p. 471. The phrase *natione italicus*, e. g. in X 3412, and also the term *verna* (XI 96), indicate birth at Misenum or Ravenna. On the Augustan scheme for recruitment of the armed forces, cf. Mommsen, "Die Conscriptiionsordnung der römischen Kaiserzeit," *Hermes* 19 (1884), pp. 1-79, 210-234; Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, p. 48 n. 2.

35 Tac., *Hist.* 3. 12, 50; G. G. Mateescu, "I Traci nelle epigrafi di Roma,"

Ephemeris Dacoromana 1 (1923), pp. 57-290; Radu Vulpe, "Gli Illiri dell' Italia imperiale romana," *ibid.* 3 (1925), pp. 129-258.

36 Other Thracians probably designated themselves by this name, which was employed by Ovid, *Trist.* 3. 10. 5, Lucan, *Phars.* 5. 441, etc., to denote the typical Thracian tribe; cf. Wilhelm Tomaschek, *Die alten Thraker I* in *SB Wien* 128 (1893), pp. 72-80, and Oberhummer s.v. "Bessoï" (PW). Their service in the navy can hardly have begun before A.D. 26: Tac., *Ann.* 4. 46-51. The Daci in the navy may have been natives of the region south of the Danube: Andreas Alföldi, "Dacians on the Southern Bank of the Danube," *JRS* 29 (1939), pp. 28-31.

37 The distinction is more properly between the *laographoumenoi* and the *epikekrimenoi*, who received official recognition of their higher status (below, p. 110); for the latter group apparently included some native Egyptians in addition to Romans, Alexandrians, etc. To my knowledge, the question of status in Egypt has not yet been fully clarified; cf. Lesquier, *L' Armée romaine d' Égypte*, pp. 155-201; Elias Bickermann, "Beiträge zur antiken Urkundengeschichte II," *Archiv* 9 (1928), pp. 24-46 (on which note H. I. Bell in *CAH* 10, pp. 295-300); S. L. Wallace, *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian* (Princeton, 1938), pp. 109-134. Josephus, *contra Apion* 2. 41, 72, states the general rule that the *laoi* could not gain Roman citizenship, the reward for military service, and the *Gnomon* proves that the legions were closed to *laoi*. The failure of *Gnomon* 55 (quoted below) to mention the *auxilia* leaves the question of their recruitment open. Lesquier, *L' Armée romaine d' Égypte*, p. 224, thinks the *laoi* were barred here too; Jérôme Carcopino in "Le Gnomon de l' Idiologue," *Revue des études anciennes* 24 (1922), pp. 215-219, disagrees. If they were admitted to the *auxilia*, the restriction on their naval service becomes even more peculiar.

38 *Gnomon* 55: 'Εάν Αἰγύπτιος λαθὼν στρατεύσῃται ἐν λεγεῶνι ἀπολυθεὶς εἰς τὸ Αἰγύπτιον τάγμα ἀποκαθίσταται ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ἑρετικοῦ ἀπολυθέντες ἀποκαθίστανται πλὴν μόνων τῶν ἐκ Μισσηνῶν στόλου. If this provision were strictly enforced, the Egyptians who served in the Syrian and Alexandrian fleets (to which the *Gnomon* probably has special reference) must have been *epikekrimenoi*. ἐκ τοῦ ἑρετικοῦ must here include both *remiges* and *nautae* (see above, p. 57), a point on which P. M. Meyer, *Juristische Papyri* (Berlin, 1920), p. 330, falls into error.

39 On Alexandrian status, cf. Pliny, *Epp.* 10. 5-7; the *Gnomon passim*; Elias Bickermann, "A Propos des 'Αστοὶ dans l' Égypte gréco-romaine," *Revue de philologie* 53 (1927), pp. 362-368, who cites P. Ox. 1681 on the cleavage between the Alexandrian and the "inhuman Egyptian." Note also the attitude in the *Acta Isidori*, e.g. Wilcken 14, col. 3, 9-11.

40 Pausanias 3. 6. 5; *OGIS* 90, l. 17; W. W. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* (Oxford, 1913), p. 299 n. 66; P. Tebt. 5, l. 46. The Egyptians who were apparently settled at Nemausus in the early decades of Augustus' principate may have been sailors from Antony's ships at Forum Iulii: Otto Hirschfeld, "Die Crocodilmünzen von Nemausus," *Wiener Studien* 5 (1883), pp. 319-322.

41 A. H. M. Jones, *JRS* 26 (1936), p. 232 n. 37, suggests that the legal reason for the ban on military service lay in the fact that these Egyptians were technically *dediticii*, and that on entry into the Misene fleet their status was improved; see above, p. 98 n. 28.

42 In XI 343 a Dalmatian of the Ravennate fleet set up a tombstone to his two brothers, who served eight years and six months respectively, each having enlisted at the age of twenty.

43 P. Mich. 191, early second century; published and translated by J. G. Winter

in *Classical Philology* 22 (1927), pp. 245-246 (by permission of *Classical Philology* and the University of Chicago Press).

44 As given in the inscriptions, the usual ages are:

Ages	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Misene fleet	9	13	19	44	31	22	13	7	7
Ravennate fleet	2	6	4	15	6	2	6	2	5
	11	19	23	59	37	24	19	9	12

Roughly the same ages occur in the land service; cf. P. Ox. 1022.

45 BGU 423 (Wilcken 480). Early second century, from Philadelphia.

46 P. Mich. 4527 and 4528, published and translated by J. G. Winter, *Classical Philology* 22 (1927), pp. 239-245 (by permission of *Classical Philology* and the University of Chicago Press); I have changed the wording in various places. Wilcken, *Archiv* 9 (1928), pp. 85-86, considers them early second century, and Winter, *Life and Letters in the Papyri* (Ann Arbor, 1933), p. 39, accepts this dating. Apolinaris apparently employed professional letter-writers.

47 Augustan system: Dio 55. 23. 1; Suet., *Aug.* 49. 2. The earliest naval diploma (Dip. 1) is not so phrased as to give the length of service, but this does not prove that the term was not already set; Trebius, who served seventeen years under Augustus (p. 28), may have received a special discharge. Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, pp. 46-47, discusses the necessity for a long-term army. Increase of two years: Dip. 122 of 166 (the "sex," however, is restored); Dip. 138 of 214/217.

48 Discharge: Dips. 17, 60; and below, pp. 185, 187. Transfer: PSI 1026 and below, p. 188.

49 Domaszewski's conjecture as to the auxiliary stipend in "Der Truppen sold der Kaiserzeit," *Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher* 10 (1900), pp. 225-226, is borne out by a papyrus; cf. Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte*, pp. 251-253. De la Berge, pp. 160-161, suggested that the *pitulus septesemiodalis* (X 3480, 3481) was a *sesquiplicarius* and that the seven and one-half *modii* of grain which he received monthly would indicate a base of five (on which Seneca, *Epp.* 80. 7, says a slave lived). Troops in the Early Empire, however, had to purchase their own food (Lesquier, *loc. cit.*), and this explanation may be queried.

50 IX 60 (Brundisium); cf. A. B. Purdie, *Some Observations on Latin Verse Inscriptions* (London, 1935), pp. 93-94.

51 XI 6107. The regular duties of any military unit—guard, fatigue work, etc.—are known for the Roman army and may be assumed for the navy: Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte*, pp. 140, 141, 228-248 (based on P. Gen. Lat. 1). Military punishments are discussed in Dig. 49. 16; Sallust, *Hist.* 3. 9 (cited by De la Berge, p. 66), mentions flogging at the mast in the Republic.

52 Firm. Mat., *Math.* 8. 30. 6 (quoted by Franz Cumont, *L'Égypte des astrologues*, p. 110 n. 2).

53 Some sixty inscriptions mention freed slaves; only X 3354, 3355, 3401, and 3577 record actual slaves, but the servile element in the Roman world rarely secured epigraphical recognition. A praetorian usually had only one slave: Durry, *Les Cohortes prétoriennes*, p. 281. Private work by soldiers is mentioned in Tac., *Hist.* 1. 46; see H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions* (Oxford, 1928), p. 221.

54 Macer: AE 1896. 21; Adolf Schulten, "Ein römischer Kaufvertrag auf Papyrus aus dem Jahre 166 n. Chr.," *Hermes* 32 (1897), pp. 273-289. Since this document was found in the Fayum, the purchaser may be the same person as the C. Fabullius Macer of BGU 327. Montanus: AE 1922. 135; Otto Eger in ZSS:RA 42 (1921), pp. 452-468. The deed was executed at the Ravennate camp shortly before A.D. 152. Concubines: XI 26 and frequently elsewhere; Dig. 29.

1. 40. 2 (Ulpian, *Reg.* 1. 20). By *Dig.* 38. 11. 1, 40. 2. 19, etc., a woman freed for the purpose of marrying her patron could not desert him to marry another without his consent. On the character of slavery in the Roman Empire, see especially W. L. Westermann s.v. "Sklaverei" (PW), cols. 994-1063.

55 X 3593, 3622, etc.; in X 3360 two thousand sesterces were expended. Note also *AE* 1927. 180 (*BGU* 1695) of the Alexandrian fleet.

56 Castor: *BGU* 326 (A. D. 189), 327; Mommsen, "Aegyptische Papyri III," *ZSS:RA* 16 (1895), pp. 198-202; also *Dig.* 49. 17. 6 and 13, 29. 1. 40. 2. Fiduciary heir: X 3388, 3454, 3565; *Dig.* 36. 1. 48 (46).

57 Gaius, *Inst.* 2. 109-111; *Gnomon* 34; Ulpian, *Reg.* 20. 10, 23. 10; *Dig.* 29. 1, 37. 13, 49. 17. Hadrian limited the validity of such wills to one year after discharge (*Inst.* [of the Code] 2. 11, *BGU* 327; but see *Gnomon* 34), after which a civil will was necessary; cf. W. W. Buckland, *A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian* (Cambridge, 1921), pp. 357-358. Ulpian in *Dig.* 37. 13 shows that the sailors enjoyed these privileges of the Roman law.

58 E. g., XI 54.

59 E. g., X 3402, XI 35. In the Ravennate fleet the *heres* and *subheres* often united in setting up the gravestone (X 3486, 3527, 3645; XI 35); this custom does not appear in the Misene fleet.

60 *Eph. ep.* 8. 444 (Misenum); see above, p. 60.

61 Cf. VI 3142; X 3487, 3570, 3573; XI 43. A bereaved mother whose son served only seventeen days set up X 3599.

62 X 3454, 3406.

63 *Proretae*, X 3483; *armaturae*, X 3344; *artifices*, X 3479; *sodales*, XI 6739; *veterani*, X 1881. The last was found at and surely belongs to Misenum (Beloch, *Campanien*², p. 192), although Mommsen assigned it to Puteoli. A *collegium* of the *medici* is hesitatingly accepted by Cagnat, *L'Armée romaine d'Afrique* (1st ed.; Paris, 1892), pp. 463-477, on the basis of X 3441. His opinion that such organizations were first permitted under Septimius Severus is refuted by Domaszewski, *Die Religion des römischen Heeres* (Trier, 1895), p. 32; Severus probably first permitted clubs to have their *scholae* within the camp proper. Cagnat does not discuss the matter in his second edition.

64 Ravenna, XI 32; Rome, VI 3093, 3149; Misenum, *NdS* 1928, pp. 187-201.

65 *BGU* 632.

66 X 3406; cf. VI 3165, V 774 and 910 (Aquileia). This adoption of new names produced brothers with different *nomina*, who sometimes have the same *cognomina* (XI 94, 110); at times they took exactly the same name, as in VI 3151. The two M. Aurelii Romani of this inscription may have taken the *cognomen* "Romanus" to indicate their entry into service at Rome. The principles on which the recruits formed their names are not clear. The *nomina* of the emperors are not common among the sailors; some *nomina* are conventional Roman names, and others are coinages of the second and third century which mark the gradual breakdown of the Roman nomenclature. Generally the sailors accepted Roman or Romanized *cognomina*, but in various instances they retained their native names as *cognomina*. See above, p. 98 n. 27, and the lists in Ferrero 1899, pp. 290-305.

67 *AE* 1896. 21 has the usual stipulations and the seven witnesses of a Roman bill of sale; note also *AE* 1922. 135, *AE* 1927. 180, and above, p. 000. To my knowledge the juristic sources do not state which law, peregrine or Roman, was to be used by these soldiers, who would eventually become citizens; Ulpian, *Dig.* 37. 13, notes only that they could use the common *ius militaris* in wills. Latin required in armed forces; Suet., *Tib.* 71.

68 E. g., X 3430, 3435, 3554 (*berna, iubenis*); on *nauphlax*, see p. 63 n. 24. The regional difference is clearest in the use of *pono* or *facio* to indicate the establishment of a grave. Of the one hundred and ninety-three inscriptions at Misenum using one word or the other, one hundred and eighty-seven use some form of *facio*; fifty-two of the fifty-nine at Ravenna have a form of *pono*. Forty-four naval inscriptions of Rome employ one or the other; thirty-eight, all Misene, use *facio*, and the remaining six, all Ravennate, *pono*.

69 *AE* 1929. 149; cf. X 719 (Surrentum), the Latin tombstone of a veteran in Greek letters, and X 3380, which adds the valedictory *εὐψύχει* at the end of a Latin epitaph. Lesser traces may be noted in X 3533, *Eph. ep.* 8. 430 (Misenum).

70 X 3527; X 3515, 3535; X 3406, 3553.

71 *Lib(eria) et con(iunx)* is often found on sailors' tombstones. *Ancilla* occurs in VI 3158 and X 3455; *amicus*, in X 3655. Sister, XI 106. The *vernae* of X 1981, 3444, 3446, 3472 along with XI 83 and 112 (*natione Italica*) are natives of Misenum, Ravenna, Puteoli, etc.

72 X 8261 (Tarracina), "ex civitate Coropisso vico Asseridi."

73 Statues: Tac., *Hist.* 3. 12; and below, p. 147. Vows: X 3339, 3341, 3343; possibly XIV 110. Games: VI 1063, 1064; see also René Cagnat, *A Travers le monde romain* (Paris, 1912), pp. 153-179.

74 X 3675, 3676, and probably 1880, 1881 (Beloch, *Campanien*², p. 192). The few non-naval inscriptions of Misenum pertain almost entirely to the religious life of the community.

75 Appian, *B. C.* 5. 98, 100; Virgil, *Aeneid* 5. 772-776; E. S. McCartney, *Classical Weekly* 27 (1933), pp. 9-10. A ceremony on arriving at the destination: Virgil, *Aeneid* 3. 525-529. Domaszewski has dealt with the military worship in *Die Religion des römischen Heeres*; see also R. O. Fink, A. S. Hoey, and W. F. Snyder, "The *Feriale Duranum*," *Yale Classical Studies* (1940), pp. 1-222.

76 Ernest Desjardins, *Géographie historique et administrative de la Gaule romaine* 1 (Paris, 1876), p. 367. Greek crews even in the Empire formed a religious union, e.g., *IGR* 4. 1149 (Lindus); the heterogeneity of Roman crews renders doubtful a full transfer of the custom.

77 Strigianus: X 3337; cf. X 3495 (restored) and Marbach s.v. "Strigianus" (PW). *Matronae*: V 774 (Aquileia), "domnab(us) sacrum Sex. Baebius Bai f. vet ex classe vestiarius v(orum) s(olvit) l(ibens) m(erito)"; cf. Ihm s.v. "domina" (PW). VI 32945 and XI 2842, which may be Christian, are of the fourth century. "Gods here": *BGU* 632; the same phrase appears in the second letter of Apollinaris (P. Mich. 4528).

78 X 8131 (Stabiae), "si sapiunt aliquid post funera manes, Antoni et Proculi molliter ossa cubent." The expression "non fui, non sum, non curo" appears on V 1813 (Gemonia) of a trierarch and his wife.

79 Some of the Ravennate sailors may have worshiped at the *aedes Neptuni* (XI 126, 127), and a Ravennate subpraefect restored a temple of Neptune at Parentium (V 328). The characteristics of Neptune are discussed by Domaszewski, *Abhandlungen zur römischen Religion* (Leipzig, 1909), pp. 19-24; see also Stefan Weinstock s.v. "Neptunus" (PW). Castor and Pollux: Horace, *Odes* 1. 3. 2; E. S. McCartney, *Classical Weekly* 27 (1933), p. 11. By reason of orthodox official influence, one finds the triremes *Castor*, *Pollux*, and *Neptunus* in the Misene fleet; in the Ravennate, the triremes *Castor* and *Neptunus*, and the quadrireme *Neptunus*.

80 Aelius Aristides 45. 23 (ed. Keil).

81 X 3507, 3574, 3596, 3638; *AE* 1929. 146; a trireme *Isis* in the Misene fleet, X 3640. Serapis had a temple at Puteoli (X 1594); cf. A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (London, 1933), pp. 56, 84, 127.

82 VI 32772, X 3350. The post of *navarch* in the worship of Isis and Serapis appears elsewhere; cf. Nicolas Papadakis in *Archaiologikon Delion* 1 (1915), pp. 153-168; Franz Cumont, *Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain* (4th ed.; Paris, 1929), chapter 4, nn. 94, 100. That these *navarchi* were not officers in the fleet proper is clear both from the fact that one was a stripling who died at the age of twenty-four, and from the term *bis*, which does not accord with the permanent nature of the fleet *navarchy*. On the festival of Isis, see Andreas Alföldi, *A Festival of Isis in Rome under the Christian Emperors of the Fourth Century* (Budapest, 1937), pp. 46-54.

83 Franz Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra* (Brussels, 1896-1899) 1, p. 252. There is no evidence to support this conjecture.

84 XIV 110; VI 3699 = 30946; A. B. Cook, *Zeus* 1 (Cambridge, 1914), pp. 604-633.

85 Some twenty-six epitaphs record service of twenty-five years, as against ten to fifteen instances for each of the other possible years short of twenty-six. On the *missio causaria*, cf. *Dig.* 49. 16. 13. 3.

86 The diploma itself was not a *missio* (except Dips. 7-9), and special documents to attest the discharge itself were at least occasionally issued to soldiers; see Wilcken 457; P. Hamb. 31 (quoted in A. C. Johnson, *Roman Egypt* [Baltimore, 1936], p. 249); A. E. R. Boak, "The Epikrisis Record of a Roman Veteran," *Ann. du Service des antiq. de l'Égypte* 29 (1929), pp. 58-63. Veteran sailors called themselves *missicii* in V 910, X 469 (*honeste* is also given in V 938 [cf. BGU 326]); *emeriti*, in III 14695, X 3541, 3630.

87 Gaius, *Inst.* 1. 57; Pliny, *H. N.* 34. 99; Dips. 43, 69, 72. Legionary veterans did not receive diplomas; see Attilio Degrossi, "Il papiro 1026 della Società italiana e i diplomati militari romani," *Aegyptus* 10 (1929), pp. 242-254; Heinrich Nesselhauf, *CIL* XVI, pp. 147-148. Degrossi and Nesselhauf (pp. 148, 152 n. 4) rightly reject the argument of Wilhelm Kubitschek, *Jahreshefte* 17 (1914), pp. 184-185, that before Vespasian each veteran obtained his diploma from the provincial authorities alone. Restoration of P. Ox. 1508 to imply discharge by the trierarchs is surely erroneous; the veteran may have been a trierarch.

88 This form was used down to Dip. 122 (166), on which see above, p. 91. "Ro civitate d(onato)" appears in XI 85. A few other inscriptions mention the veteran's tribe (as XI 104), but this custom was rare by the second century; accordingly we cannot determine the principles on which these new citizens were assigned to the various tribes. The wives did not become citizens: *Gnomon* 53-54; Gaius, *Inst.* 1. 57.

89 Rhosos stone, col. 4 ll. 89-90; also col. 2 ll. 10, 12-18, and col. 3 ll. 81-83 (*Syria* 15 [1934], pp. 34 ff.). Cf. also Nesselhauf, *CIL* XVI, p. 147, amplifying and quoting Mommsen's remarks in *CIL* III, pp. 2006-2007.

90 Nesselhauf, *CIL* XVI, p. 148 (with the epigraphical evidence for the Claudian origin adduced by Eric Birley, *JRS* 28 [1938], p. 226); A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 189-192, on the "sprinkling." It is to be regretted that Sherwin-White does not deal more fully with viritate grants or the other problems which must be noticed in these pages.

91 Ulpian, *Reg.* 5; Poste, *Gaii Institutiones*⁴, pp. 44-49; P. E. Corbett, *The Roman Law of Marriage* (Oxford, 1930).

92 Gaius in *Dig.* 24. 1. 61. The best discussions of the general problem may be found in Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte*, pp. 262-279, and Nesselhauf, *CIL* XVI, pp. 154-155. The meaning of the grant by Severus, recorded by Herodian 3. 8. 4, is clarified by P. M. Meyer in *Archiv* 3 (1906), pp. 70-71.

93 P. Catt. cols. 4-5 (Mitteis 372). In *matrimonium* the children were legitimate and took their father's *nomen*, if he were so Romanized as to have one;

they did not receive Roman citizenship even if one of the parents possessed it.

94 X 8209; X 3608; X 3409: "optimae feminae cum qua vixi an. xxii sine ullo stomacho." Marriage in the Julio-Claudian period: Dip. 1, also X 469 and 3608, if these refer to the same person.

95 X 3882.

96 AE 1929. 142, also X 3395, 3454, 3482, 3505, 3519, 3534, 3592, 3638. The mother's name is lacking in some of these. On concubinage, see Paul Meyer, *Der römische Konkubinat* (Leipzig, 1895), especially pp. 86-92; Vespasian (Suet., *Vesp.* 3) had a concubine "paene iustae uxoris loco."

97 BGU 140; Dig. 49. 17. 16; *Gnomon* 35. On the special statement of birth needed for these children, cf. H. I. Bell, "A Latin Registration of Birth," *JRS* 27 (1937), pp. 30-36; Egon Weiss, "Zur Rechtsstellung der unehelichen Kinder in der Kaiserzeit," *ZSS:RA* 49 (1929), pp. 260-273 (a better text in J. G. Winter, *Michigan Papyri III* [Ann Arbor, 1936], no. 169).

98 Dip. 122 (166) and all subsequent naval diplomas. The omission of "posteris" does not appear to be significant.

99 Nesselhauf, *CIL* XVI, p. 155; Lesquier, *L' Armée romaine d' Égypte*, p. 278. Jérôme Carcopino, "Le Diplôme Jean Maspéro," *Mélanges Paul Thomas* (Bruges, 1930), pp. 87-98, holds essentially the same opinion.

100 In P. Mich. 4703, published by H. A. Sanders, "A Sailor's Marriage Certificate in Diploma Form," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 81 (1939), pp. 581-590, a sailor of the Alexandrian fleet who had lived with a woman at least fourteen years formally contracted marriage. This remarkable act might be a result of Marcus Aurelius' grant, for the document comes from this period. It would be difficult to interpret the change in the naval diplomas solely as a limitation of the sailors' rewards complementing the narrower privileges given the auxiliaries after 140 (Dips. 87, 90; BGU 113, 265; Degraisi, *Aegyptus* 10 [1929], p. 250), for the official recognition of some sort of union between the sailor and his mate seems more than the necessary corollary to a restriction on citizenship.

101 X 3425. See also VI 3109; X 3380, 3547, 3563, 3596 (cf. 3635); XI 52, 66, 80; probably X 3388, 3627. In VI 3116; X 3366, 3432, 3429, 3466, 3476, 3485, 3507, 3657, 7595, 8374a; XI 31, XIV 241; and AE 1930. 63 the *nomina* of father and child are the same, but the wife is not given. P. Catt. col. 3 illustrates the tendency of soldiers to consider their sons legitimate.

102 Elias Bickermann, *Das Edikt des Kaisers Caracalla in P. Giss.* 40 (Berlin, 1926), especially pp. 15-37 on the *deditici* and Egyptians; A. H. M. Jones, "Another Interpretation of the 'Constitutio Antoniniana,'" *JRS* 26 (1936), pp. 223-235; Maurice Besnier, *L' Empire romain de l' avènement des Sévères au concile de Nicée* (Paris, 1937), pp. 65-73; Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship*, pp. 220-227; and the large bibliography cited by these four works.

103 Dips. 152, 154; Dip. 138 was probably granted to a Sardinian. The son in Dip. 154 apparently bears his father's *nomen*; one can make little from Dip. 152, in which each of the four children has a different *nomen*, except that the rules of Roman nomenclature were rapidly vanishing. The only possible indication of barbarian recruits in the third century is III 7327 (Thessalonica), which records two brothers with different *nomina* under Philip, but conditions such as those in Dip. 152 might have produced this.

104 The fact that the only *focaria* of the navy (XI 39, under Caracallus) and that the few concubines specifically so called date probably from the third century would seem to be a result of the marriage grants of Marcus Aurelius and Septimius Severus; whereas previously every "wife" had technically been a

concubine, the name now described the fact. *Contra*, Mommsen in *CIL* III, pp. 2011-2012.

105 Durry, *Les Cohortes prétorienne*, pp. 294-297. He admits that the sailors could marry, yet surely they were in the same position as the praetorians, and he does not satisfactorily explain the fact that from the legionaries, who were able to marry, were drawn the praetorians.

106 So also Bickermann, *Das Edikt*, pp. 37-38, who does not, however, assign any reasons why traditional forms should have been maintained. P. Yale 1528 (published by C. B. Welles, "The *Immunitas* of the Roman Legionaries in Egypt," *JRS* 28 [1938], pp. 41-49) along with P. Fuad I 21 shows that already in A.D. 63 the privileges of the veterans were not being fully observed by the civil authorities in Egypt; see W. L. Westermann, "Tuscus the Prefect and the Veterans in Egypt," *Classical Philology* 36 (1941), pp. 21-29.

107 Wilcken 462 of 40/37 B.C. The terms echo Augustus' grant of citizenship to the navarch Seleucus, as Roussel, *Syria* 15 (1934), p. 48, notes.

108 Wilcken 463, whose text is improved by Franz Schehl in *Aegyptus* 13 (1933), p. 144: "veterani milites omnibus vectigalibus portoriis publicis liberati immunes esse debeant."

109 Ulpian in *Dig.* 47. 11. 2, 49. 18. 2. 1; the latter chapter lists other privileges of the veterans. See also Roussel, *Syria* 15 (1934), pp. 50-58; Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte*, pp. 333-348. The *collegia*: Albert Möller, "Veteranenvereine in der römischen Kaiserzeit," *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* n. f. 29 (1912), pp. 267-284.

110 Of the four Misene diplomas attesting a colony, Dip. 12 of a Thracian and Dip. 13 of a Dacian were found in Bulgaria, where they were carried by their possessors; Dip. 16 comes from Corsica, Dip. 15 from Pompeii. The one diploma of a Ravennate veteran settled in Pannonia (Dip. 14) was found at Salona, the birthplace of the sailor. The Arrius Isidorus of X 469 (near Paestum) is perhaps the same as the sailor of X 3608 who buried his wife at Misenum.

111 Forty-eight years of service, X 3420; forty-five, XIV 238; thirty-seven, X 3375; etc. Cf. Dip. 12 (71), "qui sena et vicena stipendia aut plura meruerunt." "Aut plura" is first absent in Dip. 62 of 116.

112 X 3417; Mommsen, "Evocati Augusti," *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin, 1913) 8, pp. 446-461; Domaszewski, *Rangordnung*, p. 75.

113 *BGU* 326, 327; P. Ox. 1508, which records the acquisition of a *colonia* (Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte*, pp. 328-332). III 2020 (Salona), 3971 (Siscia), etc. indicate the return home by veterans from the Balkans.

114 V 774 (above, p. 102 n. 77), a *vestiarius*; III 14695 (Salona), a mime (?). The family seems to have joined the sailor at times, as a mother (X 3458), a sister (X 3487), etc.

115 Sons as sailors: X 3376, probably 3592; XI 77. As praetorians: VI 2491.

CHAPTER VI

THE PROVINCIAL SQUADRONS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE fleets based on Misenum and Ravenna were by far the most important naval forces in the empire; but one must not commit the egregious error of considering these two units the only parts of the imperial naval establishment. Even in the Mediterranean the requirements of the empire demanded independent squadrons off Syria, Egypt, and Mauretania, and those waters which were far distant, as the Black Sea, the English Channel, the Rhine and Danube Rivers, were obviously beyond the sphere of the Italian fleets. Discussion of the general missions of the navy must accordingly attend on an examination of these provincial squadrons. The three river flotillas on the northern frontier are known to be Augustan in origin, and two others of high strategic significance, the Syrian and Egyptian squadrons, may be assigned to the same period; the remainder were gradually fashioned as the shifting stresses within the empire or the suppression of client kingdoms produced a need for naval protection in regions previously unsurveyed.

In turning from the Italian fleets to these provincial squadrons, we move from the relatively well-lit to the generally obscure.¹ Some of the minor flotillas appear in one isolated, tantalizing inscription; for most of the others we must be satisfied if all the sources, both literary and epigraphic, provide fifteen or twenty relevant notices. Meager though it is, the material fortunately indicates an essential similarity between the Italian and the provincial squadrons, and thus enables us to fit the scanty evidence into a coherent scheme. The basis of maneuver and control was everywhere the galley, and the system of organization was that of a mixed naval and military unit; in so far as the provincial fleets

were younger in date, imitation and a desire for uniformity strengthened this resemblance between the greater and the lesser units.

One salient point, however, distinguishes the minor flotillas: they were essentially provincial in scope, organization, and control. Each was assigned to its particular province, in which it had one or more bases; as a rule it took its name from this province, e. g. *classis Pannonica*; and normally it operated only within the bounds or sphere of the province in conjunction with the other troops under the provincial governor. To be sure, the zone of action for a fleet was not thereby necessarily limited to the one area, if imperial needs were pressing elsewhere; nor did every province have a fleet. The senatorial provinces, which usually had a few troops, did not have attached ships, and many of the imperial provinces had no need of naval forces.

To ensure more perfect integration in the administrative and military machinery of its province, the provincial flotilla was placed under the control of the local governor. In the diplomas, the provincial sailors "are under" the provincial legate and are discharged by him as commander-in-chief both of the military and naval forces of his district. In direct control of the fleet, however, was the provincial *praefectus classis*, subject to the legate's orders but appointed by the emperor. This praefect's naval duties paralleled those of the praefect of an Italian fleet; in addition, he might also serve as an administrative aide to the governor. Since his independence was more directly curtailed than that of the Italian praefect and the fleet was smaller, the provincial praefect was a junior *eques* who often came to his post directly after performing his required equestrian military service. The careers of praefects over the British and German fleets indicate that these officers were *centenarii*; the other fleet praefects were *sexagenarii*. The provincial praefecture was higher than the subpraefecture of an Italian fleet, and on rare occasions it formed a step in the career of the praefect of a praetorian fleet.²

The various ship's officers whose functions were described for the Italian fleets turn up now and again in the inscriptions of the provincial flotillas. Navarchs and trierarchs appear most fre-

quently; presumably the higher officers alone were sufficiently tinged with Graeco-Roman culture to set up stone memorials. The trierarchs were in the Julio-Claudian period often freedmen; later almost all higher officers were sufficiently Romanized to have Latin names, and in the late second century they were at times Roman citizens by birth.³ The provincial navarchy conclusively disproves the theory that navarchs commanded quadriremes and quinqueremes, for the trireme is the largest ship known for any provincial flotilla. Indeed, the warcraft most generally used in these squadrons was the liburnian.⁴

The dual military and naval organization of each ship which was used in the Italian fleets occurs in the minor squadrons as well; as the consideration of the individual fleets will show, there is no evidence for the frequently repeated assertion that the marines on provincial warships were regularly furnished by the legions and auxiliaries. These provincial fleets, however significant one considers their subsidiary service to the army in transport and communication, were primarily military agencies; strategic motives underlay the formation of each separate flotilla, and on the northern fringe of the empire the fleets appear only at those places where the frontier and an extensive body of navigable water coincide.

The individual sailors of the minor squadrons may be more justly likened to the neighboring auxiliaries than to the sailors of Misenum or Ravenna. Like the auxiliaries they tended to keep their native names; in the second century the same influences operated in both *auxilia* and fleets, for as Roman citizenship and Latin rights were spread more widely throughout the empire the proportion of peregrine recruits fell. The area of recruitment, which varied from fleet to fleet, must be considered separately for each. Besides extensive drafts from the home province some admixture of other provincials occasionally occurs, and a fair sprinkling of easterners is found everywhere in the Julio-Claudian period. Once enlisted, the sailor served twenty-six years; on the northern frontier at least, the diploma, which brought him the rights received by veterans of the Italian fleets, signified an unconscious acceptance of a culture somewhat different from that of Misenum or Ravenna,

With so much as general introduction to the subject of the provincial squadrons, the scant fragments for each fleet must now be examined in reference to their proper, local setting. The provincial character of these fleets cannot be emphasized too strongly; only by studying each in the light of the pertinent geographical and military factors may one understand the close co-ordination of the naval establishments with the military and fiscal fabric of the various provinces and the minor variation in organization and functions from fleet to fleet.

The provincial squadrons, thus considered, fall logically into two categories. The fleets on the northern frontier—the Pontic, Moesian, Pannonian, German, and British—were above all else military units. For the subordinate fleets of the Mediterranean—the Egyptian, Syrian, and Mauretanian—the opportunities to serve in war were rarer, and other functions were more important. Various reasons favor discussion of the latter first, and one may well commence with the most fully known of these, the Egyptian.

§ I. CLASSIS ALEXANDRINA

The Egyptian squadron is first named in the reign of Nero and appears now and again thereafter in inscriptions and papyri through the opening years of the third century. As an organized unit it probably perished during the troubled years after 250, for the rare references of a later date to warcraft in Egypt do not mention any special flotilla, nor does the fleet appear in the fourth-century *Notitia Dignitatum*. Inasmuch as Philo refers indirectly to the fleet under Gaius, its founder cannot have been Nero, or even Claudius;⁵ rather the Egyptian fleet of the Empire dates from the reorganization of Egypt by Augustus in 30 B. C. That scrupulous care which he paid to the military, administrative, and economic structure of Egypt, for him the “*claustra imperii*,” must surely have included the formation of a special fleet to guard the approaches by sea; we know that Augustus did continue the *potamophylacia* or Nile fleet, which will be discussed below, and some remnants of the once great Ptolemaic navy remained at Alexandria as a nucleus for the provincial fleet.⁶ The necessity and value

of such a squadron would have been clearer to Augustus than to any of his immediate successors, for he had been forced to meet an attack based largely on the resources of Egypt.

In the Julio-Claudian period, the fleet was styled simply *classis*, in the fashion of the Italian fleets; under Vespasian it received the official title *classis Augusta Alexandrina* which it bore thenceforth.⁷ As this title indicates, the chief and at first the only station of its liburnian galleys was at Alexandria, probably in the old Ptolemaic war harbor off the Great Harbor.⁸ The term *Augusta* has been taken as an allusion to the Augustan parentage but is more properly linked with Vespasian's grant of honorific titles to various other fleets, including a similar *Augusta* to the German fleet. Here it commemorates the zeal of the Egyptian fleet on his behalf during the civil wars of 68-69. Such an adjective also defined more clearly the imperial character of the squadron in contradistinction to the fleet of Alexandrian ships carrying grain to Rome, for this by the late first century was slowly beginning to assume a corporate character.

Even in the second century, however, the term might be omitted in references to the war fleet,⁹ an omission which is most frequent in the title of the praefects. The diplomas prove that these junior *equites* served under the praefect of Egypt; numerous papyri show also that the fleet praefect further acted as administrative assistant to this viceroy in a matter quite alien to his naval duties. At set times, usually in the winter, the praefect of the Alexandrian fleet or some other junior officer of the military staff journeyed about the country and held an *epikrisis* or examination for those of Roman and Alexandrian status who desired to prove the right of their households to exemption from poll tax. Inasmuch as the *epikekrimenoi* thereby also received official recognition of their superior status, this examination was important, and the names of most fleet praefects known are recorded in the excerpts of the *epikrisis* record made for private individuals. The praefect Q. Marcius Hermogenes was possibly up-country on this duty when he decorated the right foot of the famous statue of Memnon with a Latin inscription and the left foot with Greek verse testifying "audit Memnonen" on the Nones of March. This duty, and

perhaps other administrative tasks which are not thus attested, may explain the otherwise puzzling assignment of a subpraefect to the Egyptian fleet, for the ordinary duties of the praefect in a small squadron cannot have required the assistance of an equestrian aide, and no subpraefects are known for the other provincial fleets.¹⁰

Apart from the service of imperial freedmen as trierarchs and minor officers under the Julio-Claudians, the Egyptian fleet was manned entirely by Egyptians, or rather, by those natives of Egypt who possessed the rank of *epikekrimenos*,¹¹ for the imperial government apparently did not dare to put arms in the hands of the lowest classes. The frequency with which the Fayum, largely Greek in population, appears as the home of sailors is partly the result of this restriction, but chiefly arises from its importance as the source of the vast bulk of our papyri. Here, at all events, the sailors are attested as borrowing money on their estates and selling property while still in active service, or settling down after discharge. Two trierarchs and a navarch also dedicated stones to the great Ammon at his temple of Tehneh, south of the Fayumite town Oxyrhynchus, and one of these erected a statue of the Dioscurides, saviors of sailors.¹²

All except one of the sailors adopted Latin names on entering the service; for example, the two naval diplomas preserved, which were issued to natives of the Fayum, name M. Papirius M. f. of the Arsinoite nome and C. Gemellus Croni f. of the Coptitic nome. Latin was formally used in all official documents,¹³ but private records were usually in Greek. The Romanization of these sailors was of the most superficial character.

Whatever the fears of Augustus may have been, Egypt proved to be one of the most peaceful provinces in the empire down to the third century, and the Alexandrian fleet had few occasions for displaying its military efficiency. Its primary function was that of keeping Egypt loyal and preventing any usurper from striking at the Egyptian end of the grain route from Alexandria to Puteoli and Ostia. This duty it filled simply by its mere existence except in the period of the civil wars, A. D. 68-69, which will be discussed later along with its activities in the turbulent third century. Other-

wise it discouraged any petty marauding in Cyrenaica and the Delta; it constituted a police force which the governors of unruly Alexandria might use in small or greater street affrays; but chiefly, it may be judged, the fleet enforced the strict regulations of that port and the other Nile exits, carried official reports and dignitaries to Italy or elsewhere, and perhaps managed the Alexandrian grain fleet each spring.¹⁴ In the first century after Christ the Alexandrian fleet did not even have regular duties on the Nile, for the river was patrolled by ships of the *potamophylacia*, an independent service which exercised fiscal and police supervision over the waterways of Egypt.

This institution was an inheritance from the Ptolemaic régime, and much of the Ptolemaic framework carried over into the Empire. Under Augustus, as previously, the chief station lay at the pontoon bridge of Schedia, the point on the Canopic mouth of the Nile where a canal branched off to Alexandria, for most of the traffic coming down the Nile would pass this place. Here tolls were levied, and guard ships of the *potamophylacia* inspected the commerce. In the time of Caesar, and presumably later, all mouths of the Nile had such vessels, "exigendi portorii causa," while other ships lay at the southern end of the Delta and at each end of the two other great fiscal divisions of Egypt. These vessels on the upper Nile also guarded the banks and canals from bandits of the desert and accordingly carried detachments from the military forces of Egypt; the duty roster of a legionary detachment stationed at Nicopolis near Alexandria records that "T. Flavius Celer exit cum potamofulacide" in A. D. 81/87.¹⁵ At this time, it should be noted, the *potamophylacia* had no connection with the *classis Alexandrina*.

In a crisis the Alexandrian fleet, like its Ptolemaic predecessor, might supplement this river guard by sailing up the Nile both to transport troops and to land marines.¹⁶ The first and among the greatest of such emergencies in the Empire was the general Jewish revolt of 115-117, which completely disrupted Roman control of the land and defied the full strength of the Egyptian army. Trajan was forced to send both military and naval reinforcements under Q. Marcius Turbo to put down the rebellion in Egypt and Cyr-

enaica; on the re-establishment of peace the two flotillas, the fiscal and the military squadrons, were united under a single praefect.¹⁷ During the second century, in which native unrest increased, the Alexandrian fleet fully absorbed the river guard, and the tax for the *potamophylacia* disappeared. A liburnian *Sol*, which must have belonged to the Alexandrian fleet, had a station in 167 at Fulvini, an unidentified spot on the Nile; and at the very limit of Roman domination in Egypt, Hiera Sykaminos in the Dodekaschoinos, two soldiers, who mention a member of the fleet, set up a *proskunema* to Serapis and many-named Isis.¹⁸ Warships were not brought this far upstream, beyond the beginning of the cataracts, but the use of the Nile fleet as far south as the first cataract became increasingly important as the Blemmyes and other marauders began to trouble Egypt in the third century.

Routine employment of the Alexandrian fleet to police the Red Sea was impossible before Trajan restored the canal from the sea to the Nile, the Augustamnica, and is unlikely even then. In the reign of Augustus special galleys and transports were constructed for an unsuccessful expedition against the Sabaeans in southwestern Arabia, and Pliny indicates the presence of Roman ships in the Red Sea in 1 B. C.; but thereafter no evidence can be found for Roman naval activity in these waters.¹⁹ Probably the *praefectus montis Berenice* or some other imperial official of the local administration did have a few ships at his disposal, for the greater part of the Red Sea was fairly effectively under Roman control,²⁰ and the Nabataeans opposite Berenice constituted a Roman protectorate from the time of Strabo. Trajan annexed most of their kingdom to the province of Arabia Petraea in 106 and established a military post at Clysma in the Gulf of Suez, but the fleet which he formed "ut per eam Indiae fines vastaret" must surely be located in the Persian Gulf.²¹ Merchant vessels trading between Egypt and India, says Pliny the Elder, were protected by detachments of archers; indeed, the Empire could do no more, even if it had viewed with a kindly eye the dangerously unbalanced Indian trade.²²

The coast of Cyrenaica, to the west of Egypt, may with more justice be assigned to the sphere of the Alexandrian fleet. That

squadron, however, could not always keep the peace in the region. The Jewish revolt of 115-117 had necessitated naval reinforcement under Turbo; an isolated reference to a *classis nova Libyca* later in the century, between 180 and 190, suggests that the Libyan shores needed and obtained more immediate naval supervision. The formation of this, the last provincial fleet added to the navy of the Early Empire, is probably a reflection of the increasing restlessness of the African tribes from Marcus Aurelius onward.²³ The Alexandrian fleet had authority even farther to the west after the annexation of Mauretania, for a detachment co-operated with a similar squadron from the Syrian fleet in the police of the Mauretanian coast. This joint detail may best be described separately after consideration of the Syrian fleet, in so far as the latter is possible.

§ 2. CLASSIS SYRIACA

Inscriptions naming the Syrian fleet are few, and of these not one comes from the province of Syria; the date of its establishment is nowhere stated; even the home port of the fleet has been the subject of varying conjecture. The squadron is first met in our datable evidence under Hadrian, when Sextus Cornelius Dexter, the only praefect known, received the post after commanding an *ala* in the Jewish war of 131-134.²⁴ Presumably the main function of the flotilla was the maintenance of communication and imperial control along the Syrian coast, but it never actually appears in history in this role. For the Jewish war under Hadrian the sources are wretchedly poor, yet in the fuller description by Josephus of the Jewish revolt under Nero and Vespasian there is no mention of any Roman warships along the coast. Indeed, Jewish pirates operated from Joppa and demoralized commerce in eastern waters as far as Egypt until Roman troops took Joppa and a storm destroyed the rebels' ships.²⁵

Urgent duties in other quarters may have prevented the Syrian fleet from coping with this problem; for it is difficult to believe that the squadron was not then in existence, and had not been in service since the reign of Augustus. During the last years of the Republic, it will be remembered, piracy had appeared again in

Levantine seas, and western Cilicia continued to be unruly through the first decades of Augustus' principate. At first Augustus left this problem to a native king, but on his death the kingdom was annexed, and Roman troops under P. Sulpicius Quirinius, the governor of Galatia-Pamphylia, finished the pacification.²⁶ The establishment of a fleet to watch the coastline, where outbreaks are known in A. D. 36 and 52, seems a necessary step in the *Pax Augusta*; a Syrian fleet was likewise valuable in matters of transport and communication between Syria and the West. Probably the squadron which Tacitus mentions vaguely in recounting the arrest of the Syrian governor Gnaeus Piso in A. D. 19 is the *classis Syriaca*, and it is almost certainly one of those fleets which Vespasian strengthened in 69 in his preparations to seize the imperial power.²⁷

The base of this fleet must have been Seleuceia, the chief harbor on the Syrian coast. From here the products of rich Antioch and the costly goods brought by eastern caravans were shipped to the West; to this port came imperial legates, and emperors themselves, when Parthian hostility threatened the frontier on the Euphrates. Its importance is particularly marked by the care with which the emperors from Augustus to Valentinian improved the harbor, silted both by coastal currents from the south and by mountain torrents. One of the Julio-Claudians made the Orontes navigable from Seleuceia to Antioch, and Vespasian began an extraordinary project of tunneling in order to divert a mountain stream. Under several reigns sailors labored beside the legionaries of IV Scythica and X Fretensis on the tunnel; that they came from the *classis Syriaca* in the port below is highly probable.²⁸

From Seleuceia the Syrian fleet maintained with success, until the third century, the peace which northern Syrian waters had enjoyed before Rome crippled the Seleucids. Its duties carried it even farther west, for four inscriptions record the presence of its sailors in the Aegean at Ephesus, Teos, Tenos, and the Piraeus.²⁹

The Aegean of the Empire, still a hub of the sea routes, presents a tangle of naval inscriptions. There are the scattered tombstones of Misene and Ravennate sailors, which have already been noted; these may be accepted as evidence for an occasional detachment

or for cruises in full force by the great Italian fleets in time of eastern war. One stone base at Philippi commemorates the Alexandrian fleet, which may have been ordered there in connection with the eastward march of Caracallus in 214.³⁰ The Syrian inscriptions suggest the frequent presence of that squadron in the Aegean; since no Aegean unrest is mentioned in our sources until the third century, one must conjecture more peaceful reasons, such as the transport of governors and generals between Athens and Seleuceia. Vessels of the Syrian fleet may also have carried agents of the procurators and proconsuls of Achaia and Asia from island to island on tours of inspection; as Cicero had observed in the last days of the Republic:

equidem existimo in eius modi regione atque provincia [i. e., Asia] quae mari cincta, portibus distincta, insulis circumdata esset, non solum praesidii sed etiam ornandi imperii causa navigandum fuisse.³¹

To substantiate this suggestion, one may note that from the administrative capital of Asia, Ephesus, come not only the inscriptions of a Syrian trierarch and of a Misene scribe on official business but also a fragment bearing "praef class."³²

The local fleets of the Aegean must also be considered, for the cities of this area, which had so largely contributed to the naval strength of the later Republic, did not immediately or ever completely relinquish their long traditions of naval prowess. After Actium, indeed, the majority were exhausted, and the maintenance of warships must have appeared a burden rather than a privilege. Nor did the government of Augustus have any great interest in perpetuating their service once an imperial navy assured the peace of the seas. A few of Rome's allies, however, continued to keep up a few ships, either of their own volition or to meet their treaties with Rome. The Lycian League presumably had its regular navarch or admiral until it was absorbed into the empire by Claudius,³³ and the token-service of Rhodes, dropped perhaps in those periods when the city was not free, is still to be found under Titus. At this time Dio Chrysostom pointed out to the Rhodians that formerly they maintained a fleet, but now (under Titus),

"you go in one or two undecked ships yearly to Corinth." This surprising fact is corroborated by numerous Rhodian inscriptions of the period mentioning the *triemioliae Euandria Sebasta, Eirena Sebasta*, and *Polias*.³⁴ The duties of these vessels cannot have been great—possibly they bore envoys to greet the proconsul of Achaia³⁵—and the ghostly reminder of the naval support which Rhodes had given to Rome since the days of Antiochus III slowly faded away. Free for the first time in their history from the menace of piracy and invasion, the Aegean cities generally devoted themselves to their commercial shipping, for the imperial navy did not even require recruits from the area; still, the Aegean with Phoenicia remained the chief reservoir of naval experience in the empire, and in the troubled days of the period between Galienus and Constantine the emperors called again on its aid.

§ 3. THE MAURETANIAN DETACHMENTS

The Augustan system, which assigned to the Syrian and Alexandrian fleets the policing of the eastern seas, did not long retain its pristine clarity. In the reign of Vespasian an imperial freedman commanded the liburnian *Nilus* of the Alexandrian fleet, stationed far to the west at Caesarea Mauretania, and for a century and more thereafter the two eastern provincial squadrons co-operated in maintaining a fleet at this harbor.³⁶ Although the first clear evidence of this co-operation is of the second century, each fleet presumably sent a detachment when the squadron was formed.³⁷

This event is probably to be connected with Gaius' execution of the local ruler and the annexation of Mauretania in A. D. 40. The act caused a bitter revolt, which was not put down until after the accession of Claudius;³⁸ it also threw on Roman hands the necessity of policing the coast, which had been entrusted to the younger Juba by Augustus. The simplest means of forming a new squadron evidently lay in drawing off the excess strength of the eastern fleets; such narrow patrol duties were perhaps felt to be incompatible with the broader mission of the Italian fleets, which had few small craft, and in any event the peace of the eastern seas must

have made some part of these naval establishments superfluous. So small a flotilla, however, scarcely needed all the administrative and physical equipment of an independent squadron, and the new fleet was not completely separated from the eastern units. At the bases of the Syrian and Alexandrian fleets the necessary ships could be constructed without duplication of facilities, and the sailors could be enlisted and trained. The two sailors whose homes are known were respectively Syrian and Alexandrian, and though the crews remained so long at Caesarea as to contract marriages there they at least occasionally returned to their homeland.³⁹

The tombstones of the Mauretanian sailors bear the terms *classis Augusta Alexandrina* or *classis Syriaca*, which evince their administrative connection with the parent fleet; yet this flotilla, composed of ships detached from two fleets, was commanded not by the praefect of either, but by a separate equestrian *praepositus classibus* or, as one inscription gives more fully, *praepositus classis Syriacae et Augustae*. This *sexagenarius* praefect, again, was responsible in the first degree not to the praefect of either fleet but to the equestrian *procurator et praeses* of Mauretania Caesarensis, for this officer discharged the veterans and detailed the sailors to such tasks as labor on the aqueduct at Saldæ in 147-152.⁴⁰

This peculiar arrangement is unique in the navy. Its only military parallel, the custom of placing the detachments from several legions under a *praepositus vexillationibus*, is not completely analogous; for the troops composing a vexillation came from one province and were not intended as a permanent detail. The Mauretanian fleet, on the other hand, was a standing force, which has left behind it more evidence than we possess for the Syrian squadron.

All but one of the naval inscriptions in Mauretania come from Caesarea, which had been embellished by Juba II and served as capital both for his kingdom and for the Roman province. This was the westernmost port of any consequence on the African shores of the Mediterranean, and had also the advantage of a special war harbor set off in an irregular hexagon at the west side of the commercial harbor; to judge from its size, the squadron cannot have exceeded twenty liburnians.⁴¹ The coasts to the east of Caesarea, that is, the shores of Numidia and of proconsular Africa,

afforded little scope for the Mauretanian squadron, for the area of Roman occupation had been pushed well inland and was thoroughly held by the legion III Augusta. The port of Carthage, accordingly, betrays no sign of use by warships. During the civil wars of 68-69, L. Clodius Macer, proconsul of Africa, struck for the supreme power, stopping grain ships and planning an attack on Sicily, but his power was so ephemeral even in Carthage that his control of Mauretania and its fleet is unlikely.⁴²

The fleet looked rather to the west from its port of Caesarea. On the Mauretanian coast it found a problem which justified its existence and made it, moreover, more purely a military force than any other squadron in the Mediterranean. The failure of Juba and then of Ptolemaeus to prevent the Mauretanians from aiding the rebel Tacfarinas in Numidia or from harassing Roman Spain probably speeded the Roman annexation of Mauretania, but the Romans discovered that the direct control of the country was hardly more satisfactory. Along the western coast of the Mediterranean, the mountains approach the sea closely and afford little room for settled towns; Roman culture spread but little, and for some two hundred miles along the coast from Tingis to Rusaddir not even a Roman road was built. From time to time governors exacted submission from the Gaetuli in the mountains or the seacoast Mazices and Baquates, beginning in 42 with the successful campaign of Suetonius Paullinus, yet this forced obedience vanished as quickly as it was imposed. Such a coast, populated by tribes addicted to piracy, particularly required naval forces. Inasmuch as the southern part of Spain, Baetica, was a senatorial province and the imperial province of Hispania Tarraconensis was too far to the north to lend prompt aid, the requisite naval strength was stationed at Caesarea in Mauretania. Experienced commanders were obtained by the appointment of *equites* who had already commanded auxiliary units in the region.

Nevertheless the Roman Empire never secured a lasting peace for the coasts of western Africa, a region in which modern armies have again and again met disastrous failure. The Roman garrison of auxiliary units, which was inadequate to the task, along with a minute fleet could provide only a defense against the petty

raids; literary sources and inscriptions alike testify to repeated troubles. The Moors periodically harassed the few Roman outposts west of Caesarea and occasionally broke into Baetica, especially in the second century. In the reign of Pius, Spanish troops crossed the Straits and beat back the Moors, who were restive from 143 to 149, to the Atlas Mountains.⁴³ Further serious disturbance came in the seventies of the same century, which required the aid of the Italian fleets and possibly dictated the formation of the *classis nova Libyca*. Such great irruptions the small Mauretanian squadron could not stop; the fleet appears at the beginning of the third century but then slips out of existence amid the upheavals in the middle of the century.⁴⁴

NOTES

1 Tac., *Ann.* 4. 5, shares this feeling in discussing the minor squadrons and the auxiliaries: "sed persequi incertum fuit, cum ex usu temporis huc illuc mearent, gliscerent numero et aliquando minuerentur."

2 In VI 1643 an *equus* was promoted from the subpraefecture of an Italian fleet to the praefecture of a provincial fleet. Vehilius served as praefect of the Pontic squadron (VI 31856).

3 Citizens: III 14214³⁴ (Chersonesus), 4319 (Brigetio). The Egyptian navarch Charicles, *IGR* 1. 1129 (Acoris), is the only officer of either rank who does not have a Latin name. Freedmen: VIII 21025; XIII 3542; *IGR* 1. 781.

4 Trireme as flagship: Tac., *Hist.* 5. 22 (cf. also *Ann.* 4. 5, 11. 18); Arrian, *Periplus* 4. 4. Liburnians: III 434 (Ephesus); VIII 9379 (Caesarea); etc. In the Later Empire, the river fleets were composed chiefly of a special type of ship, the *lusoriae*.

5 VI 32775, under Nero; Philo, *In Flaccum* 163. A liburnian in the fourth century appears in P. Rainer E 930, col. 1 l. 2 (Carl Wessely in *SB Wien* 149 [1905], 5. Abh. no. 20); C. Th. 13. 5. 32 (A. D. 409) refers to the grain fleet. The brief account of the squadron in Lesquier, *L' Armée romaine d' Egypte*, pp. 98-101, does not come up to the level of his remarks on the army.

6 Lesquier, *Les Institutions militaires de l' Egypte sous les Lagides* (Paris, 1911), pp. 255-260, gives a summary of our scanty information on the Ptolemaic fleet. Augustus' conquest: Orosius 6. 19. 16; Arthur Stein, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Verwaltung Aegyptens unter roemischer Herrschaft* (Stuttgart, 1915), pp. 49-54.

7 Nero, VI 32775; Vespasian, VIII 21025. The diplomas, however, insisted on a mention of the province, "classis quae est in Aegypto" (Dip. 24, A. D. 79), or "classis qui militat in Aegypto" (Dip. 32, A. D. 86). As in these instances, sailors might be discharged by themselves; more frequently their names were added to the list of time-expired auxiliaries in a province, and "item classicis" was inserted in the auxiliary diploma form (e. g., Dip. 45, A. D. 99).

8 The harbor: Lehmann-Hartleben, *Hafenanlagen*, pp. 132-138, 146. Liburnians: *Dracon*, P. Mich. 4703 (see above, p. 104); *Lupus*, BGU 709, 741; *Nilus*,

VIII 21025; *Sol*, BGU 455 and Grenfell and Hunt, *Greek Papyri* 2 (Oxford, 1897), no. 108; *Taurus*, AE 1927. 180. P. Tebt. 316, ll. 22-23 (A.D. 99) possibly refers to an isolated admiralty at Alexandria.

9 II 1970 (Malaca); BGU 142, 143, 455, 709; *Sammelbuch* 5070. The grain fleet did not regularly bear the appellation ὁ πορεύτικος Ἀλεξανδρείνης στόλος (IG XIV 918, Ostia) until the late second century; cf. Waltzing, *Les Corporations professionnelles* 2, pp. 37, 51-54.

10 Hermogenes: III 43; *CIGr* 4735. Subpraefect: VI 32775, a freedman in the reign of Claudius. The position may later have been dropped. *Epikrisis* extracts: BGU 142, 143, 1033; P. Ox. 1451. On the *epikrisis*, which has been misunderstood until recently, see B. P. Grenfell, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 12 (1916), pp. 148-153; Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte*, pp. 155-201; Elias Bickermann, *Archiv* 9 (1928), pp. 24-46.

11 Freedmen, VIII 21025; the restriction as to Egyptians follows from the passage in the *Gnomon* discussed above, p. 99.

12 Dedications: IGR 1. 1129-1131. Papyri from the Fayum: BGU 741 (cf. 709), 455, 1695; *Greek Papyri* 2, no. 108; P. Mich. 191 (quoted above, p. 78), 4301 (*Michigan Papyri* 3, p. 141), 4703 (see above, p. 104 n. 100).

13 Will, BGU 1695; receipt, P. Mich. 4301; marriage certificate, P. Mich. 4703. See Stein, *Geschichte und Verwaltung Ägyptens*, pp. 140-149, 173-181. Dips. 24, 32; the navarch Charicles gives only a Greek name in IGR 1. 1129.

14 Alexandrian regulations: *Gnomon* 64-66, 68; Jos., B. I. 4. 612-613. Erich Leider, *Der Handel von Alexandria* (Hamburg, 1934), does not discuss its official control. Caesar, B. C. 3. 111. 3, notes a detachment of twenty-two ships "quae praesidii causa Alexandriae esse consuerant."

15 Anton von Premerstein, "Die Beführung einer ägyptischen Legionsabteilung," *Klio* 3 (1903), pp. 1-46, particularly pp. 16-17; similar legionary *epiplooi* on grain ships occur in P. Lond. 2. 256 (Wilcken 443). Schedia: III 12046 = IGR 1. 1055, 1056; Strabo 17. 1. 16; Kees s.v. "Schedia" (PW). Mouths: *Bell. Alex.* 13. 1. Stations along Nile: Strabo 17. 1. 41; evidence in Ulrich Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka* (Leipzig, 1899) 1, pp. 282-283, indicates a station at the southern end of Egypt. From this the ships used by Petronius about 24 B.C. in a campaign beyond the first cataract (Strabo 17. 1. 54) were perhaps brought. See generally Wilhelm Schwartz, "Die Potamophylacia," *Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie* 143 (1891), pp. 713-716; A. C. Johnson, *Roman Egypt*, p. 401; Wallace, *Taxation in Egypt*, p. 151.

16 P. Berl. 13945 and 13949 (*Archiv* 8 [1927], pp. 190-199) mention Ptolemaic warships in the river, and Kunkel, *op. cit.* p. 191, cites the unpublished papyrus BGU 1730 as placing such ships under the direction of the *potamophylacia*. The Barberini mosaic (Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, plate 52) shows a warship on the Nile.

17 II 1970 (Malaca), of about 130. Another L. Valerius Proculus, presumably the same man, was praefect of Egypt in 144-147: O. W. Reinmuth, *The Praefect of Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian* (Leipzig, 1935; *Klio*, Beih. 34), p. 134; Willy Hüttl, *Antoninus Pius* 2 (Prague, 1933), pp. 63-64 and *passim*.

18 Fulvini: *Greek Papyri* 2, no. 108, "ad statione Liburne S[eid]es." "Solis" would offhand seem a more probable restoration, for the Alexandrian fleet did have a *liburna* *Sol* (BGU 455). Hiera Sykaminos: IGR 1. 1370.

19 Strabo 16. 4. 22-24; Pliny, *H. N.* 2. 168, 6. 141, 6. 160, 12. 55-56. Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, pp. 109 n. 18, 180 n. 19, assumes a permanent Red Sea squadron, at least in the second century, on the basis of his restoration of AE 1930. 53; see also his remarks in *Bull. de l'Institut français d'arch. orient. de Caïre* 31 (1931), pp. 26-27. This restoration has little to recommend it; see Paul Graindor's

rejoinder in the *Bulletin*, pp. 31-32; Adolf Wilhelm, *Anzeiger Wiener Akademie*, phil.-hist. klasse, 69 (1938), pp. 25-27. The suggestion of A. C. Johnson, *Roman Egypt*, pp. 593-594, that the Coptos tariff of A.D. 90 (*IGR* 1. 1183) mentions sailors' wives does not seem justified.

20 Lesquier, *L' Armée romaine d' Égypte*, pp. 427-431; Rostovtzeff, "Zur Geschichte des Ost- und Südhandels im prolemaisich-römischen Aegypten," *Archiv* 4 (1908), pp. 298-315, would extend this control to the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb.

21 Eutropius 8. 3; Jerome, *Chron.* Ol. 220. The sequence of Jerome, who connects it with Mesopotamia, seems the preferable; so also Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, p. 182 n. 19; *contra*, R. P. Longden, *CAH* 11, p. 238, and others.

22 Pliny, *H. N.* 6. 101. The question of imperial naval policy involved in this problem is discussed below, p. 175.

23 VIII 7030 (Cirta); Henzen, *Bull. dell' Inst. di corr. arch.* 1874, p. 114. As Ferrero 1884, p. 61, pointed out, this is not the African grain fleet, which was given corporate character by Commodus as the *classis Africana Commodianae*. See also Premerstein in *Klio* 12 (1912), pp. 141-142; and below, p. 189.

24 VIII 8934 (Saldæ). The monograph of Paul Perdrizet, "Les Flottes romaines en Syrie," *Revue archéologique* 3. ser. 32 (1898), pp. 41-49, is not a very successful treatment.

25 Jos., *B. I.* 3. 414-427. Vespasian showed Jewish ships in his triumph, *ibid.* 7. 147, probably in reference to his victory on Lake Gennesareth (*ibid.* 3. 466, 505, 522-531); on his *Victoria Navalis* coins, see below, p. 185. VI 1565 cannot be connected with any Jewish war in the Empire.

26 J. G. C. Anderson, *CAH* 10, pp. 270-273, 877-878; on the general defensive system of Syria, cf. *ibid.* pp. 279-283.

27 Tac., *Ann.* 2. 81; *Hist.* 2. 4, 76, 84, 3. 1. Its ships were presumably constructed of wood from the forests of Lebanon (Theophrastus, *H. P.* 5. 7), for these were state property at least under Hadrian. See Ernest Renan, *Mission de Phénicie* (Paris, 1865), pp. 258-281.

28 *IGR* 3. 1006; *AE* 1912. 120 may refer to the same navarch Germanus. Seleucia: Strabo 16. 2. 7; Pausanias 8. 29. 3; Lehmann-Hartleben, *Hafenanlagen*, pp. 214-216; Victor Chapot's exhaustive monograph, "Séleucie de Piérie," *Mém. de la Soc. nat. des antiq.* 66 (1907), pp. 149-266. The *classis Seleucena* in *C. Th.* 10. 23, A.D. 369, may be a reincarnation of the earlier fleet after the disasters in Syria attendant on the capture of the Emperor Valerian by the Sasanids.

29 III 434, C. Iulius Hilarus, trierarch of the liburnian *Grypus* and his wife; III 421; *CIGr* 2346e add., L. Cassius Longinus; *IG* III 1447, Ματωρ Φιλίππυ . . . γένει Ἀπαδίου. Many of the sailors presumably were Syrian and at least some were Egyptian (*BGU* 113, 265). Of the six known monuments of its sailors, five are wholly or partly in Greek.

30 *AE* 1934. 64, "cla[ssis Aug Ale]xand[rina]." The broken ex-voto of the first century after Christ bearing "clas" (*AE* 1923. 92) is not connected with this. See below, p. 192. Naval activity in the Propontis will be treated in the first section of Chapter VII.

31 *Pro Flacco* 27. III 421 was set up to a navarch or trierarch of the Syrian fleet (who was a Roman citizen) by the *demos* of Teos, an act which suggests some official connection.

32 III 14195⁸⁸. The "insularum provincia" of Rufius Festus, *Brev.* 10, is discussed by R. K. McElderry in "Some Conjectures on the Reign of Vespasian," *JRS* 3 (1913), pp. 116-120.

33 Cf. *IGR* 3. 495, 524; an actual navarch, *ibid.* 607, 620; Ruge s.v. "Lykia" (PW), cols. 2275, 2279; M. P. Charlesworth, *CAH* 11, p. 15. The "socii triremes"

of Tac., *Ann.* 4. 5, refers to these Aegean allies in so far as it does not mean the provincial squadrons manned by the peregrines.

34 Dio, *Orat.* 31. 103; Hans von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin, 1898), pp. 210-219. The inscriptions: *IGR* 4. 1110, 1129, 1149; *Jahreshefte* 4 (1901), pp. 159-162; *Ephemeris Archaeologicae* 1913, p. 9; *Laographia* 7 (1923), p. 58; Christian Blinkenberg, *Triemiolia, étude sur un type de navire rhodien* (Copenhagen, 1938), pp. 18-19. See Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen, "Hellenorromaika ploia," *Laographia* 7 (1923), pp. 56-60; and *idem s.v.* "Rhodos" (*PW*), cols. 808-811.

35 So Hermann Dessau, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit* 1 (Berlin, 1924), p. 314.

36 VIII 21025. See Ferrero, "Iscrizioni classiarie dell' Africa," *Atti* 17 (1881), pp. 88-93, translated with additions as "Inscriptions de l' Afrique relatives à la flotte," *Bulletin épigraphique* 2 (1882), pp. 157-162; *idem*, "Le Marine militaire de l' Afrique romaine," *Bulletin trimestriel des antiquités africaines* 2 (1884), pp. 157-181; René Cagnat, *L' Armée romaine d' Afrique*², pp. 275-284.

37 VIII 9363, after A.D. 168; cf. *Prosop.*² 2, p. 236 no. 977.

38 M. P. Charlesworth, *CAH* 10, pp. 674-675. Grain was brought by sea from Baetica (Dio 60. 24. 5).

39 Syrian, VIII 21017; Alexandrian, *Eph. ep.* 5. 1005. Marriages: VIII 9392, a trierarch; 9386, a centurion; 9379, a scribe; *Eph. ep.* 5. 993, a *sesquiplicarius* whose wife was a native of Saldae; VIII 9385, a *miles*. P. Mich. 4301, a receipt written at Caesarea, was found in Egypt.

40 Praefects: VIII 9358, 9363. Sailors who name their fleet: VIII 9385, 21025; those who do not give their specific fleet use the singular *classis*. Procurator: VIII 2728; Dip. 56; Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten*, pp. 371-409.

41 Cagnat, *L' Armée romaine d' Afrique*², pp. 283-284, estimates thirteen but overstates their size. Liburnians: *Nilus*, VIII 21025; *Aug[usta ?]*, 9379. Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, suggests that the ships in an African mosaic illustrated by him in plate 62 were messenger boats of the Mauretanian fleet. On the port, see Stéphane Gsell, *Histoire ancienne de l' Afrique du nord* 8 (Paris, 1928), pp. 230-232, 284-286.

42 Plut., *Galba* 13; Tac., *Hist.* 1. 7, 73; Harold Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum* 1 (London, 1923), pp. clxxxvi-viii. The fleet perhaps carried Lucceius Albinus in 69: Tac., *Hist.* 2. 59.

43 III 5212-5215; *SHA vita Pii* 5. 4; Pausanias 8. 43. 3; Premerstein, *Klio* 12 (1912), p. 175 n. 6. Calpurnius Siculus, *Ecl.* 4. 40, mentioned the "trucibus Mauris" on the Baetic coast under Nero (cited by Mommsen, *Die Provinzen*, p. 639 n. 3). On the whole period, see Cagnat, *L' Armée romaine d' Afrique*², pp. 43-55; Mommsen, *op. cit.* pp. 61, 623-640. The Flavian *praefectus orae maritimae* at Tarraco (II 4224-4226, etc.) had, as I hope to show elsewhere, no naval powers.

44 Third century: VIII 9358, 21017. The *barcarii* of VIII 21568 (Benia) were possibly a later naval formation; see Cagnat, *Bull. de la Soc. nat. des antiq.* 1896, pp. 238-239, 245-246. The troubles in the later second century are discussed below, p. 189.

CHAPTER VII

NAVAL POWER ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER

FOR four hundred years the northern frontier of the Empire, with its garrisons and fortifications, defended the Mediterranean provinces against the dimly known tribes of the continent. Although the actual boundary was always changing, a barometer as it were of imperial strength, the essential geographical bases of the frontier remained constant: the great rivers, the Rhine and the Danube, with the two seas into which they empty as terminal marks on the northwest and southeast. These were not in every part the legal boundary, for rivers and seas may unite as well as divide their shores, but even in the areas where Rome controlled both banks the navigable sheets of water were the backbone of the frontier. The presence of provincial flotillas to exploit their advantages was necessary and inevitable from the outset.

On the greater part of the frontier native naval opposition was slight and primitive. Roman fleets, which embodied the advanced principles of ship construction, organization, and maneuver introduced from the Mediterranean practice, quickly mastered the Rhine and the Danube; on these rivers they first appear in the wars by which Augustus gained all Illyricum and attempted to reach the Elbe. When this offensive stopped, and the conquests were organized, the fleets remained as an integral part of the provincial administration, primarily military in character and stationed normally only in those sectors where the legal boundary followed the course of a navigable stream. Here they assured a naval control which at once protected the Roman shores and laid open the opposite banks to Roman incursions or invasions; on the Danube Roman power was for some time maintained by

a Roman fleet which linked the riverbank *castella* of the auxiliaries in a forward line of defense, while the legions lay behind in the interior. In addition the fleets developed the superb advantages offered by these lateral lines of communication for the movement of men and supplies from one sector to another, guarded and promoted shipping, and aided the fiscal agencies in collecting river tolls.

As Roman energy spilled over under Claudius and Nero in annexations to the west and east of this river frontier, the Black Sea and the English Channel were drawn more firmly into Roman control through the establishment of their respective fleets. The Euphrates, however, instead of paralleling the frontier, cut across the boundary and led directly into Parthian territory. This river was useless in the defense of Syria and never had a standing fleet. In attack, on the other hand, it furnished a valuable avenue of advance, and Roman generals from Corbulo to Julian placed transports on the stream to lighten the problems of supply in their invasions of Mesopotamia.¹

§ I. CLASSIS PONTICA

The survey of the northern squadrons may conveniently begin with the Black Sea and proceed westward toward the English Channel, for though the Roman fleet of the Euxine was the latest of the group to be established, Roman care for this region had not been lacking before the institution of the *classis Pontica* in A. D. 64. Here, also, we can view most clearly the variety of means which the Empire might employ to secure its naval *pax*, and the effect of shifting strategical considerations, which led in this case to an ever firmer Roman domination.

The Euxine, along with the Bosphorus, was in the Augustan period an unimportant, out-of-the-way corner of the world. In particular, through traffic between the East and the West across the Bosphorus was not great, for neither the Armenian nor the Danubian frontier had achieved its later importance, and the road nets of both the Balkans and Asia Minor as yet remained rudimentary. A direct naval police of the region was accordingly not

attempted, but the policy of entrusting the whole task to the local dependent states was conspicuously unsuccessful.

The Thracian kingdom and the Greek cities of the area apparently were assigned to guard the Bosphorus to prevent incursions into the Aegean from the Black Sea and to control the scanty communication between Europe and Asia. In the first years of Tiberius, however, the city of Ilium still had occasion to set up thanks to a procurator of Drusus Caesar, the son of Tiberius, who had "put down the piracy in the Hellespont and in all things kept the city free from burdens." ²

The police of the Euxine itself to prevent the emergence of another Mithridates was left by Augustus to two local states, situated respectively in Pontus and in the Tauric Chersonesus. The Pontic kingdom, on the northeastern coast of Asia Minor, essayed to keep the Caucasian tribes in check by means of a fleet based on the capital, Trapezus; the northern shore of the Black Sea was entrusted to Asander, king of the Bosphoran realm. An inscription which has been preserved attests a naval victory of his forces in this mission. In 17 B. C. Asander lost his throne, and Agrippa, who was then reorganizing the government of the East, gave his kingdom to Polemo I of Pontus, thus uniting the two principalities charged with the preservation of the Euxine peace.³ This arrangement, which might have proved dangerous to Rome itself, soon collapsed, and the Euxine remained troubled. From the Caucasus Mountains at the eastern end of the Black Sea, such tribes as the Heniochi, Achaei, and Zygi ravaged widely in their native *camarae*, two-prowed boats which they transported inland to impregnable fortresses after their raids. Strabo terms them rulers of the sea and adds that, though the native chieftains protected their coasts against piratical inroads, the Roman officials were indifferent. The Roman poet Ovid, exiled to Tomis, records in the first decade after Christ that they raided even to the mouths of the Danube.⁴ The reigns of Tiberius and Gaius, nevertheless, saw no Roman action in the region.

The annexation of Thrace in A. D. 46, coupled with certain naval operations in the northern Euxine in the years immediately pre-

ceding, opens a more aggressive policy by which Claudius brought the Black Sea permanently within the Roman orbit. One token of this action may be the shadowy *classis Perinthia* under the equestrian procurator of Thrace, which is mentioned once in an inscription of 88/90. This squadron was very probably formed by Claudius, when he annexed Thrace, either as an entirely new fleet or as a transformation of an otherwise unknown Thracian royal fleet;⁵ apart from controlling the Propontis, it had an important part in ferrying troops and supplies between Europe and Asia. The uneventful quiet of the Black Sea following the reign of Trajan probably brought its dissolution.⁶

Since the various Roman interventions in the Bosphorus beginning with Claudius and the increasingly direct control of the northern shores by land and by sea are most closely connected with the history of the Moesian fleet, we may turn back to the Pontic kingdom, where action waited on Nero. This kingdom, unfortunately for its rulers, occupied a position vital to the Roman frontier on Armenia. As the campaigns of Corbulo against the Parthians showed, the lack of Roman roads in eastern Asia Minor under the Julio-Claudian emperors made Trapezus, head of the only road breaking the coastal mountain range, a place of prime importance as a supply base for all operations against Armenia. Polemo II may have been unsuccessful in maintaining security in the Euxine for the Roman supply ships; in any case Nero needed a base for his ambitious plans of conquest in the Caucasus, and one year after the conclusion of a far from victorious peace with Parthia in 63 he removed Polemo from his throne.⁷ Pontus was added for the time being to the Roman province of Galatia and from the reign of Trajan formed a part of Cappadocia, the military province of Asia Minor.

With the annexation of Pontus, the Empire took over the burden of policing the eastern Euxine. The royal Pontic fleet, renamed the *classis Pontica* and placed under the usual equestrian praefect, was continued and probably reinforced, inasmuch as it was the chief naval force available for Nero's great plans. Josephus puts its strength at this time at forty vessels; since the fleet was

largely composed of liburnians, with a trireme as flagship, this strength would make it somewhat weaker than a legion in total personnel.⁵

The plans of Nero collapsed in civil strife, and in the summer of 69 Mucianus summoned the best liburnians and all the soldiers of the fleet to Byzantium to assist his campaign on behalf of Vespasian against Vitellius.⁹ Anicetus, a freedman of Polemo and former commander of the royal fleet, raised the standard of Vitellius, stirred up the Caucasian tribes to launch their *camarae*, took Trapezus, and burned the remainder of the squadron. General ravaging followed. The trouble was put down, but such a flare-up revealed the potential danger of the eastern Euxine; the Pontic fleet continued to survey the area from Trapezus and with the Moesian fleet, which guarded the northwestern shores, maintained an outward peace on the Black Sea during the next century and a half. In the reign of Hadrian, Arrian's *Periplus of the Euxine Sea* indicates relatively quiet conditions with Roman garrisons at various strategic posts along the Caucasian shores, connected through the Pontic fleet. Vessels of the squadron bore Arrian on his journey of inspection from Trapezus, where the poor harbor was improved by Hadrian. He noted that two tribes in the Caucasus, the Colchi and the Drillae, "do not pay tribute as they should" but promised to force them to do so, a promise which indicates the progress in Roman domination of the Black Sea since the reign of Augustus.

Shortly after Arrian's cruise, problems more vital than the peace of the Colchi called the Pontic fleet to Cyzicus, on the Propontis, where it remained until its extinction. Trapezus itself had become steadily less important as the Roman road net in Asia Minor was improved; on the other hand, the volume of army traffic across the Bosphorus tended to increase as the center of gravity in the northern frontier shifted from the Rhine to the Danube. The inroads of the Costoboci, who in 170 broke through the lower Moesian defenses and penetrated as far as Elateia and Eleusis, furnished the decisive impulse for the transfer of the fleet to guard the Propontis. About 175 the Pontic fleet received an

extraordinary praefect with the grade of *centenarius* and the rank of *procurator Augusti*, and it is probable that this praefect, L. Iulius Vehilius Gratus Iulianus, who had commanded a vexillation against the Costoboci, was entrusted with the mission of shifting the Pontic fleet permanently to Cyzicus.¹⁰ Here as elsewhere the Empire was slowly retreating upon the Mediterranean.

From Cyzicus the Pontic fleet probably aided Niger in the civil war centering on the Propontis in 193, and thereafter it presumably assisted the Italian fleets in the siege of Byzantium. In the days when pretenders and usurpers began to plague the Empire, a private citizen at Cyzicus attempted to incite the fleet to raise him to the throne, while the Emperor Elagabalus was wintering at Nicomedia, 218-219; a third-century Cyzicene tombstone of a certain Crispinus from Ravenna boasts him "stolarch of the sea darts, taking delight in six-oared wings."¹¹ These warcraft seem largely rhetorical, and the invasions of the Goths after 250 swept away all the remnants. Roman warships did not appear again in the Hellespont until the fourth century.

§ 2. CLASSIS MOESICA

The Danube, which Republican boundaries had nowhere reached, became under Augustus the Roman frontier from its headwaters to the kingdom of Thrace. Through these Augustan conquests an area as great as Caesar's Gaul was annexed; the Empire gained a strategic frontier which it guarded for four hundred years; and a land route between East and West was assured. The newly conquered portion of the Balkans, at first governed in one block under the title *Illyricum*, was soon divided into the two provinces of Pannonia and Moesia. This was a natural dichotomy which may be marked even in the plan of conquest, for the military operations proceeded partly north from Macedonia, ill-guarded behind the Haemus Mountains, but chiefly east from the coastal strip of Dalmatia. Naval assistance was found requisite in either sphere as soon as the armies reached the Danube or its navigable tributaries; and even when Roman arms had every-

where gained the Danube the establishment of two provinces, joined to the difficulty of passing the Iron Gates in upper Moesia, perpetuated the existence of two fleets on the Danube.

The Pannonian offensive may be referred to the *classis Pannonica*, and attention here will be fixed on the lower Danube, the area soon known as Moesia. In this region Roman aggressive action followed hard upon Actium, for M. Licinius Crassus, governor of Macedonia, had in 29 and 28 B. C. conquered the tribes north of his province between the Haemus and the Danube.¹² Permanent Roman military and political occupation, however, did not come for some twenty years. The consolidation of Roman power in the Balkans from 20 B. C. to A. D. 10 is one of the most hidden corners of Augustan history; dates, places, even the identity of generals both in Moesia and Pannonia are subject to indecisive debate, but it may at least be said that by A. D. 6, when Caecina Severus commanded the legions of Moesia, the completed scheme of defense on the lower Danube had taken shape, and that the Romans controlled all the lands and tribes up to the river.¹³

Since the eastern part of the region, the *ripa Thraciae*, was as yet of little importance to the Romans, Augustus entrusted it to the subject Thracian king, whose kingdom had been consolidated and quieted by Piso in 11 B. C. The remainder of Moesia, westwards from the vicinity of Novae, apparently constituted a military district resembling the buffer commands on the Rhine. The legions of Macedonia now lay at interior points in Moesia; the Danube itself was fortified by the *praesidia* which Cn. Cornelius Lentulus had established in the last decade B. C. and garrisoned presumably by auxiliaries. The forward defense system thus formed included from its beginning a fleet to connect the forts, for Strabo states that the Romans transported their war supplies on the Danube.¹⁴

On the lower Danube continuous military action was necessary during the last decade of Augustus' rule. The Daci unsuccessfully attempted to invade Moesia in A. D. 6 and then turned to the Thracian bank, guarded by King Rhoemetalcus. When Aegiscus fell to them in 12, they ravaged the countryside as far as Tomis until a Roman legion sailed down from upper Moesia. In 15 the

frontier post of Troesmis was taken, and Roman troops from Moesia were again required to expel the raiders.¹⁵ By this date Moesia was a province, and the fleet presumably bore its later title of *classis Moesica*.

Except for minor raids in the last years of Tiberius, both the upper and the lower Danube enjoyed peace from 15 to 69, for the transdanubian peoples were engaged in war with the Iazyges and other invaders from the east. In 46 Claudius ended the system of indirect control by converting the Thracian kingdom into a province, and assigned the protection of the *ripa Thraciae* to the Moesian army, which received another legion. The three legions at this time lay in the west of the province at Novae, Oescus, and Viminacium.¹⁶ The *classis Moesica*, like the Pannonian fleet at this date, probably patrolled the area yet unprotected by legions and linked the riverbank *castella*.¹⁷

With Claudius, also, begins the use of the Moesian fleet on the northern coasts of the Black Sea, and the intimate connection of the Bosporan kingdom with the army of Moesia. In 38 Gaius had revived Agrippa's plan by giving the Bosporus to Polemo II of Pontus. Three years later Claudius revoked this grant of the northern kingdom, which Polemo probably had never carried into effect, and accepted a certain Mithridates, the de facto ruler of the Bosporus. Mithridates was not content with this and tried to throw off Roman suzerainty, but the governor of Moesia, A. Didius Gallus, expelled him in 44 or 45 and installed Mithridates' half-brother Cotys. The success of these operations necessarily depended on action by the Moesian fleet to put down any naval opposition; the actual transport of men and supplies seems to have been assigned to merchant vessels requisitioned from Byzantium and the other coastal cities.¹⁸

A stricter control of the northern shores of the Black Sea accompanied Nero's annexation of Pontus Polemoniacus. The new era of dating which Tyras began in 56-57 indicates the submission of that independent Greek city on the Black Sea to the north of the Danube, and a famous inscription of Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus, governor of Moesia from about 58, throws a clear light on Rome's advance. Besides defeating the Sarmatians and settling

one hundred thousand transdanubian natives in Roman territory, this energetic governor freed the independent city of Chersonesus in the Bosphorus from Scythian siege, and so pacified the Euxine that he, first of all the Moesian governors, could ship grain to Rome.¹⁹ Here again the intervention of Plautius in the Bosphorus undoubtedly called upon the Moesian squadron.

The catastrophic finale of Nero's reign coincided with the end of the disturbances among the Dacians which had resulted from the settling of the Iazyges to their west and other tribes such as the Roxolani to their east, and the movement of legions from the Balkans in the civil wars kindled serious troubles on the Danubian boundary. Although two thousand men were drafted from each Moesian legion in the winter of 68-69 to aid Otho against Vitellius, the remainder of the legion III Gallica managed to crush the invading Roxolani. Again in the summer of 69 the departure of the Pannonian and Moesian legions on Antonius Primus' expedition to win Italy from Vespasian encouraged the Dacians to sweep the lower river; fortunately Mucianus, governor of Syria, who was leading the eastern legions to Italy, arrived in the Balkans at the critical moment and thrust the disappointed Dacians back across the Danube. Mucianus left in Moesia two legions under C. Fonteius Agrippa, who fell in a winter incursion of the Sarmatians. With the restoration of peace in the empire, further forces could be spared, and the new governor Rubrius Gallus drove the Sarmatians out and restored the *castella* of the frontier.²⁰ At this time both the *classis Moesica* and the *classis Pannonica* received the title *Flavia* which they bore thereafter in commemoration of their service when the Danube was stripped of its legions. The term does not necessarily imply a reorganization of the fleets, for the parallel grants of *praetoria* to the Italian fleets and *Augusta* to the German and Egyptian squadrons brought no observable changes; and it most certainly does not indicate the foundation of the two Danubian fleets.²¹

After 70 the Moesian legions remained in the west, VII Claudia at Viminacium, V Macedonica at Oescus, I Italica at Novae, while the Danube to the east of Novae fell as before to the auxiliaries and fleet. The latter pivoted on one or more eastern stations so

as to control both the lower Danube and the Black Sea route to the Bosporan kingdom.²² The opening of the Dacian war in 85, which begins the important era of Danubian history, swept this all away; the fleet very possibly suffered serious losses when the Dacians struck across the lower reaches of the river, the Dobrudja was largely abandoned, and sea connection between the Danubian army and the Bosporus was perhaps broken. The Moesian fleet presumably co-operated in the disastrous Dacian expedition of Cornelius Fuscus in 86 and in the more successful campaign of Tettius Iulianus, whose victory at Tapae in Dacia permitted peace. Even before the cessation of hostilities, Domitian had reorganized the defense of the lower Danube in 85/86 by the division of Moesia into two provinces—Inferior and Superior—and the addition of two legions to the garrison. The *classis Flavia Moesica* was assigned to Moesia Inferior and remained under its governor thenceforth.²³

The Dacian settlement of Domitian could not be permanent, and the first great action of Trajan's rule was a new solution through force. In the thorough preparations preceding his Dacian wars the Moesian fleet was probably strengthened, for veterans were discharged in 99; the road constructed in 100 on the Roman side of the Iron Gates, if it were intended for a towpath as has been suggested, facilitated employment of the Pannonian fleet on the lower Danube.²⁴ The subsequent series of campaigns from 101 to 106 brought the complete conquest of Dacia.

Our chief source for this event, the spiral band of reliefs on Trajan's Column in Rome, is neglectful of geography and historical time. The sculptors sensed the broader human implications of their particular story, but more especially they felt the craft and power of the Trajanic army, its varied forces which formed a unity, its careful preparations, its dauntless spirit, its diligent labor in watch and fortification after which victory was the inevitable culmination. The Column is, as it were, a timeless apotheosis of the Roman army, a pattern of Roman might which sums up and describes all the northern campaigns since the conquests of Augustus. The navy plays its part as well on the reliefs; the lack of evidence for other wars seems scarcely a loss,

for the graphic record of the Column stands as sufficient illustration for every northern war based on the great rivers.²⁵

The curtain rises quietly on a simple countryside of the Danube with the riverbank *castella* which the Moesian fleet linked into a chain of defense, but immediately the tale passes to a portrayal of ships laden with barrels and soldiers' packs which are being put on shore at a town—preparations for war.²⁶ This scene, recurring at intervals throughout the early part of the reliefs, marks the importance of the Moesian fleet in the maintenance of the army, for which the Danube furnished an incomparable route. The galleys themselves could not transport the materials of war, and in the Column the freight ships are clearly distinguished from the warships;²⁷ the main service of the latter, and a sufficient one, was in so dominating the river that this supply might proceed uninterrupted. The reliefs unfortunately do not tell us whether the transports also formed a part of the *classis Moesica*, that is, whether the military *naves onerariae* of the northern rivers were assigned to the war fleet. The German squadron had some transports, and at least in the early days of Roman rule the war fleets, it would appear, combined military and supply functions; yet the legions and auxiliaries, wherever we have specific evidence, built and manned their own supply ships,²⁸ and in the event of great expeditions the burden of supply must have fallen almost entirely on the army quartermaster service. The river fleets possibly helped, and particularly in linking the river forts in time of peace, but any such assistance was auxiliary to their military mission.

After the preparations Trajan and his forces crossed into Dacia on their bridges of boats, and the war began. The campaign of the first year, based on Viminacium and Tsierna, ends as it commenced, with a reference to the fleet: captive Dacian women are being placed aboard a galley, possibly for transport up the Danube and Save and so to Italy.²⁹ Late in the winter of 101–102 the Dacians with aid from the Roxolani broke across the Danube below Drobeta, where Trajan probably wintered, and ravaged widely. As the reliefs depict, the galleys of the Moesian flotilla, which had perhaps been assembled at Drobeta for the winter,

carried Trajan and his expeditionary force, with horses and supplies in transports, down the river, possibly to Novae. The invaders crushed, Trajan sailed upstream to open the second campaign.³⁰ The separate Roman columns plunged into the heart of Dacia, and unnavigable mountain torrents replace the Danube on the frieze. The great river yet remains throughout in the background as the lateral line of communication which made such division of troops possible, and the Moesian fleet continued to patrol that stream throughout the wars.³¹

After his final victory Trajan reorganized the defense of the lower Danube along lines which it retained for a century and more. The Danube remained the first line of protection, and here most of the legions were stationed. In Moesia Inferior, I Italica remained at Novae, but XI Claudia came to Durostorum, and by 107 V Macedonica garrisoned Troesmis in the northern Dobrudja. The new province of Dacia covered the Danube between the Marisus and the Alutus; the area east of the latter and west of the Hierasus, the modern Wallachia, was possibly occupied to a limited extent, but was chiefly encircled by a net of garrisons. Both banks of the Alutus, the eastern boundary of Dacia and a principal means of access to the Dacian hills, were held by a line of auxiliary *castella*; the Danube to the south was firmly controlled; on the east and northeast posts ran up the Hierasus to the strong castle of Piriboridava (Poiana), held by some small force, whence a road led to the pass at Brețcu in eastern Dacia.³² This eastern sector was manned by troops from Moesia Inferior, and the discovery of a naval station at Ghergina, on the left bank of the Danube near the Hierasus junction, suggests that the fleet assisted in linking the forts on the Hierasus as well as those on the lower Danube. The actual supply of these posts was undertaken, according to a *pridianum* of a cohort active in the region, by *naves frumentariae* which were guarded by details from the army.³³

The principal station of the Moesian squadron apparently lay somewhat to the east of Ghergina at Noviodunum, and a detachment may have occupied a camp near Istrus, a Greek city on the Black Sea; both posts were well located for the fleet's dual mission of patrolling both the Danube and the northern Euxine. Naval

inscriptions come also from Tomis, the capital of Moesia Inferior and the most flourishing city on the coast, but scarcely attest a station at this point.³⁴ One of these, the tombstone of a veteran, is extremely odd, for it begins in Latin and ends in Greek; probably many Greeks of the coast served in the fleet alongside the provincials who appear as rowers in the ships on Trajan's Column, but its full composition cannot be stated.³⁵ The fleet played some part in the advance of that semi-urban civilization which characterized Moesia, for civil settlements grew up about the stations of the fleet on the naval *territoria*.³⁶

Under Trajan the northern coast of the Euxine, which had remained quiet during the Dacian wars, was attached even more firmly to Moesia Inferior.³⁷ From the fort of Piriboridava a road ran east to Tyras as well as west to Dacia; at some time a wall was constructed between the Hierasus and the Pyretus which probably guarded this route. Roman troops garrisoned Tyras; Hadrian brought Olbia into the Roman orbit, and Antoninus Pius gave it military aid; in the Crimea both the Bosporan kingdom and the city of Chersonesus were subject to Rome. To command the outlying detachments the governor of Moesia regularly appointed a tribune of the legion I Italica as "praepositus vexillationibus Ponticis apud Scythia et Tauricam."³⁸ This thin arm stretching along the northern shores did not quite meet the band of Roman garrisons curving around the eastern end of the Euxine, but Roman domination of the sea was unquestioned.

The basis for this control was necessarily naval. On the east lay the Pontic fleet; along the northern shores the force which could transport troops quickly between the mouth of the Danube and the Bosphorus was the Moesian fleet. Chersonesus was probably a regular naval base, for the trierarch T. Aurelius Secundus of the *classis Flavia Moesica* there set up a stone in 185 to the commander of the local garrison "sub cuius cura egi."³⁹ In the early third century a soldier of the *sagittarii Palmyreni* recorded on his dress shield at Dura Europos a march from Moesia around to Olbia by Tomis, Istrus, and Tyras, and thence to the eastern high road at Trapezus by a voyage broken at Chersonesus.⁴⁰ The peace which permitted such a phenomenal journey was not broken

until the Goths seized the northern coast and sacked Istrus in 238.

The duties of the Moesian fleet on the Danube were pre-eminently military. By itself the squadron was unable to prevent sudden raids; but the encirclement of Wallachia hindered such inroads, and the fleet could usually come up in time to cut off the raiders on their retreat. Most barbarian invasions which are recorded in our sources occurred in the winter, for since the Danube freezes over from December through February the Roman fleet was then useless.⁴¹ The squadron also assisted in transport along and across the Danube, and possibly exercised fiscal duties similar to those of the Egyptian *potamophylacia*, inasmuch as a *portorium Illyrici* was exacted at various toll stations along the Danube.⁴² For this purpose, and also for military reasons, it may have controlled navigation on the river, particularly to prevent the barbarians from using ships.

Although these duties presumably called vessels of the fleet from time to time into Moesia Superior, no traces of permanent stations there have been found. The late second-century inscription (III 14567) of a recruit in the legion VII Claudia who was training as an *epibata* or marine at Naissus on the Margus by no means assures a fleet station at that point; more probably the legion had its own craft for supply and control. A similar system is found on the Rhine at the same date, and in the fourth century several legions on the Danube itself were assigned the duty of river patrol.

At the beginning of the third century the Moesian fleet appears in Dobrudjan boundary stones set up by its praefect, acting under the orders of the governor Ovinus Tertullus, who re-surveyed many boundaries in this area. From Gordian the Moesian fleet, like all other army units, received the ephemeral epithet *Gordiana*. Some parts of it probably survived the remainder of the chaotic third century, for in the fourth century small independent squadrons garrisoned various strategic posts along the Danube. The essential considerations which had caused the creation of a river fleet kept it in existence until the Byzantine Empire lost the Danube.⁴³

§ 3. CLASSIS PANNONICA

Since Pannonia was traversed by two navigable tributaries of the Danube, the Save and the Drave, a Roman fleet supported Augustus' advance in this section from the outset. The first campaigns, which were directed by the Emperor himself, had as objective the acquisition of Siscia, the northern key of the river Save, for this stream approaches closely to the Carnic Alps and thus furnishes the easiest route into the whole Balkan region from Italy. In 35 B. C. the Roman forces put down the Iapodi and Dalmatian pirates and besieged Siscia itself by land and water. A friendly native prince sent vessels up the Save from the Danube, and additional ships were constructed by the Romans, possibly with the aid of sailors brought from the Mediterranean. The admiral of the fleet was Menas, the notorious freedman of Sextus Pompey, who died in a battle against the primitive native boats.⁴⁴ When Siscia was finally taken and made a Roman fortress, the Roman flotilla which Octavian had formed for further use probably remained in commission there.

The threat and thereafter the reality of civil war, with the problems incident to its conclusion, prevented further operations on the middle Danube until 15 B. C. Augustus' plan of campaign in Pannonia then proceeded methodically, at first under Agrippa, later under Tiberius, and by 12 B. C. the Danube could formally be claimed as boundary throughout its middle course.⁴⁵ Since Sirmium, the southern key of the Save, was in Roman hands by this time, it is probable that the Save furnished the lateral base line of communication and that the advance moved north to the Danube from this river. In the later stages of Tiberius' campaign the Drave, which paralleled the Save on the north, may have been similarly used; and it would seem that a fleet could have been put to admirable employment in landing troops along the Danube in the rear of local centers of resistance.

Apart from ill-defined operations across the Danube in Dacia, which postulate naval support based on Siscia,⁴⁶ the middle Danube saw no further serious action until the Pannonian revolt of A. D. 6 recalled Tiberius from his campaign against Maroboduus in

southern Germany. Caecina Severus, commander of the Moesian legions, relieved Sirmium from its siege by the rebels, Tiberius kept firm hold on Siscia, and in the year 7 reinforcements from the eastern armies opened the Save. With the Save in his hands Tiberius moved surely and by 9 ended the revolt. Shortly after the great rebellion Pannonia became a province and received a garrison of three legions to guard the frontier and to quiet the natives. VIII Augusta lay inland on the Drave at Poetovio; IX Hispana was perhaps at Siscia to assure Italy against sudden inroads; only XV Apollinaris was on the Danube, probably at Carnuntum, which had been transferred from Noricum to Pannonia. Auxiliary *praesidia* presumably held the right bank of the Danube along its great bend from Carnuntum to Singidunum, and the left bank was guarded by a buffer state of the Suebi, whose king, Vannius, was installed by Roman power in A. D. 19.

The stream itself was patrolled by the *classis Pannonica*, which had moved forward from the Save at some uncertain date; in 50, when the Suebi expelled Vannius, it transported him across the Danube to Roman territory.⁴⁷ His successors remained friendly to Rome, and the Iazyges, who were filtering into the great re-entrant between the Danube and the Theiss, were as yet well-disposed. The *classis Pannonica* seems never to have penetrated far beyond Carnuntum, for the Hermunduri opposite Raetia and Noricum formed another consistently friendly buffer state.⁴⁸ The lakes between the Rhine and Danube, it may be noted here, had no naval forces until the abandonment of the *agri decumates* in the late third century exposed the area to direct attacks by the Germans.⁴⁹

During the civil wars of 68-69 the upper Danube did not suffer from the severe incursions which harassed Moesia, and Antonius Primus was able to draft sailors from the fleet for his Italian expedition.⁵⁰ The title *Flavia* which the Pannonian fleet received on the accession of Vespasian commemorates this and perhaps reflects action by the squadron against minor, unrecorded raids. Thereafter, apart from the disturbances caused by Domitian's misfortunes in Moesia, Pannonia enjoyed quiet until the Marcomannic wars of Marcus Aurelius. Domitian increased its garrison and

moved the legions to the Danube; ⁵¹ in 107 Trajan split the province into Pannonia Superior and Pannonia Inferior.

In this division the *classis Flavia Pannonica* was officially assigned to Pannonia Inferior, which bordered the Danube from Singidunum past Aquincum, but its vessels continued to patrol the upper reaches both of the Save and the Drave in Pannonia Superior.⁵² The Save in particular was still traversed by the fleet, even after the Flavian emperors had built a road along this vital route between Italy and the lower Danube and Asia Minor; one naval inscription comes from Emona, close to its headwaters, and another from Sirmium, its southern guard. An ex-voto to Jupiter set up by a trierarch at Poetovio proves that the fleet visited the Drave, and tombstones of sailors come from the legionary camps of Brigetio and Aquincum on the Danube.⁵³ The naval base itself lay at Taurunum near Singidunum, a strategic point three miles north of the junction of the Save and the Danube.⁵⁴

The history of the Pannonian fleet in the second and third centuries is most scantily illumined. It may have co-operated in the Dacian wars under Trajan, or possibly it remained in its own area to guard the frontier against feints.⁵⁵ Its ships are represented on the Column of Marcus Aurelius, but the evidence to be derived thence is insignificant. The ships are even more absurdly conventionalized than on Trajan's Column, representations of their activity in supply and transport during the Marcomannic wars are parodies of the Trajanic prototypes, and one can say only that the Pannonian fleet, controlling the best artery of lateral communication, aided the armies, first from Carnuntum and then from Aquincum.⁵⁶ The temporary peace under Marcus Aurelius banned Danubian navigation by the transdanubian natives, a rule which will be found also on the Rhine; but the failure of Commodus to press his father's hard-won successes to their conclusion required the strengthening of the river defenses with forts "per loca opportuna ad clandestinos latrunculorum transitus oppositis."⁵⁷

An inscription set up by L. Cornelius Restitutus, praefect of the fleet, can be assigned to 201/207; thereafter the *classis Flavia Pannonica* vanishes until the middle of the fourth century. In the

later *Notitia* the main strength of the old fleet apparently lay on or close to the Save: above Carnuntum *milites liburnarii* of the frontier legions guarded the Danube. Roman fleets on the middle Danube vanished only with the end of Roman rule.⁵⁵

§ 4. CLASSIS GERMANICA

Of the provincial fleets thus far noted it may be asserted that they existed; there are usually some scraps of direct evidence, and a consideration of the general history of their locality suggests a bare outline of the naval history. Much further one cannot go. On turning to the Rhine we have at last the flesh and blood of intimate detail, and for the first century at least we know more about the history and geographical basis of the Rhenish fleet than for any other squadron of the Empire, not excepting the great Italian fleets. The authors of this period, Tacitus, Velleius Paterculus, Strabo, and others, are full of the history of the Rhenish frontier; inscriptions are plentiful, and some few may even be placed before Domitian; the thorough archaeological exploration by the Germans and the Dutch has left few sites unexcavated. This richness of material is not wholly accidental. The number of stations for the German fleet far surpasses that of any other minor squadron, and all evidence indicates that the strength of the flotilla corresponded with the importance of the frontier, which was the most heavily garrisoned of all down to the reign of Domitian.

The Roman fleet on the Rhine was the product of that Augustan expansion which had placed the Balkan boundary on the Danube. In the Rhenish sector Augustus apparently aimed at advancing the frontier to the Elbe in central Germany, and operations to this end were begun as soon as Tiberius had conquered Illyricum. His general on the Rhine, Drusus the Elder, was the creator of the German fleet, for according to Florus "Bormam et Caesoriacum pontibus iunxit classibusque firmavit."⁵⁹ The precise meaning of this corrupt passage is subject to dispute, but Bonn may well have been a temporary port; and that Drusus actually formed a Rhenish fleet there is no question, for he even excavated a canal, the *fossae Drusianae*, between the Rhine and the

lacus Flevis (Zuyder Zee) to open for it a shorter way to the North Sea. In his first campaign, 12 B. C., Drusus sailed down the Rhine through this canal to the sea, accepted the submission of the Frisians, and by coasting east to the lands of the Chauci became the first Roman general to venture on the North Sea. The difficulties of Caesar in Britain had not yet fully acquainted the Romans with the vagaries of the ocean, and Drusus' ships were stranded by the ebbing tide on one occasion. Local naval opposition was slight; after one battle against the Bructeri on the Ems in 12 or 11, the Romans met no challenge to their control of German waters.⁸⁰

The subsequent campaigns of Drusus in 11-9 were waged from Vetera or Moguntiacum. The naval mishap perhaps discouraged prosecution of the war by sea; strategically, such naval expeditions were subsidiary, for a successful conquest of the Cherusci, Chatti, and other transrhene tribes could proceed only on the basis of a careful advance by land from the middle and upper Rhine. The valley of the Lippe opposite Vetera and the valley of the Main across from Moguntiacum furnished the only easy routes of approach to the area of operations; the Roman base in the German wars accordingly shifted between these two points. Drusus built forts on the Lippe, and succeeding commanders attempted to provide adequate roads in the broken, wooded territory of western Germany.

None the less, the German fleet remained useful, and literary evidence gives us a fine picture of the experiments in its employment during the war on the Rhine from 12 B. C. to A. D. 16. Along with supply ships it presumably penetrated to the head of navigation on the Lippe and the Main; naval control of the Rhine must also have facilitated the plan of attack. The Romans, that is to say, often used several independent parallel or converging columns, a method risky except against barbarians and dangerous even then if lateral contact were not maintained at least in the rear. When Tiberius resumed the German conquest in A. D. 4 after a lapse of thirteen years, the fleet found new employment as the campaigns extended eastward. In the year 5 the *classis Germanica* sailed along the coast and met Tiberius at the Elbe with supplies;

afterwards it conducted a reconnoitering expedition to the east which expanded Roman knowledge of the coast and gave occasion for Augustus' proud boast that

classis mea per Oceanum ab ostio Rheni ad solis Orientis regionem usque ad fines Cimbrorum navigavit, quo neque terra neque mari quisquam Romanus ante id tempus adit.⁶¹

Further activity was stopped for the moment by the Pannonian revolt and then the Varian disaster in 9, but in the following campaigns of Germanicus, A. D. 14-16, yet other possibilities of naval action were explored in a series of dramatic, quick, and ineffectual raids which were modeled on the first campaign of Drusus the Elder. In the second campaign of 15, Germanicus packed the four legions of lower Germany on the fleet and sailed through the *lacus Flevis* to the Ems, where he met the legions of upper Germany and the cavalry. Since the period of the equinoctial storms was approaching by the time of his return, he lightened his ships by embarking only two of the four legions, but the two which marched along the shore were so buffeted by tide and storm that he finally crowded them aboard ship.⁶²

Instructed by their congestion and by the difficulties of the land columns, Germanicus hit upon the bold plan of shipping his whole army along the coast and so into the middle of Germany for the following year. During the winter of 15-16 shipwrights along the Rhine built the necessary fleet of a thousand vessels, some designed with flat bottoms or broad waists, others equipped with double sets of rudders. These were assembled in the spring of 16 at the island, *insula Batavorum*, formed by the two chief estuaries of the Rhine; Germanicus embarked eight legions, auxiliaries, and supplies, and entered the *fossae Drusianae* after invoking his father to assist the son attempting the same exploits. The fleet carried the troops some distance up the Ems; its vessels were probably dragged upon shore and put under guard; and the army proceeded upstream for a desultory campaign. Germanicus again lightened ship on the return voyage by sending some legions on land, but this time a storm struck the fleet itself, as it moved along the North Sea shore. Its hastily-constructed trans-

ports, manned largely by landlubber soldiers, were scattered over the coast by violent winds, and some vessels were even blown to Britain.⁶³ The greatest naval expedition ever undertaken by the Roman Empire had ended in disaster, and Tiberius recalled the youth.

The Roman offensive in Germany was closed. The two military districts of Germania Inferior and Superior were no longer joined under a generalissimo, and the Rhenish armies settled down into a system of defense. Four legions lay in Upper Germany, two at Moguntiacum, one each at Argentorate and Vindonissa; in Lower Germany, two were at Vetera, one at Novaesium, one at Bonna. The *classis Germanica*, which quickly shrank to a more moderate size, remained on the lower Rhine with headquarters at the *ara Ubiorum* (Köln), where it appears to have been located in A. D. 14.⁶⁴ From this point, entitled *colonia Agrippinensis* after 50, and from other stations on or close to the *insula Batavorum*, the fleet assisted in the guard of the Rhine; since the Frisians were subject, it also could gain the ocean through the canal of Drusus. When the exactions of a Roman officer drove these Frisians to revolt in 28, the Romans in the fortress of Flevum were saved, presumably with the aid of the fleet, but the aged Tiberius preferred to let the region go. At the beginning of Claudius' reign the Chauci, who had been marauding on the coast, were defeated by P. Gabinius Secundus, the governor of Germania Inferior; in 47 Corbulo, the new governor, strengthened the fleet, again defeated the restless Chauci, and regained the Frisian territory. Claudius, however, needed troops elsewhere and ordered the evacuation of the right bank of the Rhine.⁶⁵

Legions, auxiliaries, and fleet alike of the Germanies were caught up in the machinations of the Batavian Civilis during the later stages of the civil wars in 68-69. When Civilis raised the standard of Vespasian in the Batavian country as a pretext for revolt, the Romans abandoned the forts along the lower Rhine which had harbored vessels of the fleet and assembled the twenty-four ships of the *classis Germanica* in the area, with the auxiliary units available, at the eastern end of the *insula Batavorum*.⁶⁶ Since the

Batavian rowers and also the auxiliaries in part were treacherous, the attack of Civilis swiftly destroyed this force.

With this Roman debacle, Civilis' revolt had an auspicious start. The Rhine first fell so low that navigation was almost impossible and bank patrols had to be instituted to prevent German forays; then, thanks to the creeping paralysis of the Roman administration, Civilis dominated the river past Novaesium. Difficulties beset the Romans on all sides, for the Rhine was at once a frontier and an avenue of military action. Germans flocked across the river in large numbers to aid Civilis. The transport of Roman troops down the current was impossible. Supplying Lower Germany became crucial in its difficulty.⁶⁷ Shortly after the new year the chief loyal general Vocola was murdered, and the entire Rhine yielded allegiance to some Gallic nationalists, Classicus and Tutor, who were engaged in a quixotic attempt to create an Empire of All Gaul.

In the spring of 70 the government of Vespasian took firm steps to put down this Empire and to break the Rhenish domination of Civilis. When a vigorous general, Cerialis, crossed the Alps with fresh troops and began to move down the Rhine, the Gallic Empire collapsed. Civilis, however, remained defiant, and in the ensuing operations the Roman failure to provide local security, a failure endemic in Roman armies at this time, cost them severely. The British fleet, which had transported the legion XIV Gemina from Britain to Gaul, was suddenly assailed by the Canninefates as it lay on the Gallic coast and was in the main destroyed. Cerialis himself, proceeding down the Rhine from Novaesium with a squadron, was surprised one night as he lay camped on the shore and lost every ship.⁶⁸

Nevertheless the arrival of Cerialis had at least brought tactical skill and an aggressive spirit. Civilis withdrew rapidly northward and crossed to the *insula Batavorum* before Cerialis could gain contact; as Tacitus notes, the war would have ended then if the German fleet had been on hand to cut off his retreat. Although Cerialis had ordered it to join the army, its rowers had been drafted off to shore duties in the previous fall, when the Rhine

was yielded to Civilis, and the reorganization of the fleet took time.⁶⁹ The fate of one detachment, which met Cerialis at Novaesium or Bonna, has already been noted; when other vessels finally appeared at Cerialis' camp on the Waal opposite the *insula*, Civilis in turn launched his boats to hearten his men and to frighten off the Roman grainships coasting from Gaul. Though the sole naval encounter of the revolt is a scene from *opéra bouffe* in which the two fleets merely sailed by each other and exchanged a few light missiles,⁷⁰ the scene is a significant one. Mediterranean naval technique had quickly given the Romans the mastery of northern waters, but as this technique was acquired by the barbarians Roman superiority decreased; the willingness of the Batavians to challenge the Roman fleet in 69 presaged the more serious naval opposition of the free Germans in the next century. In the campaign itself, the reappearance of a Roman navy on the Rhine has its importance: Cerialis' advance down the river was probably encouraged by the knowledge that his right flank, resting on the Rhine, would be safe; and the arrival of some part of the fleet in the lower reaches of the stream signified that the river above the Roman camp once again could be used as a line of supply. Neither side had shown any evidence of trained discipline, but Civilis judged his heterogeneous flotilla to be the weaker, and retired from the Batavian Island to the country of the Frisians. Shortly thereafter the revolt ended with his surrender. Vespasian did not see fit to grant the Rhenish fleet the title *Flavia*, but he apparently did concede at this time the less significant *Augusta* which appears in a few brick-stamps at the Köln station.⁷¹

The remarkably full history of the German fleet in the first century, which has already demonstrated its place in foreign and internal war, ends with the suppression of a pretender to the throne. About January 1, 89, L. Antonius Saturninus, governor of Germania Superior, proclaimed himself emperor, but within the month he was crushed by L. Appius Norbanus Maximus, governor of Germania Inferior, in the vicinity of Bonna. The Chatti, who planned to cross the Rhine in support, were foiled by an opportune breakup of the ice. The fleet's part in this winter campaign can at best have been slight, but Domitian bestowed on it,

along with every other unit in the army of Germania Inferior, the title *pia fidelis Domitiana* in grateful memory of their swift loyalty.⁷² The *damnatio memoriae* which Domitian suffered in 96 removed the imperial name, but Nerva and later emperors appreciated the suppression of usurpers too deeply to remove the adjectives *pia fidelis*.

These changes in nomenclature permit the distinction and a rough dating of the epigraphical remains of the German fleet. The great bulk of the inscriptions are of the second and early third centuries; from this period also come the bricks made by the sailors for the barracks and fortifications of the various naval posts. Apart from the few exceptions at Köln, these bear the stamps "CGPF" or "CGPF EX (i. e., exercitus) GER INF."⁷³ A detailed description of the German fleet accordingly is in most respects an analysis of its second-century framework, although archaeological and literary evidence gives us some notion of conditions in the first century.

The greatest number of stamped bricks come from Colonia Agrippinensis Ubiorum (Köln), which was alike the capital of Germania Inferior and headquarters of the *classis Germanica*. The fleet station proper was three kilometers south of the city at Altbürg, where excavations have uncovered a camp measuring two hundred meters on the west, two hundred and thirty meters on the south, and one hundred and seventy meters on the east.⁷⁴ The earliest wall, a simple *vallum* of earth crowned by a palisade, is apparently Tiberian. This was burned in 69;⁷⁵ under Vespasian the camp was rebuilt in stone and brick-rubble, but later reconstructions in bricks bearing "CGPF" obliterated most of the Vespasianic structure. Within, the excavations have uncovered remains of the barracks, an altar to Virtus and other altars, the statue of an unknown emperor, spear points, weights, and the like. Round about lay the cemetery of the sailors, where inscriptions and complete graves have been found.⁷⁶ The enceinte seems to have been occupied down to the middle of the third century.

At other points along the Rhine lay the subsidiary stations, each with its detachment of vessels and men commanded by a trierarch.⁷⁷ South of Köln the fleet had no permanent bases. A detail

for quarrying stone lay at Bonna in 160,⁷⁸ and the vexillations of sailors working in the Brohl quarries have left numerous indications of their activity; but these were clearly temporary. The presence of warships in Upper Germany, except for occasional fiscal duties or for purposes of transport in the rare wars, such as that of Domitian against the Chatti in 83, is highly improbable; under the Flavians the frontier was advanced some distance east of the upper Rhine, and the Germano-Raetian *limes* protected the region. Separate *navalia* of the legion XXII Primigenia at Moguntiacum constructed the vessels used by this, and perhaps the other legions of the upper Rhine for transport of men and supplies.⁷⁹

Immediately below Köln, the evidence of naval bricks suggests that the fleet had stations at Novaesium, a legionary camp until the reign of Domitian, and at Vetera, the post of a legion throughout the Early Empire. The next sector of the Rhine was probably pivoted on Noviomagus, in view of its commercial importance and its position at the beginning of the Rhine delta.⁸⁰ In the delta itself the German fleet garrisoned several forts, for water transport here assumed special importance. The fleet which Civilis captured came from posts in the area; second-century bricks have been found at Katwijk near the old mouth of the Rhine, and at Arentsburg in Voorburg, a suburb of The Hague.⁸¹

The station at Arentsburg, which has been thoroughly excavated, fronted on the *Fossa Corbulonis*, a canal parallel to the sea "qua incerta Oceani vitarentur"; the side walls of stone and brick went down to the canal and provided a safe landing place, cut off from the fort proper by a palisade. It was occupied from shortly before 89 until the middle of the third century, and was probably garrisoned by auxiliaries as well. Katwijk and Arentsburg controlled the commerce between the Rhine and Britain and also checked coasting pirates from the east. The fact that bricks of the fleet have been found at Rumpst to the south on the Scheldt suggests that the fleet assisted in maintaining peace throughout this waterlogged plain.⁸²

The details preserved of the fleet's organization repeat the structure of the Italian fleets. The *classis Germanica* was governed

by an equestrian praefect ranking as a *centenarius*, subject to the provincial governor.⁸³ The fleet had its navarchs, trierarchs, *gubernatores*, *proretae*, *velarii*, centurions, *optiones*, scribes; it even possessed certain personnel not found in the praetorian fleets. The *dolabrarii* who set up a stone to Minerva between 89 and 96 at Andernach were presumably part of the detachment in the Brohl quarries, who served as pickmen; the *gladiatores* in the second century who dedicated a statue to Mars Victor may have given games in honor of the emperor. The most puzzling term is the "pler(omate) Chresimi," which the sailor Similio names in an inscription found near the Brohl quarries. The word *pleroma* is a transliteration from the Greek, meaning "crew" or perhaps more probably "transport"; in either case it seems to suggest that some vessels of the German fleet were primarily transports, in this instance for the quarried stone of the Brohl cuttings.⁸⁴

At the outset the German fleet was necessarily manned chiefly by sailors from the Mediterranean, inasmuch as the Mediterranean naval skill was an innovation on the Rhine, and the inscriptions record sailors from Antioch, Alexandria, and Tralles in Caria.⁸⁵ As the natives of the Rhine valley became reconciled to Roman rule and advanced in culture, they began to contribute the greater part of the crews, and though the government may have temporarily barred the Batavians after their treachery in 69, the recruiting of the fleet on the lower Rhine and perhaps on the coast probably continued. Throughout the first and the early second century the common sailors were peregrine in name. Beside conventional dedications to Jupiter Optimus Maximus, Neptune, Minerva, Mars Victor, Castor, and Hercules Saxanus, worshipers offered invocations to the local *matres* and to an obscure Bacurdus. One sailor of Domitian's time was afterwards a *cervesarius*, probably, that is, a vender of the locally popular beer. In the third century barbarian Germans from the tribes pressing on the Rhine seem to have been admitted.⁸⁶

This Rhenish squadron was military in origin and directly military in character throughout its history. In matters of supply and transport the Rhone, with its tributaries, was fully as important to the frontier garrison of the Rhine as that river itself,

yet the Rhine lacked a state fleet until the fourth century.⁸⁷ On the upper Rhine, where Roman civilization and Roman arms soon penetrated a hundred miles beyond the river, the German fleet has left no traces; but wherever the river and boundary coincide, there bricks and inscriptions of the squadron occur. Its stations were spaced at regular intervals from Colonia Agrippinensis to Noviomagus and formed a cluster at the principal mouth of the Rhine. Based on these convenient posts, the *classis Germanica* assisted the army in ways the importance of which the revolt of Civilis has already made clear, patrolled the river to prevent incursions, guarded the continental terminus of an important water route between the British and German armies,⁸⁸ and prevented the use of the Rhine by Germans. In the latter duty a pertinent passage in the so-called Hegesippus paraphrase of Josephus' *Jewish Wars* seems as applicable to the Rhine of the first or second century as to that of the fourth century:

itaque iam non caupulis Germanorum repletur sed Romanorum liburnis, quae pererrantes toto usque ad mare bicornis amnis fluento quondam liberas gentes servitio premunt.⁸⁹

The maintenance of peace on the Rhine, the prevention of German navigation, the introduction of Mediterranean naval technique, and the construction of canals and harbors for military purposes co-operated with the advancing level of culture and the needs of the garrison in promoting navigation on the Rhine, especially from 71 on. The assurance of peace along the Belgic coast encouraged trade with Britain and to some extent along the Atlantic coast of Gaul; British merchants penetrated to Köln and the vicinity of Mainz, while the Nervii in Belgica traded down the Scheldt and up the Rhine. Through such traders Roman objects passed into the region of the Frisians and thus made their way along the coast of Germany.⁹⁰

The spread of commerce proceeded unimpeded for a century after the revolt of Civilis. The brief war of Domitian against the Chatti in 83 was followed by an expansion of Roman territory and the formal change of Germania Inferior and Superior from military districts to provinces. Imperial exigencies elsewhere de-

manded one after another of the legions, until by the reign of Trajan only four remained on the Rhine, at Vetera, Bonna, Moguntiacum, and Argentorate. Peace yet continued, and to counteract the danger of idleness among the troops, varied activities of a civil nature were devised, in which the German fleet sometimes co-operated. The chief tokens of the fleet's operation are the numerous naval inscriptions in the trass quarries on the left bank of the Brohl Valley, just south of Rheineck. During the years 101-103, detachments from all the forces of Lower Germany were employed in quarrying the light tufa for Trajan's *colonia Ulpia* at Vetera; independent vexillations of the sailors also worked here before 89 and after 96. A further detachment of the fleet which was stationed under Domitian at Andernach on the Rhine apparently transported the quarried stone to its destination.⁹¹

The last trace of this civil activity comes in 160, with the detachment at Bonna cutting stone for the forum at Noviomagus; thereafter the growing pressure on the frontier slowly subordinated all else to the original military character of the fleet. Barbarian forays began in the first years of the reign of Marcus Aurelius, when Aufidius Victorinus was sent to Germania Superior to repress the Chatti; later years saw minor troubles on the Rhine paralleling the greater unrest on the Danube. It is recorded that the future emperor Didius Iulianus, then governor of Belgica, defeated the Chauci and Chatti in 170/171, and a fragmentary inscription mentioning a barbarian fleet may perhaps be assigned to this period.⁹² Extensive employment of the *classis Germanica* at the mouth of the Rhine seems probable.

With these events the relatively well-lit history of the Rhenish fleet ends. The German squadron presumably assisted the army under the Severi and participated in the campaigns on the upper river begun by Alexander Severus and finished by Maximinus in 235; but this was probably its last effort as an organized unit, for archaeological evidence suggests that its camps were abandoned by the middle of the century. A casual reference in the Augustan Histories indicates that Roman *lusoriae*, built perhaps by Aurelian or Probus, patrolled the Rhine in 280; ⁹³ these the Germans burnt,

but the restoration of the frontier by Maximian, the colleague of Diocletian, undoubtedly entailed the construction of other light vessels. During the fourth century the Rhenish *lusoriae* are mentioned several times.⁹⁴

§ 5. CLASSIS BRITANNICA

The *raison d'être* for the British squadron is clear: if Britain were to be conquered and held by the Romans, they had first to reach its shores and thereafter to assure communication with Gaul. Caesar's invasions depended on his fleet, as his *Commentaries* graphically testify; and when the conquest of Britain was again seriously mooted under the Emperor Gaius, the first requirement was the construction of transports and galleys. Although the expedition of Gaius became a subject of malicious distortion, we can still gather some notion of his extensive naval preparations. The lighthouse, for instance, which he constructed at Gesoriacum (Boulogne-sur-Mer) probably accompanied extensive harbor works designed to make this point a base port. The triremes "quibus introierat Oceanum" and then ordered sent by land to Rome were undoubtedly galleys constructed to protect the crossing;⁹⁵ when the soldiers of his army balked and Gaius dropped the scheme of conquest, a fleet on the English Channel was of no use, but its warships could be utilized by the Italian fleets. The reluctance of the naval command to sail these craft across the Bay of Biscay and around Spain is a striking indication of the diffidence of the sailors and the unsuitability of Mediterranean craft in the ocean. Both factors restricted the activity of the later British squadron.

The fiasco under Gaius was not a dead loss. The harbor of Gesoriacum remained, some of Gaius' ships very possibly were laid up there, and the failure itself, it has recently been argued, forced Claudius to undertake his more successful attack. His generals undoubtedly built other warships and transports, and skilled sailors from the Mediterranean were drafted to fill this *classis Britannica*;⁹⁶ in 43 the expedition left Gesoriacum and made three landings on the southeast coast of Kent, from which the campaign

progressed triumphantly.⁹⁷ The fleet possibly aided in scouting and outflanking local resistance along the seashore; otherwise it shuttled chiefly between the Gallic base and the bridgeheads in Britain.

This transport of men and materials from the Continent to Britain always remained the chief function of the British squadron. Its stations were, in consequence, concentrated on the English Channel, and Gesoriacum in Gallia Belgica remained its headquarters. Some fifty bricks stamped with "CL BR" or the like testify to the camp of the fleet south of the town proper, and of the other epigraphical remains on the English Channel most come from this point. Gesoriacum, the chief port in north Gaul, was also the western terminus of the highroad to the Rhine, the medieval "*chemin de Brunehaut*," which served as a major link between the German and British armies. The fleet, which furnished the necessary prolongation of the route across the Channel, occupied the port from the reign of Claudius into the fourth century.⁹⁸

On the British coast evidence points to several termini. Richborough, which was fortified as a base camp in the first years of the conquest and was maintained until Domitian's reign, was probably the first British station of the squadron. The inscription of a praefect at Portus Lemana (Lymne) indicates that this port was frequented during the second century; four types of stamped brick have been found at Lymne, and also one type has turned up at Dover.⁹⁹ Roads ran from each of the latter to Canterbury, where they united and proceeded to London, center of the Roman road net. No station on the west coast has yet been discovered, and the presence of the fleet in the Irish Sea is attested only during the wars of Agricola. A continuous patrol of the Welsh and Scotch coasts, or even of the Atlantic coast of Gaul was prevented both by the traditional fear of the ocean and by the character of the warships, for the British fleet seems to have retained the Mediterranean trireme and liburnian. Pliny the Elder might boast that all the western shores of Spain and Gaul were navigated, and Calgacus might exhort his followers before the battle of Mons Graupius in 83,

nullae ultra terrae ac ne mare quidem securum imminente nobis classe Romana. . . . raptores orbis [Romani], postquam cuncta vastantibus defuere terrae, iam et mare scrutantur,

but Tacitus elsewhere more correctly expresses the official position: we have essayed the Ocean itself, let that be sufficient.¹⁰⁰

Despite the concentration of the fleet's matériel on the Gallic coast, the praefect of the *classis Britannica* was under the legate of Britain. The praefecture itself, in keeping with the importance of the British military establishment, carried the rank of *centenarius* and the title of *procurator Augusti*; one occupant of the post later became praefect of the Ravennate fleet and then praefect of Egypt,¹⁰¹ while another, Carausius, ventured to claim the purple as admiral of the British fleet. Of the subordinate officers an *archigubernes*, a few trierarchs, and a *beneficiarius* are known.¹⁰² The sailors themselves were in part Pannonian, African, Thracian; Carausius was of the Menapii, and the Gallic coast dwellers probably furnished many recruits.¹⁰³

According to Tacitus, the governor Agricola first utilized the squadron as a military agent.¹⁰⁴ Its losses at the hands of the Caninefates in 70 had presumably been repaired, and Agricola may have increased its strength in the reorganization of 78 which preceded his steady advance northward during the following years. In this advance he employed the fleet on both sides of the island for transport and scouting. It had no hand in his surprise attack on Mona in 77 but was apparently in the neighborhood, and service on the west coast is mentioned in 81.¹⁰⁵ It scouted ahead of his column moving north along the east coast in 83, as it had done in 82; Tacitus portrays the stupefaction of the British at the sight of a fleet, "tamquam aperto maris sui secreto ultimum victis per-fugium clauderetur."¹⁰⁶ After his decisive victory at Mons Graupius, Agricola placed a detachment of soldiers on the fleet and sent it north with orders to "circumnavigate" Britain. The actual course of the cruise indicates that the squadron was ordered only to sail around far enough to establish officially the insularity of Britain, for after receiving the submission of the Orkneys, and perhaps viewing one of the Shetlands, the fleet returned to the port Trucculum, probably on the Firth of Forth or the Firth of

Tay, whence it had started.¹⁰⁷ Tacitus' notorious vagueness in geography leaves one in doubt as to the precise limit of the voyage, which enjoyed remarkably good weather, but it seems incontestable that Roman warships reached the northern end of Britain for the first and only time.

Modern archaeological investigation has shown that Domitian continued to occupy the conquered area for some years after Agricola's recall during the winter of 83.¹⁰⁸ The British fleet may have held a station on the northeast coast during this period; the complete lack of evidence prevents more than the bare guess, and an almost unrelieved blackness hides any naval action north of the English Channel for the next two centuries. Britain was the most consistently unruly province of the Empire throughout all this period, but its history is the least known. Two inscriptions of the *pedatura classis Britannicae* have been found in the vicinity of Hadrian's Wall, on which the sailors probably labored in conjunction with the British army, but any ships maintained to protect the ends of the walls were probably local flotillas under independent commanders.¹⁰⁹ The squadron possibly transported the legion VI Victrix from Lower Germany to the mouth of the Tyne in 122;¹¹⁰ likewise vessels of the fleet may have carried troops to the north in the later revolts under Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Commodus. Septimius Severus employed the squadron in his Scotch expeditions of 208-211; then, except for an inscription of a member of the *classis Britannica Philippiana*, darkness drops again until the end of the third century.¹¹¹

By 285 the Franks and Saxons had begun the raids along the Belgic coasts which continued until they became settlers and rulers in the fifth century. That, however, was not yet to be, for Diocletian quickly took steps to check this and other unrest in the West. Maximian, the subordinate Caesar whom Diocletian sent to the western provinces in 285, selected a Menapian, Carausius by name, who had done good service in the army, to pacify the sea and gave him command over the fleet at Gesoriacum. The operations of Carausius in 285 were presumably the basis for Diocletian's assumption of the title *Britannicus Maximus*, but in 286 the admiral revolted, sailed to Britain, and received the allegiance

of its population. While Maximian was busy on the Rhine, Carausius built more ships and enlisted barbarians; in 289 he defeated the fleet which Maximian had constructed in Gaul during the previous winter, and the two Emperors—Maximian by now being Augustus—made a temporary peace until more important perils could be met. Carausius received some part of Belgica, issued coins as Augustus, some of which bear galleys and other symbols of naval power, and successfully guarded his realm against sea raiders.¹¹²

In 293 the Augusti chose two Caesars and assigned to one, Constantius Chlorus, the task of guarding Gaul and of reconquering Britain. After the capture of Gesoriacum in 293, Constantius spent three years in building a fleet, which sailed from the Seine in 296 in two divisions. One passed Allectus, who had slain Carausius and succeeded to his power, in a fog off the Isle of Wight; its commander Asclepiodotus defeated and killed Allectus in Hampshire, and the detachment of Constantius' fleet which had made London annihilated the Frankish mercenaries of Allectus fleeing there to seek shipping.¹¹³ With this the war ended—the only occasion in the history of the Roman Empire when an usurper based his rule on sea power.

The reunion of Britain with the empire did not end the threat of piracy; rather it made new measures necessary, and the British fleet acquired greater importance than ever before. Constantius probably is the person responsible for the construction of some twelve forts along the southeastern shore of England, the Saxon Shore, which guarded harbors from which fleet detachments apparently operated.¹¹⁴ Evidence of Roman naval activity occurs sporadically down through Julian's operations in Gaul. Vegetius notes the light, camouflaged craft used by the British fleet against the pirates, and the *Notitia Dignitatum* records a separate *classis Sambrica*, bricks of which have been discovered at one of its ports, Étapes on the Canche.¹¹⁵

NOTES

1 Victor Chapot, *La Frontière de l'Euphrate* (Paris, 1907), pp. 145-149, is the only scholar to my knowledge who has expressed this point clearly. As an

example of its use in invasion, the campaign of Trajan may be cited; cf. Suidas s.v. *Nauß*; XII 1357; Anton von Premierstein, "Die Offizierslaufbahn eines kleinasiatischen Ritters," *Jahreshefte* 13 (1910), pp. 200-209.

2 *IGR* 4. 219; see also *ibid.* 146, and M. P. Charlesworth, *CAH* 10, pp. 645-646. 3 Asander's victory: *IGR* 1. 874, set up by a navarch for the king *φιλορωμαίος* (cf. *Jahreshefte* 18 [1915], Beibl. cols. 315-321). Self-interest encouraged this guard, for the Bosphorus had an extensive commerce with Asia Minor; see J. G. C. Anderson, *CAH* 10, pp. 265-270. According to Dio 54. 24. 6, Agrippa sailed to Sinope, prepared to install Polemo by force. Part of the Italian fleets may have accompanied Agrippa.

4 Strabo 11. 2. 12; Ovid, *Ex Pont.* 4. 10. 25-30; Tac., *Hist.* 3. 47; Pliny, *H. N.* 6. 16.

5 *IGR* 1. 781 (Heraclea); Arthur Stein, *Die römischen Reichsbeamten der Provinz Thracia* (Sarajevo, 1920), pp. 114-115; A. B. Cook, *Zeus* 2 (Cambridge, 1925), pp. 817-824.

6 See below, p. 189.

7 Tac., *Hist.* 1. 6; Suet., *Nero* 18; Franz Cumont in *Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir William Ramsay* (Manchester, 1923), pp. 109-119; J. G. C. Anderson, *CAH* 10, pp. 774-778. The value of Trapezus: Franz and Eugène Cumont, *Studia Pontica II: Voyage d'exploration archéologique dans le Pont et la Petite Arménie* (Brussels, 1906), pp. 363-372; Tac., *Ann.* 13. 39. The argument of Werner Schur is noted below, p. 174.

8 Jos., *B. I.* 2. 366-367, an account as of A. D. 66 but chiefly Vespasianic in date (Ritterling s.v. "legio" [PW], cols. 1261-1263, 1272); but see Domaszewski, "Die Dislocation des römischen Heeres im Jahre 66 n. Chr.," *Rheinisches Museum* 47 (1892), pp. 207-218. Liburnians, Tac., *Hist.* 3. 47; trireme, Arrian, *Periplus* 4. 4. At present we have only two inscriptions of the Pontic fleet, both of praefects (*IGR* 4. 150, VI 31856); the navarch C. Numisius Primus of Sinope is Augustan (see above, p. 40).

9 Tac., *Hist.* 2. 83, 3. 47-48.

10 VI 31856; Premierstein, *Klio* 12 (1912), pp. 148-164. The story of P. Valerius Comazon, who was degraded from the legions to the fleet (Dio 79. 3. 5), suggests that the Pontic fleet obeyed the governor of Thrace.

11 Siege of Byzantium: below, p. 190. Attempted revolt: Dio 79. 7. 3; F. W. Hasluck, *Cyzicus* (Cambridge, 1910), p. 189 n. 11. A great part of the Italian fleets was also at Cyzicus at this time; see below, p. 192. Crispinus: *IGR* 4. 150.

12 A king of the Getae furnished the necessary naval assistance (Dio 51. 24. 6, 51. 26. 5). In the following discussion down through the wars of Trajan, I am particularly indebted to the careful and comprehensive monographs of Carl Patsch, *Beiträge zur Völkerkunde von Südosteuropa V. Aus 500 Jahren vorrömischer und römischer Geschichte Südosteuropas*, 1. Teil. *Bis zur Festsetzung der Römer in Transdanuvien* (SB Wien 214 [1933], 1. Abh.); 2. Teil. *Der Kampf um den Donaauraum unter Domitian und Trajan* (*ibid.* 217 [1937], 1. Abh.).

13 Caecina, Dio 55. 29. 3. Ronald Syme presents a temperate reconstruction of Balkan history of the period in *CAH* 10, pp. 351-358, 366-368, and gives a full bibliography, *ibid.* pp. 939-940. To this may now be added Premierstein, "Der Daker- und Germanensieger M. Vinicius und sein Enkel," *Jahreshefte* 29 (1935), pp. 60-81; Franz Miltner, "Augustus' Kampf um die Donaugrenze," *Klio* 30 (1937), pp. 200-226.

14 Strabo 7. 3. 13. Neither the post nor the date of Lentulus (Florus 2. 28) is certain; modern estimates of the date range from 14 B. C. to A. D. 11. Cf. *Prosop.* 2, pp. 330-333; Syme, *CAH* 10, p. 367; Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 91-94.

The article by Premerstein, "Die Anfänge der Provinz Moesien," *Jahreshefte* 1 (1898), Beibl. cols. 145-196, remains one of the most judicious on the organization of early Moesia.

15 Ovid, *Ex Pont.* 1. 8. 5-19, 4. 7. 13-54, 4. 9. 75-80. As Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 117-120, notes, Ovid painted the situation in the Dobrudja with purposely dark colors. Ratiaria has been suggested as a base of the flotilla; cf. Premerstein, *Jahreshefte* 1 (1898), Beibl. col. 169; Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 121-122. The province of Moesia was possibly formed a few years before 15: Tac., *Ann.* 1. 80; S. E. Stout, *The Governors of Moesia* (Princeton, 1911), pp. ix, 2.

16 Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 149-150; Syme, *CAH* 10, pp. 805-806, who suggests that the two legions in Moesia before this date had lain inland. Bogdan Filow, *Die Legionen der Provinz Moesia* (Leipzig, 1906; *Klio*, Beih. 6), is sounder than H. van de Weerd, *Trois légions romaines du Bas-Danube* (Louvain, 1907), but the latter has useful information.

17 A *beneficiarius navarchi* served as witness in Dip. 3 of A.D. 54, found in Moesia but not necessarily issued to a Moesian veteran. This diploma disappeared shortly after its discovery but has been accepted as authentic by most scholars on the basis of photographs taken before its disappearance. It is, however, peculiar; the existence of a *navarch's officium* is not attested anywhere else, the witnesses are not listed according to rank, and the *beneficiarius* would not have been a citizen if he were still in service, and so could not have acted as witness. The *praefectus orae maritimae* on the Euxine (Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, p. 153) and the *praefectus orae Ponticae* (Pliny, *Epp.* 10. 21, 86a) do not seem to have had any naval forces.

18 The war: Tac., *Ann.* 12. 15-21; J. G. C. Anderson, *CAH* 10, pp. 751-753. The "recentia merita" of Byzantium which secured it a remission of taxes in A.D. 53 (Tac., *Ann.* 12. 62) probably relate to the action of Gallus. Although Rostovtzeff has made out a good case in "Pontus, Bithynia, and the Bosphorus," *Annual of the British School at Athens* 22 (1917-1918), pp. 1-22, for his argument that the Bosphorus was politically dependent on Bithynia, its military history is connected directly with that of Moesia.

19 XIV 3608 (Tibur); Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 162-167; J. G. C. Anderson, *CAH* 10, pp. 775-776. The dates of Aelianus cannot be precisely set; Léon Halkin, "Tiberius Plautius Aelianus," *L'Antiquité classique* 3 (1934), pp. 121-161, accepts Dessau's dates of 58-68, but is surely wrong in dating the Chersonesus expedition to 67/68. The Bosphoran coins suggest 63; cf. Domaszewski, *Rheinisches Museum* 47 (1892), pp. 208-209. Dip. 37 (92) was issued to a sailor enlisting in or before the year 66.

20 Tac., *Hist.* 1. 79, 3. 46; Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 170-182.

21 The first dated notice of the term is in Dip. 37 (92), but the title seems to be Vespasianic. Domitian usually gave *Domitiana*; also, this *Flavia* escaped his *damnatio memoriae*.

22 Ritterling *s.v.* "legio" (PW), cols. 1619-1620, 1575-1576, 1410. The legion V Alauda was perhaps in the east until its destruction in 86 (Ritterling, cols. 1569-1570) or 87 (Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 3, 12-13).

23 Dips. 37, 45, 50, 83 of 92-138. Domitian's Dacian war: Syme, *CAH* 11, pp. 168-172 (with bibliography, p. 885); and especially Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 5-32.

24 Discharge: Dip. 45; Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 60-61. The road: III 1699; E. T. Salmon in *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 67 (1936), pp. 86-87.

25 The plates of Conrad Cichorius, *Die Reliefs der Traianssäule* (Berlin,

1896-1900), are excellent, but his interpretation of the war relies too heavily on fancied geographical clues. In an able criticism Ernst Petersen, *Trajan's Dakische Kriege* (Leipzig, 1899-1903), points out *inter alia* that, since all ships in the reliefs lie with their prows to the right, the direction of movement on the Column, one cannot tell whether they came up or down stream. Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 54-128, presents a notable essay in reconstruction; see also R. P. Longden, *CAH* 11, pp. 223-236 (bibliography, pp. 889-890).

26 Cichorius, plates 5-6; see also plates 25-26 and 35.

27 E. g., Cichorius, plate 26.

28 The Neumagen relief, a Rhenish transport vessel with the prow and eye of a warship, has been considered a vessel of the *classis Germanica* by Louis Bonnard, *La Navigation intérieure de la Gaule à l'époque gallo-romaine* (Paris, 1913), pp. 226-227; and the German fleet did have ships to carry quarried stone (see above, p. 149). Legionary vessels: see below, pp. 137, 148.

29 Cichorius, plate 22.

30 Cichorius, plates 23-35; Trajan holds the steering gear on his pennant-marked flagship (cf. Pliny, *Pan.* 81-82). I cannot agree with Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 66-67, who argues against the conventional view (e.g. Petersen, *Dakische Kriege* 1, pp. 36-43) by dating this sortie in the summer of 101. Trajan would scarcely have left his army at that time to counter a raid, which in any case seems more a gesture of defiance at the opening of a new campaigning season than an attempted diversion while Roman armies were in Dacia itself. Patsch, *ibid.* pp. 17-18, 68, is no more convincing in thinking that Nicopolis ad Haemum marks the site of Oppius Sabinus' defeat in 85 rather than the location of Trajan's victory over this incursion.

31 The road-builders in Cichorius, plate 67, clad in a sleeveless tunic which the sailors customarily wore, are generally considered *classarii* (Petersen, *Dakische Kriege* 2, p. 46; Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 89, 98, 102); but the point is scarcely proven.

32 Ritterling s.v. "legio" (PW), cols. 1410-1411, 1697-1698, 1576-1577; Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 137-152, 168-174; Radu Vulpe, "Piriboridava," *Revue archéologique* 5. ser. 34 (1931), pp. 237-276. See also the *pridanium* of the cohort I Hispanorum veteranorum equitata of about 110/115, in the article by Georges Cantacuzène, "Un Papyrus latin relatif à la défense du Bas-Danube," *Aegyptus* 9 (1928), pp. 63-96, which shows that soldiers were detailed to Piriboridava.

33 Vasile Pârvan, "Castrul dela Poiana," *Analele Academiei Române* 2. ser. 36 (1913-1914), pp. 99-130; and especially pp. 106-119 for the station at Ghergina, which was already occupied by military forces in 112/113 (III 777, 785 = 7620). *Naues frumentariae*: the *pridanium* published by Cantacuzène, l. 69.

34 At Noviodunum bricks stamped "CL F M" and used in the *castellum* have been found; see Pârvan in "Descoperiri novae in Scythia Minor," *Analele Academiei Române* 2. ser. 35 (1912-1913), pp. 502-509. Istrus: *idem*, "Histria IV," *Analele Academiei Române* 2. ser. 38 (1915-1916), pp. 633-637; inscriptions from Istrus, *AE* 1919. 14 and *AE* 1927. 60. Tomis: *IGR* 1. 623; III 7552. III 12472 (near Adamklissi) is probably not naval.

35 III 7552. Cichorius found among the sailors on the Column "interessante, deutlich barbarische Gesichtstypen" (plates 25-26; text volume 2, pp. 164, 172), but he states the matter a little too strongly.

36 See the various articles by Pârvan cited above, especially his acute remarks on the boundary stones set up by the naval praefect (*AE* 1919. 14, III 14447) in *Analele* 2. ser. 38 (1915-1916), pp. 636-637; also *idem*, *Inceputurile vietii Romane la gurile Dunării* (Bucharest, 1923), pp. 92-93.

37 Although the three thousand Moesian legionaries which Josephus (*B. J.* 2. 366-367) lists for the Euxine had been withdrawn after 86, and coins of the Bosporan kingdom no longer mentioned the imperial peace, the area was peaceful; see Rostovtzeff, "Römische Besatzungen in der Krim und das Kastell Charax," *Klio* 2 (1902), pp. 80-95; Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 50-51.

38 Road to Tyras: *Geogr. Rav.* 4. 5; the cohort I Hispanorum sent a detachment to Tyras "in praesidio" (the *pridianum*, l. 57). Another wall from the Pyretus to Tyras is mentioned by Mommsen, *Die Provinzen*, p. 206, and both are shown in *Stielers Handatlas* (10th ed.; Gotha, 1925), map 57. Olbia: *SHA vita Pii* 9. 9. Tribune: III 14214³⁴; VIII 619; Van de Weerd, *Trois légions*, pp. 262-263, 375-376.

39 III 14214³⁴, III 14215⁵ has no relation to any fleet.

40 Franz Cumont, "Fragment du bouclier portant une liste d'étapes," *Syria* 6 (1925), pp. 1-15; *idem*, *Fouilles de Doura-Europos* (Paris, 1926), pp. 323-337. The breakup of the peace: Andreas Alföldi, *CAH* 12, pp. 140-142.

41 Ovid, *Ex Pont.* 4. 10. 32-34:

Hic freta vel pediti pervia reddit hiems,
ut, qua remus iter pulsus modo fecerat undis,
siccus contempta nave viator eat.

See also Florus 2. 28; Ammian. 19. 11. 4; Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, p. 119 n. 1. The evidence collected by Cantacuzène, *Aegyptus* 9 (1928), p. 69 n. 3, shows that internal brigandage was not completely eradicated.

42 Domaszewski, "Die Grenzen von Moesia Superior und der illyrische Grenz-zoll," *Arch.-ep. Mitt.* 13 (1890), pp. 129-154; criticized by Patsch, "Der illyrische Zoll und die Provinzialgrenzen," *Mitt. des kais. deut. arch. Inst. RA* 20 (1905), pp. 223-229. The important stations thus far known are Tomis, Tyras, Durostorum, Oescus, Ratiaria, Tsierna, Margum, Viminacium. See also Vasile Christescu, *Viața Economică a Daciei Romane* (Pitești, 1929), pp. 96-130. Apollodorus' bridge was destroyed by Hadrian in 117 (Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 159-160); thereafter the Danube was not permanently bridged.

43 Tertullus: *AE* 1919. 14; III 14447. *Gordiana*: *IGR* 1. 623. Fourth-century posts: Appiaria, Transmarisca (?), Altinum, Viminacium, Margum, Aegeta, Ratiaria, Plateypegiae (apparently toward the mouth of the Danube), Flaviana (unknown); see *Not. Dig. Or.* 39-42. *C. Tb.* 7. 17 of A.D. 412 provides for the maintenance of a fleet of *lusoriae*.

44 Dio 49. 37; Appian, *Ill.* 22; Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 58-61. These campaigns have a large bibliography; cf. M. P. Charlesworth, *CAH* 10, pp. 84-88, 903-904.

45 Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 96-100; Syme, *CAH* 10, pp. 351-358.

46 Cn. Cornelius Lentulus and a general who was possibly M. Vinicius crossed the Danube; see Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 82-86, 91-93, 101-107; Syme, *CAH* 10, pp. 366-367, who seems to misinterpret Strabo 7. 3. 13. Note also the boast of Augustus in *Res Gestae* 30. In two passages (7. 5. 2, 4. 6. 10) Strabo emphasizes the importance of Siscia as a port and as a base for war against the Dacians.

47 Tac., *Ann.* 2. 63, 12. 29-30; Johannes Klose, *Roms Klientel-Randstaaten an Rhein und an der Donau* (Breslau, 1934), pp. 95-99. The general scheme of defense: Ritterling s.v. "legio" (PW), cols. 1645-1646, 1665-1666, 1749; Syme, *CAH* 10, pp. 369-373.

48 Tac., *Germ.* 41. Beyond the work of Klose, see also the brief topographical sketch by Anton Gnirs, *Die römischen Schutzbezirke an der oberen Donau* (Augsburg-Vienna, 1929).

49 *Not. Dig. Occ.* 35, a *numerus barcariorum* at Confluentes (Constance) or

Brecantia (Bregenz) on Lake Constance; *ibid.* 42, another at Ebrudunum, possibly Yverdon on the Lake of Neuchâtel. So Denis van Berchem, "Ebrudunum-Yverdon," *Zeitschrift für schweizerische Geschichte* 17 (1937), pp. 83-95. Felix Stahelin, *Die Schweiz in römischer Zeit* (2nd ed.; Basel, 1931), p. 301, and Waldemar Deonna, "Les Nautae du Lac Leman," *Anzeiger für schweizerische Altertumskunde* 27 (1925), pp. 136-153, argue for Lake Geneva. During the conquest of the region in 15 B.C., Tiberius won a naval victory on Lake Constance against the Vindelici (Strabo 7. 1. 5; Dio 54. 22. 4).

50 See below, p. 185. He took with him hostages of the Iazyges and Quadi; see Tac., *Hist.* 3. 5; Patsch, *SB Wien* 214, pp. 174-176.

51 Syme, *CAH* 11, p. 187; Ritterling *s.v.* "legio" (PW), cols. 1387-1389, 1714-1716, 1736-1737, 1752-1754, differs to a certain extent. In 92 the Iazyges had crossed the river and destroyed the legion XXI Rapax; see Syme, *CAH* 11, pp. 175-178; Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 39-44.

52 Dip. 91 (139/145). Action in both provinces, attested by the evidence cited in the following notes, is also suggested by VIII 7977, which a naval praefect set up to the wife of Ti. Claudius Claudianus, then governor of Pannonia Superior and erstwhile governor of Pannonia Inferior.

53 Emona: III 14354^a, completed by Premerestein, *Jahreshefte* 5 (1902), Beibl. col. 31. Sirmium: III 3223 (with *CIL* III, p. 2277); Patsch, "Die Sava-Schiffahrt in der Kaiserzeit," *Jahreshefte* 8 (1905), pp. 139-141; *Antike Inschriften aus Jugoslawien* 1, ed. Viktor Hoffiller and Balduin Saria (Zagreb, 1938), pp. 11, 67-68. Poetovio: III 4025 (Wilhelm Gurlitt in *Arch.-ep. Mitt.* 19 [1896], p. 22); Michael Abramic, *Poetovio* (Vienna, 1925). Brigetio: III 4319, a trierarch who was a Roman citizen. Aquincum: III 10343 (at Parka near Aquincum). A patrol of the Theiss is conjectured by Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 137-139.

54 III 10675, bricks stamped "CL F P"; *Itineraria Antonini* 131. 6, "tauruno classis IIII singiduno castra." Cf. Konrad Miller, *Itineraria Romana* (Stuttgart, 1916), col. 436; Otto Cunz, *Jahreshefte* 2 (1899), p. 82. Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, p. 278, seems to overlook this evidence in making Mursa, a station only in the Later Empire, the chief base.

55 C. Manlius Felix, *praefectus fabrorum* during one or more of the Dacian campaigns (III 726), was praefect of the Pannonian fleet in this period and may have directed it in some military operations.

56 *Die Marcus-Säule*, ed. Ernst Petersen and others (Munich, 1896), plates 8, 35, 41, 68, 92-93; Domaszewski, *ibid.*, text volume, pp. 105-125; Wilhelm Weber, *CAH* 11, pp. 349-364.

57 III 3330, 3332, 3385, 10312, 10313; Dess. 8913. The peace of Marcus Aurelius: Dio 71. 19. 2; cf. Tac., *Germ.* 41.

58 Restitutus, VIII 7977. In VI 1643 the various fleet praefectures were presumably held consecutively. In the fourth century fleets on the Save lay at Sirmium, Graium, Servitium, Siscia; on the Drave at Mursa; on the Danube at Florentia, Arlapa and Comagenae, Lauriacum, Vindobona. *Milites* occur at Ioviacum, Iuvenensis (unknown), Fafiana (near Kahlenberg; Joseph Aschbach, *SB Wien* 35 [1860], pp. 3-32), Carnuntum, Arrabona. See *Not. Dig. Occ.* 32-34. Naval activity in the fourth century: Ammian. 19. 11. 8; Zos. 3. 10, 4. 35; Veg. 4. 46. As late as 580 Menander Protector notes Roman ships at Singidunum (Müller, *Frag. Hist. Graec.* 4, p. 264).

59 Florus 2. 30. 26. It is not likely that Drusus constructed the highroad later used between the Rhine and the English Channel; it was of no particular use when Britain did not have a Roman army, and Bonn was never its Rhenish terminus (Franz Cumont, *Comment la Belgique fut romanisée* [Brussels, 1919], pp. 16-17, 32, 106-107). Donald Atkinson in *Historical Essays in Honour of*

James Tait (Manchester, 1933), p. 2, accepts a fleet at Bonn but makes Caesoriacum the fortified bridgehead opposite Bonn; Emil Sadée, *Das römische Bonn* (Bonn, 1925), p. 10, thinks Drusus would have stationed a Rhenish fleet in modern Holland and refers the passage to Gesoriacum alone. The only modern account of the *classis Germanica* at any length is that of Ernst Stein in *Die kaiserlichen Beamten und Truppenkörper im römischen Deutschland* (Vienna, 1932), pp. 273-278.

60 Dio 54. 32. 2-3; Strabo 7. 1. 3; Syme, *CAH* 10, p. 362; Mommsen, *Die Provinzen*, pp. 23-26. *Fossae*: Suet., *Claud.* 1. 2; Tac., *Germ.* 34.

61 *Res Gestae* 26; Pliny, *H. N.* 2. 167, 4. 97. Camille Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule* 4 (Paris, 1913), pp. 114-115, assumes that it also carried a part of the army. Vell. Pater. 2. 106. 3 attests its use in supply; Drusus apparently had not used the fleet for this purpose, for he was short of provisions on the Weser in 11 B.C. (Dio 54. 33. 2).

62 Tac., *Ann.* 1. 60, 63, 70. The study of Friedrich Knoke, *Die Kriegszüge des Germanicus in Deutschland* (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1922), is full but hypercritical.

63 Tac., *Ann.* 2. 6-8, 23-24.

64 Tac., *Ann.* 1. 45. The only bridge in Lower Germany crossed the Rhine here (*ibid.* 1. 69); see also above, p. 147. The legions: Syme, *CAH* 10, pp. 786-787; before they moved forward to the river ca. 13 B.C., native *auxilia* had held the Rhenish frontier (*ibid.* p. 359).

65 Dio 60. 8. 7; Tac., *Ann.* 11. 18-20; Mommsen, *Die Provinzen*, pp. 110-116. Revolt in 28: Tac., *Ann.* 4. 72-74.

66 Tac., *Hist.* 4. 15-16. These forts were probably Katwijk and Voorburg, with perhaps Fectio; see above, p. 148. G. H. Stevenson, *CAH* 10, pp. 840-849 (bibliography, p. 991), gives a convenient summary of the revolt.

67 Tac., *Hist.* 4. 27, 35.

68 British fleet: *ibid.* 4. 79. Cerialis: *ibid.* 5. 21-22.

69 *Ibid.* 5. 18, 21.

70 *Ibid.* 5. 23.

71 XIII 12562, "C A G." It occurs in the reign of Domitian (XIII 7723, "classis Aug Ger p f D") and is found once even after 96 in XIII 7716, "cl A G p f"; these may indicate that the term remained a part of official nomenclature, although it was generally omitted.

72 *AE* 1928. 183; XIII 7681, 7723. "p f D" was erased in the first two before Nerva (or Trajan) confirmed the *pia fidelis*. The revolt: Ritterling, "Zur römischen Legionsgeschichte am Rhein II. Der Aufstand des Antoninus Saturninus," *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kunst* 12 (1893), pp. 203-242; Syme, *CAH* 11, pp. 172-175.

73 XII 2412, XIII 7719 (probably also XIII 8322, 8323, 8843) are inscriptions of the early first century. In VIII 9327 "p f" is omitted.

74 A brief account of the excavations in 1927 was published by Fritz Fremersdorf in *Germania* 11 (1927), pp. 83, 160; *ibid.* 12 (1928), pp. 112-116; *ibid.* 13 (1929), pp. 134-137. See also Carl Blümlein, *Bursians Jahresberichte* 248 (1935), pp. 152-153; Albert Grenier, *Quatre villes romaines de Rhénanie* (Paris, 1925), pp. 154-155. Stamped bricks: XIII 12562. Inscriptions: XIII 8166, 8168, 8198 (praelect), 8322, 8323; Alexander Riese, *Das rheinische Germanien in den antiken Inschriften* (Leipzig, 1914), no. 1816 add.

75 The most interesting remains of this period are two burned and bent iron lance points found in 1927, which bear a triton dotted on the blade and the name of a centurion; see Fremersdorf, *Germania* 13 (1929), pp. 113-116.

76 Fremersdorf, *ibid.* 12 (1928), pp. 113-116, describes two graves.

77 Trierarchs: XIII 7719, 8036. Centurions commanded the work detach-

ments in the Brohl Valley. E. g., *AE* 1923. 32, "4 class Ger p f pro se et suis commilitonibus qui sub eo sunt"; also XIII 7710, 7728.

78 XIII 8036; also XIII 10027²²⁸, "Strato tr" on a bronze plate.

79 XIII 6712 (A. D. 198), 6714 (185); Dess. 9226.

80 Novaesium: XIII 12563; Syme, *CAH* 11, p. 180 n. 3. Heinrich Nissen, "Geschichte von Novaesium," *Bonner Jahrbücher* 111/112 (1904), pp. 1-96, does not notice the fleet but appreciates the strategic position of the camp. *Vetera*: XIII 12564; Hans Lehner, *Das Römerlager Vetera bei Xanten* (Bonn, 1926), likewise fails to mention the fleet. J. H. Holwerda, "Die Römer in Holland," *Bericht der römisch-germanische Kommission* 15 (1926), pp. 1-10, summarizes his excavations at the Dutch sites; see also Carl Blümlein, *Bursians Jahresberichte* 201 (1924), p. 23. Fectio (Vechten) was perhaps a station of the fleet in the first century; it was an important transshipping center in commerce (Cumont, *La Belgique*, p. 30). XIII 12086a, set up by a trierarch, was found here.

81 Katwijk: XIII 12566, after 98 but with "frühen Buchstaben" according to Holwerda, *Bericht der RG Komm.* 15 (1926), p. 6. Arentsburg: XIII 12565; Tac., *Ann.* 11. 20. 2; J. H. Holwerda, *Arentsburg, een Romeinsch Militair Vlootstation bij Voorburg* (Leyden, 1923).

82 XIII 12567; Cumont, *La Belgique*, p. 9 n. 2, p. 101 n. 2.

83 The only emperor who ever commanded any Roman squadron, i. e. Pertinax, served as praefect of the German fleet (*SHA vita Pert.* 2. 2). The restoration "classicus" in Dip. 59 (107/114) is doubtful.

84 Navarch, XII 2412; trierarchs, XIII 7719, 7941, 8036, 8168, 10027²²⁶, 12086a, XII 681. All have Latin names. *Gubernator*, XIII 8323; *proreta*, XIII 8322; *velarii*, Riese 1816 add., XIII 8160; *scriba*, XIII 8323; centurions, *AE* 1923. 32, XIII 7710; *optio*, XIII 8166; *immunis*, XIII 7719; *dolabrarii*, XIII 7728; gladiators, XIII 8831; *pleroma*, XIII 7681 (Andernach). Note the "ordo corporatorum lenunculariorum pleromariorum auxiliorum Ostiensium" of XIV 252, with Waltzing's remarks in *Lés Corporations professionnelles* 2, pp. 74-75. The Neumagen ship was noted above, p. 159 n. 28.

85 XIII 8843, Heliades Adrasti f.; 8322, Horus Pabeci f.; 8323, Dionysius Plestarchi f. This fact partly explains such mishaps as that of Drusus in 12 B. C., for these sailors would not have known the ways of the ocean.

86 Dedications: XIII 7681, 7697, 7710, 7715, 7716, 7719, 7723, 8166, 8168, 8831; *AE* 1923. 32. *Cervesaris*: *AE* 1928. 183, an ex-voto in the great temple area at Trier. Rostovtzeff, *Comptes-rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions* 1930, pp. 253-256, comments on the difficulties of this inscription. That Germans were admitted follows if the barbarian grave at Alteburg, described by Fremersdorf, *Germania* 13 (1929), p. 116, is naval. *AE* 1899. 97, "Bubentis Tharsae mil clas Germ pie fid," is said to be in "caractères de mauvaise époque."

87 Louis Bonnard, *La Navigation intérieure de la Gaule*, pp. 217-229, discusses the various fourth-century squadrons and points out that here also the flotillas were primarily agencies of defense; cf. Camille Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule* 5 (Paris, 1920), pp. 129-132, 161-166; *ibid.* 8 (1926), pp. 110-111.

88 For transfers of troops, see above, p. 155. In the fourth century grain was frequently sent to the Rhine by this route; see Zos. 3. 5; Ammian. 18. 2. 3; Julian, *Epist. SPQ Ath.* 279D.

89 *B. I.* 2. 9 (CSEL 66, p. 151), expanding Jos., *B. I.* 2. 377; see also Tac., *Hist.* 4. 64.

90 Hermann Aubin, "Der Rheinhandel in römischer Zeit," *Bonner Jahrbücher* 130 (1925), pp. 1-37; Olwen Brogan, "Trade between the Roman Empire and the Free Germans," *JRS* 26 (1936), pp. 195-222; Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, p. 110 n. 18a, p. 177 n. 17; Cumont, *La Belgique*, pp. 25-30.

91 Ritterling *s.v.* "legio" (PW), cols. 1803-1804, dates XIII 7697 to 101, XIII 7716 to 101/102, XIII 7715 to 102 or 103. Independent work is shown in XIII 7719 (before 89); XIII 7710, 7728, and *AE* 1923. 32 (after 96), along with which one may probably place the fragment XIII 8325. Detail at Andernach: XIII 7681, 7723. Cf. *Der grosse Brockhaus s.v.* "Tönnisstein," "Brohl." Civil employment of the sailors may explain the presence of bricks (XIII 12561) stamped "C G P F EX GER INF" at Weissweiler, some miles inland from Köln.

92 Victorinus: *SHA vita Marci* 8. 8. Iulianus: *SHA vita Iul.* 1. 7; Domaszewski, "Inschrift eines Germanenkrieges," *Mitt. des kais. deut. arch. Inst. RA* 20 (1905), pp. 156-163.

93 *SHA vita Bonosi* 15. 1. Gallienus had partly rebuilt the Rhine defenses; see Léon Homo in "L'Empereur Gallien et la crise de l'Empire romain au III^e siècle," *Revue historique* 113 (1913), pp. 12-14.

94 *Pan. Lat.* 7. 13. 1, 9. 3. 2, 9. 22. 6; Ammian. 17. 1. 4, 17. 2. 3, 18. 2. 12; station at Speyer, Symmachus, *Laud. in Valent.* 2. 28. On the later fleets generally, see Robert Grosse, *Römische Militärgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der byzantinischen Themenverfassung* (Berlin, 1920), pp. 70-80.

95 Lighthouse, Suet., *Calig.* 46; ships, *ibid.* 47 and Dio 59. 25. 2. The facts garbled by Suetonius have been placed in their proper setting by J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius* (Oxford, 1934), pp. 58-95, especially pp. 88-95. He fails, however, to note the significance of Suet., *Calig.* 47, for the naval preparations.

96 XIII 3542, the trierarch Ti. Claudius Aug. l. Seleucus. Florus 2. 30. 26 was noted above, p. 141. Donald Atkinson, "Classis Britannica," *Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait* (Manchester, 1933), pp. 1-11, discusses chiefly the archaeological evidence and the life of Carausius.

97 Dio 69. 19; R. G. Collingwood (with J. N. L. Myres), *Roman Britain and the English Settlements* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 75-80. Collingwood's argument against a triple landing is vitiated by the fact that the Romans often did divide their forces.

98 Bricks: XIII 12559; *AE* 1889. 44. Note the numerous variations in the style and lettering of the stamps; cf. V.-J. Vaillant, "L'Estampille ronde de la flotte de Bretagne trouvée à Boulogne-sur-Mer," *Revue archéologique* 3. ser. 12 (1888), pp. 367-371 (also his *Classis Britannica, classis Sambrica, et cohors I Morinorum* [Boulogne, 1888]; E. T. Hamy, *Les Sigles figulées de la flotte de Bretagne* [Boulogne, 1907]. These I have not been able to consult.) Inscriptions: XIII 3540-3547; Ferrero 1878. 512. A thorough description of the site is given by Ernest Desjardins, *Géographie historique et administrative de la Gaule romaine* 1, pp. 348-376, with plan xv. The town later, perhaps after its capture by Constantius Chlorus, was moved north and called Bononia.

99 Richborough: Atkinson, *Historical Essays*, pp. 3-5; Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, p. 80; cf. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule* 5, p. 167. Praefect at Lymne: VII 18 with *Eph. ep.* 9, p. 314 (after 133; cf. Dip. 76). Bricks: VII 1226. Some of these may be assigned to the elaborate scheme of fortification in the early fourth century, but the presence of different types at Lymne suggests its use over a long period.

100 Pliny, *H. N.* 2. 167; Tac., *Agr.* 30, *Germ.* 34 (cf. *Agr.* 38).

101 VI 1643, XI 5632, XIV 5341.

102 *Archigubernes*: Dig. 36. 1. 48 (46), about A.D. 83. Trierarchs: XII 686; XIII 3540, 3542, 3545, 3546; Dig. 31. 1. 48 (46). *Gubernator*: Tac., *Agr.* 28. *Beneficiarius*: XIII 3547; cf. Cagnat, *Revue archéologique* 3. ser. 27 (1895), p. 125. Galen, ed. Kühn 12, p. 786, refers to an oculist of the British fleet in a

passage which does not occur in all MSS; the post is extraordinary, even dubious.

103 Pannonian, XIII 3541; African, XII 686; Thracian, XIII 3544. The two Syrians in XIII 3542, 3543 are probably of the early period; but the Greek characters *chi* and *upsilon* appear on a brick at Gesoriacum (Vaillant, *Revue archéologique* 3. ser. 12 [1888], p. 371). Navigation by the Menapii: Pliny, *H. N.* 7. 206, 16. 158; Cumont, *La Belgique*, pp. 25-28.

104 Tac., *Agr.* 25; on its part in the revolt of Civilis, see p. 145. The loss of some ships by Suetonius Paullinus in 61 was given as the reason for his recall (Tac., *Ann.* 14. 39). Syme, *CAH* 11, pp. 152-157, presents a good account of Agricola's campaigns (bibliography, *ibid.* pp. 883-884).

105 Tac., *Agr.* 18, 24. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, p. 114, suggests a naval station at Ravenglass; Atkinson, *Historical Essays*, pp. 5-6, dissents. The Bessus in *Eph. ep.* 7. 890 (Deva) who served twenty-six years might have been a sailor, while the *oprio* "qui naufragio perit" (*Eph. ep.* 9. 1094, Deva) is perhaps to be connected with Agricola's campaigns. Tac., *Agr.* 18. 4, suggests that the fleet normally did not serve on the west coast.

106 Tac., *Agr.* 25, cf. 29.

107 Tac., *Agr.* 10, 12, 38; Juvenal 12. 160; Furneaux and Anderson, *Agricola* (Oxford, 1922), pp. 118-119, 141-142. Some rebels from a *cohors Usipetorum* had seized three liburnians on the west coast in 82, the main fleet then being on the east coast, and sailed around northern England to the Suebic and Frisian coast of Germany (Tac., *Agr.* 28, which seems more accurate than Dio 66. 20. 1-2).

108 Sir George Macdonald, "Verbum non amplius addam," *JRS* 29 (1939), pp. 5-27.

109 *Pedatura*: VII 864 (Birdoswald), 970 (Netherby); on the cohort I Aelia classica, see below, p. 188. Naval forces at the walls: Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, pp. 131, 142; Atkinson, *Historical Essays*, p. 5. A *numerus barcariorum Tigrisiensium* is listed at Arbeia, perhaps Ireby on the Ellen River, by *Not. Dig. Occ.* 40. 22; a praefect of such craft turns up in VII 285 (Lancaster).

110 Collingwood, *Roman Inscriptions and Sculptures belonging to the Society of Antiquaries of Newcastle-upon-Tyne* (Newcastle, 1926), nos. 44, 46; Atkinson, *Historical Essays*, p. 6; Ritterling s.v. "legio" (PW), cols. 1605-1606.

111 Use of the fleet by Severus is an inference from Dio 74. 13 and Herodian 3. 14 by Haverfield and Macdonald, *The Roman Occupation of Britain* (Oxford, 1924), p. 123. Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, p. 159, assumes a naval base at Cramond on the Forth; S. N. Miller, *CAH* 12, p. 40, suggests that Severus sailed from South Shields on the Tyne. Fleet under Philip: XII 686 (Arelare).

112 Eutropius 9. 21-22; Victor 39. 20-21, 39; *Pan. Lat.* 2. 12, 5. 12; Atkinson, *Historical Essays*, pp. 7-9; Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, pp. 276-277; P. H. Webb, "The Reign and Coinage of Carausius," *Numismatic Chronicle* 4. ser. 7 (1907), pp. 1-88 and *passim*; *idem*, "The Coinage of Allectus," *ibid.* 4. ser. 6 (1906), pp. 127-171. It must, however, be noticed that the naval types in this coinage were standard references to the "ship of Felicity," on which see Alföldi, *Festival of Isis*, p. 56.

113. *Pan. Lat.* 5. 6-7, 13-18; Eutropius 9. 22; Victor 39. 40-42. Constantius struck some fine gold medallions in celebration of his victory, one of which bore on the reverse the legend "Reditor lucis aeternae" and figured the Caesar on horseback with a galley below and London before her gate holding out her hands to the victor; see Sir Arthur Evans, "Some Notes on the Arras Hoard," *Numismatic Chronicle* 6. ser. 10 (1930), pp. 221-274.

114 Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, pp. 277-279, 285. Atkinson, *Historical Essays*, pp. 6-7, 10-11, and J. P. Bushe-Fox, "Some Notes on Roman Coast Defences," *JRS* 22 (1932), pp. 60-72, assign their origin to Carausius. The CL BR bricks of a Folkestone villa are probably early fourth century; cf. S. E. Winbolt, *Revue archéologique* 5. ser. 20 (1924), pp. 247-248; Collingwood, *Roman Britain*, p. 275.

115 *Not. Dig. Occ.* 38. 8 with XIII 12560; Veg. 4. 37; Ammian. 20. 1. 1-3, 20. 9. 9, 27. 8. 5-6; Julian, *Epist. SPQ Ath.* 279b-280a. On Étaples (Quartensis or Quentovic), see Henri Pirenne, *Les Villes du Moyen Age* (Brussels, 1927), p. 33; Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule* 8 (1926), pp. 105-110. The Visigothic king Eric had a fleet off the Garonne (Sidonius Apollinaris, *Epp.* 8. 6. 13).

CHAPTER VIII

THE NAVY AND THE EMPIRE

THE foregoing description of the imperial navy demonstrates that the emperors had broken with the Republican policy of fashioning naval instruments for each separate need, and considered a permanent navy desirable. Throughout most of their existence the two Italian fleets had a very considerable strength which at one time reached fifteen thousand men, and the eight major provincial squadrons were together possibly as strong; ships and crews were scattered in every quarter of the empire where naval power could be advantageous. Yet this navy fought no serious battles for two centuries. And again, we are dealing with the Romans, so generally and with some justice considered a landbound folk, but these same Romans developed the control and organs of sea power to their highest refinement in antiquity.¹ These puzzling facts insistently demand an explanation if we are to understand the Roman imperial navy: what reasons justified to the emperors the very considerable annual expense of a far-reaching naval establishment, and justified it through the centuries? Or, to strip the problem to its essentials, how and to what extent did the Empire rely upon sea power?

For the Mediterranean fleets, which are the essential part of the navy, the questions are more easily put than answered. Inscriptions give little help on such abstruse points, and the literary evidence is slight; in fine, it is easier to conjecture than to substantiate the conjectures with specific citations. Nor will the bare statement that the Roman Empire rested on the Mediterranean, though correct, suffice to explain the navy:

It is easy to say in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world; it is more troublesome to seek out and show its exact bearing

at a particular juncture. Yet, unless this be done, the acknowledgement of general importance remains vague and unsubstantial.²

No amount of present day study, it is true, can entirely remedy the initial indifference of Roman historians, but this need not be a fatal stumbling block. Little scraps of evidence do remain, and these may be combined into a coherent, if somewhat hypothetical whole which gives some notion of the shifting value of sea power in the Empire. In brief, it will appear that the Mediterranean fleets, like those of the northern frontier, were primarily military in nature, i. e., that they were designed to assist in imperial control of the Mediterranean itself; but that since Roman occupation of all its shores soon made this Augustan peace simple to maintain, the navy was assigned additional, less strictly military duties in the form of the transport of dignitaries, soldiers, and orders. These were by themselves not sufficient to justify the scale of the naval establishment, and the fleets of the Mediterranean may in large part be considered an insurance. The lessons of the civil wars in 68-69 reinforced the tradition of naval preparedness set by Augustus, but in the peace of the second century the tradition, and with it the navy, began slowly to crumble. When hostile fleets appeared in the late third century, the navy everywhere was inadequate to its mission, and was swept away; thereafter the Empire reverted generally to the Republican policy of preparing fleets in haste to meet each emergency. Nevertheless some fragments of the Augustan emphasis on sea power endured as a heritage for the Byzantine Empire.

Since the imperial navy begins with Augustus, the motives which influenced Augustus to create it are of the first importance. For a French scholar, Christian Courtois, who has recently examined these motives, Augustus was moved by reasons quite different from those general principles which swayed his successors. In 30 B. C. he was essentially a dictator, and his power rested on armed mastery of both land and sea; there was peace, but it was neither secure nor complete, and the experience of the past suggested that the spirit of unrest and violence would rise again. Accordingly, when Augustus formed the Italian fleets, he aimed

solely at safeguarding Italy and assuring his mastery. Only under Claudius were the duties of the navy expanded to embrace the entire Mediterranean, and then the provincial fleets of Syria, Alexandria, and Pontus were formed to police the East.³

The theory is glittering, but the facts are weak. Although the foundation of the Syrian and Alexandrian fleets cannot be directly dated to the period before A. D. 14, various reasons, which were adduced in the discussion of those fleets, strongly suggest that they were created in the reign of Augustus; and certainly the European river flotillas, which Courtois ignores, show that Augustus was willing to use naval power wherever it was advantageous. More important, such a thesis fails to consider either the mission of Augustus or the naval lessons of the sad years between the first Mithridatic war and Actium. Augustus did think first of Rome and Italy, yet he also considered the empire at large. The imperial peace, even in the reign of Augustus, was not limited to the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic, but was to include all waters and lands ruled by Rome. And in any case the narrower peace of Italy depended on the peace of the empire; the pirate inroads, commencing in Cilicia and sweeping to the harbor of Ostia, had sufficiently emphasized that point. Dismissal of his navy was barred for Augustus both by his present necessity and by the warning of the past, for the history of the whole previous century showed clearly that the Mediterranean needed standing fleets, both off Italy and in Levantine seas. These squadrons were, as a matter of fact, then in existence, and had existed along with standing armies for two decades; it remained only for Augustus to give order to institutions which the half-hidden needs of the political society had already crudely formed. The fleets of the civil wars accordingly furnished a permanent naval establishment, just as a part of the legions and auxiliaries was organized into a permanent army.

The method, however, differed in the two establishments. While the bulk of the army was split into detachments lying on the frontier, with but a small portion in Italy, the greater part of the navy was based on Italian ports and only minor squadrons covered the frontier and outlying seas. In the Augustan period, it

may be granted, special considerations made a pivot in Italy essential. Italy and Rome were still the first care of every Roman, and Rome was the capital of the empire. Its food supply, furthermore, depended on long sea routes which could be, and recently had been cut at numerous points in the Tyrrhenian by a hostile fleet. Augustus used first Misenum, Ravenna, and Forum Iulii; later he realized that Forum Iulii was a mistake and concentrated his naval strength at the two Italian ports. These remained the great naval bases of the Early Empire. The choice of Ravenna indicates more particularly a desire to control communications with Illyricum, both to aid its conquest and to protect northern Italy from raids, while the fleet at Misenum dominated the Tyrrhenian.

At the same time the concentration of the imperial navy off the coasts of Italy was proper from the wider point of view of the empire; the army had the unending task of policing a long boundary, but the navy was chiefly designed for unpredictable emergencies. The peninsula of Italy has a strategic position in the Mediterranean which is being realized anew in recent decades; operating from its ports a powerful fleet can cut the Mediterranean in two, and can strike both east and west quickly and forcefully. Some regions, however, demanded special fleets. The far end of the eastern Mediterranean could scarcely be policed from Italy, yet Levantine waters carried a valuable commerce and might raise a pretender; accordingly Augustus formed the Syrian and Alexandrian fleets. The Black Sea could as yet be left to Roman vassals, the Red Sea was abandoned after the expedition of Gallus, and the English Channel was of no significance, but the great rivers, the Rhine and the Danube, furnished a fine opportunity for a naval survey. To meet this need the German, Pannonian, and Moesian flotillas were established. Niches remained to be filled later, but Tacitus might say of Augustus' realm: "*mari Oceano aut amnibus longinquis saeptum imperium; legiones, provincias, classis, cuncta inter se conexa.*"⁴

The total of each fleet was determined in accordance with its duties; suitable bases and, where advisable, subsidiary stations were chosen, and the necessary buildings and harbor works were

constructed; conditions of service, including recruitment, term of enlistment, training, pay, and discipline, were laid down; tables of organization were fixed. Most of this work was completed in the early decades of Augustus' principate, and part at least should probably be ascribed to Agrippa.⁵ In some points the architects of the navy reached novel solutions, but the work of organization generally was a happy medley of Greek and Roman experience, which made the fullest possible use of the men, matériel, and bases already at hand. The resultant structure forms the most carefully articulated framework for naval power which the ancient world evolved. There is justice in the recent view which calls the *Aeneid* "l'épopée de la marine nationale" in that "l'esprit qui anime la flotte troyenne est celui d'une grande force de mer organisée." ⁶

Yet even under Augustus the spirit of sea power did not quite triumph. Although the fleets were a co-ordinated part of the imperial military establishment, Augustus could not and did not try to raise them to a position of equality with the army. In the last analysis control of the Mediterranean was as essential for the endurance of the Empire as the guard of the frontier, but this fact was hidden, and the Roman gentry did not love the sea. Fronto later put their feeling neatly in describing a friend who sought the seashore "non maris sed auræ cupidus," ⁷ and this attitude stood diametrically, though largely unconsciously, opposed to a permanent navy. The history of the imperial navy in the broadest sense is the product of the conflict between this old prejudice and the Augustan spirit. Augustus himself set the navy on firm foundations, and Vespasian appreciated the value of sea power even more; in his reign the navy reached its apogee and was heaped with honors. Thereafter it passed through decades of peace, in which the inveterate Roman indifference to the sea finally destroyed the spirit of naval preparedness. Tradition, however, kept the navy alive, and even in the Mediterranean there were certain obvious, recurring services which it might perform.

As far as Augustus was concerned, the navy was chiefly an instrument in assuring that *pax*, the Augustan keynote, which must cover land and sea alike. Much remained to be done after 31 B. C., but information on the campaigns of Augustus against

piracy is lacking: the work was steady, successful, and quiet. Despite the campaign of 35 B. C. against the Dalmatian pirates, further action was probably necessary in the Adriatic, while in Cilicia peace was not achieved until after 25 B. C.⁸ Both fleets and legions supported the peace and calm which found expression in the great *Odes* of Horace and the fine reliefs of the *ara Pacis*. Thrice Augustus closed the doors of the Temple of Janus in symbolic recognition of the peace "terra marique" which he had brought the world; Strabo rejoices, "since the pirates have been suppressed, those who sail enjoy complete quiet in the present peace"; and Horace sings in verse:

tutus bos etenim rura perambulat,
nutrit rura Ceres almaque Faustitas,
pacatum volitant per mare navitae,
culpari metuit fides.⁹

It has been alleged that the Italian fleets decayed during the later years of Augustus' reign, but the evidence does not support this assertion. The *λησται* disturbing Sardinia in A. D. 6 and succeeding years were probably petty buccaneers, whose activities were chiefly on land within the island. The coasts of the Adriatic were vexed by marauders in the same period, but naval forces could not suppress this piracy when the whole hinterland was aflame in the Pannonian revolt.¹⁰ In the last years of Augustus' long rule the navy possibly felt that slackening which the revolts of the German and Pannonian troops on Tiberius' accession manifested in the army, but the peace of the Mediterranean survived unimpaired. Philo praises Tiberius,

holding power over land and sea for twenty-three years, who allowed no seed of war to afflict Greece or other lands, who gave peace and the fruits of peace to the end of his life with ungrudgingly ample hand and mind.

In the next generation Pliny the Elder echoes these sentiments, which become clichés none the less true for their triteness.¹¹

If one seeks a monument for the imperial navy, it may be found in the disappearance of piracy from men's thoughts. From the

time of Augustus to that of Septimius Severus there is not one contemporary reference to a Mediterranean pirate; imperial literature has fearful portrayals of the sailor's danger, but a swift pirate forms no part of the recital.¹² After Labeo, a contemporary of Augustus, no jurist is known to have dealt with provisions of the Rhodian sea law on the subject until the third century.¹³ Piracy had been eradicated from the commercial routes of the Mediterranean, a feat not repeated until the nineteenth century of our era. Along with the navy other factors had indeed played their part: the peace of prosperity eliminated the buccaneering which results from disturbed political, social, or economic conditions; and the army had firmly occupied the pirate coasts in Cilicia and Dalmatia. Such occupation, it may be admitted, was a prerequisite for a thorough peace; along the thinly held western Mauretanian coast tribal raids might on rare occasions slip past the Mauretanian flotilla.

The fleets at times assisted in the maintenance of peace on shore. Tacitus records the suppression of a servile insurrection near Brundisium by sailors in A. D. 24,¹⁴ and other such risings may have been prevented or subdued by the praetorian fleets, which controlled all the Italian coast. The detachments of sailors at Ravenna, Brundisium, Puteoli, Ostia, and Centumcellae—not to mention the naval forces at harbors in the provinces—presumably served as police forces in the thriving commercial ports whenever grave riots developed; after the praetorian guards were concentrated in their Viminal camp at Rome, there was no other force which could meet this duty for most of Italy.¹⁵

Another monument to the peace wrought in part by the imperial navy, the surge in commerce in the Julio-Claudian period, can only be mentioned in these pages. Maritime peace was all that the commercial interests needed, and its maintenance they fully appreciated. During Augustus' last voyage along the Campanian coast, the sailors and passengers of an Alexandrian ship which had put in at Puteoli appeared, clad in white with flowers and crowns, to praise him: "*per illum se vivere, per illum navigare, libertate atque fortunis per illum frui.*"¹⁶ To Augustus, "*admodum exhilaratus,*" the incident may justly have seemed the

final thanks of the empire for his long and earnest years of labor.

Further than this, it is generally held, the relations of state and trade did not extend. The Empire was indifferent to commerce or, to define the opinion more precisely, it adopted that *laissez-faire* attitude which often accompanies a healthy, rapidly advancing economic life. No efforts to promote the expansion of commerce were made, and paternalistic theories entered only in the late second century, when commerce began to decline. More recently, dissenters have argued that trade had a greater influence on governmental policy than is commonly admitted.¹⁷ The problems arising from this divergence of opinion cannot be discussed at length here, but it may at least be pertinent to determine if the navy was anywhere used *directly* to promote water-borne commerce.

On the Mediterranean the expedients of modern imperialism were unnecessary, once peace was assured and tariffs were fixed at a moderate, standard rate, for the Roman domain occupied all its shores. There can be little doubt that Augustus aimed at making its seas safe for that commerce on which the fiscal health and unity of the Empire depended,¹⁸ but once security was attained, action of the emperors ceased. The matter is less simple for the outlying regions. Werner Schur has coupled the Black and Red Seas in an ambitious theory which assigns Nero a vast eastern program based largely on motives of trade: on the south the Emperor intended to control the Red Sea, to check the Axumite kingdom, and to expand the Indian trade; on the north he planned a campaign to gain mastery of the western end of a northern silk route from China.¹⁹ This route is a myth, and the whole program is much exaggerated; yet, to take the Black Sea first, it is clear that Roman domination tended to increase through naval intervention in the Bosporan kingdom and elsewhere, and that Roman commerce in the Euxine was fairly extensive. On the other hand these posts along the northern coasts formed a first line of defense for Asia Minor and Moesia, and the Bosporus was a state which had to be dominated lest it fall into hostile hands. In the absence of ancient evidence the Roman motives in this region cannot be dogmatically formulated. On

the Rhine, to shift to the other end of the northern frontier, the harbor and river improvements were always dictated by military reasons, and the activity of the German fleet at the mouths of the Rhine was intended not so much to protect Gallic coasting trade as to guarantee the maritime connection of the German and British armies.²⁰

The Red Sea offers one clear example of political action based on commercial motives, for in the year 25 B. C. Augustus sent Aelius Gallus to conquer the Sabaeans in southwestern Arabia, the middlemen in the Indian trade. This expedition can only have had commercial motives, for Rome was not previously involved in the region, nor did Augustus have any general program for the acquisition of all Arabia. Gallus returned in failure; at best the demonstration manifested Roman interest in the Red Sea²¹ and the Indian trade thrived prodigiously without further military efforts. The emperors controlled at least the northern half of the Red Sea, but a Roman fleet was never permanently stationed there.

Modern criticism of this "neglect" is unjustified, for diplomatic and fiscal action seems to have secured any necessary concessions.²² Moreover, naval operations in the Red Sea were made difficult by the lack of good harbors, by the unsuitability of Mediterranean craft to the region, and by the fact that suppression of ancient piracy always entailed occupation of the coasts which served as pirate bases. The conquest of the barren Arabian and Aethiopian coasts was a costly task, perhaps impossible in itself and certainly not directly remunerative; operations in the Indian Ocean itself were impracticable. Patrol of this area was perhaps undertaken by the Axumite kings, who were interested in protecting their own traders of Adulis. In any case the rudimentary economic thought of the Roman Empire quickly felt a dangerous lack of balance in the Indian trade which must have limited imperial interest in Horace's energetic merchant who hastened to the farthest Indies.²³

Apart from the expedition of Gallus, then, commercial motives cannot be said to have directed any large-scale naval operations in the Roman Empire. Nor is there any sufficient evidence

that the various squadrons were designed *primarily* to protect and expand Roman shipping, in so far as this was private. In the Mediterranean the political motives of Augustus were at least as important as economic reasons in fashioning fleets; on the northern rivers, the Roman flotillas developed before there could have been any extensive traffic, and retained their military character throughout. In general, political expansion purely to promote private commerce appears to have been an alien notion in the Roman Empire. The absence of this impulse, however, is not incompatible with a subsidiary desire to strengthen commerce as an agency of revenue and supply. The molestation of Roman shippers presumably brought direct retaliation, and minor developments of imperial policy may well have been bent by protests or requests of traders, as in the Black Sea.²⁴

One type of commerce, the grain trade, the emperors did wholeheartedly advance and encourage, for the populace of imperial Rome depended very heavily on imported food. Augustus had experienced the popular outcries during the blockade by Sextus Pompey and made the *annona* a matter of prime concern. His successors, also spurred by outbreaks in time of scarcity, paid no less attention to feeding the people:

vita populi Romani per incerta maris et tempestatum cotidie
volvitur . . . hanc, patres conscripti, curam sustinet princeps;
haec ommissa funditus rem publicam trahet.²⁵

Guard of the sea routes accordingly was essential to the state, spiritually based on Rome. The fear of a blockade in 49 B. C. along with the effects of the pressure by Sextus Pompey has already been noted, and the reliance on such pressure formed an important part in the campaigns of Vespasian and Constantine, which will be discussed below; that there were not more attempts to sever the long route from Egypt to Rome may be attributed to the presence of the navy, both at Alexandria and at Misenum. It is, however, very unlikely that the Misene or Alexandrian squadrons convoyed the grain fleet, which usually left Alexandria as a unit in June and returned from Puteoli and Ostia with the etesian winds in August.²⁶ As far as the danger of

interruption was concerned, the navy had through an unremitting guard of the Mediterranean done its duty before the fleet set sail, nor could the light war galleys give any aid in time of storm to the more solidly formed *naves onerariae*. At the utmost a few vessels might be postulated to maintain control over the group and to keep its various units in communication.

Our sources do not actually attest either this, or the wide use of warships to bear despatches and orders generally. Nero sent his agents on one occasion on triremes with picked crews, and had an informer brought from an island on a liburnian of the navy; but Augustus had special despatch boats when he wintered at Samos in 21 and 20 B. C. An inscription records a procurator of similar craft under Hadrian.²⁷ Yet it may be that these ships were detailed from the navy, for sailors certainly formed the last link in the naval chain of communication by acting as couriers between the Italian ports and the emperor at Rome or, in the reign of Antoninus Pius, at Lorium. In particular, news of the eastern wars may have been brought from Seleuceia on Misene ships; it will be remembered that a detachment of the Misene fleet lay there in 166. A potent argument for such use of the warships arose from the fact that they were at hand and sometimes idle, while the *cursus* by land was both expensive and troublesome to maintain.²⁸

Apart from transmitting orders and news, the Italian fleets might also transport officials, and in times of peace they often had the honor of carrying the emperor and his retinue. Following Augustus, who loved the Campanian coast and habitually traveled by sea whenever possible, all the emperors of the Julio-Claudian line spent much of their leisure in cruises with their court along Campanian coasts, and various scions of the house made their trips to the East aboard galleys of the Italian fleets.²⁹ Sailing in a trireme along the Italian coast was so familiar a pleasure to the younger Agrippina, mother of Nero, that her son's first attempt to murder her involved the construction of a collapsible galley which would neatly drown her.³⁰ Although the Flavian and Antonine emperors made less use of the navy for cruises, Hadrian's phenomenal travels, which took him to all

parts of the empire, now and again called on naval transport.³¹ Fronto gives a vivid picture of Marcus Aurelius embarking at Alsium for a cruise of relaxation: "ut aethere tranquillo in altum [provectus] portisculorum et remigum visu audituque te oblectares." ³²

The role of the fleets in transporting provincial dignitaries is particularly evident along the old Republican route to the East, which ran *via* Brundisium, Dyrrachium, and the Via Egnatia. In A. D. 24 biremes regularly ferried officials between Dyrrachium and Brundisium and some persons might employ warships to carry them from the Piraeus to Asia and Syria.³³ Others, however, proceeded entirely by sea from Italy to the provinces, and the mixed land and sea route was perhaps less used as direct navigation from the west Italian coast to Alexandria and thence to Syria grew more common.³⁴ It does not follow necessarily that these officials going to the East, or to Africa by sea, used the navy, for instances occur even of voyages by the emperors on commercial ships. Vespasian and Titus both came from the East to Rome in 70 on merchant vessels, and Hadrian twice journeyed in the Aegean on the ship of an Ephesian.³⁵ Warships were speedier, but merchant craft had more room and at times were perhaps the only ships available. Officials going to the provinces probably preferred the latter, unless time were pressing or, as in 69, the sea were unsafe.

The emperors, finally, could use the ships of their fleets in whatever manner they desired. Claudius had the praefect of the Misene fleet, Tiberius Iulius Optatus, plant oysters along the Campanian coast to increase their supply; Vitellius even detailed whole squadrons of triremes under navarchs to cull extraordinary delicacies for his table from Asia Minor to Spain, or so it was later fabled.³⁶ Services of the sailors in imperial *naumachiae* have already been mentioned; they had some part in the imperial guard, when the emperor was on the seashore; and patrol by warships must have been necessary to ensure that those persons exiled to islands did not escape.³⁷ Other methods of imperial employment were less innocent, for emperors at times found the peregrine sailors more amenable than the haughty

praetorians. The report that Tiberius stationed sailors at the foot of a Caprean cliff to kill those condemned persons who were thrown from its top is a malicious rumor born of his Caprean seclusion, but there is no doubt that Nero suborned Anicetus, his freedman praefect of the Misene fleet, to destroy Agrippina, first by constructing the collapsible boat, which failed, and then by straightforward murder. In this act a trierarch and a naval centurion were the actual villains.³⁸

Of such nature were the missions which busied the Mediterranean fleets from year to year: the supervision of the grain routes, the patrol of the coasts, the transport of emperors, swift journeys with news and orders, and all the numerous petty duties which cluster about any institution. These were, it may be repeated, of subsidiary importance; occasionally the empire suffered crises of foreign or civil strife which recalled the navy to its essential mission, that of controlling and using its proper element for the ends of war.³⁹ Even wars on the inland frontiers called upon action by the navy, for the Mediterranean was the hub of the imperial economy; ⁴⁰ each great war brought the shifting of troops across its expanses to the threatened sector. So long as the navy dominated this inland sea, the Empire enjoyed the tremendous advantage of interior lines of communication. Prearranged joint action by the Blemmyes in Egypt and the Germans on the Rhine was impossible; through the transfer of forces from one frontier to another the Empire long economized in military establishments.

The very unity of the Empire rested on control of the Mediterranean, which permitted the emperors to maintain their rule on all its coasts, to localize any scattered revolts, and to retain an avenue of escape if Italy itself were lost. The loyalty of the navy was an important question in every major extended crisis of the first two centuries after Christ. An imperial squadron, however, only once advanced an independent candidate for the throne, and the instance of Carausius was unique in many ways. Within the Mediterranean the sailors had no direct relations with the Senate, recruiting ground of emperors, inasmuch as their admirals were *equites* and the naval bases lay some distance from

Rome; in addition, concerted naval action or even the formation of a mutual understanding was hindered both by the geographical separation of the two Italian fleets and by the difference of racial stocks in each. The role of the fleets in the political history of the Empire was auxiliary, but significant.

In 31 Tiberius prepared to flee on the Misene fleet, if his attempt to destroy Sejanus miscarried; Gaius prepared the fleets, "subsidia fugae," on rumors of a revolt on the Rhine, "uno solacio adquiescens transmarinas certe sibi superfuturas provincias." In Nero's last days his freedmen were sent to assure the loyalty of the naval detachment at Ostia, for Nero planned to sail to Alexandria and begin his life anew.⁴¹ The pages of Tacitus on his reign suggest the importance of the fleets in a period when the emperor spent much of his time by the sea. One of the conspirators in the plot of Piso tried to undermine the loyalty of the Misene fleet, and Nero removed his former wife Octavia on the simple pretext that she had offered herself to Anicetus, praefect of the Misene fleet, in order to start a revolution.⁴² At this time the Misene fleet had more than ten thousand sailors and the Ravennate more than five thousand; in man power the combined Italian fleets probably equaled the troops in Rome.

The civil wars of A. D. 68-69 give a superb demonstration of the part which naval power could play in the making and unmaking of emperors. On the news of Galba's rebellion in Spain in April 68, Nero hastily drafted a temporary legion from the Misene sailors; but all others deserted him, and he committed suicide. When the legion of sailors streamed out to greet Galba at the Milvian bridge and demanded its "eagle" or standard in a somewhat importunate and violent manner, Galba bluntly refused their request and had his horse clear the way with some bloodshed among the unresisting sailors. As his position in Rome grew weak, Galba released the remainder from custody and granted the *legio classica* its formal organization under the title I Adiutrix. With the eagle came citizenship for the sailors serving in the legion; those incapacitated by age or service were by

diploma discharged on December 22, 68.⁴³ These last-minute efforts were of no avail; Galba and his Caesar, Piso, fell on January 15, 69, and Otho, aided by the praetorians, gained the throne.

During his brief rule Otho was supported loyally by the legion I Adiutrix, which had not forgiven Galba's harshness, and by the two Italian fleets.⁴⁴ The legions on the Rhine, however, elevated the governor Vitellius as a competitor for the throne, and in the early months of 69 two Vitellian armies entered Italy, one by the Mt. St. Genèvre pass and another by the Great St. Bernard. Several thousand sailors from the Misene fleet went north with Otho and the praetorian guard to check these threats,⁴⁵ and the Misene squadron itself formed the basis of an offensive which might have had great results. Otho's strategy, in fact, depended largely on the success of this naval action.

In brief, the squadron was to harass the shores of Liguria and Narbonese Gaul, thus delaying and drawing aside the western Vitellian column led by Fabius Valens, while the Othonian generals, reinforced by the Illyrian legions, defeated Caecina on the Po.⁴⁶ For this purpose the fleet under its freedman praefect Moschus was strengthened by the urban cohorts and many of the praetorians, "ducibus consilium et custodes." The whole expedition was placed under the *primpipares* Antonius Novellus and Suedius Clemens with the tribune Aemilius Pacensis. Inclement weather as well as general slackness perhaps delayed the expedition, which sailed north in March, but it lost yet more valuable time in quarrels among the leaders and in purposeless looting on the Ligurian coast. The procurator of the Maritime Alps, who tried to check this depredation, was defeated, and the expedition so far achieved its main purpose that Valens detached a force of auxiliaries to counter the threat to Gaul.⁴⁷ The expedition crushed the auxiliaries also; in the battle a part of the sailors together with the country folk occupied the coastal hills, the praetorians held the plain by the sea, and the fleet itself attacked the rear of the Vitellian force. The victory kept Corsica, Sardinia, and the other islands loyal, for a rebellion against Otho

in Corsica fell through when the Corsicans reflected that "*direptos vastatosque classe etiam quos cohortes alaeque protegerunt.*"⁴⁸

Gallia Narbonensis was reported to have been frightened by the invasion, and a swift advance might still have done much; instead, the incompetent leaders delayed and finally did nothing. In the fighting on the Po near Cremona Ravennate liburnians attempted without success to harass the eastern Vitellian column led by Caecina; Valens joined Caecina, and after the first battle of Bedriacum, in which the legion I Adiutrix fought valiantly, Otho killed himself to prevent further struggle.⁴⁹ The boldly-planned Ligurian expedition was nevertheless a master stroke which revealed again the potentialities of sea power in war. An even more fruitful lesson came in the succeeding challenge for the unstable imperial power.

Vitellius first replaced Moschus by Claudius Iulianus as praefect of the Misene fleet and then, when the news of Vespasian's revolt came from Syria, appointed Sextus Lucilius Bassus praefect of both Misene and Ravennate squadrons to secure unified command of the great Italian fleets in the impending war.⁵⁰ The naval forces of the empire, however, aided Vespasian rather than Vitellius in the actual conflict.

Since Vespasian's own plan of campaign was made superfluous by the speedy, bloody, and disobedient action of Antonius Primus, the self-appointed Vespasianic general who led the Balkan armies into Italy, the importance which Vespasian attached to sea power has not been fully understood. Yet throughout his steps, which aimed at forcing the Vitellian armies to capitulate without severe bloodshed, the necessity of controlling the sea is implicit. The council of war held at Berytus after Vespasian's revolt had decided that the governor of Syria, Mucianus, who was Vespasian's chief adherent, should lead the Syrian legions through Asia Minor to Italy and put down Vitellius' armed forces, while Vespasian held Egypt and thus starved Rome.⁵¹ As Antonius was winning the war against Vespasian's orders, this program was also progressing, although in more deliberate fashion. Mucianus proceeded toward Byzantium, to which he

had summoned the effective strength of the Pontic fleet to use in the event he found it better to sail directly from Dyrrachium to Italy; ⁵² Vespasian started for Egypt.

The adhesion of that province had been the necessary condition of his rebellion, and its praefect Tiberius Iulius Alexander along with the two legions had initiated his cause by swearing fealty on July 1st. Even before Vespasian's arrival, the administration had undoubtedly cut off shipment of grain to Rome; it is even probable that the annual grain fleet had not sailed before the embargo went into effect. ⁵³ On this embargo, coupled with the steady advance of Mucianus' forces, Vespasian relied heavily:

quando Aegyptus, claustra annonae, vectigalia opulentissimarum provinciarum obtinerentur, posse Vitellii exercitum egestate stipendii frumentique ad deditionem subigi. ⁵⁴

A further step in the plan was the conquest of Africa, which Vespasian was planning to invade "terra marique" when the news of Antonius' bloody triumph at Cremona arrived. ⁵⁵

This statesmanlike method of victory was swept aside by Antonius Primus, but even for the actual services of the navy Vespasian owed it a heavy debt. In this connection there is an illuminating conflict of opinion at the council of war which Antonius held in Poetovio before beginning his campaign. Antonius himself urged a speedy advance of his forces; Vitellius, commanding the Mediterranean and more particularly the Adriatic, could get reinforcements from across the sea and might attack the Balkans if he wished. Yet others at the same table directly denied this and argued that Vespasian held "mare, classis, studia provinciarum." In a way both were right; Antonius looked chiefly to the fact that Vitellius held Italy and the great Italian fleets, while his opponents considered more the frame of mind of those squadrons. Despising Vitellius as they had favored Otho, the Italian fleets wore a thin cloak of loyalty; various incidents even suggest that the party of Vespasian had through secret emissaries prepared for their revolt at a suitable opportunity. ⁵⁶ The course of events insistently demands the assumption

that Vitellius could not rely on the Italian fleets, and that Vespasian knew this. Vespasian otherwise would not have been certain of his ability to hold Egypt by opposing the eastern fleets to the great Italian squadrons, and if Mucianus seriously considered sailing to Italy he must have known that the Italian fleets would not oppose his small Pontic fleet and his transports.

The strongest proof of this attitude in the Italian fleets is the fact that as Antonius moved into Italy the fleets did change sides with the utmost alacrity. The Ravennate fleet deserted Vitellius when Antonius' advance past Aquileia guaranteed the safety of its secession. Although the naval praefect Bassus treacherously encouraged and advanced the revolt, the trierarchs leading the sailors had already picked the man they wished as praefect, Cornelius Fuscus, and the fact that he came up "propere" from Primus' army suggests previous arrangements.⁵⁷ Tacitus rightly connects with this transfer of allegiance the memory of Otho and the fact that most of the Ravennate sailors came from the Balkans, the armies of which had declared for Vespasian.

Vitellius, lolling at Aricia, and the general Valens, moving north with concubines and soldiers to stop Antonius Primus, were both justly alarmed at the news of this defection. The entire Adriatic coast of Italy was now open to Primus, who used the fleet to secure his flank as far as Ariminum; his line of communications with the Balkans, which he had attempted to guard against an unexpected naval action before the accession of the Ravennate squadron, was secure; his supply became easier, and that of the Vitellian forces on the Po more difficult.⁵⁸ Further, and more important, the loyalty of the Misene fleet was now suspect, although the very atmosphere of uncertainty prevented drastic action. Claudius Apollinaris was at once appointed as praefect of the Misene fleet, and Vitellius attempted both to strengthen its allegiance and to decrease its numbers by drawing a temporary legion from the sailors to assist in the barricade of the Apennines. When his position grew more desperate and the Misene fleet did revolt along with much of Campania,⁵⁹ Vitellius took quick steps; if this fleet maintained its position, Rome's food supply, and with it Rome, was lost. He returned to Rome

at once and sent Claudius Iulianus, who had governed the fleet with a lax hand, to pacify the sailors; on his desertion the Emperor's brother Lucius was ordered to recover Campania. Lucius actually recaptured Tarracina, with much loss to the sailors,⁶⁰ but events moved too swiftly elsewhere, and Vitellius fell. Immediately thereupon, Vespasian sent large quantities of Egyptian grain to strengthen his popularity among the Roman populace.⁶¹

His other rewards were slow, for Vespasian did not reach Rome until the late fall of 70; but they may for that reason be taken as the sober recompense of carefully weighed service. He chose to stress sea power as the most significant factor in his success. In the commemorative coinage of 71 and succeeding years, the only type which specifically refers to the civil war bears the legend *Victoria Navalis*, "Our Lady Victory of the Fleet."⁶² The honors, moreover, which he heaped upon the fleets were greater and more extensive than those given to any other force. The legion I Adiutrix was continued as part of the permanent military establishment. The Ravennate sailors who had forced Primus to enroll them in a *legio classica* after the second battle of Bedriacum were formally organized by order of Vespasian on March 7, 70, as the legion II Adiutrix pia fidelis. Veterans of twenty years' service and also those "bello inutiles facti ante emerita stipendia" were discharged from the legion at this time by two grants.⁶³ On February 9, 71, Vespasian discharged and settled great numbers of the Misene fleet in a colony at Paestum; on April 5 further Misene veterans were dismissed and given land at Paestum, and Ravennate sailors discharged on that day were settled in Pannonia.⁶⁴ Yet other veterans who were released before the due date "quod se in expeditione belli fortiter industrieque gesserant" turn up in a diploma of April 14/30, 71; the name of the fleet is lost, but since the Italian fleets had been taken care of previously, these may be considered sailors of the Pannonian fleet who had accompanied Antonius Primus to Italy.⁶⁵

Those sailors remaining in the Italian fleets were perhaps permitted to adopt Latin nomenclature, although this did not entail Latin rights. In this same year of 71 presumably, Vespasian gave

to each of the Italian squadrons the honorific title of *praetoria*, which placed them beside the praetorian cohorts as guards of the Emperor's security.⁶⁶ The provincial fleets were also honored by similar titles. The Alexandrian, German, and possibly Syrian squadrons received *Augusta*; the services of the Pannonian and Moesian fleets in guarding a countryside stripped by Antonius were even more signalized by the title *Flavia*.⁶⁷ As a final gesture Vespasian raised the praefects of the praetorian fleets from the grade of *sexagenarius* to that of *ducenarius*, or, in the case of the Misene fleet, probably to that of *trecenarius*, thus making them two of the great equestrian praefects. In his treatment of the fleets, as in his general policy, Vespasian may justly be called a second Augustus.

In the reign of Domitian the revolt of Antonius Saturninus allowed the German fleet to proclaim its loyalty and to receive in recompense the title *pia fidelis Domitiana*. The actual overthrow of Domitian brought no internecine warfare; for a time Nerva's rule tottered, and the coinage appealed to the army and navy jointly under the timid wish of *Concordia Exercituum*,⁶⁸ but the adoption of Trajan secured the new regime. Thereafter the empire enjoyed internal peace for almost a hundred years, and its armed forces devoted themselves to the frontiers.

The navy had played an auxiliary role in this guard from the reign of Augustus. The direct service of the provincial fleets along the northern frontier has been described, and does not need repetition; it is rather more necessary to stress the fact that the Mediterranean fleets were also used in military operations, particularly in the interior transport of men and orders. In fact the bases of Ravenna and Forum Iulii were partly chosen with this end in view. Such transport was speedy, and the ships were easily requisitioned; on the other hand, the cramped quarters available cannot have made the voyage comfortable, nor could the galleys carry great numbers.⁶⁹ Long journeys like the trip from Puteoli to Alexandria or Syria were surely broken at every possible landing. Even so the crossing from the Sicilian Straits to Alexandria, which usually required at least ten days, must have exhausted both crew and passengers; Tacitus preserves the dole-

ful complaint of some German vexillations sent by Nero to Egypt and ordered back by Galba, "longa navigatione aegros." ⁷⁰

It is unnecessary here to list all the known minor movements of troops which involved crossing the sea, for generally there is no indication of the mode of conveyance. Since the Mediterranean had an extensive commerce and great numbers of large merchant craft which could be conscripted, the part of the Mediterranean fleets in transportation was more limited than on the northern seas and rivers; but the use of warships for this duty, especially in the movement of emperors and praetorians between West and East in the eastern wars, is attested for various occasions in the second and third centuries. The part of the navy in the history of these two hundred years, indeed, deserves a detailed consideration; naval operations in the Mediterranean in the period are significant illustrations of the functions of the navy, and have been too generally neglected.

The great wars of Trajan form a prime example of the transportation of troops by the navy. At the opening of the second Dacian war in 105 Trajan sailed hastily by night from Ancona for Dalmatia, accompanied by the praetorians; ⁷¹ at the outset of the Parthian war he sailed with a large force *via* Athens to Seleucia. ⁷² On the latter trip, which occurred in the early winter of 113-114, the sailors of a quadrireme *Ops* performed some extraordinary service, which earned the crew an immediate discharge with full privileges. Possibly they carried Trajan himself safely through a storm. ⁷³

At this time certain of the eastern seaports began to emphasize their maritime position. The coins, that is, of Sidon and Dura bear the legend *ναυαρχίς*, "mistress of fleets," under Trajan, and inscriptions of Laodicea ad Mare and Tripolis have the same term in the reign of Hadrian. ⁷⁴ The simple word is not very illuminating in the lack of other evidence, but whether it be a Trajanic grant or an older term its appearance at this juncture suggests that these cities took upon themselves part of the burden of transport in the Parthian war. This does not prove that the war fleets were becoming inadequate, for the duty of supplying a large army was not theirs; it does, however, appear that in time of war the Empire

was beginning to have some difficulty in maintaining its service of supply.

A considerable part of the Misene fleet remained in the East during the campaign of Trajan, as later in 166, and served in the suppression of the Jewish revolts which plagued Trajan's last years. When the Jews rose in Cyrenaica, Egypt, and Syria in 115-117, Trajan singled out Q. Marcius Turbo, praefect of the Misene fleet, probably promoted him to a special command, and sent him against the Jews with both military and naval forces. This expedition quickly stamped out the revolt in Egypt and Cyrenaica and probably also in Cyprus.⁷⁵

In the campaign sailors may have served on land to strengthen Turbo's forces, for they regularly received military training. In the civil wars of 68-69 the fleets were stripped again and again for land service, and two of the legions thus formed became permanent units in the army. Other drafts from the reserve of naval manpower gave rise to the various *cohortes classicae* of the army. Augustus formed two of these cohorts, possibly at the time when he reduced the strength of the fleet at Forum Iulii, and the cohort I Aelia classica, it has been suggested, came from naval detachments of the British fleet put on shore to cope with the British rebellion under Hadrian.⁷⁶ At other times, when imperial exigencies forced the use of marines as soldiers, those selected were incorporated into already existing military units. In the Jewish war under Hadrian the legion X Fretensis was thus strengthened by sailors from the Misene fleet, and certain other soldiers of the same legion who turned up earlier in a peculiar document may have been transferred to it in 68/69 at the time of the earlier Jewish revolt.⁷⁷

After this reinforcement of the legion X Fretensis and the transport of Hadrian at various times, the fleets enjoyed the quiet obscurity which characterized the reign of Antoninus Pius. Moorish troubles gave employment to the Mauretanian detachments; the praetorian fleets received certain favors with regard to the promotion of officers and, a little later, in the matter of marriage. In 162 vessels of the Misene fleet carried the co-Emperor Lucius Verus from Brundisium to Antioch to manage the Parthian war. Imperial coins bearing galley types and the legend *Felicitas Aug*

were struck to celebrate the safe journey, and part of the Misene fleet still lay at Seleuceia in 166, the year in which the Parthian war was victoriously closed. These vessels perhaps carried news and orders between the East and the West. They may also have transported some of the numerous army vexillations required by the eastern crisis.⁷⁸ The forces which crossed the Hellespont were presumably ferried by the local cities in the area, for at this time and on later occasions the Greek cities on both sides of the Propontis struck naval types on their coinage when armies and emperors moved east or west across the Straits.⁷⁹ This military traffic between Europe and Asia was also borne by the Pontic fleet, which, it will be remembered, lay at Cyzicus from about 175.

During the last decade of Marcus Aurelius' reign, the Mediterranean was more disturbed than it had been since the civil wars of the dying Republic. The Costoboci in 170 probably invaded Greece by sea, inasmuch as the *classis Pontica* was shifted from Trapezus to guard the Hellespont; the revolt of Avidius Cassius unsettled the East;⁸⁰ the Moors ravaged widely in the western Mediterranean. When they rose first, apparently in 171/172, and beset the African and Spanish coasts, the Emperor took Baetica from the Senate and sent L. Iulius Vehilius Gratus Iulianus against the rebels. The Misene fleet presumably played a part, and the lone Ravennate tombstone in Spain may be a result of Ravennate participation;⁸¹ in the creation of the *classis nova Libyca* about this period the imperial naval forces received their first increase in a century. The war was ended by 173, but the Moors seem to have broken out again temporarily in 177.⁸² The invasion of the Costoboci through the Hellespont and the temporary inability of imperial military and naval forces to put down rebellious subjects in the Mediterranean itself were evil omens, but not in themselves disastrous.⁸³

Throughout the century of the Antonines the historic role of the navy had been that of an adjunct in the frontier defense. During the following hundred years this duty continued, for the pressure on the frontiers was unremitting; yet more, the Mediterranean fleets now witnessed the bane of civil strife. Commodus was murdered on December 31, 192, and the reign of his successor

Pertinax endured but a few months; then Didius Iulianus at Rome and three contenders in the provinces all claimed the throne. The tottering Emperor in the capital again resorted to the Italian squadrons, as in 68-69, to bolster his power; but the campaign took a different turn, and the navy had a smaller scope for action. The Ravennate fleet, Didius Iulianus' attempts to strengthen its loyalty notwithstanding, deserted to Septimius Severus as he entered Italy along the route which Antonius Primus had followed almost one hundred and twenty-five years before. The Misene sailors whom Iulianus summoned to Rome proved no bar to Severus' rapid advance, and Cassius Dio jeers at their sorry military training.⁸⁴

After his victory over Iulianus, Septimius Severus treated the Italian fleets in more kindly fashion than the old praetorian guards, for he needed their support in his campaign against another claimant, Pescennius Niger. In July of 193 Severus started east to aid his generals who were holding Pescennius at the Hellespont; while he moved by land, the Italian fleets transported part of the army to Dyrrachium and then proceeded to the Aegean. They probably arrived at the Hellespont after Pescennius had fallen back into Asia Minor, but may have aided the crossing in turn of the Severan generals. Some portion of the navy perhaps made a demonstration toward Egypt, for this province had come over to Severus before the final battle of Issus gave him definitive victory in the East.⁸⁵

While Septimius returned to the West to crush his last opponent, Clodius Albinus, in Gaul,⁸⁶ the greater part of the Italian fleets remained in the East to aid in the siege of Byzantium, which had declared for Niger and held out after his suicide. The rapid current of the Bosphorus prevented a fully effective blockade of the city, but its supplies grew steadily less, and the war fleet completely annihilated a last desperate plundering sortie of the Byzantines by sea. With the fall of the besieged town in the winter of 195-196 the fleets returned to their Italian ports. Tiberius Claudius Subatianus Proculus, subpraefect of the Misene fleet, rendered such great service in the naval operations that Septimius Severus advanced him to the Senate by the urban quaestorship

and promoted him steadily thereafter; the navarchs and trierarchs of the Misene fleet set up a dedication to Caracallus, both to commemorate the victory and possibly to indicate their gratitude for Septimius' leniency in 193.⁸⁷

In 197 Severus sailed east from Brundisium for his Parthian war; later he made a trip by sea to his homeland of Africa; and the last years of his life he spent campaigning along the northern coasts of Britain with the British fleet in support.⁸⁸ At his death the complex geographical and administrative frame of imperial sea power still stood in its entirety. After the extensive alterations at the hands of Vespasian, the fleets grew older decade by decade without fundamental change: ancient discipline trained anew recruits to fill the places of discharged veterans; the dockyards replaced old ships with new; praefect succeeded praefect in the unending, unvarying wheel of administration. Hardened tradition carried the navy on, and enabled it to meet the strain of the year 193; the siege of Byzantium indicated that the imperial fleets still controlled the Mediterranean. The greater stresses to come, however, were to show that the imperial appreciation of sea power had slowly died, and in this decay Dio's derisive remarks regarding the military training of the Misene sailors are an indicative signpost. They are somewhat unjust, for the sailors were not expected to be first-rate soldiers and had not been that in 69; yet they do, in view of what was to come, suggest a lethargic decline in the naval discipline.

For a time those inscriptions of Asia Minor which hailed members of the Severan house as "masters of land and sea" do not too much belie the truth.⁸⁹ In this period the navy appears chiefly in its old role as auxiliary in the eastern wars, which grew steadily more dangerous and frequent after the Sasanids had swept away the Parthian state. In 214 Caracallus moved ponderously east along a carefully prepared route which apparently included a crossing by sea from Ravenna to Altinum; at the Hellespont an accident sank the imperial galley, and Caracallus was saved by an unnamed *praefectus classis*. Coins of Nicaea ascribed the rescue to Serapis, who is there shown aboard a galley with the Emperor.⁹⁰ Imperial coinage overlooked the contretemps, but both praetorian fleets re-

ceived at this time the titles *pia vindex* which they bore through the rest of the century.⁹¹ Apart from this grant, which attests the activity of the two Italian fleets, there is other evidence for extensive naval movements during this campaign against the Parthians. The Alexandrian fleet possibly came north to Philippi to aid in the ferrying of troops; war machines were shipped from Nicomedia, where Caracallus wintered in 214-215, to Syria; and a trierarch of the Ravennate fleet died at Berytus in the last years of Caracallus' reign. The senator Marcius Agrippa, praefect probably of the Misene fleet, was in the East at the time of Caracallus' murder, in which he was an accomplice.⁹²

Under Elagabalus (218-222) the forces brought east by Caracallus retraced their steps to the West,⁹³ but again in 231-233 the Emperor and his guard were summoned to the eastern frontier. Although Severus Alexander and his mother Julia Mamaea proceeded by land, the bulk of the Misene fleet also sailed east, for C. Sulgius Caecilianus acted as *praepositus reliquationis* of the Misene fleet and oversaw the shipping of imperial monies and court supplies from Italy.⁹⁴ As sea-borne commerce declined, the use of the fleets in transport and even in supply presumably gained in importance. In this same reign the first signs of piracy and unrest in the Mediterranean appear. The Aegean, it seems, was particularly affected, for a certain P. Sallustius Sempronius Victor, who was honored by Cos for his services, received an extraordinary naval command with the *ius gladii* to ensure "the peace of the whole sea," i. e. of the Aegean. About this time Dio in nearby Nicaea was writing that "pirates are always with us."⁹⁵

Under Gordian III (238-244), who gave the fleets the meaningless title *Gordiana*, the Mediterranean squadrons performed their last service of the traditional variety. Coins bearing the legend *Traiectus Aug* with the type of soldiers and a standard aboard a trireme suggest that when the Emperor and the praetorians traveled east for the Persian wars of 243-244, he moved partly by sea, possibly from Thrace to Syria.⁹⁶ A Jewish tradition speaks of large naval forces in the war, and the detachments of the praetorian fleets left behind in Italy could be combined under one *praepositus reliquationis*, C. Iulius Alexander, who later became

praefect of the *classis praetoria Misenensis pia vindex Philippiana*. Before this war the brother of the succeeding Emperor Philip, C. Iulius Priscus, seems to have commanded vexillations of a praetorian fleet, possibly to check piracy.⁹⁷

Philip himself (244-249) seriously tried to restore peace to the empire. Of naval activities as such we are not informed, but in his need Philip used even sailors to police the land; an Umbrian inscription to "Victory" names twenty sailors detached from the Ravennate fleet under an *evocatus* of the Sixth Praetorian Cohort to hunt down a robber on the Flaminian Way in 246.⁹⁸ Throughout the period from the death of Septimius Severus in 211 to the murder of Philip in 249, conditions grew steadily worse in the Mediterranean. The visible inflation of the currency which began with the *Antoniniani* of Caracallus, the impositions on private shipowners for the purpose of state transport, the exactions and taxes of every type—all these had joined with the general political and economic insecurity to decrease sea-borne commerce. At the same time, the increasing difficulty of living by trade or agriculture again forced the poor and encouraged the daring to renew piratical raids on a scale not known since the first century before Christ. Yet the war fleets seem to have grown smaller as their names became longer; in the financial embarrassment of the early third century naval funds apparently were diverted to the pressing problems of the frontier defense. The emperors, that is, canceled their insurance just before the conflagration, for though the general situation in 249 in comparison with the world of the Antonines presented striking decay, the next two decades proved that the reign of Philip was but the prelude to chaos.

During the upheavals in the empire from Decius to Aurelian (249-270) the use of temporary expedients seems the keynote in every field; whatever means promised success were speedily adopted and as quickly discarded if they failed. The emperors, specially Gallienus (253-268), used any military units which could be improvised and thus gradually formed a mobile field army composed chiefly of cavalry.⁹⁹ The formal organization of the past, in so far as it was insufficient or decadent, was abandoned, but a new system awaited the peace of Diocletian.

So far as we can discern, the naval forces of the empire were subject to the same tendencies of destruction in these murky decades. Old units vanished or underwent startling changes; some temporary formations of new types appeared; wide areas turned to local strong men to counter piracy and barbarian marauders, like that Valerius Statilius Castus who was thanked by Termessus in Pamphylia for "providing peace by land and by sea."¹⁰⁰ This activity, however, did not give rise to a new naval structure which would be more closely adapted to the changed world; the Augustan navy collapsed, but only on the northern frontiers did a solid substitute take the place of its fragments. Hampered by universal war, the emperors of this period tended to abandon the Mediterranean to pirates and barbarians.

The nature of Roman naval power in the last half of the third century is best illustrated in the Gothic invasions, the most serious challenge to the peace of the Mediterranean from the battle of Actium to the invasion of the Vandals in the fifth century. In its earliest attacks the mass of German tribes north of the Danube struck at Roman territory by land. About 254 the Borani carried out the first of the sea invasions by forcing the natives of the Bosphorus to transport them to the Pontic coast of the Black Sea. This attack was stemmed at Pityus, and the barbarians, who had sent back their ships, barely succeeded in regaining the northern shore of the Euxine, a region in which Roman control had already been broken.¹⁰¹ On their next expedition they took Pityus, and Trapezus as well. Inflamed by the loot, the Goths themselves had their slaves and merchants build light boats, with which they coasted in 256 along Moesia and Thrace to Byzantium. On this trial expedition they pushed their devastation no farther than the coast cities of Bithynia.¹⁰² For the next decade the Goths apparently neglected the sea.

The accounts of the succeeding invasions, based on Dexippus, are so badly conflated and epitomized that a certain sequence of events cannot be established. In 267 the Goths seem to have ravaged Bithynia and Lydia, to have sacked Nicomedia and Ephesus among other cities, and finally to have been met by the Palmyrene prince Odenathus, before whom they hastily retreated. They

were also said to have lost a naval battle.¹⁰³ In 268 came an even greater foray, when the Heruli with some Goths set sail from the Danube, in five hundred light boats according to Syncellus. By this time the Emperor Gallienus had made a personal visit to Byzantium and had taken steps to improve the Roman defense in the area. Two natives of Byzantium, Cleodamus and Athenaeus, had been charged with the fortification of the Thracian cities exposed to the Goths; a certain Venerianus organized a naval force and defeated the invaders in the Propontis. His death in the battle, however, temporarily demoralized the Roman fleet, and the barbarians made their way on into the Aegean. They were repelled from Athens by the citizen *ephebi* under the historian Dexippus; the imperial fleets, now under Cleodamus and Athenaeus, checked them at sea; and Gallienus killed a great number returning by land through Thrace.¹⁰⁴

The revolt of Aureolus in Italy forced him to abandon the campaign half-completed, and a decisive settlement awaited his successor Claudius (268–270) in the next year. A brilliant attempt has recently been made to prove that the events of 268 and 269, as recorded in our miserable sources, refer to one single invasion in 268 which Gallienus crippled and Claudius annihilated, but the proof has not been solid; the accounts of the two years are not identical in all respects, and the history of any frontier at this time will show that if the barbarians invaded one year they might invade again in the following spring, striking even at the same points.¹⁰⁵ Certainly, fresh naval forces did pass through the Hellespont in 269, this time without any Roman opposition. As the conventional account for this year tells the story, the barbarians halted near Mount Athos to repair their ships, which had collided in the swift Hellespont, and then made their way safely to Cassandra and Thessalonica, where the greater part disembarked and besieged the two cities. These the Emperor Claudius annihilated and so gained his title *Gothicus*; those who remained on the fleet found all the cities of Thessaly and Greece fortified, and attacked the islands Rhodes, Crete, and Cyprus. They were defeated in several battles by a fleet under Tenagino Probus, governor of Egypt; one of the plagues endemic in the Mediterranean since the

period of Marcus Aurelius struck them; and only a remnant returned home.¹⁰⁶ By this time the empire was slowly moving toward a new stability; Aurelian (270-275) regained Gaul and the East, and within ten years of his death Diocletian held the throne.

The naval forces which met the Goths cannot be identified with previously existing forces. The squadron of Venerianus seems a new creation conscripted probably from the seacoast cities, which served Rome again as they had served it in the first century before Christ. Its commanders were in part supplied by the army, for an inscription of this dark period mentions an officer who served for a time as *tribunus liburnorum*.¹⁰⁷ In 268 the fleet did good service, but its failure to appear early in 269 suggests that the various ships had returned to their native cities during the winter; Tenagino Probus perhaps reformed and reinforced it with Phoenician vessels, incorporating any remnants of the Alexandrian and Syrian flotillas which may have survived. This reconstruction of imperial naval power in the East seems the direct result of Gallienus' visit, but the effort was essentially ephemeral. The invasion of the Palmyrene queen Zenobia swept it away, and no new units of permanent character appear thereafter in the eastern Mediterranean during the remainder of the century.¹⁰⁸

The Italian fleets could have given scant assistance against the Goths, for they were already engaged in the West, where various extraordinary officers, such as L. Artorius Castus, *praepositus* of the Misene fleet, attempted to maintain order.¹⁰⁹ About 260 Gallienus appointed M. Cornelius Octavianus both praefect of the Misene fleet and also *dux* of Africa, Numidia, and Mauretania to cope with a formidable revolt of the native Bavares under a certain Faraxen. In this mission he was apparently successful, for the "splendidissimus ordo municipi Bisicensis" set up an inscription to him as "patrono incomparabili ob merita."¹¹⁰ While the navy was busied with such pressing tasks, the seas lay open to the strong; some Franks settled in Thrace seized vessels and made a marauding trip through the Mediterranean to the Straits of Gibraltar and so to their homeland. This journey is placed in the reign of Probus (276-282).¹¹¹

Of the ten squadrons in existence in 230, only three remained when Diocletian became Emperor at Nicomedia in 285. The provincial fleets of the Mediterranean had vanished forever; on the northern frontier the *classis Britannica* alone had endured through the barbarian invasions so far as we can discern. To compare Diocletian and Constantine with Augustus, and then to reproach the founders of the Later Empire for choosing not to support a great navy would be unjust for many reasons. Mediterranean commerce had so decayed that its protection became less openly essential, and the Later Empire, a "deficit institution," had no funds for the unessential. Even more important, Augustus had found a navy already evolved, but Diocletian succeeded to a period in which a navy had been destroyed. Accordingly no great navy rose to match the reinvigorated army of Diocletian and Constantine. Naval forces on the northern frontier were yet necessary and continued as long as Rome held the waterways; the carefully organized squadrons of the Early Empire, however, gave way to new, smaller flotillas, each based on a single port and patrolling a small area. The praetorian fleets had been too great to disappear suddenly; an inscription set up to Diocletian in 302 by the praefect of the *classis praetoria Misenensis* may even suggest some reorganization of the Italian fleets.¹¹²

These squadrons were presumably used by the tyrant of Rome, Maxentius, in 311 to restore his control of Africa, but they could not hold the mastery of the Tyrrhenian for him against Constantine's fleet in 312; now as earlier an invader of Italy found it essential to cut off the grain supply of Rome by blockading the west coast ports.¹¹³ Sea power also played an important part in the campaign of Constantine against Licinius in 324 which brings to an end the period of unrest after Diocletian's abdication. Each Emperor recruited as large a fleet as possible, Constantine gathering from Greece or building some two hundred *triakontors*, which assembled at the Piraeus, Licinius levying three hundred and fifty triremes from Egypt, Phoenicia, and Asia Minor. When Licinius was defeated by Constantine at Adrianople and fell back on Byzantium, the fleet of Constantine under his son Crispus defeated the Licinian flotilla under Abantus in a two-day

battle off the entrance to the Hellespont and thus blockaded Byzantium by sea. Licinius fled across the Propontis and tried to prevent a hostile landing on the Asia Minor coast; but Constantine again used the fleet, with other transports, for the crossing which brought him final victory.¹¹⁴

This campaign of 324 clearly marks the disappearance of the Augustan navy as an effective force, for neither of the hastily-levied squadrons shows any traces of the old fleets. The Italian squadrons officially lasted through the fourth century, for they appear in the *Notitia Dignitatum*; but they lost their title *praetoria* when the capital was removed from Rome.¹¹⁵ Toward the end of the century Vegetius speaks of the imperial navy in the past tense, and apologizes for a somewhat scanty attention to naval affairs, "quia dudum pacato mari cum barbaris nationibus agitur terrestre certamen."¹¹⁶

Eventually the emperors of the Eastern Roman Empire at Constantinople again built up permanent fleets to maintain their control of the eastern seas, and even to aid their attempts at reconquest in the West; and in such a work as the *Tactica* of the Emperor Leo VI, composed early in the ninth century, appears a minute attention to the instruments of sea power which would not have been out of place in the Augustan period. The tradition of the Early Empire so far persisted, but a direct continuity in the mechanical details cannot be established; the fourth century marks a very real break in this respect.¹¹⁷ The Roman and the Byzantine navies seem two successive flowerings of the ancestral naval skill of the Aegean, parallel but not innately related; at most the Roman sailors preserved some otherwise forgotten parts of Hellenistic naval lore for the Byzantine dromonds. The West, which lacked the reservoir of the Aegean, abandoned the sea to the Vandals in the fifth century, and the squadrons of Misenum and Ravenna ceased even to be formal entries on the army register.

NOTES

1 On the Hellenistic age, W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments*, p. 142, observes: "No Power maintained a standing fleet, that is,

one always in commission, with one possible exception [Egypt]. . . . What is called the command of the sea, at this time, only meant that the Power who claimed it had a good prospect, if challenged, of getting a fleet to sea which might defeat the challenger."

2 A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783* (Boston, 1890), p. iii. Note also his remarks, *ibid.* p. 191, on sea power and the League of Augsburg.

3 Christian Courtois, "Les politiques navales de l'Empire romain," *Revue historique* 186 (1939), pp. 17-47. Courtois is interested especially in the role of naval forces in the German invasions, which was to have been published in a sequel. He is influenced particularly by Mommsen's erroneous notion of a reorganization of the navy by Claudius (above, p. 66), and fails to see the superiority of the Italian fleets, which is marked throughout imperial history. The abolition of the *quaestores classici* by Claudius, it may be noted, was of more administrative than naval significance (Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten*, pp. 247-248).

4 Tac., *Ann.* 1. 9.

5 Although there is no direct evidence, his participation is likely; see especially Rudolf Daniel, *M. Vipsanius Agrippa* (Breslau, 1933), pp. 40-41.

6 Eugène de Saint-Denis, *Le Rôle de la mer dans la poésie latine* (Paris, 1935), pp. 251-278, 478.

7 Fronto, *Ad amicos* 1. 3 (ed. Haines [Loeb Library] 1, p. 280); Saint-Denis, *op. cit.* p. 485, notices a similar concept of the sea in Latin verse.

8 Appian, *Ill.* 16-30; Pliny, *H. N.* 3. 152; Mommsen, *Die Provinzen*, p. 184; above, pp. 115, 138.

9 *Res Gestae* 13 (cf. Suet., *Aug.* 22); Strabo 3. 2. 5; Horace, *Odes* 4. 5. 17-20; Philo, *Leg. ad Gaium* 145-147: "This [Augustus] is the man who swept the seas of pirate skiffs and filled it with commerce." Propertius 3. 4. 1, 11. 59 sqq. is in part relevant. On the Augustan peace, see Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, pp. 30-31, 43-63. "Master of land and sea" and "benefactor and savior of the whole world" are linked in dedications to Augustus and his family (*IGR* 3. 718, 719, 721; Lycia). Note also *Res Gestae* 3-4; Philo, *In Flaccum* 104.

10 Sardinia: Dio 55. 28. 1; Tac., *Ann.* 2. 85, who uses the term "latrocinii." Ormerod, *Piracy*, p. 257 n. 2, likewise considers them simple brigands. Adriatic: Dio 55. 29. 4. Fiebiger's argument, p. 296, is accepted by Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit* 1, pp. 649-650.

11 Philo, *Leg. ad Gaium* 141; Pliny, *H. N.* 2. 117-118, 27. 3; Persius 5. 141-142; Plutarch, *De tranq. animi* 469e; Epictetus 3. 13. 9.

12 Horace, *Odes* 1. 1. 13-18, 1. 31. 10-15; *idem*, *Satires* 1. 1. 6-7; Persius 5. 146-148, 6. 27-31; Petronius, *Satyr.* 76, 114; Martial 4. 66. 14, 5. 42. 6; Juvenal 12. 17-81, 14. 256-302; Plutarch, *De tranq. animi* 466c; *Revelation of St. John* 17-19; Aristides, *Orat.* 45. 33 (ed. Keil). Of the references to piracy in Imperial literature, Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius* 3. 23-24, relates to a previous incarnation of Apollonius; Seneca, *De clem.* 2. 4, is a literary figure; Firm. Mat., *Math.* 3. 4. 23 and *passim*, refers to Ptolemaic Egypt according to Cumont, *L'Égypte des astrologues*, p. 65 n. 3.

13 *Dig.* 4. 9. 3. 1 and 47. 9. 3 (Labeo), 14. 2. 3 (Paulus). See Rodolphe Dareste, "La Lex Rhodia," *Revue de philologie* 29 (1905), pp. 1-29; Hans Kreller, "Lex Rhodia," *Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht* 85 (1921), pp. 257-367. Wreckers on shore: *Dig.* 14. 2. 9; Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.* 7. 31-32, 51-53; Petronius, *Satyr.* 114.

14 Tac., *Ann.* 4. 27; Veg. 4. 31 emphasizes that the two Italian fleets might guard the city of Rome.

15 Ostia and Puteoli each had detachments of the Roman city troops after Claudius; see Suet., *Claud.* 25, and Baillie Reynolds, *The Vigiles*, pp. 107-115.

16 Suet., *Aug.* 98.

17 E. g., Friedrich Oertel, *CAH* 10, pp. 382-389; *CAH* 12, pp. 232-235. The older view: Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, pp. 63, 83, 103, 199; Tenney Frank, *Rome and Italy of the Empire* (Baltimore, 1940; *Economic Survey* 5), pp. 267-270; F. M. Heichelheim, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums* (Leyden, 1938), does not deal explicitly with the matter, but on pp. 677-682, 708, seems to hold a similar view.

18 Mahan, who placed the chief necessity for sea power upon "a peaceful and extensive commerce," was puzzled by the Romans, inasmuch as they did not have the necessary "aptitude for commercial pursuits" (*Influence of Sea Power*, pp. 26, 50). The resolution of the crux results from the fact that Roman subjects had such an aptitude, and that the emperors protected it.

19 Werner Schur, *Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero* (Leipzig, 1923; *Klio*, Beih. 15); the theory is sufficiently criticized by J. G. C. Anderson, *CAH* 10, pp. 880-884.

20 Louis Bonnard, *La Navigation intérieure de la Gaule*, pp. 122-134; Hermann Aubin, *Bonner Jahrbücher* 130 (1925), pp. 3-4.

21 Modern opinion of the results varies. J. G. C. Anderson, *CAH* 10, pp. 247-253, 881-883, is among the most conservative and doubts that Adana was even taken by the Romans; see above, p. 113.

22 Mommsen, *Die Provinzen*, pp. 476-479, 598-619; E. H. Warmington, *The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India* (Cambridge, 1928); Rostovtzeff, *Archiv* 4 (1908), pp. 298-315; *idem*, *Storia economica*, pp. 62, 105-109; Heinz Kortenbeutel, *Der ägyptische Süd- und Osthandel in der Politik der Ptolemäer und römischen Kaiser* (Berlin, 1931).

23 Horace, *Epp.* 1. 1. 45. Heichelheim, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums*, pp. 683-686, unduly emphasizes the disastrous effects of this trade on the Roman monetary system, but his general point is not without validity.

24 Dio 53. 26. 4 presents a clear-cut instance of Roman traders being protected beyond the Roman frontier, presumably as Roman subjects rather than specifically as traders, but the result was essentially the same.

25 Tac., *Ann.* 3. 54, a speech of Tiberius. The attention of Augustus: *Res Gestae* 5; G. H. Stevenson, *CAH* 10, p. 202. Of Tiberius: Tac., *Ann.* 4. 6, 6. 13. Of Gaius: Jos., *Ant.* 19. 2. 5. Of Claudius: Gaius, *Inst.* 1. 32c; Tac., *Ann.* 11. 4, 11. 26, 12. 43; Suet., *Claud.* 18; Dio 60. 31.

26 BGU 27 (Wilcken 445); cf. Suet., *Nero* 20. 3. It is unlikely that the *naves tabellariae* which preceded the grain fleet (Seneca, *Epp.* 77. 1-3) were warships, unless they had specially strong masts to bear the *sipae* or topsails. The grain fleet: Waltzing, *Les Corporations professionnelles* 2, pp. 51-52 and *passim* (followed by Stoeckle s.v. "navicularii" [PW]), with Wilcken, *Grundzüge* 1. 1, pp. 379-380; a different view, Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, pp. 185-187. The African grain fleet was organized as a state service by Commodus; see Waltzing, *op. cit.* 2, pp. 37-38; J. M. Heer, "Der historische Wert der vita Commodi," *Philologus* Suppl. 9 (1904), pp. 106-108.

27 Nero: Tac., *Ann.* 16. 2, 14; cf. Philo, *In Flaccum* 110. Augustus: *IG XII* 5. 941 (Tenos), "praef tesserar in Asia nav"; Hirschfeld, *Jahreshefte* 5 (1902), pp. 149-151. Hadrian: XIV 2045, "proc pugillationis et ad naves vagas"; see Reincke s.v. "Nachrichtenwesen (PW)". From III 3 (Lutri), it appears that *tabellarii* might proceed by private ships; cf. Ernest Desjardins, "Les Tabellarii," *Bibl. de l'Ecole des hautes études* 35 (1878), pp. 51-81.

28 Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, p. 441. The Misene fleet presumably main-

tained communication with Capri under Tiberius (Tac., *Ann.* 4. 67, 6. 1; Suet., *Tib.* 62).

29 Augustus: Suet., *Aug.* 17, 72, 82, 92, 97-98. Germanicus: Tac., *Ann.* 2. 53-55. Tiberius: Tac., *Ann.* 4. 67, 6. 1; Suet., *Tib.* 72. Gaius: Suet., *Gaius* 14-15, 23, 37, 47; Pliny, *H. N.* 32. 4; Dio 59. 25. 2. Claudius: Suet., *Claud.* 17; Dio 60. 21. 3. Nero: Suet., *Nero* 27; Tac., *Ann.* 15. 51, *Hist.* 1. 23; Dio 63. 8-19; *BMC Corinth* (1889), pp. 70-71 nos. 567, 571; *BMC Alexandria* (1892), p. 21 no. 176; Joseph Vogt, *Die alexandrinischen Münzen* (Stuttgart, 1924) 2, p. 11. State vessels possibly transported Gaius Caesar to the East (Orosius 7. 3. 4-5) and Tiberius to Rhodes (Suet., *Tib.* 10-11).

30 Tac., *Ann.* 14. 3-5; Suet., *Nero* 34; Léon Herrmann, "A Propos du navire d' Agrippine," *Revue des études anciennes* 29 (1927), pp. 68-70. The disaster of the Misene fleet in 64 (Tac., *Ann.* 15. 46) probably resulted from orders concerning imperial transport.

31 Wilhelm Weber, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Hadrianus* (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 86-276; *idem*, *CAH* 11, pp. 318-319. Imperial coinage bearing galley types: Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire* 3 (1936), s.v. "Galley" in Index III; *BMC Alexandria*, p. 80 no. 672, p. 101 no. 871; Vogt, *Alexandrinische Münzen*, pp. 43, 45-46; P. L. Strack, *Untersuchungen zur römischen Reichsprägung des zweiten Jahrhunderts* 2 (Stuttgart, 1933), *passim*. These and other ship coins of the second century correspond too closely with actual voyages for me to agree with Alföldi, *Festival of Isis*, pp. 53-56, that they are purely symbols of the ship of Felicity. For the third century, on the other hand, his interpretation of such types seems correct.

32 Fronto, *De fer. Als.* 3 (ed. Haines [Loeb Library] 2, p. 4). The *hexeres Ops* of the Misene fleet was probably the imperial flagship on such occasions.

33 Tac., *Ann.* 4. 27, 2. 55; cf. Philo, *In Flaccum* 153-155, and Jos., *Ant.* 14. 376-378.

34 Gnaeus Piso returned to Ancona from Syria by ship (Tac., *Ann.* 2. 69-70, 75, 78-81, 3. 9), and Calpurnius Asprenas sailed to the East via Cythera (Tac., *Hist.* 2. 9). A galley may have carried Pliny the Younger to Ephesus (*Epp.* 10. 15); by law (*Dig.* 1. 16. 4. 4) the proconsuls of Asia had to come to Ephesus by sea. The Emperor Gaius advised his friend Herod to sail from Puteoli to Alexandria (Philo, *In Flaccum* 26-27; Pliny, *H. N.* 19. 3).

35 For Hadrian, see Wilhelm Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (3d ed.; Leipzig, 1915), no. 838. Vespasian sailed from Alexandria to Rhodes on a transport and thence on a trireme to Brundisium (Jos., *B. I.* 7. 21-22; Dio 66. 9. 2); Titus came by way of Rhegium to Puteoli (Jos., *B. I.* 7. 116-119; Suet., *Titus* 5). The specific references to the character of the ships suggest that the incidents were exceptional.

36 Claudius: Pliny, *H. N.* 9. 62; Macrobius, *Sat.* 3. 16. 10. Vitellius: Suet., *Vitel.* 13.

37 Tac., *Ann.* 14. 11; Mommsen, *Römisches Strafrecht*, pp. 973-974.

38 Suet., *Nero* 34. 2-3; Tac., *Ann.* 14. 3-11, 15. 51; Dio 62. 13. 1. Tiberius: Suet., *Tib.* 62.

39 Peace, indeed, always remained the aim of the Roman state, but that *pax* was from the days of Augustus a defensive, vigilant concept resting on the humbling of dangerous neighbors and the prevention of hostile combinations. Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.* 1. 27, gives a superb, compact expression of this doctrine of preparedness.

40 J. Holland Rose, *The Mediterranean in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1933), especially pp. 119-120, 145-146. On the difficulties of land transport, cf. Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, pp. 437-441.

41 Tiberius: Suet., *Tib.* 65; Dio 58. 13. 1. In 14 Tiberius planned to sail to Gaul or Illyricum if necessary (Tac., *Ann.* 1. 47). Gaius: Suet., *Gaius* 51. Nero: Suet., *Nero* 47; Dio 63. 27. 2.

42 Tac., *Ann.* 14. 62-63, 15. 51.

43 Formation by Nero: Tac., *Hist.* 1. 6; Plut., *Galba* 15. 3. Harshness of Galba: Plut., *Galba* 15. 3-4; Suet., *Galba* 12, and Dio 64. 3. 1-2 state that they were decimated; Tac., *Hist.* 1. 6, gives merely "tot milibus." Discharge: Dips. 7-9. The formal organization of the legion took place on this date or a day immediately preceding. See Tac., *Hist.* 1. 44, 82, 87; Nesselhauf in *CIL XVI ad Dip.* 7 (quoting Mommsen, *CIL III*, p. 2014); Ritterling s.v. "legio" (PW), cols. 1381-1382. On the wars, see G. H. Stevenson, *CAH* 10, pp. 808-839 (with bibliography, p. 990); B. W. Henderson, *Civil War and Rebellion in the Roman Empire A. D. 69-70* (London, 1908).

44 Tac., *Hist.* 1. 31, 36.

45 *Ibid.* 2. 11, 17, 22. These Misene sailors hoped to become legionaries (*ibid.* 2. 101).

46 *Ibid.* 1. 87; Henderson, *Civil War and Rebellion*, pp. 50-52, 73-79; Stevenson, *CAH* 10, pp. 820-821.

47 Tac., *Agr.* 7, *Hist.* 2. 12-15, 28.

48 Tac., *Hist.* 2. 14, 16. The local naval commander, who opposed the rebellion, was killed in its first stages.

49 *Ibid.* 2. 43, 34-36 (cf. 3. 14). The sailors on the Po deserted or were taken as Ortho's cause grew more hopeless (2. 17, 22). Vitellius sent the legion I Adiutrix to Spain, where it revolted on Vespasian's rebellion (3. 44).

50 *Ibid.* 2. 100, 3. 57.

51 Tac., *Hist.* 2. 82; Jos., *B. I.* 4. 620-621, 630-632, who reports that the impending winter deterred Mucianus from transporting his troops by sea from Syria.

52 Tac., *Hist.* 2. 83. The council of Berytus had left him the choice between advance by land or by sea from Byzantium. He actually moved by land.

53 Dio 65. 9. 2, who misses the point of the embargo. Rome, at least, was alarmed, and Vitellius struck reassuring coins at the Roman mint for *Annona Aug* and *Ceres* (Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire* 1, p. 375 no. 47, p. 381 no. 71). Oath to Vespasian: Tac., *Hist.* 2. 79; Jos., *B. I.* 4. 616-617.

54 Tac., *Hist.* 3. 8, also 2. 82; Suet., *Vesp.* 7. 1; Jos., *B. I.* 4. 605-607.

55 Tac., *Hist.* 3. 48. This program shows that Vespasian's scheme was not as passive as Henderson, *Civil War and Rebellion*, pp. 150-154, considers it. The eastern fleets, it may be noted, are mentioned in every summary of Vespasian's strength by Tacitus (*Hist.* 2. 4, 76, 84) and precede the auxiliaries on two occasions.

56 The letters of Vespasian by which Claudius Faventinus secured the revolt of the Misene fleet (Tac., *Hist.* 3. 57) were forged, but their acceptance by the sailors may indicate previous secret communication; the action of the Ravennate fleet, which is much clearer, is noticed immediately below in the text. The council: *ibid.* 3. 1-2.

57 *Ibid.* 2. 100-101, 3. 4, 12-13. He was perhaps a native of some north Italian town, such as Aquileia, and had been procurator of Dalmatia for a brief time; see Syme, "The Colony of Cornelius Fuscus: an Episode in the *Bellum Neronis*," *American Journal of Philology* 58 (1937), pp. 7-18.

58 Tac., *Hist.* 3. 6, 13, 36, 40, 42, 52.

59 *Ibid.* 3. 55-58. The detachment at Forum Iulii also went over to Vespasian (3. 41-43) and captured Valens, fleeing after the second battle of Bedriacum.

60 *Ibid.* 3. 76-77; Suet., *Vitel.* 15. 2, erroneously assigns him the praefecture of the fleet.

61 Dio 66. 9. 2.

62 Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire* 2, p. xlvii, and the numerous coins s.v. "Victoria Navalis" in the Index. Vespasian may also have intended some parallel with Actium, but this motive was distinctly secondary.

63 Tac., *Hist.* 3. 50; Dips. 10-11; Nesselhauf in *CIL XVI ad Dip.* 10; Ritterling s.v. "legio" (PW), cols. 1438-1439. On Vespasian's problems at this time, cf. M. P. Charlesworth, *CAH* 11, pp. 3-5.

64 Dips. 12-16; above, p. 94. In these diplomas Sextus Lucilius Bassus is named as praefect *honoris causa*; he was not liked by the Ravennate fleet, and Vespasian had sent him to Judaea, where he died in 71. See Jos., *B. I.* 7. 163, 252; *Prosop.*¹ 2, p. 302 no. 383; Fiebiger, pp. 399-400.

65 Dip. 17, granted to a Pannonian. Nesselhauf in *CIL XVI ad Dip.* 17 rightly rejects Mommsen's view that these were further Ravennate sailors but suggests that the diploma rewarded sailors of the Syrian fleet for the battle on Lake Gennesareth (above, p. 122 n. 25). Josephus is silent on the presence of such sailors, and the service of a Pannonian in the Syrian fleet would be strange.

66 The earliest diploma containing the term *praetoria* is of 114 (Dip. 60), but Fiebiger, pp. 298-300, conjectured that Vespasian bestowed it. The Misene inscriptions referred to on p. 71 have proved this, for they all bear the title.

67 Above, pp. 110, 132, 139, 146.

68 Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire* 3, p. 14 no. 86, pp. 16-19. The reverse shows clasped hands holding a legionary eagle which rests on a prow. The coinage of Didius Iulianus, bearing the same type and issued under much the same circumstances, does not have the prow; see Harold Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham, *The Roman Imperial Coinage* 4. 1 (London, 1936), p. 16 no. 5, etc. In the intervening century the lessons of 68-69 had lost their effect in more than one way.

69 Republican fleets had carried about eighty marines per trireme, and one hundred and twenty for a quinquereme, but these marines were usually shipped especially for the battle. Probably some sixty galleys of the types used in the imperial fleets could transport a legion of over five thousand men on a long journey.

70 Tac., *Hist.* 1. 31. Five and six days were records for the trip from the Sicilian Straits (Pliny, *H. N.* 19. 3).

71 Cichorius, *Die Traianssäule*, plates 58-64. The exact route is much argued, but a long journey around Greece to the Danube is highly improbable. See Petersen, *Dakische Kriege* 2, pp. 11-41; Roberto Paribeni, *Optimus Princeps* (Messina, 1926) 1, pp. 280-288; H. Stuart Jones, *Papers of the British School at Rome* 5 (1910), pp. 444-451; Patsch, *SB Wien* 217, pp. 95-97.

72 Joannes Malalas, *Chron.*, pp. 270-272 (ed. Dindorf); Dio 68. 17. 2; R. P. Longden, *CAH* 11, p. 241. For the return journey he re-embarked at Seleucia in 117 but died at Selinus (Dio 68. 33). On Trajan's nautical interests, cf. Pliny, *Pan.* 81-82. The war: R. P. Longden, "Notes on the Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS* 21 (1931), pp. 1-35; Adolf Gunther, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kriege zwischen Römern und Parthern* (Berlin, 1922).

73 Dip. 60; Helen McClees, "A Military Diploma of Trajan," *American Journal of Archaeology* 30 (1926), pp. 418-421. The . . . *ldriere* is certain; one would have expected the *hexeres Ops*.

74 Sidon, *BMC Phoenicia* (1910), p. 180 nos. 218-223 (A.D. 116/117); Dura, *ibid.* pp. 117-118 nos. 30-32 of 111/112, no. 39 under Hadrian, nos. 40 and 42

under Antoninus Pius. Laodicea, *IG* III 479; Tripolis, *IG* III 622; Tyre, *IG* XIV 830 of 174. The exact meaning of this word is difficult to determine, and I advance the suggestion in the text only as a possible explanation. A connection with the *navigium Isidis* seems most improbable.

75 Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 4. 2. 3-5; *idem*, *Chron.* (trans. Jerome) Ol. 223; Dio 68. 32. 1-3; Longden, *CAH* 11, pp. 249-251. Turbo: Dip. 60; *Prosop.*¹ 2, p. 339 no. 179.

76 Cohort I classica: X 6674 under Nero (Ritterling *s.v.* "legio" [PW], col. 1263), and XIII 924, both natives of Forum Iulii. The *cohors classica* named in an inscription from Forum Iulii itself (*AE* 1904. 7) may be the same cohort. Cohort II classica: III 6687 of Augustus' principate. Cohort I Aelia classica: A. R. Burn, *The Romans in Britain* (Oxford, 1932), p. 111. See Cichorius *s.v.* "cohors" (PW), cols. 272-273.

77 Hadrian: PSI 1026; Wilcken, *Archiv* 9 (1928), p. 81, does not agree that these twenty-two veterans were transferred in 132-135. Earlier transfer: Wilcken 463; Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte*, pp. 207-312, 317; Degraasi, *Aegyptus* 10 (1929), pp. 252-253. This case is not proved. The tract *Liber de munitionibus castrorum*, ascribed to Hyginus and dated by Domaszewski and others in the early second century, lists in its three-legion camp five hundred Misene and eight hundred Ravennate sailors, who were used for road-building (cc. 24, 30). Although the pamphlet seems some person's ideal scheme rather than a reflection of current military practice, this suggested use of the sailors indicates the peace of the Mediterranean, and the tendency to draw off "useless" naval personnel.

78 Ritterling in "Epigraphische Beiträge zur römischen Geschichte 2," *Rheinisches Museum* 59 (1904), pp. 190-196; above, p. 20. The coins are listed in Mattingly-Sydenham, *The Roman Imperial Coinage* 3, pp. 319-320 nos. 1325-1340. *IGR* 1. 1046 (above, p. 40) must be assigned to this period and shows that the fleet touched at Alexandria. The character of Verus' operations is well discussed by Pierre Lambrechts, "L'Empereur Lucius Verus. Essai de réhabilitation," *L'Antiquité classique* 3 (1934), pp. 173-201.

79 Coins in the Parthian war of Lucius Verus: Amastris, *BMC Pontus*, p. 89 no. 32; Cyzicus, *BMC Mysia*, p. 49 no. 229. See particularly Clemens Bosch, "Kleinasiatische Münzen der römischen Kaiserzeit," *Jahrbuch des deut. arch. Inst.* AA 46 (1931), cols. 422-455, and his *Die kleinasiatischen Münzen der römischen Kaiserzeit* 2. 1. 1 (Stuttgart, 1935), pp. 94-99. Franz Schehl in "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Antoninus Pius," *Hermes* 65 (1930), p. 193 n. 1, suggests that a Nicomedian coin with the legend *στόλος* under Antoninus Pius is connected with the military preparations for a threatened war with the Parthians (139-144), and refers to the formation of a transport fleet. Although this is endorsed by Bosch, *Kleinasiatische Münzen* 2. 1. 1, pp. 239-241, Gebhard *s.v.* "Stolos" (PW) is probably more correct in considering the coin as representing Nicomedian commerce generally. As this instance suggests, the evidence of naval types, though extremely valuable in the later period, may not be pressed too far; some cities customarily figured a prow or trireme, or Neptune, and on some occasions such emblems appear on coins when no naval activity can be determined.

80 Marcus Aurelius and Commodus visited Syria and returned from Athens to Brundisium by sea. On the way they suffered a storm (*SHA vita Aurel.* 27. 2-3), and imperial coinage commemorated their escape from danger. See Mattingly-Sydenham, *The Roman Imperial Coinage* 3, pp. 307-308 nos. 1192-1201, p. 334 no. 1513, p. 337 no. 1550. The naval coinage under Commodus re-

flects either his activity in the grain supply or an interest in the *navigium Isidis*; cf. Alföldi, *Festival of Isis*, pp. 48-49; Vogt, *Alexandrinische Münzen* 2, pp. 109-110.

81 II 4063 (Dertosa); Misene sailors were apparently discharged on May 13, 173 (Dip. 127). It may be noted that Ravenna itself was disturbed by a revolt of the Marcomanni settled there (Dio 71. 11. 5).

82 Premierstein, *Klio* 12 (1912), pp. 177-178; Raymond Thouvenot, "Les Invasions des Maures en Bétique sous le règne de Marc-Aurèle," *Revue des études anciennes* 41 (1939), p. 20-28.

83 Premierstein, "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Marcus II: Seezüge der Nordpontusvölker und der Maurer. Der Einfall der Kostoboken," *Klio* 12 (1912), pp. 139-178, magnifies the unrest. As L. R. Taylor has recently shown in "The Publii Lucilii Gamalae of Ostia," *American Journal of Philology* 57 (1936), pp. 183-189, the *pollicitatio* by Ostia for a *bellum navale* is to be associated with a six-day *naumachia* which Trajan held at Ostia in 109 to celebrate his addition to Portus. Other interpretations had been advanced by Mommsen, *Eph. ep.* 3, pp. 330-331; Jérôme Carcopino, "Ostiensia III," *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.* 31 (1911), pp. 143-230; Premierstein, *op. cit.* pp. 139-141.

84 *SHA vita lul.* 6. 3-4; Dio 73. 16. 3.

85 Italian fleets: Herodian 2. 14. 7, 3. 1. 1; S. N. Miller, *CAH* 12, pp. 6-8; G. A. Harrer, "The Chronology of the Revolt of Pescennius Niger," *JRS* 10 (1920), pp. 155-168; Johannes Hasebroek, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Septimius Severus* (Heidelberg, 1921), pp. 50-62. Egypt: *SHA vita Sev.* 8. 7, *vita Pesc. Nig.* 5. 4; Miller, *CAH* 12, pp. 6, 8 n. 1. The coinage of the Greek cities suggests movements across the Hellespont but cannot be dated to exact years: Perinth, *BMC Thrace* (1877), p. 151 nos. 27 and 29, and a second crossing there, p. 152 no. 33; Apamea, *BMC Pontus*, p. 113 no. 32, p. 114 no. 34; Caesarea Germanica, *ibid.* p. 122 no. 2; Nicomedia, *ibid.* p. 186 nos. 42-43; Hadrianopolis, *BMC Thrace*, p. 117 no. 12; Corinth, *BMC Corinth*, p. 83 no. 642; Anchialos, F. Imhoof-Blumer, *Die antiken Münzen Nord-Griechenlands* 2, ed. M. L. Strack (Berlin, 1912), p. 240 nos. 488-490, p. 243 no. 498.

86 The operations by Ti. Claudius Candidus in Spain against rebels about 198 "terra marique" (II 4114) were aimed at remnants of Albinus' party; the extent of his naval forces is not disclosed. See H. M. D. Parker, *A History of the Roman World from A. D. 138 to 337* (London, 1935), p. 68.

87 The siege: Dio 74. 10-13; G. A. Harrer, *JRS* 10 (1920), pp. 163-164. Subatianus: Dess. 9488; VIII 4323. Dedication: X 3341; De la Berge, p. 215.

88 Parthian war: *SHA vita Sev.* 15. 2. British wars: above, p. 155; Neptune coinage in 209-211, Mattingly-Sydenham, *The Roman Imperial Coinage* 4. 1, pp. 120-122 nos. 228, 234, 241, 244, p. 200 no. 801. The voyage to Africa is dated to 206/207 by Mattingly and Sydenham, *ibid.* p. 119 no. 215 and *passim*; Hasebroek, *Septimius Severus*, pp. 133-135, assigns it to 203 and ascribes to it the coinage which they, *op. cit.* p. 144 no. 175 and *passim*, take as referring to Septimius' return to Rome in 202. Miller, *CAH* 12, p. 20, follows Hasebroek.

89 Septimius, *IGR* 3. 239; Severus Alexander, *IGR* 3. 53. It is also used for Macrianus (*IGR* 3. 27) and Constantius (*IGR* 3. 150), and occurs in the Augustan period (above, p. 199 n. 9).

90 Ravenna to Altinum: Otto Cuntz, *Itineraria Romana* 1 (Leipzig, 1929), p. 18; Denis van Berchem, *Bull. de la Soc. nat. des antiq.* 80 (1937), p. 172. Hellespont: *SHA vita Carac.* 5. 8; Dio 77. 16. 7; VI 2103a; *BMC Pontus*, p. 164 no. 74 (the whole series, *ibid.* pp. 162-164 nos. 67-78, to various divinities seems a reflection of the event). Other coinage: Chalcedon, *ibid.* p. 128 no. 33; Perinth,

BMC Thrace, p. 154 no. 44; Anchialos, Imhoof-Blumer, *Antike Münzen* 2, p. 252 nos. 538-540. See also F. W. Drexler, *Caracallas Zug nach dem Orient* (Halle, 1880).

91 The terms appear in III 168 at the end of Caracallus' reign and sporadically thereafter, e.g. VIII 1322 = 14854 of about 231; since they are absent in Dip. 138, this must be dated to 214/215.

92 Alexandrian fleet: *AE* 1934. 64. The inscriptions published by Paul Collart in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 57 (1933), pp. 336-340, 368-370, relate to Caracallus' march eastward, although Caracallus did not actually visit the city; see also *idem*, *Philippes, ville de Macédoine* (Paris, 1937), pp. 510, 515-518. The machines of Dio 77. 18. 1 were probably sent by merchant craft. Ravennate fleet: III 168 (*Antoniniana* occurs here, in XI 36 and 39, Dip. 138, and *AE* 1904. 171 of the Misene fleet). Agrippa: *SHA vita Carac.* 6. 7. Tomis did not issue coins at this time with the legend *vavapχis*, as Wilhelm Reusch, *Der historische Wert der Caracallavita* (Leipzig, 1931; *Klio*, Beih. 24), p. 35, states on the authority of Eckhel; see Imhoof-Blumer, *Antike Münzen* 1, p. 802 no. 3108.

93 Elagabalus wintered at Nicomedia (see above, p. 129) and probably crossed to Perinth, which placed a galley on some coins at this time (*BMC Thrace*, p. 156 no. 56). Tripolis struck coins in 219-221 bearing *vavapχis* (*BMC Phoenicia*, p. 225 nos. 133-134).

94 VIII 1322 = 14854, X 3342. Denis van Berchem in "Ebrudunum-Yverdon," *Zeitschrift für schweizerische Geschichte* 17 (1937), pp. 88-89, misunderstands the nature of Sulgius' post. On the campaign, cf. Walter Thiele, *De Severo Alexandro imperatore* (Berlin, 1909), pp. 94-103; August Jarde, *Études critiques sur la vie et la règne de Sévère Alexandre* (Paris, 1925), pp. 76-85. Troops apparently moved across the Propontis: Cyzicus, *BMC Mysia*, p. 56 no. 265; Abydus, *BMC Troas*, p. 7 no. 62.

95 Dio 36. 20. 1. In the same period Paulus deemed it necessary to include a provision on piracy (*Dig.* 14. 2. 3) in his commentary on the Perpetual Edict; an archpirate came a little later (*SHA vita Trig. Tyr.* 26. 2). Victor: *IGR* 4. 1057 (Cos). In view of the location of this stone and Victor's rank, the "sea" can scarcely have been the Mediterranean; see Courtois, *Revue historique* 186 (1939), p. 44. This fact excludes the possibility that Sulgius was a subordinate of Victor, as argued by Domaszewski, "Untersuchungen zur römischen Kaiser-geschichte IV. Die Piraterie im Mittelmeere unter Severus Alexander," *Rheinisches Museum* 58 (1903), pp. 382-390.

96 *Traiectus*: Henry Cohen, *Description historique des monnaies frappées sous l'Empire romaine* 4 (Paris, 1860), pp. 165-166 nos. 323-324; the coin type is well reproduced by Francesco Gnecci, *I medaglioni romani* 2 (Milan, 1912), plate 105 no. 8. *Gordiana* occurs in X 3336 of 238/241 as well as among the provincial fleets and in the army. Such an honorific title became customary from this time; when the emperor died, his name was replaced by that of his successor. K. F. W. Lehmann, *Kaiser Gordianus III* (Berlin, 1911), pp. 69-79, treats of the campaign; naval coins of the Greek cities are more extensive than for any other war: Apamea, *BMC Pontus*, pp. 114-115 nos. 38-39; Chalcedon, *ibid.* p. 129 no. 38; Hadrianopolis, *BMC Thrace*, p. 122 no. 46; Perinth, *ibid.* p. 159 no. 65; Cyzicus, *BMC Mysia*, p. 57 no. 273; Anchialos, Imhoof-Blumer, *Antike Münzen* 2, p. 291 no. 682.

97 Alexander: Dess. 9221. Priscus: VI 1638; Stein *s.v.* "C. Iulius Priscus" (PW); A. G. Roos, "De C. Iulio Prisco," *Mnemosyne* n.s. 51 (1923), pp. 286-296, 435. See Samuel Krauss, "Neue Aufschlüsse über Timesitheus und die Perserkriege," *Rheinisches Museum* 58 (1903), pp. 627-633.

98 XI 6107; Ferrero, "Iscrizione scoperta al passo del Furlo," *Atti* 22 (1886),

pp. 256-259; K. W. H. Henzen, "Iscrizione trovata presso la galleria del Furlo," *Mitt. des kais. deut. arch. Inst. RA* 2 (1887), pp. 14-20. The sailor of the Misene fleet who died at Thessalonica in Philip's reign (III 7327) was probably aboard the squadron which had accompanied Gordian and was then engaged in ferrying troops across the Aegean. The title *Philippiana* is attested for the Misene (III 7327), Ravennate (XI 6107), and British (XII 686) fleets.

99 See the admirable account by Léon Homo, "L'Empereur Gallien et la crise de l'Empire romain au III^e siècle," *Revue historique* 113 (1913), pp. 1-22, 225-267, which has been the base of more recent work; cf. also Alföldi, *CAH* 12, pp. 169-231, with bibliography, pp. 746-749.

100 *IGR* 3. 481; Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica*, p. 555.

101 Zos. 1. 31-32; in 253 they had crossed to Ephesus from Thrace (*ibid.* 1. 28. 1). Mommsen, *Die Provinzen*, pp. 216-218, ends Roman control on the northern coast with Severus Alexander; Alföldi, *CAH* 12, pp. 141-142, continues it to 248.

102 Zos. 1. 32-35; Syncellus, pp. 716-717 (Bonn ed.). Valerian sent a general Felix to guard Byzantium (Zos. 1. 36), who may have deterred the Goths for a time.

103 Syncellus, p. 717; *SHA vita Gall.* 4. 7-8, 6. 2, 11. 1, 12. 6. The appearance of Odenathus dates this expedition to 267 and so fixes the succeeding events. I have generally followed the reconstruction, based primarily on the Byzantine historians, and the dating of Alföldi, *CAH* 12, pp. 146-150, except with respect to the events of 268-269, on which see below. The previously standard account may be found in Parker, *Roman World 138 to 337*, pp. 165-170, 176-177, 188-190; Bruno Rappaport, *Die Einfälle der Goten in das römische Reich bis auf Constantian* (Leipzig, 1899).

104 Zos. 1. 39-40; *SHA vita Gall.* 13. 6-10; Syncellus, p. 717; Zonaras 12. 24, 26. Dexippus mentions the approach of the fleet in his speech to the *ephebi* (*FHG* 3, p. 680 frag. 21). This Athenaeus is probably the same person as the Panathenaios of *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* 1. 62, who restored the walls of Athens; cf. Zos. 1. 29; Syncellus, p. 715; Zonaras 12. 23. Visit by Gallienus: *SHA vita Gall.* 6. 8, 7. 2; Homo, *Revue historique* 113 (1913), p. 226, who dates the trip to 263.

105 Alföldi, *CAH* 12, pp. 146-150, 721-723, who argues that Syncellus put the events under Gallienus, Zosimus and the *Historia Augusta* under Claudius. The two tables of comparisons which he has drawn up do not seem as identical as there stated. For the second invasion no naval battle is mentioned in *SHA vita Claud.* 9. 7; for the first, a failure at Cyzicus does not appear from Syncellus, p. 717, or *SHA vita Gall.* 13. 8, and the siege of Thessalonica is not mentioned in Syncellus, p. 717, or Zos. 1. 39. 1. If the remnants of the Goths were hard-pressed in Thrace at the beginning of 269, one would expect their friends to succor them instead of embarking on a second sea invasion, which is absolutely certain; Alföldi's reconstruction leaves the title *Gothicus* by which Claudius has been distinguished little more than a farce.

106 Zos. 1. 44, 46; *SHA vita Claud.* 12. 1; Ammian. 31. 5. 16; Syncellus, p. 720; Arthur Stein, "Tenagino Probus," *Klio* 29 (1936), pp. 237-242. A later invasion was repelled by Tacitus: Zos. 1. 63; Zonaras 12. 28. See also *SHA vita Claud.* 6-9; Paul Damerau, *Kaiser Claudius II Gothicus* (Leipzig, 1934; *Klio*, Beih. 33), pp. 62-75.

107 *IGR* 1. 1496; the use of a tribune as a navarch is to be noted (see above, p. 40). The coinage of the Greek cities drops rapidly to extinction in this troubled era, but there are a few naval types. Valerian: *Caesarea Germanica*, *BMC Pontus*, p. 123 no. 7; Side, *BMC Lycia*, p. 157 no. 98. Gallienus: Cyzicus,

BMC Mysia, pp. 58-59 nos. 281, 287-288; Side, *BMC Lycia*, p. 161 nos. 112-116, some of these bearing *vavapχis*; Tabae, *BMC Caria*, pp. 174-175 nos. 102, 109. Claudius Gothicus: Cyzicus, *BMC Mysia*, p. 59 no. 289. The imperial coinage of Gallienus has one coin bearing "Neptuno cons Aug": Mattingly-Sydenham, *The Roman Imperial Coinage* 5. 1 (1927), p. 152 no. 244. *Ibid.* p. 184 no. 603 figures Neptune; see also a coin of Claudius, *ibid.* p. 229 no. 214. Syncellus, p. 716, indicates that Callistus, praetorian praefect for Valerian, had some naval strength in his operations against Sapor in Asia Minor.

108 Sailors are mentioned in P. Ox. 1115 at Oxyrhynchus in 281, presumably *en route* south against the Blemmyes; but we have no evidence as to their origin, and they may have been drafted at Alexandria.

109 III 1919=8513=12791. The rebellion of the *Armorici* mentioned in the inscription cannot be dated, but the fifth century (Fiebiger, pp. 304-305) is much too late. L. Mussius Aemilianus, governor of Egypt, seems to have adopted an independent course of action in 260-262 and was perhaps put down by a naval expedition from Italy under the general Aurelius Theodotus. See *SHA vita Gall.* 4. 1-2, *vita Trig. Tyr.* 26. 4; Homo, *Revue historique* 113 (1913), pp. 232-233; Alföldi, *CAH* 12, pp. 173-174. J. G. Milne, "Aemilianus the 'Ty-rant,'" *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 10 (1924), pp. 80-82, does not think Aemilianus claimed the throne.

110 VIII 12296; *AE* 1907. 4; Parker, *Roman World 138 to 337*, p. 343 n. 17; Cagnat, *L'Armée romaine d'Afrique*², pp. 62-65. In 256/257 Franks crossed into Mauretania Tingitana from Tarraco: Eutropius 9. 8; Zonaras 12. 24; Victor 33. 3.

111 Zos. 1. 71; *Pan. Lat.* 5. 18, which speaks of naval battles against the Franks. The bronze medallion of Carinus bearing "Traiectus Aug" which Gnechci, *I medaglioni romani* 2, p. 121 no. 7, took from Cohen, *Description historique des monnaies* 5, p. 350 no. 35 (who in turn noted it from another description), is not listed in Mattingly-Sydenham and may be considered a forgery.

112 X 3343; note VI 32945 of a *protector*, who possibly served in the "classis Rabennatium."

113 Maxentius: Otto Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt* 1 (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1897), pp. 98-99, 115; Jules Maurice, "Mémoire sur la révolte d'Alexandre en Afrique," *Mém. de la Soc. nat. des antiq.* 61 (1902), pp. 1-22. Constantine: *Pan. Lat.* 9. 25. 2; Seeck, *op. cit.* 1, pp. 124-125; Ernst Stein, *Geschichte des spätromischen Reiches* 1 (Vienna, 1928), pp. 139-140.

114 Zos. 2. 22-28; Anon. Vales. 5. 23-28; *Chron. Pasch.* ann. 324; Sir Edwin Pears, "The Campaign against Paganism," *English Historical Review* 24 (1909), pp. 1-17.

115 *Not. Dig. Occ.* 42. 7, 11; a *classis Venetum* at Aquileia, *ibid.* 42. 4. The Italian fleets seem to be referred to in Julian, *Orat.* 1, 38c; 2, 74c.

116 Veg. 4. 31. The effort of Dankfrid Schenk in *Flavius Vegetius Renatus. Die Quellen der Epitoma Rei Militaris* (Leipzig, 1930; *Klio*, Beih. 22) to determine the sources for the naval sections in Vegetius is unsatisfactory; Vegetius, indeed, seems more original here than elsewhere, for his comments often fit the fourth century only.

117 There is some sparse evidence for naval activity in the fourth century, e.g. Zos. 4. 45-46, but its implements seem at most to be flotillas gathered from the Greek maritime cities.

Appendix

PROSOPOGRAPHIA PRAEFECTORUM CLASSIUM

THE following lists include the names of all praefects and subpraefects of the various fleets who are at present known, together with the epigraphical and other evidence which attests their praefecture. For the great majority of praefects I have been forced to assign approximate dates, within which the praefecture lay. The reasons for my dating, in so far as they are not clear from the references cited, are drawn from the other evidence for the particular praefect's *cursus*, which may be found under the appropriate heading in the *Prosopographia Imperii Romani* or Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Realencyclopädie*.

PRAEFECTI CLASSIS

(ante A. D. 71)

C. Claudius Sardus	before 27 B. C. ?	VI 3166
M. Mindius Marcellus	36/30 B. C.	AE 1925. 93
A. Castricius	before 12 B. C.	XIV 2105
. . . nius L. f.	27 B. C./A. D. 37	XI 711
Sex. Aulienus	A. D. 14/37	X 4868
P. Cornelius Cicatricula ¹	before A. D. 41	XI 6344
M. Aurelius An . . .		XII 258
P. Flacidius Septiminus		AE 1907. 212
Cn. Octavius A . . .		X 6320 (with X, p. 1015)
L. Pontius Strabo		Dess. 2674
. . . us T. f. Rufus		X 4867

¹ Bormann, who edited this stone in the *Corpus*, dates it to the early second century on the ground of the lettering. This is either a mistake, or the stone was then recut. After Claudius, *primipili* went to the urban troops for advancement; the title *praefectus equitum* vanished about the same time. The tribunate in this inscription is held after the other posts, but this does not necessarily place it in the reign of Claudius.

CLASSIS MISENENSIS

Praefecti:

Ti. Iulius Optatus Pontianus	Dec. 11, 52	Dip. 1; X 6318; Pliny, <i>H. N.</i> 9. 62; Macrobius, <i>Sat.</i> 3. 16. 10
Anicetus	59-61	Tac., <i>Ann.</i> 14. 3, 7, 62; Dio 61. 13. 2
Moschus	69	Tac., <i>Hist.</i> 1. 87
Claudius Iulianus	69	<i>Ibid.</i> 3. 57, 76-77
Sex. Lucilius Bassus	69	<i>Ibid.</i> 2. 100, 3. 12
Claudius Apollinaris	69	<i>Ibid.</i> 3. 57, 76-77
Sex. Lucilius Bassus	Feb. 9-April 5, 71	Dips. 12, 13, 15, 16 Pliny, <i>Epp.</i> 6. 16. 4
C. Plinius Secundus	Aug. 24, 79	Dip. 60
Q. Marcius Turbo	114	Dip. 74
Iulius Fronto ²	Feb. 18, 129	Dip. 79; II 1178
M. Calpurnius Seneca		Dip. 92
Fabius Turpio Sentinatianus	Sept. 15, 134	Dess. 9002
Valerius Paetus	145	Dip. 122
T. Furius Victorinus	ca. 145/155	V 8659; <i>AE</i> 1890. 151
Iulius Crescens	April 30, 166	
P. Cominius Clemens ³	ca. 175/180	
L. Iulius Vehilius		VI 31856
Gratus Iulianus	ca. 184/185	
Cn. Marcius Rustius		IX 1582; X 1127
Rufinus	ca. 195/203	<i>SHA vita Carac.</i> 6. 7
Marcus Agrippa (?)	217	X 3336
Valerius Valens	ca. 238/240	Dess. 9221
C. Iulius Alexander	246	Dip. 152
Aelius Aemilianus	Dec. 28, 247	VIII 12296; <i>AE</i> 1907. 4
M. Cornelius Octavianus	ca. 260	X 3343
. . . ov . . . ius	302	X 3344
Flavius Marianus	4th century	

² Also praefect in Dec. 118/Dec. 119 (Dip. 66)?³ Cf. Ritterling, *Rheinisches Museum* 59 (1904), p. 92.

Subpraefecti:

(L. ?) Alfenius Senecio	ca. 161/180	X 3334
C. Annius Flavianus	ca. 182	VIII 17900
Ti. Claudius Subatianus		
Proculus	ca. 193/196	Dess. 9488
T. Fulcinus Vergilius		
Marcellus	after 100	Dess. 9010
. . .	after 200	VIII 14729

CLASSIS RAVENNAS

Praefecti:

P. Palpellius Clodius	56	V 533; Tac., <i>Ann.</i>
Quirinalis		13. 30
M. Aurelius Regulus	54/68	VI 3150
L. Aemilius Sullestinus	54/68	XIII 1770
Sex. Lucilius Bassus	69	Tac., <i>Hist.</i> 2. 100, 3.
		12
Cornelius Fuscus	69	<i>Ibid.</i> 3. 12, 42
Sex. Lucilius Bassus	April 5, 71	Dip. 14
L. Numerius Albanus	Oct. 11, 127	Dip. 72
M. Calpurnius Seneca	before Sept. 15,	II 1178, 1267
Fabius Turpio Senti-	134	
natianus		
Tuticanus Capito	Sept. 5, 152	Dip. 100
T. Furius Victorinus	ca. 145/155	Dess. 9002
P. Cominius Clemens	ca. 175/180	V 8659; <i>AE</i> 1890.
		151
L. Iulius Vehilius	ca. 183/184	VI 31856
Gratus Iulianus		
Cn. Marcius Rustius	ca. 195/202	IX 1582; X 1127
Rufinus		
M. Aquilius Felix	ca. 205	X 6657
M. Gongius Nestori-	Oct. 213/215 ⁴	Dip. 138
anus		
I cianus	Dec. 28, 249	Dip. 154
Bla . . .	after 81	XIV 5341

⁴ See above, p. 206 n. 91.

Subpraefecti:

T. Abudius Verus	before 71	V 328
T. Appalius Alfinus Secundus	ca. 138/161	IX 5357
T. Cornasidus Sabinus	3rd century	IX 5439

CLASSIS ALEXANDRINA

Praefecti:

Claudius Clemens	Feb. 17, 86	Dip. 32
Cas . . .	105/106	BGU 1033
L. Valerius Proculus	ca. 130	II 1970
Q. Marcius Hermogenes	March 7, 134	III 43; CIGr 4735
Crispus or Priscus	Oct. 10, 159	BGU 142, 143
Iuvenicus Valens	175	P. Ox. 1451

Subpraefectus:

Ti. Iulius Xanthus	ca. 54	VI 32775
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CLASSIS BRITANNICA

Praefecti:

M. Maenius Agrippa L. Tudisius Campester	ca. 124/138	XI 5632
L. Aufidius Panthera	ca. 135	VII 18
. . .	after 71	VI 1643
Bla . . .	after 81	XIV 5341

CLASSIS GERMANICA

Praefecti:

(L. ?) Iulius Burdo	69	Tac., <i>Hist.</i> 1. 58
M. Pomponius Vitellianus	before 89	VIII 9327
C. Manlius Felix	ca. 102/114	III 726
P. Helvius Pertinax	ca. 165	SHA <i>vita Pert.</i> 2. 2
M. Aemilius Crescens	after 96	XIII 8198
. . . (?)	after 71	VI 1643

MAURETANIAN FLEET

Praepositi:

Q. iorius Se- verus	ca. 170	VIII 9363
P. Aelius Marcianus	after 117	VIII 9358

CLASSIS MOESICA

Praefecti:

Q. Atatinus Modestus	ca. 80/100	IX 3609
M. Vindius Verianus	ca. 200	<i>AE</i> 1919. 14, 1937. 178
P. Aelius Ammonius	ca. 238/244	<i>IGR</i> 1. 623
L. Valerius . . .	after 71	III 8716
P. Aelius Marcianus	after 117	VIII 9358
. . .	after 71	VI 1643

CLASSIS PANNONICA

Praefecti:

C. Manlius Felix	ca. 102/114	III 726
L. Cornelius Restitutus	ca. 201/207	VIII 7977
. . .	after 71	VI 1643
. . .	after 71	XIV 4468/4470

CLASSIS PONTICA

Praefecti:

L. Iulius Vehilius Gra- tus Iulianus	ca. 175/176	VI 31856
Crispinus	3rd century	<i>IGR</i> 4. 150

CLASSIS SYRIACA

Praefectus:

Sex. Cornelius Dexter	ca. 135	VIII 8934
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CLASSIS INCERTA

Praefecti:

T. Flavius Gallicus (provincial fleet)	ca. 117/138	VIII 1269 = 14763
. . . (Italian fleet ?)	3rd century	VI 1644 (with VI, p. 854)
. . . (Italian fleet)	ca. 253/259	<i>AE</i> 1900. 125
. . .		XIV 2266
. . .		III 14195 ³⁸

Subpraefectus:

. . . (Italian fleet)	after 71	VI 1643
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Index of Inscriptions and Papyri

This index includes only those inscriptions and papyri which appertain directly to the imperial navy.

Numbers following the dash in each line refer to pages of this book.

Aegyptische Urkunden aus den Koeniglichen Museum zu Berlin: Griechische Urkunden

113 — 122
142 — 121, 212
143 — 121, 212
265 — 122
326 — 101, 103, 105
327 — 100, 101, 105
423 — 100
455 — 121
632 — 101, 102
709 — 120, 121
741 — 120, 121
1033 — 121, 212

Analele Academiei Române

2. ser. 35 (1912-1913), pp. 502-509 — 159
2. ser. 38 (1915-1916), pp. 633-637 — 159

L'Année épigraphique

1889. 44 — 164
1890. 151 — 210, 211
1892. 22 — 49
1896. 21 — 28, 64, 65, 100, 101
1899. 35 — 62
1899. 97 — 163
1900. 125 — 214
1904. 7 — 204
1904. 171 — 206
1905. 126 — 28
1907. 4 — 208, 210
1907. 212 — 209
1909. 184 — 47
1912. 120 — 49, 122
1919. 14 — 159, 160, 213
1922. 135 — 28, 64, 100, 101
1923. 32 — 163, 164

1923. 92 — 122
1925. 93 — 48, 209
1927. 60 — 159
1927. 180 — 62, 101, 121
1928. 183 — 162, 163
1929. 139 — 27
1929. 142 — 97, 104
1929. 143 — 48, 97
1929. 144 — 97
1929. 145 — 97
1929. 146 — 97, 102
1929. 147 — 97
1929. 148 — 97
1929. 149 — 97, 102
1930. 3 — 50
1930. 53 — 121
1930. 63 — 104
1934. 64 — 122, 206
1937. 178 — 213

Blinkenberg: *Triemolia*

pp. 18-19 — 123

Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum

2346e add. — 122
4375 — 121, 212

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum II

1178 — 46, 47, 210, 211
1267 — 47, 211
1970 — 121, 212
4063 — 19, 205
4114 — 205
6278 — 47

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum III

43 — 121, 212
168 — 206
225 — 64
322 — 25

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum III
[continued]

- 421 — 122
 434 — 48, 49, 120, 122
 556a — 28
 557 — 29, 64
 558 — 28
 726 — 161, 212, 213
 1919 — 48, 208
 2020 — 29, 105
 2034 — 29, 97
 2036 — 29
 2051 — 29
 3165 — 29
 3223 — 48, 161
 3971 — 105
 4025 — 161
 4319 — 50, 120, 160
 6092a — 25
 6109 — 28, 64
 6687 — 204
 6980 — 48, 49
 7289 — 29
 7290 — 28, 63, 64
 7327 — 25, 64, 104, 207
 7552 — 159
 8385 — 78, 98
 8716 — 213
 10343 — 161
 10675 — 161
 12472 — 159
 14195³⁸ — 122, 214
 14203¹⁸ — 28
 14214³⁴ — 50, 120, 160
 14354⁹ — 161
 14394 — 28, 49
 14395 — 28
 14567 — 137
 14691 — 29, 65
 14695 — 29, 97, 103, 105

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum V

- 328 — 48, 102, 212
 533 — 46, 211
 774 — 29, 101, 102, 105
 910 — 29, 101, 103
 938 — 28, 64, 96, 97, 103
 960 — 29
 1048 — 29, 50
 1813 — 102
 1956 — 62, 97
 2501 — 64
 8659 — 46, 210, 211

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum VI

- 1063 — 28, 62, 64, 102
 1064 — 28, 62, 102
 1091 — 28
 1638 — 48, 206
 1643 — 48, 120, 161, 164, 212, 213, 214
 1644 — 214
 2103a — 205
 2491 — 97, 105
 3093 — 28, 101
 3095 — 62
 3099 — 28
 3101 — 28
 3109 — 104
 3116 — 104
 3119 — 62
 3127 — 62
 3139 — 28
 3142 — 101
 3149 — 29, 101
 3150 — 211
 3151 — 101
 3158 — 102
 3163 — 62
 3165 — 63, 101
 3166 — 209
 3168 — 62
 3169 — 63
 3170 — 62
 3621 — 49, 50
 3699 — 103
 3910 — 28, 63
 3911 — 45
 8927 — 49
 8928 — 50
 8929 — 49
 31856 — 46, 47, 120, 157, 210, 211, 213
 32770 — 47
 32771 — 62, 63
 32772 — 49, 103
 32775 — 97, 120, 121, 212
 32778 — 49
 32945 — 102, 208

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum VII

- 18 — 164, 212
 285 — 165
 864 — 165
 970 — 165
 1226 — 164

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum VIII

- 1269 — 214

- 1322 — 48, 49, 206
 2728 — 123
 7030 — 122
 7977 — 161, 213
 8934 — 122, 213
 9327 — 162, 212
 9358 — 123, 213
 9363 — 123, 213
 9379 — 120, 123
 9385 — 123
 9386 — 64, 123
 9392 — 123
 12296 — 46, 208, 210
 14729 — 48, 211
 17900 — 48, 211
 21017 — 123
 21025 — 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 120, 121, 123
 21568 — 123

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum IX

- 41 — 29, 48, 49
 42 — 29, 63, 64, 97, 98
 43 — 29, 62, 63, 97
 60 — 100
 1582 — 46, 210, 211
 3609 — 213
 3891 — 29
 3892 — 29, 97
 5357 — 48, 212
 5439 — 48, 212

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum X

- 18 — 64
 469 — 103, 104, 105
 719 — 97, 102
 1080 — 48, 64
 1127 — 46, 210, 211
 1880 — 102
 1881 — 101, 102
 1981 — 102
 3334 — 27, 47, 211
 3336 — 46, 206, 210
 3337 — 50, 102
 3339 — 102
 3340 — 42, 48, 49
 3341 — 48, 102, 205
 3342 — 48, 206
 3342a — 47, 49, 50, 102
 3343 — 46, 208, 210
 3344 — 27, 46, 47, 64, 101, 210
 3345 — 48
 3346 — 47
 3347 — 47
 3348 — 49
 3349 — 49
 3350 — 49, 103
 3351 — 49
 3354 — 49, 100, 102
 3355 — 100
 3356 — 50
 3357 — 26, 49
 3358 — 50
 3359 — 50
 3360 — 28, 48, 50, 101
 3361 — 48, 49, 50
 3365 — 64
 3366 — 104
 3370 — 64
 3372 — 64
 3374 — 64
 3375 — 64, 105
 3376 — 64, 105
 3380 — 63, 102, 104
 3381 — 64
 3383 — 64
 3385 — 63
 3388 — 101, 104
 3391 — 48, 63
 3392 — 62
 3393 — 62
 3395 — 104
 3400a — 64
 3401 — 100
 3402 — 101
 3403 — 65
 3406 — 65, 101, 102
 3409 — 104
 3412 — 63, 98
 3413 — 47
 3414 — 62
 3415 — 47
 3416 — 64, 97
 3417 — 105
 3418 — 62, 63
 3419 — 62, 63
 3420 — 63, 105
 3421 — 63
 3422 — 63
 3423 — 63
 3424 — 62, 63
 3425 — 62, 63, 104
 3426 — 63
 3427 — 63
 3429 — 104
 3430 — 63, 102
 3432 — 63, 104
 3433 — 63

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum X
[continued]

- 3434 — 63
 3435 — 63, 102
 3437a — 63
 3438 — 47
 3439 — 63
 3440 — 47
 3441 — 101
 3444 — 102
 3446 — 102
 3450 — 63
 3454 — 101, 104
 3455 — 102
 3456 — 63
 3458 — 105
 3459 — 64
 3460 — 65
 3461 — 65
 3464a — 64, 65
 3465 — 64
 3466 — 65, 104
 3467 — 65
 3468 — 64
 3469 — 64, 65
 3470 — 65
 3472 — 102
 3474 — 65, 98
 3475 — 65
 3476 — 104
 3478 — 64
 3479 — 48, 62, 101
 3480 — 100
 3481 — 100
 3482 — 63, 104
 3483 — 63, 101
 3484 — 63
 3485 — 63, 104
 3486 — 29, 101
 3487 — 62, 101, 105
 3494 — 63
 3495 — 63, 102
 3496 — 65
 3497 — 65
 3498 — 63
 3499 — 63
 3500 — 63
 3501 — 63
 3502 — 64
 3503 — 63
 3504 — 63
 3505 — 63, 104
 3506 — 63
 3507 — 63, 102, 104
 3508 — 63
 3515 — 102
 3519 — 104
 3524 — 29, 64
 3527 — 29, 101, 102
 3530 — 97
 3531 — 97
 3533 — 102
 3534 — 104
 3535 — 102
 3541 — 103
 3544 — 49
 3547 — 104
 3548 — 49
 3553 — 102
 3563 — 104
 3565 — 101
 3570 — 101
 3572 — 64
 3573 — 101
 3574 — 102
 3577 — 100
 3592 — 104, 105
 3593 — 101
 3596 — 102, 104
 3599 — 101
 3608 — 104, 105
 3611 — 62
 3622 — 101
 3627 — 104
 3630 — 103
 3635 — 104
 3636 — 64
 3638 — 102, 104
 3640 — 102
 3645 — 29, 101
 3646 — 97
 3654 — 97
 3655 — 102
 3657 — 104
 3675 — 102
 3676 — 102
 3882 — 63, 104
 4867 — 209
 4868 — 26, 46, 209
 6318 — 46, 210
 6320 — 209
 6657 — 47, 211
 6674 — 204
 6800 — 64
 7288 — 28, 63
 7291 — 28
 7592 — 28, 64, 97

7593 — 28
 7595 — 28, 104
 7823 — 28
 8131 — 50, 102
 8209 — 104
 8212 — 49
 8213 — 49
 8215 — 49
 8261 — 102
 8329 — 19, 97
 8374a — 104

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XI

17 — 47
 26 — 100
 29 — 63
 30 — 63
 31 — 104
 32 — 27, 101
 35 — 101
 36 — 206
 39 — 104, 206
 42 — 98
 43 — 63, 101
 45 — 97
 52 — 104
 54 — 101
 56 — 62, 63
 59 — 97
 65 — 65, 97
 66 — 104
 71 — 49
 76 — 65
 77 — 63
 80 — 104
 83 — 102
 85 — 103
 86 — 49
 88 — 97
 94 — 101
 96 — 98
 104 — 97, 103
 106 — 102
 109 — 64
 110 — 101
 112 — 102
 340 — 64
 343 — 63, 99
 349 — 65
 555 — 50
 711 — 46, 209
 2606 — 28
 2842 — 102

3522 — 62
 3528 — 29
 3529 — 29
 3530 — 29
 3531 — 29, 65
 3531a — 29
 3533 — 64
 3536 — 29
 3719 — 28
 3735 — 28
 3736 — 28, 97
 3737 — 28
 4654 — 64
 5632 — 164, 212
 6107 — 64, 100, 206, 207
 6344 — 46, 209
 6735 — 64
 6737 — 63
 6739 — 101
 6741 — 65

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XII

257 — 26, 50
 258 — 209
 681 — 163
 686 — 164, 165, 207
 2412 — 48, 162, 163
 5736 — 63, 97

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XIII

924 — 204
 1770 — 211
 3540 — 164
 3541 — 164, 165
 3542 — 50, 120, 164, 165
 3543 — 164, 165
 3544 — 164, 165
 3545 — 164
 3546 — 164
 3547 — 164
 6712 — 163
 6714 — 163
 7681 — 162, 163, 164
 7697 — 163, 164
 7710 — 163, 164
 7715 — 163, 164
 7716 — 162, 163, 164
 7719 — 49, 162, 163, 164
 7723 — 162, 163, 164
 7728 — 163, 164
 7941 — 163
 8036 — 49, 162, 163

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XIII
[continued]

8160 — 163
 8166 — 162, 163
 8168 — 162, 163
 8198 — 162, 212
 8322 — 162, 163
 8323 — 162, 163
 8325 — 164
 8831 — 163
 8843 — 162, 163
 10027²²⁶ — 163
 12086a — 163
 12559 — 164
 12560 — 166
 12561 — 164
 12562 — 162
 12563 — 163
 12564 — 163
 12565 — 163
 12566 — 163
 12567 — 163

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XIV

110 — 27, 49, 102, 103
 232 — 62
 235 — 49
 238 — 63, 105
 241 — 104
 2045 — 200
 2105 — 46, 209
 2266 — 214
 3608 — 158
 4468/4470 — 213
 4496 — 29
 4497 — 29, 49
 5341 — 46, 164, 211, 212

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XVI
See Diploma, belowDessau: *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*

2159 — 46
 2674 — 46, 209
 2838 — 62
 2867 — 63
 2888 — 29
 9002 — 46, 210, 211
 9010 — 211
 9218 — 29, 62, 64, 97
 9221 — 48, 206, 210
 9226 — 163
 9488 — 48, 205, 211

Diploma, cited after the number in
Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XVI

1 — 26, 49, 50, 64, 97, 100, 104, 210
 3 — 48, 158
 7 — 97, 103, 202
 8 — 97, 103, 202
 9 — 97, 103, 202
 10 — 97, 203
 11 — 97, 203
 12 — 97, 105, 203, 210
 13 — 97, 105, 203, 210
 14 — 97, 105, 203, 211
 15 — 97, 105, 203, 210
 16 — 97, 105, 203, 210
 17 — 97, 100, 203
 24 — 50, 64, 120, 121
 32 — 64, 120, 121, 212
 37 — 158
 45 — 120, 158
 50 — 158
 56 — 123
 59 — 163
 60 — 100, 203, 204, 210
 66 — 47, 210
 72 — 211
 74 — 47, 97, 210
 79 — 98, 210
 83 — 158
 91 — 161
 92 — 210
 100 — 65, 211
 122 — 100, 103, 104, 210
 127 — 205
 138 — 100, 104, 206, 211
 152 — 98, 104, 210
 154 — 98, 104, 211

Ephemeris Archaeologicae

1913. 9 — 123

Ephemeris epigraphica

5. 993 — 123
 5. 1005 — 123
 7. 890 — 165
 8. 33 — 29, 97
 8. 430 — 63, 102
 8. 431 — 64
 8. 444 — 101
 8. 709 — 28
 8. 710 — 28
 8. 711 — 28, 64
 8. 712 — 28
 8. 800 — 28, 47

8. 801 — 28

9. 1094 — 165

Ferrero: *L'ordinamento delle armate
romane*

1878. 512 — 164

1899. 820 — 28

Der Gnomon des Idios Logos

55 — 99

Grenfell and Hunt: *Greek Papyri*

2. 108 — 121

Inscriptiones Graecae

III 1447 — 122

XII 5. 941 — 200

*Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas
Pertinentes*

1. 623 — 159, 160, 213

1. 781 — 50, 120, 157

1. 874 — 157

1. 1046 — 48, 204

1. 1129 — 48, 120, 121

1. 1130 — 121

1. 1131 — 121

1. 1370 — 121

1. 1496 — 207

3. 481 — 207

3. 1006 — 48, 122

4. 150 — 157, 213

4. 151 — 25, 49

4. 219 — 157

4. 1057 — 206

4. 1110 — 123

4. 1129 — 123

4. 1149 — 102, 123

*Jahreshefte des österreichischen
archäologischen Institutes in Wien*

4 (1901), p. 159 — 123

5 (1902), Beibl. col. 31 — 161

29 (1934), Beibl. col. 325 — 47

Laographia

7 (1923), p. 58 — 123

Notizie degli Scavi di antichità

1890, p. 380 — 29

1896, p. 239 — 29

Papiri greci e latini

1026 — 100, 204

Papyri, Michigan

191 — 99, 121

4301 — 121, 123

4527 — 100

4528 — 100, 102

4703 — 104, 120, 121

Papyri, Oxyrhynchus

1115 — 208

1451 — 121, 212

1508 — 103, 105

Papyri, Tebtunis

316 — 121

Papyri, Yale

1528 — 105

Riese: *Das rheinische Germanien in
den antiken Inschriften*

1816 add. — 163

Preisigke: *Sammelbuch griechischer
Urkunden aus Ägypten*

5070 — 121

Syria

15 (1934), pp. 33-74 — 48, 103

Wilcken and Mitteis

463 — 204

General Index

Well-known persons are indexed under the most familiar part of their name; others will be found under their proper *nomen*.

- Actium, 7-8, 11, 53
- Actuarius*, 37
- Adiutor*, 57
- Adriatic Sea, 4, 5, 22-23, 172
- Aegean Sea, 2, 19, 25, 115-117, 126
- Africa, 19, 76, 118-119, 183, 189, 196
- Agricola, Cn. Iulius, 153-155
- Agrippa, M. Vipsanius, 7, 8, 13, 22, 31, 126, 138, 171
- Aleria, 18
- Alexandria, 77, 109-110, 112, 176
- Alexandrina, classis*, 37, 109-114, 169, 192, 196
- Ancona, 23, 187
- Anicetus, 32, 179, 180
- Antoninus Pius, 18, 42, 120, 136, 155, 188
- Antonius Primus, 132, 139, 182-184
- Antony, 5-8
- Apion, 66, 79-81, 84-85
- Apolinaris, 79-80
- Aquilcia, 23, 184
- Aquincum, 88, 140
- Arabia, 113, 175
- Architectus*, 51
- Arentsburg, 148
- Argentus River, 12-13
- Armaturae*, 59, 84
- Armorum custos*, 60, 84
- Army, permanent organization, 13, 30-32, 67-68, 70, 76, 169-170; co-operation with navy, 58, 112, 124-125, 130-131, 133-135, 136, 139, 142-144, 145-146, 154-155; independent supply ships, 134, 135, 137, 148; third-century changes, 193; *see also Auxilia*, Legions, Praetorian Guard, *Primi-pilate*, *Vigiles*
- Artorius, L., Castus, 38, 196
- Asia Minor, 2, 4, 77
- Athens, navy of, 39, 53-54, 58, 68
- Augustus, 176, 177, 178; rise to power, 5-8, 11, 40-41, 44, 68-69; establishment of navy, 11-14, 20, 21-22, 24, 55, 58, 66-70, 80, 109-110, 114-115, 168-171; love of sea, 177; economic policy, 173-176; wars, *see Navy*
- Aulienus, Sextus, 26 (n. 6), 32
- Aurelian, 151, 196
- Auxilia*, 68, 72, 74, 80-81, 89, 92, 94, 108, 130, 132, 135, 139
- Baiae, 16
- Barbarian naval opposition, 124, 126-128, 138, 142, 145-146, 151, 194-196
- Batavians, 144-146, 149
- Bay of Naples, 14, 16, 95
- Beneficiarius*, 37, 57, 154
- Bessi, 77
- Bireme, 54
- Black Sea, 125-127, 131-132, 135-137, 174
- Blemmyes, 113
- Bonna, 141, 146, 148, 151
- Bosporus, Thracian, 125-126
- Brigetio, 140
- Britannica, classis*, 145, 152-156, 197
- Brohl quarries, 148, 149, 151
- Brundisium, 14, 23, 178, 188, 191
- Bucinator*, 59
- Bureaucracy, imperial, 30, 32-34
- Byzantine navy, 40, 137, 198
- Byzantium, 128, 129, 131, 182, 190, 195
- Caementarius*, 62 (n. 4)
- Caesar, Julius, 4-5, 58, 142, 152
- Caesarea Mauretania, 117, 118, 119
- Caligula, *see Gaius*
- Cantabrian wars, 12
- Caracallus, 25, 31, 38, 66, 73, 92, 191-192
- Carales, 19
- Carausius, 154, 155-156, 179
- Carnuntum, 139

- Carthage, 119
 Castor, 87, 149
Castra, 12, 15, 20, 21, 23
Celeusta, 56
Centumcellae, 18, 23
 Centurions, in army, 41-43, 58; in navy, 42-43, 57, 59-61, 149
 Century, naval, 57-61
Cerialis, Q. Petilius, 145-146
 Chatti, 142, 146, 151
 Chauci, 144, 151
 Chersonesus, Tauric, 126, 132, 136
 Children, *see* Sailors
 Cilicia, 2, 77, 115
 Citizenship, grant to sailors, 40-41, 44-45, 66, 89-90, 108
 Civil wars, of 49-31 B.C., 2, 4-8, 68-69; of A.D. 68-69, *see* Navy
Civilis, 144-146
 Classis, 21
 Claudius I, 17, 24, 32-33, 66, 70, 71, 72, 89-90, 109, 117, 127, 131, 144, 152, 169, 178
 Claudius II Gothicus, 195
 Clerks, 25, 35, 57, 149
Cohortes classicae, 188
 Coinage, naval types, 156, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 204 (n. 79)
Collegia of sailors, 84, 94
 Colonia Agrippinensis, 144, 146, 147, 150
 Colonies of sailors, 94
 Colosseum, 20-21
 Columbaria, 16, 20, 23, 45, 84
 Commerce with India, 113, 174-175; in Mediterranean, 173-174, 176, 193, 197; on northern frontier, 150, 174-175
 Commodus, 18, 20, 42, 88, 92, 140, 155, 189
 Communication, *see* Navy
 Concubines, 82, 84, 86, 90-92
 Constantine, 7, 30, 197-198
 Constantius Chlorus, 156
 Constitutio Antoniniana, 66, 73, 92-93
Conubium, 90, 92-93
 Convoy, *see* Navy
Cornicen, 59
Cornicularius, 37
Coronarius, 57, 86
 Corsica, 17, 18-19, 77, 181-182
 Costoboci, 128, 189
 Crew, 17, 52, 53, 55-61, 74
 Cyrenaica, 113-114
 Cyzicus, 25, 128-129, 189
 Dacians, 130, 132, 133-135
 Dalmatia, 22, 44, 76, 129
 Danube River, 22, 124-125, 129-131, 133-135, 137, 138-140
 Decay of navy, *see* Navy
Dekeres, 8, 11, 51
 Detachments of fleets, *see* Vexillations
 Didius Iulianus, 151, 190
 Diocletian, 155, 196, 197
 Diplomas, 30, 35, 68, 69, 71, 88-94, 107, 108, 120 (n. 7)
 Discharge, *see* Sailors
 Discipline, 35
 Dockyards, 51
 Doctor, *see* *Medicus*
Dolabrarius, 149
 Domitian, 94, 133, 139, 146, 150, 151, 155
 Dover, 153
 Drave River, 138, 140
 Drusus the Elder, 141-142
Dupliciarius, 37, 56, 81
 Duumvir, 26, 41, 45
 Eastern seaboard cities, assistance in Republic, 1-5; assistance in Empire, 116-117, 196-197; recruitment, 40-41, 44, 74, 77, 85, 87-88, 95, 149, 152
 Egypt, 5, 25, 72, 109-110, 111, 183, 188, 190
 Egyptians as sailors, 77-80, 93, 95
 Elagabalus, 129, 192
 Elbe River, 124, 141, 142
 Emona, 140
 Emperors, appreciation of sea power, 167-168, 171, 180, 185-186, 191, 193, 197-198; direct control of army and navy, 30-32, 66-68, 70, 107; travel by sea, 17, 177-178
 Empire, dependence on navy, 12, 124, 167, 171, 179; economic policy, 173-176; *see also* Navy
 English Channel, 125, 152, 153
 Enlistment of sailors, *see* Sailors
 Ephesus, 4, 25, 115, 116
 Epigraphical customs, 29 (n. 56), 44, 46 (n. 3, 8), 57-58, 59, 63 (n. 29), 64 (n. 31), 66, 85, 96 (n. 12), 103 (n. 88)
Epikrisis, 110
Equites, 31-34, 37-38, 41, 67, 107
Ergodota, 62 (n. 4)
 Euphrates River, 25
Evocatus, 95
Exactus, 37, 45
Exceptor, 57

- Faber navalis*, 51, 56
 Fayum, 111
Fiscus, 30, 36
 Forum Iulii, 7, 11-13, 19, 94, 170
Fossa Augusta, 21-22
Fossae Drusianae, 141, 143
 Franks, 155, 156, 196
 Freedmen, as praefects, 32-33; in other naval posts, 41, 44, 66, 69-70, 108, 111
 Frontiers, dependence on rivers and seas, 124-125; Danubian, 129-141; Rhenish, 141-146, 149-150, 151-152; British, 152-156; Parthian, 125
 Fucine Lake, 24
 Functions of fleets, *see Misenensis, classis*; Navy; *Ravennas, classis*

 Gaius, 53, 109, 117, 131, 152, 180
 Galba, 180-181
 Gallienus, 193, 195-196
 Gaul, 12, 76, 145, 150, 181-182, 196
Germanica, classis, 141-152
 Germanicus, 19, 143-144
 Gesoriacum, 152-153, 156
 Ghergina, 135
Gladiatores, 149
 Gordian III, 20, 38, 192
 Goths, 194-196
 Grain shipment on Mediterranean, 3, 5, 6, 14, 17-18, 110-112, 175-176, 183
Gubernator, 42, 54, 56, 58, 60, 61, 149

 Hadrian, 71, 91, 128, 136, 155, 177, 178, 188
 Harbors, 7, 12, 14-16, 21-22, 35, 110, 115, 118
 Hellenistic navies, 39, 40, 42, 52, 61 (n. 3), 198 (n. 1)
 Hellespont, 129, 189-190, 191, 195, 198
Hexeres, 43, 53, 55

 Illyricum, 22, 124, 129, 170
Immunis, 37, 61
 Imperial cult, 20, 36, 86
Insula Batavorum, 143, 144, 145
 Istrus, 135
 Italians in fleets, 73, 76
 Iulius, C., Alexander, 38, 192
 Iulius, L., Vehilius Gratus Iulianus, 34, 129, 189

 Jewish rebellions, *see Navy*
 Jupiter, Dolichenus, 88; Striganus, 87

 Katwijk, 148
 Köln, *see Colonia Agrippinensis*

Laoi, 77
 Latin status, 66, 71-73
 Legions, I Adiutrix, 16, 180-182, 185; II Adiutrix, 16, 88, 185; X Fretensis, 81, 188
Librarius, 36, 37, 57
 Liburnian, 7-8, 19, 34, 54, 59, 108
Libyca, classis nova, 114, 120, 189
 Lucinius, 157-198
 Lorium, 18, 24
 Lucilius, Sextus, Bassus, 31, 182, 184
 Lucius Verus, 20, 42, 188
 Luna, 23
 Lycian League, 116
 Lymne, 153

 Malchio, 44, 69
Manipularis, 59
 Marcus Agrippa, 31, 192
 Marcus, Q., Turbo, 112
 Marcus Aurelius, 42, 81, 92, 140, 178, 189
 Mariana, 19
 Marines, 58-59, 108, 137
 Marriage of sailors, 90-93
Matronae, 87, 149
 Mauretania, 76, 117, 118-120
 Mauretanian fleet, 117-120
 Maxentius, 197
 Maximian, 152, 155-156
 Maximinus, 151
Medicus, 56
 Mediterranean Sea, 11, 51, 167-168, 170
Misenensis, classis, stations, 14-21; functions, 24-25, 167-170; titles, 26 (n. 9), 186, 192, 193, 198; strength, 16-17, 54-55, 76; foundation, 13-14, 30, 168-171; in Julio-Claudian period, 52, 172, 180; in civil wars of 68-69, 180-185; in second century, 187-189; in third century, 38, 190-193, 196; in fourth century, 197-198
 Misenum, 14-16, 36-37, 45, 52, 59, 84, 86
 Mithras, 88
 Mithridatic wars, 1-4
 Moesia, 129-130, 133
Moesica, classis, 129-137
 Moguntiacum, 142, 144, 148
 Mommsen, Theodor, 39, 42-43, 44, 66-68, 71-72
 Moors, 120, 188, 189, 196

- Moschus, 34, 181, 182
 Mucianus, 128, 132, 182, 184
 Musicians, naval, 27 (n. 13), 56, 59
 Mylae, 7

 Naples, 14, 95
 Naulochus, 7, 11, 40
Naumachia, 23-24
Nauphylax, 56, 84
 Naval technique, Greek influence, 1-2, 39, 42, 52, 53, 55-56, 58; Etruscan influence, 1, 53; Roman character, 8, 51-52; on northern frontier, 124, 138, 142, 146, 153
Navalia, 15, 21
 Navarch, 38-43, 67, 87-88, 108, 149; *princeps*, 42-43, 154
 Navigation in winter, 52, 82
 Navy
 Permanent organization, 1, 4, 6, 11-12, 58, 80, 167-171
 Imperial character, 31-32, 66-70
 Rank, 67-68, 73-74, 171
 Strength, 11, 16-17, 53, 55, 118, 127-128, 141, 143, 144, 167
 Organization, *see* Crew, Harbors, *Praefectus classis*, Vexillations
 Pre-eminence of Italian fleets, 13, 24-26, 106, 169-170
 Military character, 57-59, 108, 124, 134, 137, 149-150, 168
 Co-operation of fleets, 23-26, 30-31, 114, 115-116, 117, 128, 129, 133, 136, 140, 169-170, 182, 189, 190, 192
 Peacetime functions, transport, 17, 19, 23, 116, 134-135, 140, 143-144, 152-153, 155, 177-178; convoy, 112, 176-177; communication, 18, 112, 135, 140, 142, 177; supply, 125, 134, 140, 142-143, 146; revenue duties, 112-113, 116, 137, 148; maintenance of peace, 7, 17-19, 22, 111-113, 115, 119-120, 125-126, 127, 136-137, 148, 150, 172-173; miscellaneous, 20-21, 23-24, 178-179; *see also* Piracy
 Suppression of revolts, 44, 129, 146-147, 179-180, 186
 Service in wars, of Augustus, 6-8, 12, 22, 124, 129-131, 138-139, 141-143, 168-169, 172, 175; of 68-69, 16-17, 22, 44, 128, 132, 139, 144-146, 180-185; of Trajan, 112-113, 133-135, 140, 187-188; of Marcus Aurelius, 20, 114, 120, 128-129, 140, 151, 155, 188-189; of Septimius Severus, 129, 155, 190-191; of Caracallus, 116, 191-192; of Gallienus, 194-196; of Constantine, 197-198; against Jews, 112-113, 114, 188; on German frontier, 141-146, 151-152; on Danubian frontier, 22, 129-135, 138-140; on Parthian frontier, 19-20, 125, 187-189, 191-192; on Mauretanian frontier, 117, 119-120, 189, 196; on British frontier, 44, 152-156
 Disintegration, 109, 120, 129, 137, 141, 151-152, 156, 191, 193, 196-198
 Neptune, 87, 149
 Nero, 16, 27 (n. 13), 127-128, 131, 174, 177, 179, 180
 Nerva, 186
 Nile River, 112
Nonagenarius, 63 (n. 24)
 North Sea, 143
 Novaesium, 144, 145, 148
 Noviodunum, 135
 Noviomagus, 148, 150

 Ocean, 142, 152, 153-154
 Octavian, *see* Augustus
Optio, 59, 60, 61, 149
 Ostia, 3, 14, 17, 23, 53, 176
 Otho, 16, 181-182

 Paestum, 94, 185
 Pannonia, 76, 94, 129, 139-140
Pannonica, classis, 138-141, 185
 Panormus, 19
 Parthian wars, *see* Navy
Pausarius, 56
 Pay, *see* *Duplicarius*, Sailors
Peregrini, 66, 69, 71-74
Perinthia, classis, 44, 127
 Pertinax, 190, 212
 Philip, 193
 Phoenicia, 2, 77, 196
 Piracy, in Republic, 2-4, 6; eradication, 17, 114-115, 119-120, 138, 171-173; revival in third century, 192-194, 196
 Piraeus, 19, 23, 115, 178
Pleroma, 149
 Pliny the Elder, 34
 Po River, 21-22, 95, 182
 Poetovio, 139, 140
 Pompey the Great, 3-5
Pontica, classis, 125-129, 169, 184, 189
 Pontus, 126-128

- Portus Augustus, 17
 Portus Iulius, 7, 14
Potamophylacia, 109, 112-113
Praeco, 37
Praefectus classis, creation of post, 2, 4, 30-32; *praetorium*, 12, 13, 15, 35; in Italian fleets, 22, 30-37, 209-211, 214; in provincial fleets, 34, 107, 110-111, 129, 149, 154, 211-214
Praefectus orae maritimae, 123 (n. 43), 158 (n. 17)
Praepositus, classibus, 118; *reliquationis*, 38, 192; *vexillationi*, 38, 193
 Praetorian guard, 32, 68, 92-94, 181, 187, 190
 Praetorian praefect, 30, 32, 33
 Primpilate, 32, 38, 42-43
Principalis, 37, 59, 61
 Probus, 151, 196
Procurator Augusti, 32, 33, 129, 154
 Promotion of sailors, *see* Sailors
 Propontis, 127, 129, 189, 195, 198
Proreta, 56, 84, 149
 Provincial fleets, 169-170; in Mediterranean, 106-120; on northern frontier, 124-156; military character, 108, 119
 Ptolomaic navy, 77, 109
 Puteoli, 14, 15, 16, 18, 173, 176

 Quadrirème, 39, 52, 60, 108
 Quinquerème, 39, 52, 53, 59, 60, 108

 Ravenna, 6, 13-14, 21-23, 36-37, 52, 84, 88
Ravennas, classis, stations, 21-24; functions, 24-25, 167-170; titles, 26 (n. 9), 186, 192, 198; strength, 16-17; foundation, 21-22, 167-171; in Julio-Claudian period, 172, 173; in civil wars of 68-69, 22, 182-184; in second century, 187, 189-190; in third century, 191-193; in fourth century, 197-198
 Recruitment, *see* Sailors
 Red Sea, 113, 174-175
 Religion of sailors, *see* Sailors
 Republican fleets, 1-10, 31, 40, 52, 59, 68-69, 167
 Revenue duties of navy, *see* Navy
 Revolts, *see* Navy
 Rhine River, 124, 141-142, 143-146, 148, 150, 175
 Rhodes, 2, 3, 5, 116-117
 Rhone River, 149-150
 Richborough, 153
 Roman attitude toward sea, 32, 68, 167, 171
 Romanization, of empire, 72-73, 76, 90, 95-96; of sailors, *see* Sailors
 Rome, 6, 20-21, 23-24, 30, 80, 170, 176, 184, 198
 Rumpst, 148

 Sailors, origin, 40, 44, 56, 60, 74-77, 108, 149, 154; enlistment, 30, 35, 73, 78-80; training, 35, 59-60, 81-82; term of service, 80-81, 88, 94; military character, 57-60, 69, 74; status, 66-74; promotion, 41-43, 45, 60-61, 81; detached service, 17-21, 23-24, 35, 59, 82, 118, 145, 151; pay and wealth, 45, 81-83, 111; marriage and families, 16, 23, 83, 85-86, 89-93, 95; Romanization, 74, 80, 84-88, 89, 95-96, 108, 111; nomenclature, 41, 80, 85, 104 (n. 103), 111; religion, 35-36, 54, 57, 86-88, 149; discharge, 45, 81, 88-95; later life, 94-96, 149; wills, 39, 83-85; *see also* Epigraphical customs
 Salona, 23
 Sardinia, 5, 6, 17, 18-19, 77, 172
 Save River, 138-141
Scenicus, 62 (n. 14)
Scriba, *see* Clerks
 Sea power, appreciation by Republic, 1-4; by Augustus, 5-7, 168-169, 171; by Vespasian, 33, 171, 182-186; *see also* Navy
 Seleuceia, 20, 115, 177, 189
 Seleucus, 40-41, 89
 Septimius Severus, 20, 81, 92, 190-191
 Serapis, 79, 87-88, 113, 191
Sesquipliciarius, 81
 Severus Alexander, 151, 192
 Sextus Pompey, 5-8, 68-69, 176
 Ships, 8, 17, 35, 51-55, 56, 177
 Sicily, 5, 6, 19, 76
Signifer, 37, 59, 86
 Sirmium, 138, 139, 140
 Siscia, 138, 139
 Slaves, use in army and navy, 6, 44, 66, 68-70; purchase by sailors, 82-83; use as paymasters, 36
 Spain, 12, 19, 23, 76, 119-120, 189
 Staff, of praefect, 37-38, 57; of trierarch, 57
 Strength of navy, *see* Navy

- Suboptio*, 60, 61
Subpraefectus classis, in Italian fleets, 36-38, 211-212, 214; in provincial fleets, 70, 111, 212
Subuncior, 63 (n. 24)
 Sulgus, C., Caecilianus, 43, 47 (n. 23), 192
 Sulla, 1-3
 Supply, naval, 17, 19-20, 22, 35
Symphoniacus, 56
 Syria, 2, 5, 40, 114-115, 182, 187, 192
Syriaca classis, 20, 114-116, 169, 186, 196
 Syrians as sailors, 40, 44, 77, 118, 149, 165 (n. 103)
 Tactics, naval, 8, 51-52
 Tarracina, 18, 185
 Taurunum, 140
Tesserarius, 59
 Thessalonica, 25, 207 (n. 98)
 Thrace, 126-127, 130-131
 Tiberius, 15, 22, 126, 131, 138, 142-143, 144, 172, 179, 180
 Titles, honorific, of praefects, 33, 38; of fleets, 110, 132, 137, 139, 146-147, 186, 192, 198
 Titus, 178
 Tomis, 126, 130, 136
 Trajan, 18, 81, 112-113, 133-135, 151, 186, 187-188
 Trajan's Column, 54-55, 59, 133-135
 Transportation, *see* Navy
 Trapezus, 126-128, 136, 194
 Trebius, L., 28 (n. 37), 69, 74
 Trierarch, 17, 38-40, 43-45, 57, 59, 61, 70, 86, 108, 149, 154
 Trireme, 17, 39, 53-54, 108
 Troesmis, 131, 135
Tubicen, 59
Tutela, 54, 59, 86
 Tyras, 131, 136
 Tyrrhenian Sea, 4, 5, 11, 14, 18, 170
 Uniform of sailors, 58, 80
 Vannius, 139
 Vegetius, 8, 24-25, 40, 64 (n. 39), 156, 198
Velarius, 56, 149
Verna, 69-70
 Vespasian, plan of campaign in 69, 182-184; rewards to navy, 33, 71, 73, 81, 94, 110, 132, 137, 139, 146, 185-186
 Vesuvius, eruption of, 15, 34
 Vetera, 142, 144, 148, 151
 Vexillations, 17-21, 27 (n. 21), 35, 39, 43, 52
Victimarius, 57, 86
Vigiles, 20, 21, 32, 58, 69, 73
 Vitellius, 16, 31, 178, 181-185
 Wars in Empire, *see* Navy
 Wills, *see* Sailors
 Wives, *see* Sailors

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